Daily Papers

Structured belief states are crucial for user goal tracking and database query in task-oriented dialog systems. However, training belief trackers often requires expensive turn-level annotations of every user utterance. In this paper we aim at alleviating the reliance on belief state labels in building end-to-end dialog systems, by leveraging unlabeled dialog data towards semi-supervised learning. We propose a probabilistic dialog model, called the LAtent BElief State (LABES) model, where belief states are represented as discrete latent variables and jointly modeled with system responses given user inputs. Such latent variable modeling enables us to develop semi-supervised learning under the principled variational learning framework. Furthermore, we introduce LABES-S2S, which is a copy-augmented Seq2Seq model instantiation of LABES. In supervised experiments, LABES-S2S obtains strong results on three benchmark datasets of different scales. In utilizing unlabeled dialog data, semi-supervised LABES-S2S significantly outperforms both supervised-only and semi-supervised baselines. Remarkably, we can reduce the annotation demands to 50% without performance loss on MultiWOZ.

Autonomous scientific discovery systems increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to propose new hypotheses, but many such systems condition primarily on experimental memory: archives of high-scoring candidates or heuristic summaries of recent trials. We argue that discovery agents should instead maintain explicit, uncertainty-aware beliefs about hypothesis quality. We introduce BayesEvolve, a belief-guided discovery framework that converts experimental evidence into a predictive belief state and uses this belief to guide future experimentation. As a controlled testbed for belief-guided discovery, we evaluate BayesEvolve on shifted BBOB-style black-box optimization tasks, leaving program and laboratory discovery domains to future work. BayesEvolve improves sample efficiency over memory- and archive-guided LLM baselines under a fixed evaluation budget. We further show that the belief state is predictive on held-out candidate pools, that controlled decision-rule ablations favor belief-guided selection with an annealed uncertainty bonus, and that BayesEvolve exhibits productive late-stage concentration rather than unfocused exploration.

Large language model (LLM) agents can now undertake increasingly complex tasks, but the way they organize interaction history into memory does not ensure a coherent understanding of the current world. We introduce PoS, an inference-time framework that constructs and continually maintains explicit belief states as the agent's decision context. Each belief combines an estimate of the current world state with unresolved task requirements, making explicit what the agent still needs to learn and accomplish. To keep this belief reliable and actionable, PoS validates its consistency and monitors task progress to detect Belief Trapping, where the agent continues to act without making meaningful progress toward the goal. Recovery is then tailored to both the trapping pattern and the type of unresolved task requirement. Experiments on four benchmarks spanning execution and diagnosis show that PoS achieves the highest overall performance on every benchmark with all three LLM backbones. Ablations demonstrate the importance of consistency validation and recovery, while context-scaling experiments show resilience to context growth. Together, these results support belief construction and continual maintenance as a foundation for long-horizon context management beyond history retention and compression.

Autoregressive (AR) models remain the standard for natural language generation but still suffer from high latency due to strictly sequential decoding. Recent diffusion-inspired approaches, such as LlaDA and Dream, mitigate this by generating in parallel, yet they suffer from two core limitations: information loss, as predictive distributions for non-finalized tokens are discarded at each step, and premature commitment, where local decisions are made without sufficient global coordination. We introduce Latent Refinement Decoding (LRD), a two-stage framework with Latent Refinement and a Predictive Feedback Loop. The first stage maintains masked positions as distributional mixtures of predicted tokens and the mask embedding, allowing the model to establish more globally consistent beliefs. The second stage progressively finalizes confident tokens while retaining uncertain ones for iterative feedback. KL-divergence dynamics provide a principled and reliable criterion for convergence and early stopping. Experiments across coding (HumanEval +6.3, MBPP +2.6) and reasoning (GSM8K +2.9, MATH500 +3.8) show that LRD improves accuracy while delivering speedups of up to 10.6x, making it a strong and versatile alternative for parallel sequence generation.

We propose a stronger formulation of RL on top of RWKV-style recurrent sequence models, in which the fixed-size recurrent state is explicitly interpreted as a belief state rather than an opaque hidden vector. Instead of conditioning policy and value on a single summary h_t, we maintain a compact uncertainty-aware state b_t = (μ_t, Σ_t) derived from RWKV-style recurrent statistics and let control depend on both memory and uncertainty. This design targets a key weakness of plain fixed-state policies in partially observed settings: they may store evidence, but not necessarily confidence. We present the method, a theoretical program, and a pilot RL experiment with hidden episode-level observation noise together with a test-time noise sweep. The pilot shows that belief-state policies nearly match the best recurrent baseline overall while slightly improving return on the hardest in-distribution regime and under a held-out noise shift. Additional ablations show that this simple belief readout is currently stronger than two more structured extensions, namely gated memory control and privileged belief targets, underscoring the need for richer benchmarks.

Logical reasoning encompasses deduction, induction, and abduction. However, while Large Language Models (LLMs) have effectively mastered the former two, abductive reasoning remains significantly underexplored. Existing frameworks, predominantly designed for static deductive tasks, fail to generalize to abductive reasoning due to unstructured state representation and lack of explicit state control. Consequently, they are inevitably prone to Evidence Fabrication, Context Drift, Failed Backtracking, and Early Stopping. To bridge this gap, we introduce Graph of States (GoS), a general-purpose neuro-symbolic framework tailored for abductive tasks. GoS grounds multi-agent collaboration in a structured belief states, utilizing a causal graph to explicitly encode logical dependencies and a state machine to govern the valid transitions of the reasoning process. By dynamically aligning the reasoning focus with these symbolic constraints, our approach transforms aimless, unconstrained exploration into a convergent, directed search. Extensive evaluations on two real-world datasets demonstrate that GoS significantly outperforms all baselines, providing a robust solution for complex abductive tasks. Code repo and all prompts: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Graph-of-States-5B4E.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Theory of Mind (ToM)x2014the ability to reason about the mental states of other peoplex2014is a key element of our social intelligence. Yet, despite their ever more impressive performance, large-scale neural language models still lack basic theory of mind capabilities out-of-the-box. We posit that simply scaling up models will not imbue them with theory of mind due to the inherently symbolic and implicit nature of the phenomenon, and instead investigate an alternative: can we design a decoding-time algorithm that enhances theory of mind of off-the-shelf neural language models without explicit supervision? We present SymbolicToM, a plug-and-play approach to reason about the belief states of multiple characters in reading comprehension tasks via explicit symbolic representation. More concretely, our approach tracks each entity's beliefs, their estimation of other entities' beliefs, and higher-order levels of reasoning, all through graphical representations, allowing for more precise and interpretable reasoning than previous approaches. Empirical results on the well-known ToMi benchmark (Le et al., 2019) demonstrate that SymbolicToM dramatically enhances off-the-shelf neural networks' theory of mind in a zero-shot setting while showing robust out-of-distribution performance compared to supervised baselines. Our work also reveals spurious patterns in existing theory of mind benchmarks, emphasizing the importance of out-of-distribution evaluation and methods that do not overfit a particular dataset.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

We present the Bayesian Linguistic Forecaster (BLF), an agentic system for binary forecasting that achieves state-of-the-art performance on the ForecastBench benchmark. The system is built on three ideas. (1) Linguistic belief state: a semi-structured representation combining numerical probability estimates with natural-language evidence summaries, updated by the LLM at each step of an iterative tool-use loop. This contrasts with the common approach of appending all retrieved evidence to an ever-growing, unstructured context. (2) Hierarchical multi-trial aggregation: running K independent trials and combining them using logit-space averaging shrinkage with a data-dependent prior. (3) Hierarchical calibration: Platt scaling with a hierarchical prior, which avoids over-shrinking extreme predictions for sources with skewed base rates. On 400 questions from the ForecastBench leaderboard, BLF outperforms all the top public methods, including Cassi, GPT-5, Grok~4.20, and Foresight-32B. Careful ablation studies, using mixed effects analysis to control for question variability (which accounts for 62\% of the variance in performance), reveals that all 3 components contribute to the overall gains, but some components matter more than others, depending on the base LLM, and the setting (e.g.\ with or without a crowd prior). All our experiments are based on a robust back-testing framework which we develop, which has a leakage rate below 1.5\%, and may be of independent interest.

Language agents acting over long horizons must maintain beliefs about tool states, object locations, graph edges, and subgoal dependencies. When these beliefs drift, failures can be fixed neither by longer reasoning traces nor by ordinary self-reflection, since the missing evidence lies in the environment. We formulate environment probing as a budgeted decision problem for structured agent world models: before acting, the agent may query the current value of one belief field, update its table, and pay one interaction step. We introduce EnvProbe, a simple scoring policy that combines task criticality, staleness, verbalized uncertainty, and dependency role. A type-stratified analysis separates the benefit of belief repair from the cost of displaced task actions and predicts different behavior for procedural and spatial beliefs. In three controlled environments with gold belief states, EnvProbe improves terminal world-state accuracy over periodic probing by 11.76 percentage points on procedural tool-dependency tasks, 3.79 points on spatial tasks, and 6.45 points overall. Ablations show that task-structural terms are the main source of the gains, while self-reported uncertainty is unreliable under confident wrong beliefs. The results suggest that agent calibration should be treated as an action-selection problem over environment evidence, not only as a model-internal reasoning problem.

Existing dialog system models require extensive human annotations and are difficult to generalize to different tasks. The recent success of large pre-trained language models such as BERT and GPT-2 (Devlin et al., 2019; Radford et al., 2019) have suggested the effectiveness of incorporating language priors in down-stream NLP tasks. However, how much pre-trained language models can help dialog response generation is still under exploration. In this paper, we propose a simple, general, and effective framework: Alternating Roles Dialog Model (ARDM). ARDM models each speaker separately and takes advantage of the large pre-trained language model. It requires no supervision from human annotations such as belief states or dialog acts to achieve effective conversations. ARDM outperforms or is on par with state-of-the-art methods on two popular task-oriented dialog datasets: CamRest676 and MultiWOZ. Moreover, we can generalize ARDM to more challenging, non-collaborative tasks such as persuasion. In persuasion tasks, ARDM is capable of generating human-like responses to persuade people to donate to a charity.

We introduce RFC Bench, a benchmark for evaluating large language models on financial misinformation under realistic news. RFC Bench operates at the paragraph level and captures the contextual complexity of financial news where meaning emerges from dispersed cues. The benchmark defines two complementary tasks: reference free misinformation detection and comparison based diagnosis using paired original perturbed inputs. Experiments reveal a consistent pattern: performance is substantially stronger when comparative context is available, while reference free settings expose significant weaknesses, including unstable predictions and elevated invalid outputs. These results indicate that current models struggle to maintain coherent belief states without external grounding. By highlighting this gap, RFC Bench provides a structured testbed for studying reference free reasoning and advancing more reliable financial misinformation detection in real world settings.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Even though machine learning has become the major scene in dialogue research community, the real breakthrough has been blocked by the scale of data available. To address this fundamental obstacle, we introduce the Multi-Domain Wizard-of-Oz dataset (MultiWOZ), a fully-labeled collection of human-human written conversations spanning over multiple domains and topics. At a size of 10k dialogues, it is at least one order of magnitude larger than all previous annotated task-oriented corpora. The contribution of this work apart from the open-sourced dataset labelled with dialogue belief states and dialogue actions is two-fold: firstly, a detailed description of the data collection procedure along with a summary of data structure and analysis is provided. The proposed data-collection pipeline is entirely based on crowd-sourcing without the need of hiring professional annotators; secondly, a set of benchmark results of belief tracking, dialogue act and response generation is reported, which shows the usability of the data and sets a baseline for future studies.

Transformers replace recurrence with a memory that grows with sequence length and self-attention that enables ad-hoc look ups over past tokens. Consequently, they lack an inherent incentive to compress history into compact latent states with consistent transition rules. This often leads to learning solutions that generalize poorly. We introduce Next-Latent Prediction (NextLat), which extends standard next-token training with self-supervised predictions in the latent space. Specifically, NextLat trains a transformer to learn latent representations that are predictive of its next latent state given the next output token. Theoretically, we show that these latents provably converge to belief states, compressed information of the history necessary to predict the future. This simple auxiliary objective also injects a recurrent inductive bias into transformers, while leaving their architecture, parallel training, and inference unchanged. NextLat effectively encourages the transformer to form compact internal world models with its own belief states and transition dynamics -- a crucial property absent in standard next-token prediction transformers. Empirically, across benchmarks targeting core sequence modeling competencies -- world modeling, reasoning, planning, and language modeling -- NextLat demonstrates significant gains over standard next-token training in downstream accuracy, representation compression, and lookahead planning. NextLat stands as a simple and efficient paradigm for shaping transformer representations toward stronger generalization.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Simulating human reasoning in open-ended tasks has long been a central aspiration in AI and cognitive science. While large language models now approximate human responses at scale, they remain tuned to population-level consensus, often erasing the individuality of reasoning styles and belief trajectories. To advance the vision of more human-like reasoning in machines, we introduce HugAgent (HUman-Grounded AGENT Benchmark), which rethinks human reasoning simulation along three dimensions: (i) from averaged to individualized reasoning, (ii) from behavioral mimicry to cognitive alignment, and (iii) from vignette-based to open-ended data. The benchmark evaluates whether a model can predict a specific person's behavioral responses and the underlying reasoning dynamics in out-of-distribution scenarios, given partial evidence of their prior views. HugAgent combines structured questionnaires with semi-structured think-aloud interviews to collect ecologically valid belief states, belief updates, and reasoning traces from human participants. Our experiments reveal a clear asymmetry: models recover a person's belief state from their own context reasonably well, but struggle to predict belief updates under intervention. Cross-person and cross-domain controls trace this gap to associative matching within a topic rather than identity-consistent reasoning, suggesting that progress requires better-calibrated change detection, not simply more context. We scope the benchmark to self-reported belief reasoning in three policy domains: healthcare, surveillance, and zoning. The benchmark, along with its complete data collection pipeline and companion chatbot, is open-sourced as HugAgent (https://github.com/jajamoa/HugAgent) and TraceYourThinking (https://github.com/jajamoa/trace-your-thinking).

Agentic reasoning enables large reasoning models (LRMs) to dynamically acquire external knowledge, but yet optimizing the retrieval process remains challenging due to the lack of dense, principled reward signals. In this paper, we introduce InfoReasoner, a unified framework that incentivizes effective information seeking via a synthetic semantic information gain reward. Theoretically, we redefine information gain as uncertainty reduction over the model's belief states, establishing guarantees, including non-negativity, telescoping additivity, and channel monotonicity. Practically, to enable scalable optimization without manual retrieval annotations, we propose an output-aware intrinsic estimator that computes information gain directly from the model's output distributions using semantic clustering via bidirectional textual entailment. This intrinsic reward guides the policy to maximize epistemic progress, enabling efficient training via Group Relative Policy Optimxization (GRPO). Experiments across seven question-answering benchmarks demonstrate that InfoReasoner consistently outperforms strong retrieval-augmented baselines, achieving up to 5.4% average accuracy improvement. Our work provides a theoretically grounded and scalable path toward agentic reasoning with retrieval.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

Today's autonomous agents, largely driven by foundation models (FMs), can understand natural language instructions and solve long-horizon tasks with human-like reasoning. However, current human-robot interaction largely follows a one-way master-apprentice technique where the agent passively executes commands without reciprocal learning. This neglects the co-adaptive, multi-turn nature of everyday human interactions. We introduce symbiotic interactive learning (SIL), a bidirectional co-adaptation framework in a shared latent task space, where human and agent maintain joint belief states that evolve with interaction history. This enables proactive clarification, adaptive suggestions, and shared plan refinement. SIL leverages FMs for spatial perception and reasoning, together with a triplet-loss-trained neural encoder that grounds FMs' outputs into task-specific latent representations. To support long-term stability as tasks evolve, SIL uses episodic and semantic memory architectures, regularised via elastic weight consolidation to mitigate catastrophic forgetting. We evaluate SIL on simulated and real-world embodied tasks, including instruction following, information retrieval, query-oriented reasoning, and interactive dialogue, achieving a 90.4% task completion rate and a belief alignment score of ρapprox 0.83, an absolute improvement of about 20 percentage points over the best ablations. Demos and resources: https://linusnep.github.io/SIL/.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are deployed in complex environments -- such as massive codebases, enterprise databases, and conversational histories -- where the relevant state far exceeds their context windows. To navigate these spaces, an agent must iteratively explore the environment to find relevant information. However, without explicit infrastructure, an agent's working memory can degrade into lossy representations of the search state, resulting in redundant work (e.g. repetitive looping) and premature stopping. In this work, we formalize this challenge as the Context Gathering Decision Process (CGDP), a specialized Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, where an agent's objective is to adaptively refine its belief state to isolate the necessary information for a task. We model an LLM's behavior as approximate Thompson Sampling within this CGDP, and introduce a predicate-based method that decomposes an LLM's implicit search into explicit and modular operations. We then derive two plug-and-play interventions for iterative LLM agents: a persistent, predicate-based belief state that bounds context while preserving multi-hop reasoning, and a programmatic exhaustion gate that halts unproductive search without premature stopping. Across four methods and three question-answering domains, we empirically validate that replacing an LLM's implicit state with our CGDP-motivated belief state improves multi-hop reasoning by up to 11.4%; while the modular programmatic exhaustion detection saves up to 39% of tokens without any degradation in agent performance. Ultimately, we argue that framing the LLM agent loop as a CGDP can guide the design of modular, non-interfering improvements to agentic search harnesses.

We introduce EgoToM, a new video question-answering benchmark that extends Theory-of-Mind (ToM) evaluation to egocentric domains. Using a causal ToM model, we generate multi-choice video QA instances for the Ego4D dataset to benchmark the ability to predict a camera wearer's goals, beliefs, and next actions. We study the performance of both humans and state of the art multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on these three interconnected inference problems. Our evaluation shows that MLLMs achieve close to human-level accuracy on inferring goals from egocentric videos. However, MLLMs (including the largest ones we tested with over 100B parameters) fall short of human performance when inferring the camera wearers' in-the-moment belief states and future actions that are most consistent with the unseen video future. We believe that our results will shape the future design of an important class of egocentric digital assistants which are equipped with a reasonable model of the user's internal mental states.

Large Language Models (LLMs) generate fluent text, yet whether they truly understand the world or merely produce plausible texts about it remains contested. We propose an architectural principle, the mouth is not the brain, that explicitly separates world models from language models. Our architecture comprises three components: a DBM that captures domain structure as an energy-based world model, an adapter that projects latent belief states into embedding space, and a frozen GPT-2 that provides linguistic competence without domain knowledge. We instantiate this framework in the consumer review domain using Amazon smartphone reviews. Experiments demonstrate that (1) world model conditioning achieves lower cross-entropy loss and higher semantic similarity than architectural baselines including direct projection and full fine-tuning, while qualitative analysis reveals that soft prompt conditioning resolves a trade-off that prompt-based approaches cannot: simple prompts lack expressiveness while detailed prompts cause output collapse in small LLMs; (2) the DBM's energy function distinguishes coherent from incoherent market configurations, assigning higher energy to implausible brand-price combinations; and (3) interventions on specific attributes propagate causally to generated text with intervened outputs exhibiting distributions statistically consistent with naturally occurring samples sharing the target configuration. These findings suggest that even small-scale language models can achieve consistent, controllable generation when connected to an appropriate world model, providing empirical support for separating linguistic competence from world understanding.

True general intelligence requires not only a model of the physical world but also a social world model: the capacity to infer how individual mental states interact and crystallize into group-level outcomes. Despite notable progress in individual-level Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, existing multimodal large language models fail at this broader task. Collective behavior emerges non-linearly from social tensions, conformity dynamics, and structural constraints, meaning it cannot be recovered by merely summing individual intentions. We present GroupToM-Bench, the first multimodal benchmark for group-level ToM, built around a causal chain spanning micro-level BDI states (belief, desire, intention), meso-level group tension and structural constraints, and macro-level outcome prediction and mechanistic attribution. To probe this full arc, we develop a seven-level cognitive audit framework. Experiments reveal a gap between current models and human baselines, highlighting a failure to process social structures and non-linear collective dynamics.

Large language models (LLMs) progressively revise their predictions across Transformer layers, yet we typically observe only the final output, discarding the trajectory through which it is formed. We introduce Belief-Trajectory Energy(BTE), a model-grounded measure that characterizes an input through the layerwise predictive revisions it induces in a model. By mapping intermediate states into a shared predictive space, BTE provides a principled measure of belief change that can be summarized as either a scalar or a structured depth profile. Theoretically, we show that local BTE corresponds to predictive revision under the Fisher-Rao geometry, while the sequence of revisions captures information beyond the initial-to-final belief change. Empirically, scalar BTE provides a model-relative signal of difficulty across diverse reasoning tasks, while richer BTE representations support human-LLM review detection and fine-grained generator attribution, reaching up to 0.998 macro-AUROC and 95.6% eight-way attribution accuracy. Further analysis shows that BTE develops throughout pretraining and is selectively reshaped by targeted training, demonstrating that the resulting measurement reflects what the scoring model has learned. Together, our results establish belief trajectories as a principled model-grounded signal and suggest a broader perspective in which learned models can themselves serve as instruments for characterizing the data they process. More demonstrations can be found at https://yingjiahao14.github.io/BTE-web/.

Traditional neural network models for intent inference rely heavily on observable states and struggle to generalize across diverse tasks and dynamic environments. Recent advances in Vision Language Models (VLMs) and Vision Language Action (VLA) models introduce common-sense reasoning through large-scale multimodal pretraining, enabling zero-shot performance across tasks. However, these models still lack explicit mechanisms to represent and update belief, limiting their ability to reason like humans or capture the evolving human intent over long-horizon. To address this, we propose a belief-aware VLM framework that integrates retrieval-based memory and reinforcement learning. Instead of learning an explicit belief model, we approximate belief using a vector-based memory that retrieves relevant multimodal context, which is incorporated into the VLM for reasoning. We further refine decision-making using a reinforcement learning policy over the VLM latent space. We evaluate our approach on publicly available VQA datasets such as HD-EPIC and demonstrate consistent improvements over zero-shot baselines, highlighting the importance of belief-aware reasoning.

As language models become more capable, long-term collaboration in learning, reasoning, and decision-making calls for a deeper understanding of the people they serve. Yet training such human-aware language models faces a fundamental supervision gap because current datasets for LLM assistant training contain few if any well-informed responses explicitly grounded in users' unspoken beliefs and goals. Scaling such supervision is inherently constrained, as users' underlying states are not directly observable. We thus propose the Mind2Dialogue framework to mitigate this gap by simulating users' mental states and turning them into privileged supervision for human-aware training. Specifically, we first propose a psychology-guided simulator that preserves personal characteristics while updating mental states through interaction to generate coherent conversations. The key idea is to enforce a shared evolving mental state that drives user behavior and guides an Oracle assistant's responses. Our privileged distillation then trains models on the Oracle's well-informed responses to assist users without direct access to their mental states at deployment. Moreover, we propose to evaluate human-aware learning by combining personalization and theory of mind, examining how models understand people and act on that understanding. Training on the full Mind2Dialogue corpus improves every reported personalization metric over the corresponding Qwen, Llama, and OLMo instruction-tuned baselines, including gains of 26.6 to 40.9 percentage points in preference-following generation. The gains extend to belief and action reasoning on Qwen and Llama, beyond personalized assistance. Looking forward, Mind2Dialogue makes user simulation a foundation for genuine AI collaborators that understand beliefs and intentions behind people's words and support their long-term goals across education, work, and everyday life.

Existing Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks diverge from real-world scenarios in three aspects: 1) they assess a limited range of mental states such as beliefs, 2) false beliefs are not comprehensively explored, and 3) the diverse personality traits of characters are overlooked. To address these challenges, we introduce ToMATO, a new ToM benchmark formulated as multiple-choice QA over conversations. ToMATO is generated via LLM-LLM conversations featuring information asymmetry. By employing a prompting method that requires role-playing LLMs to verbalize their thoughts before each utterance, we capture both first- and second-order mental states across five categories: belief, intention, desire, emotion, and knowledge. These verbalized thoughts serve as answers to questions designed to assess the mental states of characters within conversations. Furthermore, the information asymmetry introduced by hiding thoughts from others induces the generation of false beliefs about various mental states. Assigning distinct personality traits to LLMs further diversifies both utterances and thoughts. ToMATO consists of 5.4k questions, 753 conversations, and 15 personality trait patterns. Our analysis shows that this dataset construction approach frequently generates false beliefs due to the information asymmetry between role-playing LLMs, and effectively reflects diverse personalities. We evaluate nine LLMs on ToMATO and find that even GPT-4o mini lags behind human performance, especially in understanding false beliefs, and lacks robustness to various personality traits.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

Variable-order Markov models generate sequences over a finite alphabet by conditioning each symbol on the longest available suffix of the generated history. Regular constraints, by contrast, describe finite-horizon control requirements by an automaton: fixed positions, forced endings, metrical patterns, and forbidden copied fragments are all special cases. Existing exact methods already handle regular constraints with belief propagation for first-order Markov chains. The contribution here is the variable-order extension: identifying the state space on which the existing BP-regular machinery must be run when the generator is a variable-order/backoff model. A first-order constraint layer can enforce useful support conditions, but it computes future mass after merging histories that a variable-order generator deliberately keeps distinct. We formalize this mismatch and give the sparse construction obtained by replacing the first-order Markov state with the observed context state, then taking the standard product with the regular constraint automaton. For a fixed trained context graph and automaton, inference is linear in the sequence horizon; in general it is polynomial in the number of reachable product edges. This gives the correct variable-order distribution conditioned on regular constraints without expanding to all K-tuples. The same finite-source interface supports reversible data augmentation by inverse count lookup, matching materialized transposition augmentation without storing transformed corpora. We also separate exact BP inference from generation-time backoff policies, such as singleton avoidance, whose stochastic semantics must be made explicit if exactness is claimed.

Persistent spatial memory enables embodied agents to navigate familiar environments across repeated visits. However, targets may move while unobserved, including during navigation, making remembered locations unreliable by the time an agent arrives. Despite advances in memory retrieval and state prediction, accounting for continued hidden world evolution and revising beliefs under limited visibility remain challenging. We study Evolving-World Navigation, where agents infer target locations from intermittent observations, predict their states at inspection time, and revise beliefs using visual evidence. We propose EvolvingNav, which constructs a time-indexed belief from timestamped 3D object histories through a structured persistence-relocation model. The belief distinguishes persistence at the last observed location from relocation to alternative locations and retains probability mass outside the known candidate set. An event-driven filter propagates the current belief as time elapses, forecasts target occupancy at candidate inspection times, and incorporates new RGB-D evidence. Negative observations downweight location hypotheses according to calibrated, visibility-conditioned detection probabilities, while evidence tracking prevents repeated use of the same observations. A frozen, zero-shot vision-language controller uses the updated belief to choose actions and replan. We further introduce EvoWorld-Bench, a benchmark grounded in human activity traces, comprising 54 scenes and 803,680 tasks with controlled changes before and during navigation. In simulation and real-robot experiments, EvolvingNav improves navigation success and search efficiency over the evaluated baselines. Paired experiments show the clearest gains under learnable temporal patterns, while ablations demonstrate the value of preserving uncertainty and incorporating visibility-aware evidence.

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

LLM-based agents are increasingly used to simulate deliberative interactions such as negotiation, conflict resolution, and multi-turn opinion exchange. Yet generated transcripts often do not reveal why an agent's stance changes: movement may reflect evidence uptake, anchoring, role drift, echoing, or changed prompt and retrieval context. We introduce the Belief Engine (BE), an auditable belief-update layer that treats "belief" as an evidential state over a proposition and exposes it as scalar stance. BE extracts arguments into structured memory and updates stance with a log-odds rule controlled by evidence uptake u and prior anchoring a. Across multiple base LLMs, parameter sweeps show that these controls reliably shape stance dynamics while preserving an evidence-level update trail. On DEBATE, a human deliberation dataset with pre/post opinions, BE best reconstructs participants whose final stance follows extracted evidence; stable and evidence-opposed cases instead point to anchoring or factors outside the extracted evidence stream. BE provides configurable infrastructure for studying evidence-grounded deliberation, where openness, commitment, convergence, and disagreement can be tied to explicit update assumptions rather than hidden prompt effects.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Driver alerting from dashcam video requires sequential decision-making under partial observability: a system must decide not only whether a scene is risky, but also when the evidence is sufficient to warn. Most existing accident anticipation models output a binary risk score, leaving ambiguous scenes to be handled by thresholding. We propose VLAlert, a vision-language alerting framework that casts warning generation as a tri-action policy over SILENT, OBSERVE, and ALERT. The OBSERVE action acts as an internal evidence-gathering decision that delays uncertain warnings and changes the next observation window, creating a lightweight perception-action loop for adaptive alerting. VLAlert uses Qwen3-VL-4B as a safety-evidence generator and pools hidden states from structured belief spans to form compact representations for danger estimation and policy prediction. We evaluate VLAlert on VLAlert-Bench, a unified per-tick benchmark from four real-world dashcam alert datasets, and further test transfer to held-out naturalistic ADAS takeover clips. On VLAlert-Bench validation, VLAlert achieves the highest deployment-oriented utility among tested baselines, with DAUS 0.4878 compared with 0.4752 for Open-BADAS, and improves AUROC, AP_tick, F1_t, and balanced accuracy from 0.610, 0.176, 0.276, and 0.581 to 0.689, 0.195, 0.297, and 0.648, respectively. On 221 held-out ADAS-TO-Critic clips, VLAlert improves R@5s from 74.2% to 88.7% and F1 from 0.585 to 0.686. These results indicate that adaptive observation and safety-focused VLM representations provide measurable gains for driver-facing alert decisions.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly expected to maintain coherent, long-term personalized memory, yet current benchmarks primarily measure static fact retrieval, overlooking the ability to revise stored beliefs when new evidence emerges. We identify a critical and underexplored failure mode, Implicit Conflict: a later observation invalidates an earlier memory without explicit negation, requiring contextual inference and commonsense reasoning to detect. To rigorously evaluate this capability, we introduce STALE, a benchmark of 400 expert-validated conflict scenarios (1,200 evaluation queries across three probing dimensions) spanning over 100 everyday topics with contexts up to 150K tokens. We propose a three-dimensional probing framework that tests State Resolution (detecting that a prior belief is outdated), Premise Resistance (rejecting queries that falsely presuppose a stale state), and Implicit Policy Adaptation (proactively applying updated states in downstream behavior). A systematic evaluation of frontier LLMs and specialized memory frameworks reveals a pervasive gap between retrieving updated evidence and acting on it, with even the best evaluated model achieving only 55.2% overall accuracy. Models often accept outdated assumptions embedded in a user's query, and they struggle to recognize when a change in one aspect of the user's state should invalidate related memories. To establish an initial baseline for state-aware memory, we further present CUPMem, a prototype that strengthens write-time revision through structured state consolidation and propagation-aware search, suggesting that explicit state adjudication is a promising direction for robust agentic memory.

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

Reinforcement learning (RL) with verifiable rewards constructs trajectory-level advantage estimates, yet it often fails to credit the few pivotal decisions that determine outcomes in long-horizon, multi-turn agentic tasks. Recent work introduces privileged self-distillation for credit assignment, providing denser supervision, but it remains unclear how such local signals should represent sequential credit. We propose AgentOPSD, a critic-free, recursive method for turn-level credit assignment in agentic reinforcement learning. AgentOPSD aggregates token-level teacher-student log-probability gaps into turn-level evidence and recursively updates a Bayesian belief state in log-odds space. This yields a principled reweighting scheme that converts sparse outcome supervision into turn-level credit signals and identifies pivotal turns through the marginal belief revision between consecutive states. The method is fully compatible with standard policy optimization and requires neither an additional critic nor extra rollouts. We evaluate AgentOPSD on ALFWorld, WebShop, and Search-QA using Qwen2.5 models at two scales (3B and 7B). AgentOPSD outperforms GRPO and strong self-distillation baselines, achieving 89.1% success on ALFWorld with Qwen2.5-7B. Ablation studies attribute the gains to turn-level aggregation and history-dependent recursive belief updates.

We study quantum corrections in the gravitational path integral around nearly 1/16-BPS black holes in asymptotically AdS_5 times S^5 space, dual to heavy states in 4D N=4 super Yang-Mills. The analysis provides a gravitational explanation of why 1/16-BPS black holes exhibit an exact degeneracy at large N and why all such states have the same charges, confirming the belief that the superconformal index precisely counts the entropy of extremal black holes. We show the presence of a gap of order N^{-2} between the 1/16-BPS black holes and the lightest near-BPS black holes within the same charge sector. This is the first example of such a gap for black holes states within the context of AdS_5 holography. We also derive the spectrum of near-BPS states that lie above this gap. Our computation relies on finding the correct version of the N=2 super-Schwarzian theory which captures the breaking of the SU(1, 1|1) symmetry when the black hole has finite temperature and non-zero chemical potential. Finally, we comment on possible stringy and non-perturbative corrections that can affect the black hole spectrum.

"Read the room" is a significant social reasoning capability in human daily life. Humans can infer others' mental states from subtle social cues. Previous social reasoning tasks and datasets lack complexity (e.g., simple scenes, basic interactions, incomplete mental state variables, single-step reasoning, etc.) and fall far short of the challenges present in real-life social interactions. In this paper, we contribute a valuable, high-quality, and comprehensive video dataset named R^3-VQA with precise and fine-grained annotations of social events and mental states (i.e., belief, intent, desire, and emotion) as well as corresponding social causal chains in complex social scenarios. Moreover, we include human-annotated and model-generated QAs. Our task R^3-VQA includes three aspects: Social Event Understanding, Mental State Estimation, and Social Causal Reasoning. As a benchmark, we comprehensively evaluate the social reasoning capabilities and consistencies of current state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). Comprehensive experiments show that (i) LVLMs are still far from human-level consistent social reasoning in complex social scenarios; (ii) Theory of Mind (ToM) prompting can help LVLMs perform better on social reasoning tasks. We provide some of our dataset and codes in supplementary material and will release our full dataset and codes upon acceptance.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Algorithmic trading relies on machine learning models to make trading decisions. Despite strong in-sample performance, these models often degrade when confronted with evolving real-world market regimes, which can shift dramatically due to macroeconomic changes-e.g., monetary policy updates or unanticipated fluctuations in participant behavior. We identify two challenges that perpetuate this mismatch: (1) insufficient robustness in existing policy against uncertainties in high-level market fluctuations, and (2) the absence of a realistic and diverse simulation environment for training, leading to policy overfitting. To address these issues, we propose a Bayesian Robust Framework that systematically integrates a macro-conditioned generative model with robust policy learning. On the data side, to generate realistic and diverse data, we propose a macro-conditioned GAN-based generator that leverages macroeconomic indicators as primary control variables, synthesizing data with faithful temporal, cross-instrument, and macro correlations. On the policy side, to learn robust policy against market fluctuations, we cast the trading process as a two-player zero-sum Bayesian Markov game, wherein an adversarial agent simulates shifting regimes by perturbing macroeconomic indicators in the macro-conditioned generator, while the trading agent-guided by a quantile belief network-maintains and updates its belief over hidden market states. The trading agent seeks a Robust Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium via Bayesian neural fictitious self-play, stabilizing learning under adversarial market perturbations. Extensive experiments on 9 financial instruments demonstrate that our framework outperforms 9 state-of-the-art baselines. In extreme events like the COVID, our method shows improved profitability and risk management, offering a reliable solution for trading under uncertain and shifting market dynamics.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may ask whether composing the inversions of the component processes gives the same belief update as the inversion of the whole. We answer this question affirmatively, showing that the relevant compositional structure is precisely that of the lens pattern, and that we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a corresponding fibred category. We define a general notion of (mixed) Bayesian lens, and discuss the (un)lawfulness of these lenses when their contravariant components are exact Bayesian inversions. We prove our main result both abstractly and concretely, for both discrete and continuous states, taking care to illustrate the common structures.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are being used as policies for autonomous decision-making and planning in many domains. Despite their strong reasoning capabilities, LLMs struggle with long-horizon tasks, especially under partial observability. World models are a promising way to enhance policy performance, both during training and inference. During inference, agents currently use world models to simulate the consequences of candidate actions before choosing an action, which can improve decision-making. However, we argue that simulation alone is an incomplete interface for decision-making under partial observability: simulation does not adequately capture uncertainty about the current state, which agents may need for accurate decision-making. We address this limitation with Belief-Based World Models (BB-WMs), which maintain a belief that LLMs can query to access information on what is known and uncertain about the current state. Before developing methods to learn accurate BB-WMs, this paper focuses on a more fundamental question: does exposing a world model's belief directly to an LLM policy improve decision-making? Our results show that giving LLM agents access to beliefs improves task performance under partial observability, while remaining complementary to existing simulation-based world models. Code: https://github.com/skumar-ml/belief-world-models.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

The rapid development of mobile GUI agents has stimulated growing research interest in long-horizon task automation. However, building agents for these tasks faces a critical bottleneck: the reliance on ever-expanding interaction history incurs substantial context overhead. Existing context management and compression techniques often fail to preserve vital semantic information, leading to degraded task performance. We propose AgentProg, a program-guided approach for agent context management that reframes the interaction history as a program with variables and control flow. By organizing information according to the structure of program, this structure provides a principled mechanism to determine which information should be retained and which can be discarded. We further integrate a global belief state mechanism inspired by Belief MDP framework to handle partial observability and adapt to unexpected environmental changes. Experiments on AndroidWorld and our extended long-horizon task suite demonstrate that AgentProg has achieved the state-of-the-art success rates on these benchmarks. More importantly, it maintains robust performance on long-horizon tasks while baseline methods experience catastrophic degradation. Our system is open-sourced at https://github.com/MobileLLM/AgentProg.

Large language models (LLMs) define a distribution over text, which can be viewed as a probabilistic representation of uncertainty: sampling K responses yields a belief state - responses a model deems plausible. Existing work exploits this representation for narrow tasks like either decoding or selective prediction, and often requires manual interventions, not controlling generation directly. We propose Belief-Augmented Generation (BAG): grounding LLMs in their own belief state via the prompt and letting them reason over these K samples to decide on a conversational strategy: answer, clarify, or abstain. In a multi-turn ambiguous QA setting, we find that LLMs by default rarely clarify or abstain, ignoring uncertainty about the input or facts. BAG improves QA accuracy across six models and yields strategy decisions more faithful to the belief state than prompt-only baselines. Disentangling when to clarify from when to abstain, however, remains challenging.

Psychiatric consultation requires agents to elicit discriminative evidence, map uncertain narratives to diagnostic criteria, and decide when evidence suffices. Existing dialogue and retrieval-augmented systems condition policies on raw histories or appended passages, leaving observed evidence, missing checks, differentials, and support reliability entangled. We introduce MIND, a criteria-grounded evidence-state decision interface. At each turn, MIND constructs a typed state containing observed evidence, unresolved criterion checks, active differentials, criterion-linked supports, and reliability metadata. A training-split Psychiatric Reasoning Bank supplies gated supports, turning retrieval into state construction rather than prompt injection. The same state conditions action selection, process rewards, information-gain scoring, and trajectory rectification. Under EMR-grounded simulator protocols, MIND improves accuracy by 8.8 and 7.3 points over strong inference-only, RAG, and RL baselines, with gains transferring to public MDD-5k dialogues. Matched interventions attribute these gains to the shared state rather than prompt length, retrieval text, or formatting. MIND targets screening-level decision support, not autonomous diagnosis. Code is available at https://github.com/Lingxi-mental-health/MIND.Å

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Humans can attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unknown to what extent this ability results from an innate biological endowment or from experience accrued through child development, particularly exposure to language describing others' mental states. We test the viability of the language exposure hypothesis by assessing whether models exposed to large quantities of human language display sensitivity to the implied knowledge states of characters in written passages. In pre-registered analyses, we present a linguistic version of the False Belief Task to both human participants and a Large Language Model, GPT-3. Both are sensitive to others' beliefs, but while the language model significantly exceeds chance behavior, it does not perform as well as the humans, nor does it explain the full extent of their behavior -- despite being exposed to more language than a human would in a lifetime. This suggests that while statistical learning from language exposure may in part explain how humans develop the ability to reason about the mental states of others, other mechanisms are also responsible.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

This monograph attempts a theory of every 'thing' that can be distinguished from other things in a statistical sense. The ensuing statistical independencies, mediated by Markov blankets, speak to a recursive composition of ensembles (of things) at increasingly higher spatiotemporal scales. This decomposition provides a description of small things; e.g., quantum mechanics - via the Schrodinger equation, ensembles of small things - via statistical mechanics and related fluctuation theorems, through to big things - via classical mechanics. These descriptions are complemented with a Bayesian mechanics for autonomous or active things. Although this work provides a formulation of every thing, its main contribution is to examine the implications of Markov blankets for self-organisation to nonequilibrium steady-state. In brief, we recover an information geometry and accompanying free energy principle that allows one to interpret the internal states of something as representing or making inferences about its external states. The ensuing Bayesian mechanics is compatible with quantum, statistical and classical mechanics and may offer a formal description of lifelike particles.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

Long-horizon agents often struggle to recover from failures whose causes lie several steps earlier, beyond what local reflection or backtracking can resolve. We introduce BELIEFWEAVER, a framework that combines persistent evidence across attempts with prospective reasoning over repair directions. It maintains a relational belief state over frontiers, attempts, observations, and checkpoints. Execution evidence updates related frontier priorities across attempts and rollback, while diagnostic evidence gates execution. An implicit world model (IWM) evaluates repair hypotheses, predicts progress, and identifies relations among frontiers to guide exploration. We further distill these recurring IWM reasoning components into a 9B student through supervised fine-tuning and on-policy distillation (OPD). Across three terminal-based benchmarks, BELIEFWEAVER improves aggregate final score by 5.1 percentage points over native Terminus-2 continuation, with positive trends in exploration efficiency. The distilled 9B student improves final score by 9.8 percentage points over the reported native baseline while reducing estimated teacher API cost by 54.8% relative to the matched teacher. These results show that persistent evidence and prospective reasoning can improve recovery in long-horizon agent tasks while substantially reducing reliance on teacher-model inference.

We show that deep neural networks, including transformers and RNNs, pretrained as usual on next-token prediction, intrinsically discover and represent beliefs over 'quantum' and 'post-quantum' low-dimensional generative models of their training data -- as if performing iterative Bayesian updates over the latent state of this world model during inference as they observe more context. Notably, neural nets easily find these representation whereas there is no finite classical circuit that would do the job. The corresponding geometric relationships among neural activations induced by different input sequences are found to be largely independent of neural-network architecture. Each point in this geometry corresponds to a history-induced probability density over all possible futures, and the relative displacement of these points reflects the difference in mechanism and magnitude for how these distinct pasts affect the future.

Task-oriented dialogue requires maintaining and updating information across turns, yet language models expose no explicit belief-state object. We study how conversational state is represented, updated, and used inside eight instruction-tuned language models from four families on MultiWOZ and SGD. Structure and values separate: which domains, slots, and requests are active is linearly readable just before the model acts, whereas exact values are far more readable where the user stated them. After a user changes a value, both values remain accessible at their mentions, and causal interventions show that both continue to influence the model's action. In natural closed-loop interaction, query failures separate into cases of weak structural support, incorrect value resolution, and failure to deploy otherwise-supported constraints, with targeted interventions producing systematically different repair behavior across these cases. These findings motivate a state-action controller that starts from the base model action and selectively edits it using structural readouts, without requiring a complete predicted belief state as an intermediate representation. On held-out MultiWOZ interaction across five models, it raises the base model exact-query accuracy from .318 to .621 and task success from .272 to .371 at negligible added cost. Overall, reliable interaction requires not only retaining conversational information, but resolving which available constraints currently apply and ensuring that they govern action.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

We introduce the "Belief State Transformer", a next-token predictor that takes both a prefix and suffix as inputs, with a novel objective of predicting both the next token for the prefix and the previous token for the suffix. The Belief State Transformer effectively learns to solve challenging problems that conventional forward-only transformers struggle with, in a domain-independent fashion. Key to this success is learning a compact belief state that captures all relevant information necessary for accurate predictions. Empirical ablations show that each component of the model is essential in difficult scenarios where standard Transformers fall short. For the task of story writing with known prefixes and suffixes, our approach outperforms the Fill-in-the-Middle method for reaching known goals and demonstrates improved performance even when the goals are unknown. Altogether, the Belief State Transformer enables more efficient goal-conditioned decoding, better test-time inference, and high-quality text representations on small scale problems. Website: https://sites.google.com/view/belief-state-transformer

Memory-augmented LLM agents have advanced personalized recommendation, yet existing approaches universally adopt flat memory representations that conflate ephemeral signals with stable preferences, and none provides a complete lifecycle governing how memory should evolve. We propose MARS (Memory-Augmented Agentic Recommender System), a framework that treats recommendation as a partially observable problem and maintains a structured belief state that progressively abstracts noisy behavioral observations into a compact estimate of user preferences. MARS organizes this belief state into three tiers: event memory buffers raw signals, preference memory maintains fine-grained mutable chunks with explicit strength and evidence tracking, and profile memory distills all preferences into a coherent natural language narrative. A complete lifecycle of six operations -- extraction, reinforcement, weakening, consolidation, forgetting, and resynthesis -- is adaptively scheduled by an LLM-based planner rather than fixed-interval heuristics. Experiments on four InstructRec benchmark domains show that MARS achieves state-of-the-art performance with average improvements of 26.4% in HR@1 and 10.3% in NDCG@10 over the strongest baselines with further gains from agentic scheduling in evolving settings.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Why do we need another AI to help the AI? We argue you don't. Stateless LLM sessions impose re-orientation costs on iterative, session-heavy workflows. Prior work addresses cross-session memory through retrieval-augmented approaches: store history, embed it, retrieve by semantic similarity. Cross-session memory is a state management problem, not a search problem. Similarity search fails for named entity resolution within bounded vocabulary contexts because beliefs about a shared technical domain are semantically proximate by construction. A single user is the simplest bounded vocabulary context; engineering teams converge on the same property through shared codebases and terminology. We present Tenure, a local-first proxy that maintains a typed belief store with epistemic status, versioned supersession, and scope isolation, injecting curated context into every LLM session through precision-first retrieval. Hard scope isolation provides a structural guarantee: the right beliefs surface, and only within the boundaries the user has authorized. Tenure's typed schema converts extracted facts into imperative instructions via a why it matters field, making injected beliefs directly actionable rather than raw material for the model to re-derive. A controlled evaluation on 72 retrieval cases demonstrates the gap. Cosine similarity over dense embeddings achieves mean precision of 0.12. Alias-weighted BM25 maintains mean precision of 1.0, passing 72/72 cases versus 8/72 for cosine similarity on the same corpus. Hybrid retrieval typically solves vocabulary mismatch between disparate authors; Tenure eliminates this structurally: query and belief authors are the same person, and an alias enrichment flywheel continuously indexes their specific vocabulary. Under multi-turn topic drift this worsens: the vector backend produces drift scores of 0.43--0.50 on noise-critical turns where BM25 maintains 0.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Embodied agents in household environments must plan under partial observation: they need to remember objects, track state changes, and recover when actions fail. Existing benchmarks only partially test this ability. Egocentric video datasets capture realistic human activities but remain passive, while interactive simulators support execution but rely on synthetic scenes and hand-crafted dynamics, introducing a sim-to-real gap and often assuming fully observable state. We introduce Ego2World, an executable benchmark that turns egocentric cooking videos into executable symbolic worlds governed by graph-transition rules. Built on HD-EPIC, Ego2World derives reusable transition rules from video annotations and executes them in a hidden symbolic world graph. During evaluation, the simulator maintains the hidden world graph, while the agent plans over its own partial belief graph using only local observations and execution feedback. This separation forces agents to update memory and replan without observing the true world state. Experiments show that action-overlap scores overestimate physical-state success, and that persistent belief memory improves task completion while reducing repeated visual exploration -- suggesting that belief maintenance should be a first-class target of embodied-agent evaluation.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Inference-Time-Compute (ITC) methods like Best-of-N and Tree-of-Thoughts are meant to produce output candidates that are both high-quality and diverse, but their use of high-temperature sampling often fails to achieve meaningful output diversity. Moreover, existing ITC methods offer limited control over how to perform reasoning, which in turn limits their explainability. We present STATe-of-Thoughts (STATe), an interpretable ITC method that searches over high-level reasoning patterns. STATe replaces stochastic sampling with discrete and interpretable textual interventions: a controller selects actions encoding high-level reasoning choices, a generator produces reasoning steps conditioned on those choices, and an evaluator scores candidates to guide search. This structured approach yields three main advantages. First, action-guided textual interventions produce greater response diversity than temperature-based sampling. Second, in a case study on argument generation, STATe's explicit action sequences capture interpretable features that are highly predictive of output quality. Third, estimating the association between performance and action choices allows us to identify promising yet unexplored regions of the action space and steer generation directly toward them. Together, these results establish STATe as a practical framework for generating high-quality, diverse, and interpretable text. Our framework is available at https://github.com/zbambergerNLP/state-of-thoughts.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Understanding and predicting how social beliefs evolve in response to events -- from policy changes to scientific breakthroughs -- remains a fundamental challenge in social science. Given LLMs' commonsense knowledge and social intelligence, we ask: Can LLMs model the dynamics of social beliefs following social events? In this work, we introduce the concept of the Social World Model (SWM), a general framework designed to capture how social beliefs evolve in response to major events. SWM learns state-transition functions for social beliefs by mining temporal patterns in social data and optimizing the evidence lower bound, without the need for explicit human annotations linking events to belief shifts, or for expensive census data. To evaluate SWM, we introduce a benchmark, SWM-bench, derived from real-world prediction markets, specifically Kalshi and Polymarket. SWM-bench includes over 12k data points for social belief prediction tasks spanning diverse domains such as politics, finance, and cryptocurrency. Our experimental results show that SWM significantly outperforms time-series foundation models, achieving state-of-the-art results on Kalshi data and demonstrating competitive performance on Polymarket data, while offering interpretable insights into the underlying mechanisms of social belief dynamics.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Large foundation models have accelerated progress toward general-purpose agents that interact with humans and other agents through language and multimodal signals. However, robust multi-agent decision-making requires reasoning about what other agents know, intend, and are likely to do under partial observability. Current agentic systems often operate through prompt design, memory, or end-to-end behavioral shaping, but typically do not learn an explicit partner-state representation that can be reused as a decision variable across tasks. We introduce mental-model-enabled agents, a framework that equips an agent with a latent mental model of its counterpart, allowing it to infer hidden beliefs, intentions, and likely reactions from the observed history and use these inferences to guide action selection. Our method learns an amortized recursive Theory-of-Mind representation, with first- and second-order mental-state structure, jointly with a belief-conditioned reward model that evaluates candidate actions relative to the inferred partner state. A policy is then learned under this belief-aware signal, yielding an agent that can act independently at inference time while retaining the benefits of explicit partner modeling. We evaluate the same framework on both language-only and multimodal benchmarks. Across these settings, explicit mental-state modeling consistently improves interaction quality and Theory-of-Mind performance over base agentic systems, showing that structured partner modeling is a useful inductive bias for general multi-agent systems. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/hananshafi/Mental-Models

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Long-term memory enables large language model (LLM) agents to provide continuous personalized assistance by retaining user information across interactions. Existing systems support this process through fact extraction, organization, updating, and retrieval, but largely maintain memories as independent facts. This fact-centric paradigm may overlook how new facts update, constrain, or conflict with earlier ones, while leaving their applicability, role, and priority for the current request implicit. In this paper, we introduce EvoMemState, a state-centric framework that augments persistent facts with two complementary states: Relational States that capture how facts remain valid and relate to one another as memory evolves, and a Reasoning State that determines how these facts should be applied to the current request. Specifically, EvoMemState consists of three key components: (i) Ontology-Guided Memory State Induction extracts Persistent Facts and constructs Relational States that maintain their validity, scope, and evolving relations. (ii) RL-Based State Evolution internalizes memory-use experience into a policy through reinforcement learning to generate a request-specific Reasoning State. (iii) State-Aware Reasoning then combines the relevant facts with their Relational States and the generated Reasoning State to guide the personal agent. Extensive experiments on long-term dialogue and memory-use benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements over existing memory systems in retrieval completeness and memory-grounded response accuracy. Our code and implementation details are available at https://github.com/XMUDeepLIT/EvoMemState.git.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may observe that the inversion of the whole can be computed piecewise in terms of the component processes. We study the structure of this compositional rule, noting that it relates to the lens pattern in functional programming. Working in a suitably general axiomatic presentation of a category of Markov kernels, we see how we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a fibred category. We discuss the compositional nature of this, formulated as a functor on the underlying category and explore how this can used for a more type-driven approach to statistical inference.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

One of the key challenges in deploying RL to real-world applications is to adapt to variations of unknown environment contexts, such as changing terrains in robotic tasks and fluctuated bandwidth in congestion control. Existing works on adaptation to unknown environment contexts either assume the contexts are the same for the whole episode or assume the context variables are Markovian. However, in many real-world applications, the environment context usually stays stable for a stochastic period and then changes in an abrupt and unpredictable manner within an episode, resulting in a segment structure, which existing works fail to address. To leverage the segment structure of piecewise stable context in real-world applications, in this paper, we propose a \textbf{Segmented Context Belief Augmented Deep~(SeCBAD)} RL method. Our method can jointly infer the belief distribution over latent context with the posterior over segment length and perform more accurate belief context inference with observed data within the current context segment. The inferred belief context can be leveraged to augment the state, leading to a policy that can adapt to abrupt variations in context. We demonstrate empirically that SeCBAD can infer context segment length accurately and outperform existing methods on a toy grid world environment and Mujuco tasks with piecewise-stable context.

Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Complex problem solving (CPS) with large language models (LLMs) is often framed as a matter of stronger reasoning or longer generation. Yet early-step error amplification, prompt brittleness, and failures to revise incorrect commitments are difficult to explain by missing knowledge or expressive capacity alone. This survey interprets CPS as a sequential estimation-and-decision problem over a latent solution state. A controller maintains a belief about an unobserved solution trajectory, updates it as noisy intermediate evidence arrives, and decides whether to commit, verify, branch, roll back, or abstain to minimize expected loss. Reasoning supplies candidate transitions and interpretations, whereas process control shapes and evaluates those proposals and regulates subsequent transitions and observations. Within this framework, we organize existing methods around five components: explicit state representation, transition structuring, validation and constraint enforcement, search and rollback, and uncertainty management. We also interpret evaluation metrics according to the statistical quantities they estimate. The framework further yields a diagnostic hypothesis: interventions should be most effective when they target the error or uncertainty component implicated by an observed failure. We distinguish systematic, stochastic, and irreducible error together with epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty, and call this alignment problem-control fit and its failure control mismatch. For example, additional sampling may reduce sampling variability while leaving a shared systematic error unchanged. This perspective clarifies what current methods estimate and control, what remains uncontrolled, and why reliable validation, targeted recovery, calibrated uncertainty, and matched-budget evaluation are central open problems.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Recent work has shown that, under certain assumptions, zero-shot reinforcement learning (RL) methods can generalise to any unseen task in an environment after reward-free pre-training. Access to Markov states is one such assumption, yet, in many real-world applications, the Markov state is only partially observable. Here, we explore how the performance of standard zero-shot RL methods degrades when subjected to partially observability, and show that, as in single-task RL, memory-based architectures are an effective remedy. We evaluate our memory-based zero-shot RL methods in domains where the states, rewards and a change in dynamics are partially observed, and show improved performance over memory-free baselines. Our code is open-sourced via: https://enjeeneer.io/projects/bfms-with-memory/.

A key challenge in training Vision-Language Model (VLM) agents, compared to Language Model (LLM) agents, lies in the shift from textual states to complex visual observations. This transition introduces partial observability and demands robust world modeling. We ask: Can VLM agents construct internal world models through explicit visual state reasoning? To address this question, we architecturally enforce and reward the agent's reasoning process via reinforcement learning (RL), formulating it as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We find that decomposing the agent's reasoning into State Estimation ("what is the current state?") and Transition Modeling ("what comes next?") is critical for success, as demonstrated through five reasoning strategies. Our investigation into how agents represent internal beliefs reveals that the optimal representation is task-dependent: Natural Language excels at capturing semantic relationships in general tasks, while Structured formats are indispensable for precise manipulation and control. Building on these insights, we design a World Modeling Reward that provides dense, turn-level supervision for accurate state prediction, and introduce Bi-Level General Advantage Estimation (Bi-Level GAE) for turn-aware credit assignment. Through this form of visual state reasoning, a 3B-parameter model achieves a score of 0.82 across five diverse agent benchmarks, representing a 3times improvement over its untrained counterpart (0.21) and outperforming proprietary reasoning models such as GPT-5 (0.75), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.67) and Claude 4.5 (0.62). All experiments are conducted within our VAGEN framework, a scalable system for training and analyzing multi-turn VLM agents in diverse visual environments. Code and data are publicly available at https://vagen-ai.github.io.

In this paper, we discuss that an observable-based single-system Copenhagen and entanglement-based two-system von Neumann measurement protocols in quantum theory can be made equivalent by considering the second part of the two-system scheme to be a Dirac-type negative sea filling up the first system. Based on this equivalence, and by considering the universe as a computational process, the choice of the apparatus state in the two-system protocol can be identified with the choice of the observable in the single-system scheme as negative sea filling up the observable universe. In particular, the measuring party's state is considered to be evolving backwards in time to the big bang as a nondeterministic computational process, which chooses the acceptable path as a time-reversal process of irreversible computation. The suggested model proposes that the prepared microstate of the universe, or reality, corresponds to the observer's choice, therefore, subjective reality. Thus, this effectively provides a specific description of the subjective universe model previously proposed, which is based on the symmetry breakdown between the Schrodinger and the Heisenberg pictures of quantum theory.

Memory-Mediated Learning Architecture (MMLA) separates slow base parameters theta, a bounded numerical policy carrier Phi, and a bounded authoritative memory M. Predictive Dual-State Adaptation (PDSA) lets feedback update Phi while one problem remains active and lets a trusted lifecycle atomically commit one typed row or exact NULL. Later reasoning may read both states, but their writers, resets, rollback domains, and ledgers remain distinct. Realized futures supervise values only during training; deployment is causal and future-blind. We give conditional theory and falsifiable contracts for reasoning-time updates, completed-segment consolidation, predictive admission, authoritative memory, and dual-state attribution. Assumptions, counterexamples, capacity and cost ledgers, recovery duties, and identifying experiments are explicit; these are not implementation guarantees. Controlled studies show exact lifecycle execution on 300/300 held-out records for each of three seeds, calibrated retrieval gains over frozen-hidden dense and BM25 baselines, and exact typed anchor-filler transport on 240/240 held-out records per seed. These validate restricted components, not natural-language memory management or complete PDSA. Post-training studies retain positive and negative evidence. Later protocols obtain restricted readout progress, but a nine-trajectory comparison finds that matched latent readout, a full-width bridge, and bridge plus frozen text-teacher alignment all fail continuous-event qualification across both task families. A separately adapted text reference and restoration checks pass. At the September 13, 2026 evidence cutoff, no strict policy-only reasoning-time-training effect, predictive-admission oracle margin, learned future-blind admission policy, or policy-by-memory factorial advantage is established.

This paper presents a novel paradigm of the local percept-perceiver phenomenon to formalize certain observations in neuroscientific theories of consciousness. Using this model, a set-theoretic formalism is developed for artificial systems, and the existence of machine consciousness is proved by invoking Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The article argues for the possibility of a reductionist form of epistemic consciousness within machines.

In LLM-agent opinion simulations, each agent reports the probability that a claim is true after seeing its own previous probability and the probabilities reported by its neighbors, and that number becomes its state in the next round. If the number describes the agent's position rather than the sentence it was shown, then rewriting the claim as its complement and replacing every probability p with 1 - p should return the complementary answer, so the two reports should sum to one. We test this with three small open models: Qwen3-4B, Llama-3.2-3B and Gemma-3-4B. On 2,304 agent states taken from a running network simulation, Qwen's paired reports sum to 1.18 on average, and on 48 real fact-checking claims from AVeriTeC they again exceed one. A controlled benchmark of 24 worlds, each with exactly two possible outcomes, shows the same failure in all three models. The discrepancy is two to ten times larger than the change produced by a same-meaning paraphrase, and it persists under repeated sampling and across peer group sizes and report strengths. When the reports are fed back into two populations that start from complementary states, the populations do not remain mirror images: their divergence is positive after five rounds for every model. Averaging each answer with the complement of its paired answer restores consistency by construction and lowers Brier loss averaged over the two wordings, but at the final round it beats the better of the two original wordings for only one of the three models. A schedule-by-targeting experiment on the same model gives a small, stable interaction because such sweeps keep the claim wording fixed. Consistency under rewording therefore needs its own test before simulated probabilities are read as beliefs

Given a stationary state-space model that relates a sequence of hidden states and corresponding measurements or observations, Bayesian filtering provides a principled statistical framework for inferring the posterior distribution of the current state given all measurements up to the present time. For example, the Apollo lunar module implemented a Kalman filter to infer its location from a sequence of earth-based radar measurements and land safely on the moon. To perform Bayesian filtering, we require a measurement model that describes the conditional distribution of each observation given state. The Kalman filter takes this measurement model to be linear, Gaussian. Here we show how a nonlinear, Gaussian approximation to the distribution of state given observation can be used in conjunction with Bayes' rule to build a nonlinear, non-Gaussian measurement model. The resulting approach, called the Discriminative Kalman Filter (DKF), retains fast closed-form updates for the posterior. We argue there are many cases where the distribution of state given measurement is better-approximated as Gaussian, especially when the dimensionality of measurements far exceeds that of states and the Bernstein-von Mises theorem applies. Online neural decoding for brain-computer interfaces provides a motivating example, where filtering incorporates increasingly detailed measurements of neural activity to provide users control over external devices. Within the BrainGate2 clinical trial, the DKF successfully enabled three volunteers with quadriplegia to control an on-screen cursor in real-time using mental imagery alone. Participant "T9" used the DKF to type out messages on a tablet PC.

We formalize a transfinite Phi process that treats all possibility embeddings as operators on structured state spaces including complete lattices, Banach and Hilbert spaces, and orthomodular lattices. We prove a determinization lemma showing that lifting to sets or distributions yields a deterministic global dynamic, an ordinal stabilization theorem sending operator transforms to the fixed subspace by stage omega under normal spectral contraction, and a product of Riesz projections theorem for commuting layers. We establish a compositionality law for lifted maps, show closure of Phi packings, and present a quantitative application to sensory depletion that models tissue removal as a projection and derives strict decreases in the attainable fixed point under minimal monotonicity and positivity assumptions. We also state measurable conditions for probabilistic lifts, give explicit non normal and non commuting counterexamples, and provide finite dimensional and stochastic witnesses together with per theorem scope tables and a small reproducible code appendix.

Human language is driven by unspoken beliefs and belief updates, making these critical to model for successful communication between large language models (LLMs) and their users. In this paper, we evaluate the ability of LLMs to recognize unspoken beliefs made through implicatures and to understand their updates through implicature cancellation: the pragmatic phenomenon whereby an utterance's implied meaning is weakened or negated. We create the first expert-annotated implicature cancellation dataset, ImplicatureX, crowdsourced for human judgements of implicatures and their corresponding cancellations. We find that LLM belief update understanding lags behind that of humans, especially in more naturally-occurring scenarios. Additional control experiments suggest that successes in LLM belief updates may stem in part from a reliance on prior beliefs, and that failures in belief updates may depend on their type and on their form. Overall, our study suggests that current LLMs have not yet reached human-level understanding of unspoken beliefs and belief updates. Code and data are available at https://github.com/cesare-spinoso/ImplicatureX.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

To make informed decisions in natural environments that change over time, humans must update their beliefs as new observations are gathered. Studies exploring human inference as a dynamical process that unfolds in time have focused on situations in which the statistics of observations are history-independent. Yet temporal structure is everywhere in nature, and yields history-dependent observations. Do humans modify their inference processes depending on the latent temporal statistics of their observations? We investigate this question experimentally and theoretically using a change-point inference task. We show that humans adapt their inference process to fine aspects of the temporal structure in the statistics of stimuli. As such, humans behave qualitatively in a Bayesian fashion, but, quantitatively, deviate away from optimality. Perhaps more importantly, humans behave suboptimally in that their responses are not deterministic, but variable. We show that this variability itself is modulated by the temporal statistics of stimuli. To elucidate the cognitive algorithm that yields this behavior, we investigate a broad array of existing and new models that characterize different sources of suboptimal deviations away from Bayesian inference. While models with 'output noise' that corrupts the response-selection process are natural candidates, human behavior is best described by sampling-based inference models, in which the main ingredient is a compressed approximation of the posterior, represented through a modest set of random samples and updated over time. This result comes to complement a growing literature on sample-based representation and learning in humans.

Policy-adherent tool-calling agents in customer-service domains must maintain task states across turns while calling tools and obeying domain policies. Task states consist of relevant facts, identifiers, constraints, and conditions observed through user interaction and tool calls. In standard agents, task states are not represented separately. Observations, tool returns, and policy instructions are placed in the prompt, leaving agents to reconstruct the relevant states from the prompt each time they decide what to do next. This design makes state management implicit, creating two common failure modes. An agent may retrieve the right facts but later ground its decision in stale, missing, or incorrect information; and a syntactically valid tool call may still violate a domain policy that depends on the current task state. We introduce LedgerAgent, an inference-time method for tool-calling agents that maintains observed task states in a separate ledger and renders the states into the prompt. The ledger is also used to check state-dependent policy constraints before environment-changing tool calls are executed, blocking policy violations. Across four customer-service domains and a mixed panel of open- and closed-weight models, LedgerAgent improves average passk over a standard prompt-based tool-calling approach, with the largest gains under stricter multi-trial consistency metrics.

Vision--Language--Action (VLA) policies such as π_{0.5} and OpenVLA perform well on many manipulation tasks, but they are often reactive: the next action is predicted from the current observation, instruction, and proprioceptive state. This assumption breaks down in stage-dependent manipulation, where visually similar states may require different actions depending on latent task progress and previous interaction outcomes. We argue that such tasks require not only memory, but dynamics-aware belief updates: the policy should preserve task progress during stable or occluded phases and revise its belief near contact, release, or subgoal transitions. We introduce Temporally Conditioned Memory-Fusion Policies (TFP), a lightweight memory-action framework for VLA backbones. TFP maintains an episode-local task-progress belief with Liquid Time-Constant dynamics and injects the updated belief directly into the flow-matching action decoder through adaptive modulation. This lets temporally accumulated context shape the generated action chunk, rather than serving only as passive history context. With a 3.3B-parameter model, TFP improves the average success rate from \(96.9\%\) to \(98.75\%\) on LIBERO and from \(91.4\%\) to \(93.77\%\) on LIBERO-plus. On the memory-focused MIKASA ShellGameTouch diagnostic, TFP achieves success up to \(75.0\%\). Mechanistic analyses show that write-gain changes near manipulation events are about \(6\times\) larger than far non-event phases, and hidden-state interventions show that the belief causally modulates generated action chunks. These results suggest that compact, event-sensitive memory dynamics can improve VLA policies under occlusion, visual perturbation, and stage-dependent task structure.

We develop Markov categories as a framework for synthetic probability and statistics, following work of Golubtsov as well as Cho and Jacobs. This means that we treat the following concepts in purely abstract categorical terms: conditioning and disintegration; various versions of conditional independence and its standard properties; conditional products; almost surely; sufficient statistics; versions of theorems on sufficient statistics due to Fisher--Neyman, Basu, and Bahadur. Besides the conceptual clarity offered by our categorical setup, its main advantage is that it provides a uniform treatment of various types of probability theory, including discrete probability theory, measure-theoretic probability with general measurable spaces, Gaussian probability, stochastic processes of either of these kinds, and many others.