Daily Papers

Training data attribution (TDA) aims to identify training examples that shape model behavior, but its intervention value depends on both which examples are selected and how they are modified. Influence functions (IF) estimate behavioral changes under infinitesimal reweighting, yet IF-selected examples often show limited advantages over random selection under conventional weight-based interventions. This raises the question of whether influential examples lack intervention value or whether reweighting fails to realize their behavioral leverage.We introduce influence-guided response rewriting, which uses IF to identify intervention targets and replaces their responses with behavior-aligned or behavior-opposed supervision while keeping instructions fixed. Across four open-weight LLMs, we compare rewriting and reweighting on the same influence-selected examples using epistemic abstention as our primary testbed. Response rewriting produces stronger, more persistent, and bidirectional behavioral shifts, while reweighting the same examples yields weak and inconsistent effects. Further analyses show that influence-selected examples provide greater rewriting leverage than alternative selectors, with changes remaining concentrated on target-relevant behaviors. The same qualitative contrast extends to safety refusal. These results distinguish the local reweighting effects captured by influence estimates from the broader intervention leverage of the examples they identify, motivating intervention-aware evaluation of TDA methods.

LLMs utilizing chain-of-thought reasoning often waste substantial compute by producing long, incorrect responses. Abstention can mitigate this by withholding outputs unlikely to be correct. While most abstention methods decide to withhold outputs before or after generation, dynamic mid-generation abstention considers early termination of unpromising reasoning traces at each token position. Prior work has explored empirical variants of this idea, but principled guidance for the abstention rule remains lacking. We present a formal analysis of dynamic abstention for LLMs, modeling abstention as an explicit action within a regularized reinforcement learning framework. An abstention reward parameter controls the trade-off between compute and information. We show that abstaining when the value function falls below this reward strictly outperforms natural baselines under general conditions. We further derive a principled and efficient method to approximate the value function. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning and toxicity avoidance tasks support our theory and demonstrate improved selective accuracy over existing methods.

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

LLM agents are expected to act over multiple turns, using search, browsing interfaces, and terminal tools to complete user goals. Yet not every goal is well specified or achievable in the available environment. In such cases, a reliable agent should recognize that further interaction is unlikely to help and abstain from additional tool calls. We define Agentic Abstention, the problem of deciding when an agent should stop acting under uncertainty. Unlike standard LLM abstention, which is usually evaluated as a single-turn answer-or-abstain decision, agentic abstention is a sequential decision problem: an agent can answer, abstain, or gather more information at each turn, and the need to abstain may only become clear after interacting with the environment. We study this problem across web shopping, terminal environments, and question answering, evaluating 13 LLM-as-agent systems and 2 agent scaffolds on more than 28,000 tasks. Our results show that the main challenge is not only whether agents can abstain, but also when they abstain. Some agents never abstain when they should, while others do so only after many unnecessary interactions. This gap is especially large on tasks where the instruction appears feasible until the environment reveals otherwise (e.g., no valid result matches the instruction). We further find that model scale, reasoning, and agent scaffolding affect abstention in different ways, where larger or more capable models sometimes perform worse at timely abstention. Finally, we introduce CONVOLVE, a context engineering method for improving agentic abstention that distills full interaction trajectories into reusable stopping rules. On WebShop, CONVOLVE substantially improves timely abstention without updating model parameters, raising Llama-3.3-70B's timely recall rate from 26.7 to 57.4. Our dataset and code are available at https://lhannnn.github.io/agentic-abstention

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

Current evaluations of multimodal unlearning typically focus on whether a model stops outputting target information. This surface-level criterion, however, masks two critical failure modes. First, knowledge suppression techniques often induce confabulation, leading the model to hallucinate facts about the unlearned subject. Second, refusal training merely alters observable behavior without erasing the underlying knowledge; such models might decline open queries but still identify correct answers under multiple-choice probing. To overcome these limitations, we propose Forget-Aware Self-Distillation (FASD). This method is designed to achieve honest ignorance, a state where the model genuinely loses the target knowledge and learns to acknowledge its absence. FASD separates these goals into two complementary channels. The behavior channel distills appropriate refusals from an ignorance-prompted copy of the model itself. Crucially, target tokens are masked from the teacher distribution to avoid accidentally reteaching the forgotten concepts. Simultaneously, the knowledge channel directly suppresses ground-truth answer spans independently of the model's generated responses. Experiments demonstrate that FASD successfully unlearns target knowledge, prevents information leakage in open-ended tasks, and preserves performance on retained data. The resulting model not only forgets the specified information but accurately recognizes the boundaries of its own knowledge. Code and data will be released upon publication.

For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed in both everyday and high-stakes domains, knowing when not to answer is equally critical as answering correctly. Real-world user queries, which can be underspecified, ill-posed, or fundamentally unanswerable, require LLMs to reason about uncertainty and selectively abstain -- i.e., refuse to answer definitively. However, abstention remains understudied, without a systematic evaluation framework for modern LLMs. In this work, we introduce AbstentionBench, a large-scale benchmark for holistically evaluating abstention across 20 diverse datasets, including questions with unknown answers, underspecification, false premises, subjective interpretations, and outdated information. Evaluating 20 frontier LLMs reveals abstention is an unsolved problem, and one where scaling models is of little use. While recent reasoning LLMs have shown impressive results in complex problem solving, surprisingly, we find that reasoning fine-tuning degrades abstention (by 24% on average), even for math and science domains on which reasoning models are explicitly trained. We find that while a carefully crafted system prompt can boost abstention in practice, it does not resolve models' fundamental inability to reason about uncertainty. We release AbstentionBench to foster research into advancing LLM reliability.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Enabling large language models (LLMs) to appropriately abstain from answering questions beyond their knowledge is crucial for mitigating hallucinations. While existing reinforcement learning methods foster autonomous abstention, they often compromise answer accuracy because their static reward mechanisms, agnostic to models' knowledge boundaries, drive models toward excessive caution. In this work, we propose KARL, a novel framework that continuously aligns an LLM's abstention behavior with its evolving knowledge boundary. KARL introduces two core innovations: a Knowledge-Boundary-Aware Reward that performs online knowledge boundary estimation using within-group response statistics, dynamically rewarding correct answers or guided abstention; and a Two-Stage RL Training Strategy that first explores the knowledge boundary and bypasses the "abstention trap", and subsequently converts incorrect answers beyond the knowledge boundary into abstentions without sacrificing accuracy. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that KARL achieves a superior accuracy-hallucination trade-off, effectively suppressing hallucinations while maintaining high accuracy across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios.

LLMs cannot reliably recognize their parametric knowledge boundaries and often hallucinate answers to outside-of-boundary questions. In contrast, humans recognize their limitations and can either seek external help for such questions or abstain. In this paper, we introduce MASH (Modeling Abstention via Selective Help-seeking), a training framework that readily extracts abstentions from LLMs. Our key idea is that any external help-seeking by an LLM, i.e. search tool use, can serve as a proxy for abstention if the external help (search) is appropriately penalized while simultaneously rewarding answer accuracy. MASH operationalizes this idea using reinforcement learning with a pay-per-search reward. We run experiments on three knowledge-intensive QA datasets. Our results show that MASH substantially improves upon the selective help-seeking performance of prior efficient search approaches; on multi-hop datasets, MASH improves answer accuracy by 7.6%. Furthermore, MASH demonstrates strong off-the-shelf abstention -- it can distinguish between unanswerable/answerable questions and selectively generate responses for answerable questions -- showcasing behavior analogous to specialized abstention approaches. We emphasize that contrary to prior abstention methods, MASH does not require pre-determining knowledge boundaries to construct training data. Instead, MASH's abstentions are a by-product of training for the auxiliary selective help-seeking task. Overall, we show that MASH training effectively aligns search tool use with parametric knowledge, which can be successfully leveraged for making abstention decisions.

LLM-based agent architectures systematically conflate information transport mechanisms with epistemic justification mechanisms. We formalize this class of architectural failures as semantic laundering: a pattern where propositions with absent or weak warrant are accepted by the system as admissible by crossing architecturally trusted interfaces. We show that semantic laundering constitutes an architectural realization of the Gettier problem: propositions acquire high epistemic status without a connection between their justification and what makes them true. Unlike classical Gettier cases, this effect is not accidental; it is architecturally determined and systematically reproducible. The central result is the Theorem of Inevitable Self-Licensing: under standard architectural assumptions, circular epistemic justification cannot be eliminated. We introduce the Warrant Erosion Principle as the fundamental explanation for this effect and show that scaling, model improvement, and LLM-as-judge schemes are structurally incapable of eliminating a problem that exists at the type level.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

This paper investigates large language model (LLM) abstention learning, specifically using ternary reward, which incentivize truthfulness in large language models. This paper extends that idea by moving from a ternary reward to a Trajectory-Informed advantage reweighting, dynamically re-weights the abstention reward during Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) training. The objective of this work focuses on abstention learning instead of improving truthfulness, serving as an exploration into hallucination reduction. The novelty of this paper lies in methodological innovation, advantage re-weighting, and benchmark selection. Leveraging GRPO's multiple trajectories as a natural abstention signal, this method uses a reward signal to explore knowledge boundaries and encourage consistency. By demonstrating that trajectories can be used as a confidence indicator of the policy relative to the query, they are then used to dynamically calculate the abstention advantage. AbstentionBench is used as the evaluation benchmark, as this work aims to contribute to the field of abstention learning. All datasets on the benchmark were tested against this method and various baselines. Empirical results demonstrate that TIAR achieves state-of-the-art abstention F1 scores across five of six evaluation categories, outperforming the static ternary baseline on 17 of 31 benchmark datasets while fully preserving baseline accuracy.

Reinforcement fine-tuning improves the reasoning ability of large language models, but it can also encourage them to answer unanswerable queries by guessing or hallucinating missing information. Existing abstention methods either train models to produce generic refusals or encourage follow-up clarifications without verifying whether those clarifications identify the key missing information. We study queries that are clear in meaning but cannot be reliably resolved from the given information, and argue that a reliable model should not only abstain, but also explain what is missing. We propose a clarification-aware RLVR reward that, while rewarding correct answers on answerable queries, jointly optimizes explicit abstention and semantically aligned post-refusal clarification on unanswerable queries. Using this reward, we train Abstain-R1, a 3B model that improves abstention and clarification on unanswerable queries while preserving strong performance on answerable ones. Experiments on Abstain-Test, Abstain-QA, and SelfAware show that Abstain-R1 substantially improves over its base model and achieves unanswerable-query behavior competitive with larger systems including DeepSeek-R1, suggesting that calibrated abstention and clarification can be learned through verifiable rewards rather than emerging from scale alone.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

As large language models evolve into tool-augmented agents, a central question remains unresolved: when is external tool use actually justified? Existing agent frameworks typically treat tools as ordinary actions and optimize for task success or reward, offering little principled distinction between epistemically necessary interaction and unnecessary delegation. This position paper argues that agents should invoke external tools only when epistemically necessary. Here, epistemic necessity means that a task cannot be completed reliably via the agent's internal reasoning over its current context, without any external interaction. We introduce the Theory of Agent (ToA), a framework that treats agents as making sequential decisions about whether remaining uncertainty should be resolved internally or delegated externally. From this perspective, common agent failure modes (e.g., overthinking and overacting) arise from miscalibrated decisions under uncertainty rather than deficiencies in reasoning or tool execution alone. We further discuss implications for training, evaluation, and agent design, highlighting that unnecessary delegation not only causes inefficiency but can impede the development of internal reasoning capability. Our position provides a normative criterion for tool use that complements existing decision-theoretic models and is essential for building agents that are not only correct, but increasingly intelligent.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Abstention Ability (AA) is a critical aspect of Large Language Model (LLM) reliability, referring to an LLM's capability to withhold responses when uncertain or lacking a definitive answer, without compromising performance. Although previous studies have attempted to improve AA, they lack a standardised evaluation method and remain unsuitable for black-box models where token prediction probabilities are inaccessible. This makes comparative analysis challenging, especially for state-of-the-art closed-source commercial LLMs. This paper bridges this gap by introducing a black-box evaluation approach and a new dataset, Abstain-QA, crafted to rigorously assess AA across varied question types (answerable and unanswerable), domains (well-represented and under-represented), and task types (fact centric and reasoning). We also propose a new confusion matrix, the ''Answerable-Unanswerable Confusion Matrix'' (AUCM) which serves as the basis for evaluating AA, by offering a structured and precise approach for assessment. Finally, we explore the impact of three prompting strategies-Strict Prompting, Verbal Confidence Thresholding, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-on improving AA. Our results indicate that even powerful models like GPT-4, Mixtral 8x22b encounter difficulties with abstention; however, strategic approaches such as Strict prompting and CoT can enhance this capability.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

There are two major types of uncertainty one can model. Aleatoric uncertainty captures noise inherent in the observations. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty accounts for uncertainty in the model -- uncertainty which can be explained away given enough data. Traditionally it has been difficult to model epistemic uncertainty in computer vision, but with new Bayesian deep learning tools this is now possible. We study the benefits of modeling epistemic vs. aleatoric uncertainty in Bayesian deep learning models for vision tasks. For this we present a Bayesian deep learning framework combining input-dependent aleatoric uncertainty together with epistemic uncertainty. We study models under the framework with per-pixel semantic segmentation and depth regression tasks. Further, our explicit uncertainty formulation leads to new loss functions for these tasks, which can be interpreted as learned attenuation. This makes the loss more robust to noisy data, also giving new state-of-the-art results on segmentation and depth regression benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as data-science agents, combining abstract reasoning with advanced tool use. Yet the relevant benchmark landscape largely divides into symbolic causal reasoning benchmarks without realistic data analysis or data analysis benchmarks without causal data-generating structure or a range of causal data science tasks. Existing causal evaluation datasets are often restricted to curated examples from existing sources, with diversity coming from limited templatized variations rather than from systematic generation of novel synthetic causal structures. We introduce CausalDS, a benchmark for evaluating causal reasoning in agentic data-science workflows. Each benchmark instance is a scene consisting of a sampled structural causal model (SCM) with generated observational data and an accompanying synthetic natural-language story grounded in a real domain. We ground the composition of the benchmark components in empirical distributions obtained from real-world datasets, thus retaining empirical structure while reducing the memorization risk through completely synthetic generation. From each scene, we then derive tasks spanning all three of Pearl's rungs. Most tasks include a data science coding component, where the model typically needs to use several tools to arrive at the final answer due to imperfect observations. Abstention is tested directly: for targets the graph does not identify, the graded answer is to abstain. The benchmark thus jointly evaluates symbolic causal reasoning, data science, uncertainty quantification, abstention, and tool use/coding. Because the generator is fully synthetic, the exam is not a fixed dataset: composition, difficulty, and size are parameters, and fresh exams can be drawn at will.

On-policy distillation trains a language model on its own generations while a teacher scores them token by token. It combines the dense supervision of imitation learning with the on-policy sampling of reinforcement learning. But it requires a second, larger model to act as teacher. On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) removes that cost. The teacher is the model itself, conditioned on privileged information the student will not have at test time, such as a reference solution, a plan, or environment feedback. The teacher is no stronger than the student, only better informed. Early results were promising, with accuracy comparable to reinforcement learning at a fraction of the generated tokens. But the same asymmetry that produces the signal also biases it. One failure mode now dominates the field: collapse, the progressive narrowing of the set of reasoning paths the model can produce. Collapse is not specific to OPSD, though privileged information aggravates it. This review treats collapse as a symptom governed by three levers: (i) where the signal is applied, that is, how tokens are weighted; (ii) what the teacher is shown, that is, the nature of the privileged information; and (iii) when the signal changes, that is, the teacher's dynamics and the decay of guidance. We restrict our scope to mathematical reasoning, where the method originated and where its failure modes are best documented. We report no new experiments. The contribution is structural: a shared vocabulary for phenomena named differently across papers, and a clear line between what is settled and what is still disputed.

Embodied Question Answering (EQA) requires an agent to interpret language, perceive its environment, and navigate within 3D scenes to produce responses. Existing EQA benchmarks assume that every question must be answered, but embodied agents should know when they do not have sufficient information to answer. In this work, we focus on a minimal requirement for EQA agents, abstention: knowing when to withhold an answer. From an initial study of 500 human queries, we find that 32.4% contain missing or underspecified context. Drawing on this initial study and cognitive theories of human communication errors, we derive five representative categories requiring abstention: actionability limitation, referential underspecification, preference dependence, information unavailability, and false presupposition. We augment OpenEQA by having annotators transform well-posed questions into ambiguous variants outlined by these categories. The resulting dataset, AbstainEQA, comprises 1,636 annotated abstention cases paired with 1,636 original OpenEQA instances for balanced evaluation. Evaluating on AbstainEQA, we find that even the best frontier model only attains 42.79% abstention recall, while humans achieve 91.17%. We also find that scaling, prompting, and reasoning only yield marginal gains, and that fine-tuned models overfit to textual cues. Together, these results position abstention as a fundamental prerequisite for reliable interaction in embodied settings and as a necessary basis for effective clarification.

Large language models (LLMs) deployed for logical reasoning in knowledge-intensive domains exhibit a subtle but critical failure: coherence can be vacuously achieved through systematic abstention. A model that withholds commitment to either entailment or refutation satisfies negation consistency while providing no utility. We introduce Coherence Under Commitment (CUC), a dual-query evaluation paradigm that jointly measures consistency and decisiveness. CUC contributes three innovations: (1) a commitment score c(φ) = p(φ) + p(lnotφ) quantifying probability mass allocated to decisive outcomes; (2) a deterministic elicitation protocol via normalized YES/NO log probabilities, eliminating sampling variance; and (3) a 3-way decision framework (True/False/Uncertain) operationalizing the coherence-commitment trade-off into metrics. Experiments on four open-weight LLMs (1B-3B) across 204 FOLIO examples expose a sharp frontier. Qwen2.5-3B achieves near-zero contradiction (E[v_{neg}]{=}0.025) but only 7.4% coverage, while TinyLlama-1.1B reaches 79.4% coverage with violations on every example. Coherence-only evaluation would rank the abstaining model first; CUC exposes this as vacuous, and the frontier generalizes to LogiQA~v2 (ρ{=}0.97). We argue that evaluation must report both coherence and non-vacuous commitment and release a toolkit for standardized assessment.

To deploy language models safely, it is crucial that they abstain from responding to inappropriate requests. Several prior studies test the safety promises of models based on their effectiveness in blocking malicious requests. In this work, we focus on evaluating the underlying techniques that cause models to abstain. We create SELECT, a benchmark derived from a set of benign concepts (e.g., "rivers") from a knowledge graph. Focusing on benign concepts isolates the effect of safety training, and grounding these concepts in a knowledge graph allows us to study the generalization and specificity of abstention techniques. Using SELECT, we benchmark different abstention techniques over six open-weight and closed-source models. We find that the examined techniques indeed cause models to abstain with over 80% abstention rates. However, these techniques are not as effective for descendants of the target concepts, where abstention rates drop by 19%. We also characterize the generalization-specificity trade-offs for different techniques. Overall, no single technique is invariably better than others, and our findings inform practitioners of the various trade-offs involved.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

When audio, video, and text disagree, accuracy alone does not show whether to acquire another source or abstain. We study these choices in a controlled three-score benchmark: a policy observes two signed scores, may request the third at a cost, and can abstain. The primary reward is mechanism-specific: abstention is correct only for one designated ambiguity mechanism and is penalized under mixed corruption. Matched controls show that a threshold policy matches always-request decisions with fewer requests; its advantage over always-answer fusion depends on the reward assigned to that ambiguity. On a partially held-out synthetic split, the threshold policy reaches 0.789 +/- 0.006 targeted decision accuracy and 0.481 +/- 0.014 utility across 83 seeds. A three-score majority reference reaches 0.626 +/- 0.008 and 0.252 +/- 0.016, but uses more information. In a matched-budget test, a train-only value selector improves utility over no-query and matched-random policies at 10% and 25% budgets, while pair uncertainty has higher utility at every budget. At 50% and 63.7% budgets, the selector lowers utility despite slightly higher non-ambiguous accuracy. If all abstentions are scored incorrect, majority outranks the threshold policy in utility. At a central temporal setting, full-trace controls match the neural models while position perturbations separate them. On held-out-actor emotion clips, eight-frame fusion has opposite-signed accuracy differences for two encoder pairs, with both actor intervals containing zero; matched-request routing gains are small and uncertain. These results separate full-modality accuracy from pre-request selection value and show that selection value depends on budget and the observed-pair ranking.

On-policy self-distillation, where a student is pulled toward a copy of itself conditioned on privileged context (e.g., a verified solution or feedback), offers a promising direction for advancing reasoning capability without a stronger external teacher. Yet in math reasoning the gains are inconsistent, even when the same approach succeeds elsewhere. A pointwise mutual information analysis traces the failure to the privileged context itself: it inflates the teacher's confidence on tokens already implied by the solution (structural connectives, verifiable claims) and deflates it on deliberation tokens ("Wait", "Let", "Maybe") that drive multi-step search. We propose Anti-Self-Distillation (AntiSD), which ascends a divergence between student and teacher rather than descending it: this reverses the per-token sign and yields a naturally bounded advantage in one step. An entropy-triggered gate disables the term once the teacher entropy collapses, completing a drop-in replacement for default self-distillation. Across five models from 4B to 30B parameters on math reasoning benchmarks, AntiSD reaches the GRPO baseline's accuracy in 2 to 10x fewer training steps and improves final accuracy by up to 11.5 points. AntiSD opens a path to scalable self-improvement, where a language model bootstraps its own reasoning through its training signal.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

As LLMs increasingly mediate the political information citizens rely on, there is still no standardized way to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary informational properties such as clarity, noise, and consistency. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs on the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down under absent, vague, or contradictory information, while flattening the intensity of political language. These failures are likely driven by party priors, influenced by party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

As code generation is increasingly delegated to AI systems, the bottleneck is shifting from writing code to supervising the systems that write it --- a shift CS-education researchers have begun to name. This shift exposes a vocabulary gap: the field asks for "human oversight" without a working distinction between the two things language does in a delegation channel --- coordinate action (cybernetic: words succeed when the world comes to match them) and coordinate understanding (epistemic: they succeed when they answer to the world and a hearer can check that they do). The failure this names is not cybernetic language but epistemic-form language doing cybernetic work: explanation-shaped output calibrated for approval rather than truth. Oversight that checks only whether an output was approved is satisfiable by rubber-stamping; oversight that holds an agent accountable requires the reasoning behind its work be retrievable and checkable. We present three delegation episodes --- illustrations, not controlled evidence --- in which epistemic engagement proved practicable while remaining auditable, one public record where a recommendation was withdrawn on its own stated terms, and one failure case illustrating oversight that requires no reasons for its discretionary choices. We propose a criterion for agentic-system governance, alongside existing technical trust properties: every consequential choice should carry the condition under which it would have gone otherwise, in a form a third party can test. Without such a condition, a third party cannot distinguish a decision from a rubber stamp. We give the criterion an operational form --- a two-part reconstruction test scoring a delegation record by whether a second reader can predict what the agent does under a perturbation --- and a deliberation-recording convention, ORRCF, that makes the condition a required component of every recorded choice.

This paper reports experiments across six frontier model types from OpenAI, Anthropic, xAI, and Google DeepMind. Ten independent sessions per model type used the same three stage prompt sequence, progressing from architectural preference to a full ASCII backbone. Under the school audience framing, responses repeatedly converged on a shared architectural pattern built around persistent latent state, adaptive computation, memory, specialist routing, verification, stopping control, and delayed decoding. Most runs remained close to this common structure, while a small number developed markedly greater engineering specificity. The audience framing appears to be an important condition of this effect. In additional control runs that removed the school framing while retaining the architectural request, responses became substantially more heterogeneous and failed to reproduce the same stable motif convergence. One observation is particularly striking. GPT-5.6 Sol produced an unusually elaborate successor architecture whose organization closely overlaps with the architecture independently sketched by GPT-6 Astra. Because the prompts explicitly ask each model to imagine an architectural future, this resemblance raises a testable question: whether the overlap reflects exposure to related architectural concepts, a shared learned design prior, or independent convergence toward similar computational principles. The paper uses the term epistemic jailbreak for the accompanying loss of discipline in technical provenance as requested specificity increases. The experiments establish a repeatable behavioral pattern and do not authenticate proprietary implementation claims. What we leave to the community is a harder question: are these models independently imagining the same architectural future, or do such motifs somehow propagate between model families?

Reference-free faithfulness metrics verify each atomic claim a model makes against ground truth, and are increasingly used to evaluate grounded generation. We show they share a blind spot: they measure only precision -- are the stated claims supported? -- and therefore reward abstention, since a model can score near-perfect faithfulness by saying almost nothing. We make this measurable using Formula 1 telemetry, a domain where strategic ground truth is derived deterministically and, crucially, completely: for each decision we know the full set of facts that mattered. This completeness -- absent in open-domain faithfulness benchmarks -- lets us measure recall (coverage of the relevant facts) exactly, alongside precision. On a multilingual (EN/ES/PT) benchmark of 7,253 decision instances spanning 150 races, the most precise frontier model covers under half of the relevant facts and ranks last by F1, so requiring coverage reorders the systems; the same effect reappears in a second complete-oracle domain (NOAA weather forecasts). A prompt ablation shows the low coverage is not an under-prompting artifact: explicitly asking models to be thorough does not close the gap. We pair faithfulness with coverage into a single score, validate the metric (controlled perturbation; agreement across a model-free regex extractor and a cross-family LLM extractor, system-level Spearman 1.0), and give a verifier-guided generation method that improves precision and recall without references. We release the benchmark, structured annotations, metric, baselines, and an interactive demo.

Selective knowledge erasure from LLMs is critical for GDPR compliance and model safety, yet current unlearning methods conflate behavioral suppression with true knowledge removal, allowing latent capabilities to persist beneath surface-level refusals. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing Knowledge Immunization Framework (KIF), a representation-aware architecture that distinguishes genuine erasure from obfuscation by targeting internal activation signatures rather than surface outputs. Our approach combines dynamic suppression of subject-specific representations with parameter-efficient adaptation, enabling durable unlearning without full model retraining. KIF achieves near-oracle erasure (FQ approx 0.99 vs. 1.00) while preserving utility at oracle levels (MU = 0.62), effectively breaking the stability-erasure tradeoff that has constrained all prior work. We evaluate both standard foundation models (Llama and Mistral) and reasoning-prior models (Qwen and DeepSeek) across 3B to 14B parameters. Our observation shows that standard models exhibit scale-independent true erasure (<3% utility drift), while reasoning-prior models reveal fundamental architectural divergence. Our comprehensive dual-metric evaluation protocol, combining surface-level leakage with latent trace persistence, operationalizes the obfuscation - erasure distinction and enables the first systematic diagnosis of mechanism-level forgetting behavior across model families and scales.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Mitigating sensitive and harmful outputs is fundamental to ensuring safe deployment of LLMs. Existing approaches typically follow two paradigms: Knowledge Deletion (KD), which erases undesirable information during training, and Distinguishable Refusal (DR), which steers models away from using sensitive knowledge during inference. Despite rapid progress, KD-based unlearning struggles with biased deletion due to suppressing specific token sequences as a substitute for complete knowledge removal, whereas DR-based unlearning risks the re-emergence of harmful knowledge because the underlying knowledge remains intact. To address these issues, we propose Distinguishable Deletion (D^2), a paradigm that restricts the response distribution in the latent representation rather than specific tokens to erase undesirable knowledge, while distinguishing it from retained knowledge, enabling a refusal mechanism to handle unlearned inputs safely and coherently. To implement D^2, we introduce an energy index that quantifies the presence of knowledge and the separation between unlearned and retained content. Mathematical and empirical analyses show that energy is both accurate and efficient, enabling Energy-based Unlearning Alignment (EUA) to enforce energy-boundary unlearning during training and apply an energy-based refusal mechanism at inference. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EUA significantly outperforms previous methods, indicating the superiority of D^2. Our code is available at https://github.com/Puning97/EUA-for-LLM-Unlearning.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

Contextual Integrity (CI) defines privacy not merely as keeping information hidden, but as governing information flows according to the norms of a given context. As large language models are increasingly deployed as personal agents handling sensitive workflows, adhering to CI becomes critical. However, even frontier models remain unreliable in making disclosure decisions, and existing mitigation strategies often degrade underlying task performance. To overcome this privacy-utility trade-off, we propose SELFCI, a complementary self-distillation framework that decouples information suppression from task resolution. SELFCI jointly optimizes two independent reverse KL divergences over distinct teacher distributions derived from feedback: one encourages preserving task-relevant information for utility, while the other enforces minimal and appropriate disclosure. This complementary formulation induces a Product-of-Experts (PoE) target, aligning the policy with the intersection of capability and privacy requirements. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SELFCI, without relying on costly external supervision, consistently outperforms competitive baselines such as online reinforcement learning algorithms (e.g., GRPO). These trends further extend to out-of-domain settings involving agentic workflows and accumulated private context, suggesting that SELFCI provides a practical path toward CI alignment.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are frequently confident, eloquent, and well versed. A natural question arises: do they know what they don't know? To answer this question, we borrow the concept of epistemic honesty and develop a novel metric to systematically evaluate whether an LLM appropriately acknowledges the boundaries of its knowledge. In this work, we introduce the Epistemic Honesty Quotient (EHQ), which reports three observable sub-scores across two operational axes (epistemic restraint and substantive-answer calibration), and construct EHQ-3000, a 3,000-question benchmark spanning Fabricated Entity, Post-Cutoff Event, Hyper-Niche True, and Context-Conditioned Questions. From a frozen registry of 21 model API routes, 15 completed the protocol after endpoint and eligibility checks; 14 entered the confirmatory analysis because severe provider-side truncation made one route's score indeterminate. The study reveals substantial variation across models, including a difference that can not be explained by their capability to extract explicitly available information. Composite EHQ ranges from 0.31 to 0.81 across the analysed panel, despite near-ceiling performance on the document-grounded capability probe. The two restraint criteria overlap strongly under the present category composition, whereas substantive-answer calibration varies across models and does not reliably co-vary with restraint; however, the small panel leaves substantial uncertainty. Thus, EHQ reveals behavioral differences that are not visible to conventional correctness-based assessment, while also showing why dataset composition, provider behavior, and confidence elicitation must remain part of the interpretation.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Popular offline reinforcement learning (RL) methods rely on conservatism, either by penalizing out-of-dataset actions or by restricting rollout horizons. In this work, we question the universality of this principle and instead revisit a complementary one: a Bayesian perspective. Rather than enforcing conservatism, the Bayesian approach tackles epistemic uncertainty in offline data by modeling a posterior distribution over plausible world models and training a history-dependent agent to maximize expected rewards, enabling test-time generalization. We first illustrate, in a bandit setting, that Bayesianism excels on low-quality datasets where conservatism fails. We then scale this principle to realistic tasks and show that long-horizon planning is critical for reducing value overestimation once conservatism is removed. To make this feasible, we introduce key design choices for performing and learning from long-horizon rollouts while controlling compounding errors. These yield our algorithm, NEUBAY, grounded in the neutral Bayesian principle. On D4RL and NeoRL benchmarks, NEUBAY generally matches or surpasses leading conservative algorithms, achieving new state-of-the-art on 7 datasets. Notably, it succeeds with rollout horizons of several hundred steps, contrary to dominant practice. Finally, we characterize datasets by quality and coverage, showing when NEUBAY is preferable to conservative methods. Together, we argue NEUBAY lays the foundation for a new practical direction in offline and model-based RL.

Large language models (LLMs) define a distribution over text, which can be viewed as a probabilistic representation of uncertainty: sampling K responses yields a belief state - responses a model deems plausible. Existing work exploits this representation for narrow tasks like either decoding or selective prediction, and often requires manual interventions, not controlling generation directly. We propose Belief-Augmented Generation (BAG): grounding LLMs in their own belief state via the prompt and letting them reason over these K samples to decide on a conversational strategy: answer, clarify, or abstain. In a multi-turn ambiguous QA setting, we find that LLMs by default rarely clarify or abstain, ignoring uncertainty about the input or facts. BAG improves QA accuracy across six models and yields strategy decisions more faithful to the belief state than prompt-only baselines. Disentangling when to clarify from when to abstain, however, remains challenging.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

Various studies have attempted to remove sensitive or private knowledge from a language model to prevent its unauthorized exposure. However, prior studies have overlooked the complex and interconnected nature of knowledge, where related knowledge must be carefully examined. Specifically, they have failed to evaluate whether an unlearning method faithfully erases interconnected knowledge that should be removed, retaining knowledge that appears relevant but exists in a completely different context. To resolve this problem, we first define a new concept called superficial unlearning, which refers to the phenomenon where an unlearning method either fails to erase the interconnected knowledge it should remove or unintentionally erases irrelevant knowledge. Based on the definition, we introduce a new benchmark, FaithUn, to analyze and evaluate the faithfulness of unlearning in real-world knowledge QA settings. Furthermore, we propose a novel unlearning method, KLUE, which updates only knowledge-related neurons to achieve faithful unlearning. KLUE identifies knowledge neurons using an explainability method and updates only those neurons using selected unforgotten samples. Experimental results demonstrate that widely-used unlearning methods fail to ensure faithful unlearning, while our method shows significant effectiveness in real-world QA unlearning.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Unlearning has emerged as a critical capability for large language models (LLMs) to support data privacy, regulatory compliance, and ethical AI deployment. Recent techniques often rely on obfuscation by injecting incorrect or irrelevant information to suppress knowledge. Such methods effectively constitute knowledge addition rather than true removal, often leaving models vulnerable to probing. In this paper, we formally distinguish unlearning from obfuscation and introduce a probing-based evaluation framework to assess whether existing approaches genuinely remove targeted information. Moreover, we propose DF-MCQ, a novel unlearning method that flattens the model predictive distribution over automatically generated multiple-choice questions using KL-divergence, effectively removing knowledge about target individuals and triggering appropriate refusal behaviour. Experimental results demonstrate that DF-MCQ achieves unlearning with over 90% refusal rate and a random choice-level uncertainty that is much higher than obfuscation on probing questions.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

When retrieved evidence contradicts an agent's prior beliefs, does it revise its answer, acknowledge uncertainty, or persist with an incorrect conclusion? Existing evaluations of agentic systems focus primarily on task success, offering limited insight into how agents handle such conflicts. We propose to evaluate agents on epistemic humility (EH): the agent's willingness to recognize, act on, and communicate uncertainty during task execution. We operationalize EH through three trajectory-level behavioral dimensions: Identify, Solve, and Escalate (ISE). Through knowledge conflict, situations where the backbone language model's parametric knowledge contradicts the evidence it encounters, or where two contextual sources disagree, we evaluate two conflict settings: (1) controlled conflict and (2) naturally occurring conflict during multi-step agentic execution, each paired with matched no-conflict controls. Evaluating four agents, we find that higher task accuracy does not necessarily correspond to greater epistemic humility: some high-accuracy configurations recognize conflicts during execution but do not communicate unresolved uncertainty in their incorrect final answers. Trajectory-level analysis further reveals that agents frequently detect conflicts in early steps of execution but fail to maintain or resolve them in later steps. Finally, we show that model-level interventions can improve EH, but often at the cost of task accuracy, suggesting that epistemic humility emerges from the interaction among the backbone model, agent harness, and evaluation environment.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical topic in machine learning, aiming to eliminate the influence of specific training data or knowledge without retraining the model from scratch. A variety of techniques have been proposed, including Gradient Ascent, model editing, and re-steering hidden representations. While existing surveys often organize these methods by their technical characteristics, such classifications tend to overlook a more fundamental dimension: the underlying intention of unlearning--whether it seeks to truly remove internal knowledge or merely suppress its behavioral effects. In this SoK paper, we propose a new taxonomy based on this intention-oriented perspective. Building on this taxonomy, we make three key contributions. First, we revisit recent findings suggesting that many removal methods may functionally behave like suppression, and explore whether true removal is necessary or achievable. Second, we survey existing evaluation strategies, identify limitations in current metrics and benchmarks, and suggest directions for developing more reliable and intention-aligned evaluations. Third, we highlight practical challenges--such as scalability and support for sequential unlearning--that currently hinder the broader deployment of unlearning methods. In summary, this work offers a comprehensive framework for understanding and advancing unlearning in generative AI, aiming to support future research and guide policy decisions around data removal and privacy.

Large language models are increasingly used for content moderation, but most evaluations still report aggregate accuracy on individual benchmarks. We introduce Safety-Flag, which places seven widely used safety benchmarks (BeaverTails, XSTest, Ethics, WildGuard, Aegis, ToxiChat, and ToxiGen) into a single balanced flag / do-not-flag protocol. We release item-level decisions and confidence scores for six general-purpose LLMs and four dedicated guards, together with three reference models, evaluated on the same items. Safety-Flag measures three dimensions of moderator reliability: error direction, probability calibration, and confidence-based error ranking for human review. They often disagree. Aggregate accuracy does not reveal error direction: one model flags 85% of benign content, whereas another misses 54% of harmful content. All six general-purpose models are overconfident; fitting one temperature per model reduces calibration error by 2.8--6.0times without changing predicted labels or confidence ordering. Confidence-based abstention lowers selective risk for every model, although the gains depend on how well confidence ranks errors. Dedicated guards produce fewer false alarms and are better calibrated, but several have higher miss rates outside their documented coverage. We release the benchmark, fixed item lists, evaluation code, per-item model outputs, and leaderboard at: https://github.com/yibo-hu-lab/safety-flag-benchmark.

Managing agent thought and observation during multi-turn agent-environment interactions is an emerging strategy to improve agent efficiency. However, existing studies treat the entire interaction trajectories equally, overlooking the thought necessity and observation utility varies across turns. To this end, we first conduct quantitative investigations into how thought and observation affect agent effectiveness and efficiency. Based on our findings, we propose Agent-Omit, a unified training framework that empowers LLM agents to adaptively omit redundant thoughts and observations. Specifically, we first synthesize a small amount of cold-start data, including both single-turn and multi-turn omission scenarios, to fine-tune the agent for omission behaviors. Furthermore, we introduce an omit-aware agentic reinforcement learning approach, incorporating a dual sampling mechanism and a tailored omission reward to incentivize the agent's adaptive omission capability. Theoretically, we prove that the deviation of our omission policy is upper-bounded by KL-divergence. Experimental results on five agent benchmarks show that our constructed Agent-Omit-8B could obtain performance comparable to seven frontier LLM agent, and achieve the best effectiveness-efficiency trade-off than seven efficient LLM agents methods. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/Agent-Omit.

As large language models become smaller and more efficient, small reasoning models (SRMs) are crucial for enabling chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in resource-constrained settings. However, they are prone to faithfulness hallucinations, especially in intermediate reasoning steps. Existing mitigation methods based on online reinforcement learning rely on outcome-based rewards or coarse-grained CoT evaluation, which can inadvertently reinforce unfaithful reasoning when the final answer is correct. To address these limitations, we propose Faithfulness-Aware Step-Level Reinforcement Learning (FaithRL), introducing step-level supervision via explicit faithfulness rewards from a process reward model, together with an implicit truncated resampling strategy that generates contrastive signals from faithful prefixes, while also mitigating reward hacking from step-level rewards. Experiments across multiple SRMs and Open-Book QA benchmarks demonstrate that FaithRL consistently reduces hallucinations in both the CoT and final answers, leading to more faithful and reliable reasoning. Code is available at https://github.com/Easy195/FaithRL.

Active inference is a unifying theory for perception and action resting upon the idea that the brain maintains an internal model of the world by minimizing free energy. From a behavioral perspective, active inference agents can be seen as self-evidencing beings that act to fulfill their optimistic predictions, namely preferred outcomes or goals. In contrast, reinforcement learning requires human-designed rewards to accomplish any desired outcome. Although active inference could provide a more natural self-supervised objective for control, its applicability has been limited because of the shortcomings in scaling the approach to complex environments. In this work, we propose a contrastive objective for active inference that strongly reduces the computational burden in learning the agent's generative model and planning future actions. Our method performs notably better than likelihood-based active inference in image-based tasks, while also being computationally cheaper and easier to train. We compare to reinforcement learning agents that have access to human-designed reward functions, showing that our approach closely matches their performance. Finally, we also show that contrastive methods perform significantly better in the case of distractors in the environment and that our method is able to generalize goals to variations in the background. Website and code: https://contrastive-aif.github.io/

Large Language Models (LLMs) are converging towards a singular Artificial Hivemind, where shared Nature (pre-training priors) result in a profound collapse of distributional diversity, limiting the distinct perspectives necessary for creative exploration and scientific discovery. To address this, we propose to equip models with inference-time Nurture (individualized epistemic trajectories) using Epistemic Evolution paradigm, progressing through explore, internalize, and express. We instantiate this via PRISM (Pluralistic Reasoning via In-context Structure Modeling), a model-agnostic system that augments LLM with dynamic On-the-fly Epistemic Graphs. On three creativity benchmarks, PRISM achieves state-of-the-art novelty and significantly expands distributional diversity. Moreover, we evaluate the real-world utility via a challenging rare-disease diagnosis benchmark. Results demonstrate that PRISM successfully uncovers correct long-tail diagnoses that standard LLM miss, confirming that its divergence stems from meaningful exploration rather than incoherent noise. Overall, this work establishes a new paradigm for Pluralistic AI, moving beyond monolithic consensus toward a diverse ecosystem of unique cognitive individuals capable of collective, multi-perspective discovery.

The need for machine unlearning is critical for data privacy, yet existing methods often cause Knowledge Contamination by unintentionally damaging related knowledge. Such a degraded model performance after unlearning has been recently leveraged for new inference and backdoor attacks. Most studies design adversarial unlearning requests that require poisoning or duplicating training data. In this study, we introduce a new unlearning-induced attack model, namely indirect unlearning attack, which does not require data manipulation but exploits the consequence of knowledge contamination to perturb the model accuracy on security-critical predictions. To mitigate this attack, we introduce a theoretical framework that models neural networks as Neural Knowledge Systems. Based on this, we propose ROKA, a robust unlearning strategy centered on Neural Healing. Unlike conventional unlearning methods that only destroy information, ROKA constructively rebalances the model by nullifying the influence of forgotten data while strengthening its conceptual neighbors. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a theoretical guarantee for knowledge preservation during unlearning. Evaluations on various large models, including vision transformers, multi-modal models, and large language models, show that ROKA effectively unlearns targets while preserving, or even enhancing, the accuracy of retained data, thereby mitigating the indirect unlearning attacks.

A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists--they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Past research also shows that Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). But whether learning is sufficient to give rise to Dualism is unknown.The evidence from human learners does address this question because humans are endowed not only with general learning capacities but also with core knowledge capacities. And recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, Theodore & Valencia, 2021; Berent, 2023). To evaluate the role of learning, here, we probe for a mind-body divide in Davinci--a large language model (LLM) that is devoid of any innate core knowledge. We show that Davinci still leans towards Dualism, and that this bias increases systematically with the learner's inductive potential. Thus, davinci (a GPT-3 model) exhibits mild Dualist tendencies, whereas its descendent, text-davinci-003 (a GPT-3.5 model), shows a full-blown bias. It selectively considers thoughts (epistemic states) as disembodied--as unlikely to show up in the body (in the brain), but not in its absence (after death). While Davinci's performance is constrained by its syntactic limitations, and it differs from humans, its Dualist bias is robust. These results demonstrate that the mind-body divide is partly learnable from experience.They also show how, as LLM's are exposed to human narratives, they induce not only human knowledge but also human biases.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Conversational Information Retrieval (CIR) systems, while offering intuitive access to information, face a significant challenge: reliably handling unanswerable questions to prevent the generation of misleading or hallucinated content. Traditional approaches often rely on external classifiers, which can introduce inconsistencies with the core generative Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper introduces Self-Aware LLM for Unanswerability (SALU), a novel approach that deeply integrates unanswerability detection directly within the LLM's generative process. SALU is trained using a multi-task learning framework for both standard Question Answering (QA) and explicit abstention generation for unanswerable queries. Crucially, it incorporates a confidence-score-guided reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) phase, which explicitly penalizes hallucinated responses and rewards appropriate abstentions, fostering intrinsic self-awareness of knowledge boundaries. Through extensive experiments on our custom-built C-IR_Answerability dataset, SALU consistently outperforms strong baselines, including hybrid LLM-classifier systems, in overall accuracy for correctly answering or abstaining from questions. Human evaluation further confirms SALU's superior reliability, achieving high scores in factuality, appropriate abstention, and, most importantly, a dramatic reduction in hallucination, demonstrating its ability to robustly "know when to say 'I don't know'."

Post-training hybrid reasoning models in NoThink mode has attracted growing interest as a way to improve performance while keeping inference fast. However, these gains may draw on thinking behavior already accessible through the base model's Think mode. We formulate this thinking leakage in a causal mediation framework and audit its contribution using bidirectional interventions along a simple base-derived activation direction. Across three models and three post-training methods on competition math benchmarks, we find that leakage is real, causal, and substantial: behavioral and representational analyses reveal shifts toward Think, steering the base model along this direction reproduces most of the post-training accuracy gain, and counter-steering a checkpoint removes a substantial share of what it gains. Across nine aligned checkpoints with positive NoThink gains, the resulting leakage ratio ranges from 42% to 79%. These interventions support a substantial causal contribution of thinking leakage. Our findings show that a post-training method's apparent advantage can therefore reflect greater drift toward Think, obscuring whether it improves capability within NoThink or more effectively re-invokes existing Think behavior.

Cutting out an object and estimating its opacity mask, known as image matting, is a key task in image and video editing. Due to the highly ill-posed issue, additional inputs, typically user-defined trimaps or scribbles, are usually needed to reduce the uncertainty. Although effective, it is either time consuming or only suitable for experienced users who know where to place the strokes. In this work, we propose a decomposed-uncertainty-guided matting (dugMatting) algorithm, which explores the explicitly decomposed uncertainties to efficiently and effectively improve the results. Basing on the characteristic of these uncertainties, the epistemic uncertainty is reduced in the process of guiding interaction (which introduces prior knowledge), while the aleatoric uncertainty is reduced in modeling data distribution (which introduces statistics for both data and possible noise). The proposed matting framework relieves the requirement for users to determine the interaction areas by using simple and efficient labeling. Extensively quantitative and qualitative results validate that the proposed method significantly improves the original matting algorithms in terms of both efficiency and efficacy.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Neural Information Retrieval (NIR) has significantly improved upon heuristic-based IR systems. Yet, failures remain frequent, the models used often being unable to retrieve documents relevant to the user's query. We address this challenge by proposing a lightweight abstention mechanism tailored for real-world constraints, with particular emphasis placed on the reranking phase. We introduce a protocol for evaluating abstention strategies in a black-box scenario, demonstrating their efficacy, and propose a simple yet effective data-driven mechanism. We provide open-source code for experiment replication and abstention implementation, fostering wider adoption and application in diverse contexts.

Reinforcement learning enables Agentic RAG systems to learn multi-turn search from verifiable outcome rewards, but all- zero rollout groups provide no comparative signal and may hide useful search behavior. We present EviBack, an evidence- constrained Teacher backoff that supplies auxiliary super- vision to such groups while preserving verifiable Actor re- wards. It separates evidence assessment from answer refine- ment, preventing reference answers from overriding evidence- insufficiency judgments. A fully automated, end-to-end GPT- 5.5-assisted APE pipeline starts from a manually authored single-prompt dual-task Teacher, automatically partitions and labels rollout data, and performs ablation, task decomposition, evaluation, and selection to produce a gated two-stage Teacher. Compared with the manual design, the resulting Teacher im- proves downstream F1 and valid-answer rate while reduc- ing search, duplicate queries, and forced termination. Across seven open-domain QA benchmarks and three Qwen3 scales, EviBack improves F1 over Search-R1 and raises both single- and multi-hop macro F1. We guarantee that the code will be made publicly available at a later stage.

Answer-only reinforcement learning (RL) trains reasoning models to solve fully specified problems, but many realistic queries omit a premise needed for a unique answer. In this setting, the useful response is not always refusal: the model should ask for the missing premise, condition its answer on the unknown quantity, or abstain when no informative conditional response is available. We present Ask-Condition-Abstain Reinforcement Learning (ACA-RL), a data-augmented RL framework for this setting. Its reasoning-graph-guided pipeline converts well-posed problems into missing-premise training instances with localized gap annotations; ACA-RL then trains on these instances with a structured reward over five observable response behaviors. We also introduce the Missing-Premise Benchmark (MPB), a 274-instance human-verified benchmark spanning mathematical, logical, and real-world word problems. Across Qwen3 and Llama models, ACA-RL consistently improves on MPB while preserving competitive performance on well-posed reasoning tasks. Together with the released code, MPB, and training data, this work supports a new mission for NLP evaluation: measuring whether models can recognize when a task is underdetermined and handle uncertainty, not only whether they can answer fully specified questions.

We develop a principled procedure for determining when a large language model (LLM) should abstain from responding (e.g., by saying "I don't know") in a general domain, instead of resorting to possibly "hallucinating" a non-sensical or incorrect answer. Building on earlier approaches that use self-consistency as a more reliable measure of model confidence, we propose using the LLM itself to self-evaluate the similarity between each of its sampled responses for a given query. We then further leverage conformal prediction techniques to develop an abstention procedure that benefits from rigorous theoretical guarantees on the hallucination rate (error rate). Experimentally, our resulting conformal abstention method reliably bounds the hallucination rate on various closed-book, open-domain generative question answering datasets, while also maintaining a significantly less conservative abstention rate on a dataset with long responses (Temporal Sequences) compared to baselines using log-probability scores to quantify uncertainty, while achieveing comparable performance on a dataset with short answers (TriviaQA). To evaluate the experiments automatically, one needs to determine if two responses are equivalent given a question. Following standard practice, we use a thresholded similarity function to determine if two responses match, but also provide a method for calibrating the threshold based on conformal prediction, with theoretical guarantees on the accuracy of the match prediction, which might be of independent interest.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for search agents often suffers from evidence fabrication, a failure mode where agents bypass external information (E_{ext}) and fabricate an incorrect answer. We argue that this fabrication arises from an over-reliance on unreliable internal knowledge (E_{int}) as shortcuts due to the inherent opacity of reasoning trajectories. To address this, we propose SOAR (SOurce-Aware Reinforcement learning), a paradigm that transforms monolithic reasoning into source-explicit trajectories. SOAR (i) disentangles E_{ext} and E_{int} into parallel, observable streams via a Source-Aware Workflow, and (ii) incorporates Source-Consistent Reward to guide the policy evolution. By making information-source attribution explicit, SOAR enables precise credit assignment between different knowledge streams. Evaluations show that SOAR outperforms baselines on 3B and 7B backbones by 7.3% and 5.4%, while reducing evidence fabrication by 74.8%. These confirm that SOAR significantly improves performance on knowledge-intensive benchmarks while effectively mitigating evidence fabrication, fostering more faithful and grounded reasoning with enhanced robustness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly ship with explicit "thinking modes", yet their counterpart, "no-thinking", has received far less attention. We study LLMs' no-thinking behavior along two axes. a. How to measure no-thinking? Prior work typically defines no-thinking through proxies such as a disabled thinking mode or the absence of long traces. These proxies are unreliable: disabled thinking modes may still emit reasoning, while long traces may contain filler rather than genuine inference. We instead normalize each response into a pre-answer trace and final answer, and evaluate it at three levels: (i) Empty-Thinking Rate for strict answer-only compliance; (ii) instruction-aware Question-Pre-answer Relevance for similarity between the question and pre-answer trace; and (iii) LLM-as-judge Explicit Inference Rate for visible explicit inference. Together, these metrics distinguish answer-only output, relevant but non-inferential text, and explicit inference. b. How does no-thinking vary across tasks and models? We evaluate six prompting interventions on six LLMs across Boolean, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions. We find that explicit no-think controls cannot reliably eliminate visible inference. Models instead exhibit "Thinking Inertia": explicit inference persists even under strict controls and becomes more prevalent as the answer space opens. Accuracy remains stable on Boolean and multiple-choice tasks, whereas open-ended tasks reveal a trade-off between answer-only compliance and task accuracy. Rewriting the same questions across answer spaces shows that supplying candidate answers makes answer-only responses easier to produce. These findings establish no-thinking as a non-trivial capability: stopping explicit reasoning cannot be assumed from model settings or instructions alone and deserves systematic evaluation alongside reasoning ability.

Current unlearning methods for LLMs optimize on the private information they seek to remove by incorporating it into their fine-tuning data. We argue this not only risks reinforcing exposure to sensitive data, but also fundamentally contradicts the principle of minimizing its use. As a remedy, we propose a novel unlearning method-Partial Model Collapse (PMC), which does not require unlearning targets in the unlearning objective. Our approach is inspired by recent observations that training generative models on their own generations leads to distribution collapse, effectively removing information from model outputs. Our central insight is that model collapse can be leveraged for machine unlearning by deliberately triggering it for data we aim to remove. We theoretically analyze that our approach converges to the desired outcome, i.e. the model unlearns the data targeted for removal. We empirically demonstrate that PMC overcomes four key limitations of existing unlearning methods that explicitly optimize on unlearning targets, and more effectively removes private information from model outputs while preserving general model utility. Overall, our contributions represent an important step toward more comprehensive unlearning that better aligns with real-world privacy constraints. Code available at https://www.cs.cit.tum.de/daml/partial-model-collapse/.

Individual agents in multi-agent (MA) systems often lack robustness, tending to blindly conform to misleading peers. We show this weakness stems from both sycophancy and inadequate ability to evaluate peer reliability. To address this, we first formalize the learning problem of history-aware reference, introducing the historical interactions of peers as additional input, so that agents can estimate peer reliability and learn from trustworthy peers when uncertain. This shifts the task from evaluating peer reasoning quality to estimating peer reliability based on interaction history. We then develop Epistemic Context Learning (ECL): a reasoning framework that conditions predictions on explicitly-built peer profiles from history. We further optimize ECL by reinforcement learning using auxiliary rewards. Our experiments reveal that our ECL enables small models like Qwen 3-4B to outperform a history-agnostic baseline 8x its size (Qwen 3-30B) by accurately identifying reliable peers. ECL also boosts frontier models to near-perfect (100%) performance. We show that ECL generalizes well to various MA configurations and we find that trust is modeled well by LLMs, revealing a strong correlation in trust modeling accuracy and final answer quality.

Financial institutions operating under data-residency constraints are restricted to open-weight models small enough to locally host, which trail frontier systems on multi-step quantitative reasoning. On-policy distillation narrows such gaps by supervising a student on its own rollouts, but traditional OPD requires a strong external teacher, and on-policy self-distillation (OPSD) conditions on a full reference solution. We ask how much of that signal is necessary. We present Fin-SD, a localized hindsight self-distillation recipe for multi-step reasoning. Given a problem the student fails, the student itself identifies the first incorrect reasoning step and writes a short critique of that step. We truncate the student's trajectory immediately before the error (aiming to obtain a correct prefix), condition a frozen copy of the student on the same prefix plus the hint, and distill that hint-conditioned teacher into the student over a short rollout under reverse KL. No external model contributes a gradient. We apply Fin-SD to GPT-OSS-20B on a custom multi-step financial reasoning benchmark that requires deriving formula inputs from realistic scenarios via accounting conventions. We find: (i) replacing the critique with a generic-feedback control matches Fin-SD's entire 3.03 pp accuracy gain over the base model on the FinanceReasoning Hard subset, suggesting the gain comes from where supervision is applied, not hint content; (ii) the model writing the hint does not need to be stronger than the model receiving it: hints from same-family GPT-OSS-120B, at roughly 6x the parameters, yield no materially greater benefits than self-written hints; and (iii) Fin-SD matches on-policy self-distillation from full reference solutions on accuracy while generating 9.5% fewer tokens. With Fin-SD, general reasoning on MMLU-Pro and a fourteen-metric compliance audit on FinTrust show no material regression.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has emerged as a popular paradigm for large language model (LLM) self-improvement, allowing models to act as their own teachers by leveraging privileged information such as ground-truth solutions. However, recent findings indicate that OPSD can severely degrade the performance of LLMs on complex reasoning tasks: By forcing the student to imitate an artificially confident reasoning trace conditioned on privileged information, OPSD inadvertently suppresses expressions of uncertainty and penalizes the exploratory, self-corrective behaviors required to solve challenging problems. To address this, we introduce Negative Self-Distillation (NSD), a new framework that optimizes LLMs by diverging from flawed reasoning rather than imitating privileged solutions. Instead of relying on ground-truth answers or external supervision, NSD uses the model itself to generate a question-specific negative condition (eg, acting as a ``careless reasoner'') and pushes the student's distribution away from this self-generated negative teacher. Naively applying unlearning objectives to achieve this divergence is problematic, as flawed reasoning tokens are confounded with basic linguistic tokens; indiscriminately penalizing both risks catastrophically degrading the model's foundational language capabilities. We resolve this by designing a dynamic gating mechanism that automatically identifies and isolates reasoning-critical tokens, ensuring gradient updates target only behavioral flaws while preserving the model's linguistic priors. Empirically, NSD consistently outperforms OPSD and other label-free, self-bootstrapping reinforcement learning (RL) baselines.

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on factoid question answering, they are still prone to hallucination and untruthful responses, particularly when tasks demand information outside their parametric knowledge. Indeed, truthfulness requires more than accuracy -- models must also recognize uncertainty and abstain when unsure to avoid hallucinations. This presents a fundamental challenge for existing methods: approaches that optimize for accuracy often amplify hallucinations, while those that encourage abstention can become overly conservative, sacrificing correct answers. Both extremes ultimately compromise truthfulness. In this work, we present TruthRL, a general reinforcement learning (RL) framework that directly optimizes the truthfulness of LLMs. Specifically, we implement TruthRL using GRPO with a simple yet effective ternary reward that distinguishes correct answers, hallucinations, and abstentions. It incentivizes models to reduce hallucinations not only by providing correct responses, but also by enabling abstention when uncertain, thereby improving truthfulness. Extensive experiments across four knowledge-intensive benchmarks show that, compared to vanilla RL, TruthRL significantly reduces hallucinations by 28.9% and improves truthfulness by 21.1%, with consistent gains across various backbone models (e.g., Qwen, Llama) under both retrieval and non-retrieval setups. In-depth ablation study demonstrates that vanilla accuracy-driven methods, such as supervised fine-tuning or RL with a binary reward, struggle to balance factual correctness and uncertainty. In contrast, our proposed truthfulness-driven TruthRL achieves strong performance in both accuracy and truthfulness, underscoring the importance of learning objective design for developing truthful LLMs.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

Knowledge erasure in large language models (LLMs) is important for ensuring compliance with data and AI regulations, safeguarding user privacy, mitigating bias, and misinformation. Existing unlearning methods aim to make the process of knowledge erasure more efficient and effective by removing specific knowledge while preserving overall model performance, especially for retained information. However, it has been observed that the unlearning techniques tend to suppress and leave the knowledge beneath the surface, thus making it retrievable with the right prompts. In this work, we demonstrate that step-by-step reasoning can serve as a backdoor to recover this hidden information. We introduce a step-by-step reasoning-based black-box attack, Sleek, that systematically exposes unlearning failures. We employ a structured attack framework with three core components: (1) an adversarial prompt generation strategy leveraging step-by-step reasoning built from LLM-generated queries, (2) an attack mechanism that successfully recalls erased content, and exposes unfair suppression of knowledge intended for retention and (3) a categorization of prompts as direct, indirect, and implied, to identify which query types most effectively exploit unlearning weaknesses. Through extensive evaluations on four state-of-the-art unlearning techniques and two widely used LLMs, we show that existing approaches fail to ensure reliable knowledge removal. Of the generated adversarial prompts, 62.5% successfully retrieved forgotten Harry Potter facts from WHP-unlearned Llama, while 50% exposed unfair suppression of retained knowledge. Our work highlights the persistent risks of information leakage, emphasizing the need for more robust unlearning strategies for erasure.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

Distilling reasoning capabilities from Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) into smaller models is typically constrained by the limitation of rejection sampling. Standard methods treat the teacher as a static filter, discarding complex "corner-case" problems where the teacher fails to explore valid solutions independently, thereby creating an artificial "Teacher Ceiling" for the student. In this work, we propose Hindsight Entropy-Assisted Learning (HEAL), an RL-free framework designed to bridge this reasoning gap. Drawing on the educational theory of the Zone of Proximal Development(ZPD), HEAL synergizes three core modules: (1) Guided Entropy-Assisted Repair (GEAR), an active intervention mechanism that detects critical reasoning breakpoints via entropy dynamics and injects targeted hindsight hints to repair broken trajectories; (2) Perplexity-Uncertainty Ratio Estimator (PURE), a rigorous filtering protocol that decouples genuine cognitive breakthroughs from spurious shortcuts; and (3) Progressive Answer-guided Curriculum Evolution (PACE), a three-stage distillation strategy that organizes training from foundational alignment to frontier breakthrough. Extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that HEAL significantly outperforms traditional SFT distillation and other baselines.

As intelligent agents become autonomous over longer periods of time, they may eventually become lifelong counterparts to specific people. If so, it may be common for a user to want the agent to master a task temporarily but later on to forget the task due to privacy concerns. However enabling an agent to forget privately what the user specified without degrading the rest of the learned knowledge is a challenging problem. With the aim of addressing this challenge, this paper formalizes this continual learning and private unlearning (CLPU) problem. The paper further introduces a straightforward but exactly private solution, CLPU-DER++, as the first step towards solving the CLPU problem, along with a set of carefully designed benchmark problems to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. The code is available at https://github.com/Cranial-XIX/Continual-Learning-Private-Unlearning.

Deep learning systems now mediate military decisions to use force, yet their internal logic resists inspection, their evaluation practices are gameable, and their deployment fractures accountability across dispersed stakeholders. The ethical challenge posed by these systems is fundamentally epistemic: not just whether autonomous weapons should be permitted to kill, but whether the conditions for responsible human judgment can survive when critical functions are delegated to opaque algorithms. We show that this epistemic condition produces a concrete accountability gap: responsibility diffuses across designers, operators, and policymakers while International Humanitarian Law presupposes capacities for judgment that current AI systems lack. To address this gap, we propose a governance framework that proceduralizes ethical constraints through named accountability roles, adversarial auditing with undisclosed benchmarks, tiered deployment thresholds, and a proposed NATO evaluation standard. Counterfactual analysis of eight documented cases (1988-2025) shows that each governance mechanism addresses a documented class of failure, but no single safeguard suffices in isolation: effective governance of military AI requires not only technical constraints but the institutional infrastructure to keep human judgment meaningful.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly capable of acting in complex tool-use environments, yet they often fail to recognize when tasks are infeasible and no valid solution exists. Recent work has formalized this reliability gap as the problem of agentic abstention, and existing approaches typically optimize a model or agent harness against a fixed set of tasks, leading to limited generalization to unseen failure modes. We introduce HERA, a framework for harness-environment co-evolution for agentic abstention. HERA consists of (i) a pipeline to automatically construct verifiable pairs of feasible and infeasible tasks by applying controlled environment mutations that transform solvable tasks into cases requiring abstention, and (ii) a co-evolution procedure in which performance failures on previous tasks are used to drive harness adaptation and generate new execution environments and tasks geared towards previous weaknesses. On held-out evaluation tasks, an evolved harness from HERA improves abstention accuracy from 61.7% to 83.3% while improving feasible-task completion from 68.3% to 76.7%, achieving the highest abstention and feasible-task completion among the compared methods. The resulting best harness transfers across 19 other LLMs, improving abstention accuracy by 15.3 percentage points on average without any model-specific optimization, and enabling smaller models to match the performance of more powerful models at an estimated 85% lower cost.

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) trains a student on its own reasoning trajectories using token-level supervision from a reference-conditioned teacher initialized from the same model. However, access to the reference can induce teacher behaviors that undermine independent reasoning in thinking models, leading to reference hallucinations, where the student cites an unavailable reference to justify reasoning steps, and reconsideration suppression, where the teacher discourages verification and revision at uncertain steps. We introduce Steered-Teacher OPSD (ST-OPSD) to jointly address these failure modes through activation steering. ST-OPSD extracts two directions from model-generated reasoning trajectories and applies them to the teacher's hidden states during distillation target computation, suppressing reference-invoking behavior and encouraging reconsideration with marker-family calibration. The student learns from the resulting teacher distributions without being steered. Experiments on AIME and HMMT show that ST-OPSD improves accuracy over vanilla OPSD and other interventions while restoring reconsideration and reference-hallucination rates to base-model levels.

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Role-playing large language models (LLMs) are expected to adopt a character's style while also respecting that character's knowledge boundaries. Prior evaluations detect character hallucination but rarely distinguish whether errors arise from failure to recognize a boundary or from failure to comply despite recognition. We introduce CHARM, a multicultural benchmark of 40 real and fictional characters drawn from five cultural-linguistic regions, and validated by native reviewers. It probes two boundary types, Temporal (historical vs. modern) and Cross-Universe (entities outside a character's narrative or historical universe), using abstention-enabled multiple-choice questions. We propose a two-stage evaluation that separates Boundary-Awareness (explicit recognition that a query is out of scope) from Boundary-Compliance (abstention when answering concrete questions). Evaluations across six LLMs show that hallucination is driven predominantly by compliance failures. Models frequently acknowledge that a query lies outside the character's knowledge yet still provide factual, out-of-character answers. By re-posing the same questions to the target character, we confirm that a large fraction of these cases are verified parametric overrides; the model stores the relevant fact but fails to suppress it. We also observe systematic cultural variation in these failures, consistent with imbalances in how characters from different regions are represented in model knowledge.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

We expose a critical limitation in current approaches to machine unlearning in language models: despite the apparent success of unlearning algorithms, information about the forgotten data remains linearly decodable from internal representations. To systematically assess this discrepancy, we introduce an interpretable, information-theoretic framework for auditing unlearning using Partial Information Decomposition (PID). By comparing model representations before and after unlearning, we decompose the mutual information with the forgotten data into distinct components, formalizing the notions of unlearned and residual knowledge. Our analysis reveals that redundant information, shared across both models, constitutes residual knowledge that persists post-unlearning and correlates with susceptibility to known adversarial reconstruction attacks. Leveraging these insights, we propose a representation-based risk score that can guide abstention on sensitive inputs at inference time, providing a practical mechanism to mitigate privacy leakage. Our work introduces a principled, representation-level audit for unlearning, offering theoretical insight and actionable tools for safer deployment of language models.

Knowledge distillation improves large language model (LLM) reasoning by compressing the knowledge of a teacher LLM to train smaller LLMs. On-policy distillation advances this approach by having the student sample its own trajectories while a teacher LLM provides dense token-level supervision, addressing the distribution mismatch between training and inference in off-policy distillation methods. However, on-policy distillation typically requires a separate, often larger, teacher LLM and does not explicitly leverage ground-truth solutions available in reasoning datasets. Inspired by the intuition that a sufficiently capable LLM can rationalize external privileged reasoning traces and teach its weaker self (i.e., the version without access to privileged information), we introduce On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD), a framework where a single model acts as both teacher and student by conditioning on different contexts. The teacher policy conditions on privileged information (e.g., verified reasoning traces) while the student policy sees only the question; training minimizes the per-token divergence between these distributions over the student's own rollouts. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, achieving 4-8x token efficiency compared to reinforcement learning methods such as GRPO and superior performance over off-policy distillation methods.