Daily Papers

Financial institutions deploy Large Language Models (LLMs) for reconciliations, regulatory reporting, and client communications, but nondeterministic outputs (output drift) undermine auditability and trust. We quantify drift across five model architectures (7B-120B parameters) on regulated financial tasks, revealing a stark inverse relationship: smaller models (Granite-3-8B, Qwen2.5-7B) achieve 100% output consistency at T=0.0, while GPT-OSS-120B exhibits only 12.5% consistency (95% CI: 3.5-36.0%) regardless of configuration (p<0.0001, Fisher's exact test). This finding challenges conventional assumptions that larger models are universally superior for production deployment. Our contributions include: (i) a finance-calibrated deterministic test harness combining greedy decoding (T=0.0), fixed seeds, and SEC 10-K structure-aware retrieval ordering; (ii) task-specific invariant checking for RAG, JSON, and SQL outputs using finance-calibrated materiality thresholds (plus or minus 5%) and SEC citation validation; (iii) a three-tier model classification system enabling risk-appropriate deployment decisions; and (iv) an audit-ready attestation system with dual-provider validation. We evaluated five models (Qwen2.5-7B via Ollama, Granite-3-8B via IBM watsonx.ai, Llama-3.3-70B, Mistral-Medium-2505, and GPT-OSS-120B) across three regulated financial tasks. Across 480 runs (n=16 per condition), structured tasks (SQL) remain stable even at T=0.2, while RAG tasks show drift (25-75%), revealing task-dependent sensitivity. Cross-provider validation confirms deterministic behavior transfers between local and cloud deployments. We map our framework to Financial Stability Board (FSB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requirements, demonstrating practical pathways for compliance-ready AI deployments.

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

Commercial LLM services often conceal internal reasoning traces while still charging users for every generated token, including those from hidden intermediate steps, raising concerns of token inflation and potential overbilling. This gap underscores the urgent need for reliable token auditing, yet achieving it is far from straightforward: cryptographic verification (e.g., hash-based signature) offers little assurance when providers control the entire execution pipeline, while user-side prediction struggles with the inherent variance of reasoning LLMs, where token usage fluctuates across domains and prompt styles. To bridge this gap, we present PALACE (Predictive Auditing of LLM APIs via Reasoning Token Count Estimation), a user-side framework that estimates hidden reasoning token counts from prompt-answer pairs without access to internal traces. PALACE introduces a GRPO-augmented adaptation module with a lightweight domain router, enabling dynamic calibration across diverse reasoning tasks and mitigating variance in token usage patterns. Experiments on math, coding, medical, and general reasoning benchmarks show that PALACE achieves low relative error and strong prediction accuracy, supporting both fine-grained cost auditing and inflation detection. Taken together, PALACE represents an important first step toward standardized predictive auditing, offering a practical path to greater transparency, accountability, and user trust.

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

Control Flow Attestation (CFA) allows remote verification of run-time software integrity in embedded systems. However, CFA is limited by the storage/transmission costs of generated control flow logs (CFlog). Recent work has proposed application-specific optimizations by speculating on likely sub-paths in CFlog and replacing them with reserved symbols at runtime. Albeit effective, prior approaches do not consider the representation of addresses in a control flow path for speculation. This work proposes RESPEC-CFA, an architectural extension for CFA allowing for speculation on (1) the locality of control flows and (2) their Huffman encoding. Alone, RESPEC-CFA reduces CFlog sizes by up to 90.1%. Combined with prior methods, RESPEC-CFA yields reductions of up to 99.7%, representing a significant step toward practical CFA.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of 5G technology, the adoption of cloud-based infrastructure for the deployment of 5G services has become increasingly common. Using a service-based architecture, critical 5G components, such as the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), Session Management Function (SMF), and User Plane Function (UPF), now run as containerized pods on Kubernetes clusters. Although this approach improves scalability, flexibility, and resilience, it also introduces new security challenges, particularly to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of these components. Current 5G security specifications (for example, 3GPP TS 33.501) focus on communication security and assume that network functions remain trustworthy after authentication, consequently lacking mechanisms to continuously validate the integrity of NVFs at runtime. To close this gap, and to align with Zero Trust principles of 'never trust, always verify', we present a TPM 2.0-based continuous remote attestation solution for core 5G components deployed on Kubernetes. Our approach uses the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to provide hardware-based runtime validation. We integrate the open-source Keylime framework with a custom IMA template that isolates pod-level measurements, allowing per-pod integrity verification. A prototype on a k3s cluster (consisting of 1 master, 2 worker nodes) was implemented to attest to core functions, including AMF, SMF and UPF. The experimental results show that the system detects unauthorized modifications in real time, labels each pod's trust state, and generates detailed audit logs. This work provides hardware-based continuous attestation for cloud native and edge deployments, strengthening the resilience of 5G as critical infrastructure in multi-vendor and mission-critical scenarios of 5G.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Rising concern for the societal implications of artificial intelligence systems has inspired a wave of academic and journalistic literature in which deployed systems are audited for harm by investigators from outside the organizations deploying the algorithms. However, it remains challenging for practitioners to identify the harmful repercussions of their own systems prior to deployment, and, once deployed, emergent issues can become difficult or impossible to trace back to their source. In this paper, we introduce a framework for algorithmic auditing that supports artificial intelligence system development end-to-end, to be applied throughout the internal organization development lifecycle. Each stage of the audit yields a set of documents that together form an overall audit report, drawing on an organization's values or principles to assess the fit of decisions made throughout the process. The proposed auditing framework is intended to contribute to closing the accountability gap in the development and deployment of large-scale artificial intelligence systems by embedding a robust process to ensure audit integrity.

Existing retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems typically use a centralized architecture, causing a high cost of data collection, integration, and management, as well as privacy concerns. There is a great need for a decentralized RAG system that enables foundation models to utilize information directly from data owners who maintain full control over their sources. However, decentralization brings a challenge: the numerous independent data sources vary significantly in reliability, which can diminish retrieval accuracy and response quality. To address this, our decentralized RAG system has a novel reliability scoring mechanism that dynamically evaluates each source based on the quality of responses it contributes to generate and prioritizes high-quality sources during retrieval. To ensure transparency and trust, the scoring process is securely managed through blockchain-based smart contracts, creating verifiable and tamper-proof reliability records without relying on a central authority. We evaluate our decentralized system with two Llama models (3B and 8B) in two simulated environments where six data sources have different levels of reliability. Our system achieves a +10.7\% performance improvement over its centralized counterpart in the real world-like unreliable data environments. Notably, it approaches the upper-bound performance of centralized systems under ideally reliable data environments. The decentralized infrastructure enables secure and trustworthy scoring management, achieving approximately 56\% marginal cost savings through batched update operations. Our code and system are open-sourced at github.com/yining610/Reliable-dRAG.

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Verifiable delegation in digital identity systems remains unresolved across centralized, federated, and self-sovereign identity (SSI) environments, particularly where both human users and autonomous AI agents must exercise and transfer authority without exposing primary credentials or private keys. We introduce a unified framework that enables bounded, auditable, and least-privilege delegation across heterogeneous identity ecosystems. The framework includes four key elements: Delegation Grants (DGs), first-class authorization artefacts that encode revocable transfers of authority with enforced scope reduction; a Canonical Verification Context (CVC) that normalizes verification requests into a single structured representation independent of protocols or credential formats; a layered reference architecture that separates trust anchoring, credential and proof validation, policy evaluation, and protocol mediation via a Trust Gateway; and an explicit treatment of blockchain anchoring as an optional integrity layer rather than a structural dependency. Together, these elements advance interoperable delegation and auditability and provide a foundation for future standardization, implementation, and integration of autonomous agents into trusted digital identity infrastructures.

LLM agents struggle with regulatory audit replay: when asked to reproduce a flagged transaction decision with identical inputs, many deployments fail to return consistent results. We introduce the Determinism-Faithfulness Assurance Harness (DFAH), a framework for measuring trajectory determinism, decision determinism, and evidence-conditioned faithfulness in tool-using agents deployed in financial services. Across 4,700+ agentic runs (7 models, 4 providers, 3 financial benchmarks with 50 cases each at T=0.0), we find that decision determinism and task accuracy are not detectably correlated (r = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.49, 0.31], p = 0.63, n = 21 configurations): models can be deterministic without being accurate, and accurate without being deterministic. Because neither metric predicts the other in our sample, both must be measured independently, which is precisely what DFAH provides. Small models (7-20B) achieve near-perfect determinism through rigid pattern matching at the cost of accuracy (20-42%), while frontier models show moderate determinism (50-96%) with variable accuracy. No model achieves both perfect determinism and high accuracy, supporting DFAH's multi-dimensional measurement approach. We provide three financial benchmarks (compliance triage, portfolio constraints, and DataOps exceptions; 50 cases each) together with an open-source stress-test harness. Across these benchmarks and DFAH evaluation settings, Tier 1 models with schema-first architectures achieved determinism levels consistent with audit replay requirements.

Recent legislation required AI platforms to provide APIs for regulators to assess their compliance with the law. Research has nevertheless shown that platforms can manipulate their API answers through fairwashing. Facing this threat for reliable auditing, this paper studies the benefits of the joint use of platform scraping and of APIs. In this setup, we elaborate on the use of scraping to detect manipulated answers: since fairwashing only manipulates API answers, exploiting scraps may reveal a manipulation. To abstract the wide range of specific API-scrap situations, we introduce a notion of proxy that captures the consistency an auditor might expect between both data sources. If the regulator has a good proxy of the consistency, then she can easily detect manipulation and even bypass the API to conduct her audit. On the other hand, without a good proxy, relying on the API is necessary, and the auditor cannot defend against fairwashing. We then simulate practical scenarios in which the auditor may mostly rely on the API to conveniently conduct the audit task, while maintaining her chances to detect a potential manipulation. To highlight the tension between the audit task and the API fairwashing detection task, we identify Pareto-optimal strategies in a practical audit scenario. We believe this research sets the stage for reliable audits in practical and manipulation-prone setups.

Background: Agent skills are increasingly deployed as modular, reusable capability units in AI agent systems. Medical research agent skills require safeguards beyond general-purpose evaluation, including scientific integrity, methodological validity, reproducibility, and boundary safety. This study developed and preliminarily evaluated a domain-specific audit framework for medical research agent skills, with a focus on reliability against expert review. Methods: We developed MedSkillAudit (skill-auditor@1.0), a layered framework assessing skill release readiness before deployment. We evaluated 75 skills across five medical research categories (15 per category). Two experts independently assigned a quality score (0-100), an ordinal release disposition (Production Ready / Limited Release / Beta Only / Reject), and a high-risk failure flag. System-expert agreement was quantified using ICC(2,1) and linearly weighted Cohen's kappa, benchmarked against the human inter-rater baseline. Results: The mean consensus quality score was 72.4 (SD = 13.0); 57.3% of skills fell below the Limited Release threshold. MedSkillAudit achieved ICC(2,1) = 0.449 (95% CI: 0.250-0.610), exceeding the human inter-rater ICC of 0.300. System-consensus score divergence (SD = 9.5) was smaller than inter-expert divergence (SD = 12.4), with no directional bias (Wilcoxon p = 0.613). Protocol Design showed the strongest category-level agreement (ICC = 0.551); Academic Writing showed a negative ICC (-0.567), reflecting a structural rubric-expert mismatch. Conclusions: Domain-specific pre-deployment audit may provide a practical foundation for governing medical research agent skills, complementing general-purpose quality checks with structured audit workflows tailored to scientific use cases.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

This report describes ARIS (Auto-Research-in-sleep), an open-source research harness for autonomous research, including its architecture, assurance mechanisms, and early deployment experience. The performance of agent systems built on LLMs depends on both the model weights and the harness around them, which governs what information to store, retrieve, and present to the model. For long-horizon research workflows, the central failure mode is not a visible breakdown but a plausible unsupported success: a long-running agent can produce claims whose evidential support is incomplete, misreported, or silently inherited from the executor's framing. Therefore, we present ARIS as a research harness that coordinates machine-learning research workflows through cross-model adversarial collaboration as a default configuration: an executor model drives forward progress while a reviewer from a different model family is recommended to critique intermediate artifacts and request revisions. ARIS has three architectural layers. The execution layer provides more than 65 reusable Markdown-defined skills, model integrations via MCP, a persistent research wiki for iterative reuse of prior findings, and deterministic figure generation. The orchestration layer coordinates five end-to-end workflows with adjustable effort settings and configurable routing to reviewer models. The assurance layer includes a three-stage process for checking whether experimental claims are supported by evidence: integrity verification, result-to-claim mapping, and claim auditing that cross-checks manuscript statements against the claim ledger and raw evidence, as well as a five-pass scientific-editing pipeline, mathematical-proof checks, and visual inspection of the rendered PDF. A prototype self-improvement loop records research traces and proposes harness improvements that are adopted only after reviewer approval.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

Search-augmented LLM agents can produce deep research reports (DRRs), but verifying claim-level factuality remains challenging. Existing fact-checkers are primarily designed for general-domain, factoid-style atomic claims, and there is no benchmark to test whether such verifiers transfer to DRRs. Yet building such a benchmark is itself difficult. We first show that static expert-labeled benchmarks are brittle in this setting: in a controlled study with PhD-level specialists, unassisted experts achieve only 60.8% accuracy on a hidden micro-gold set of verifiable claims. We propose Evolving Benchmarking via Audit-then-Score (AtS), where benchmark labels and rationales are explicitly revisable: when a verifier disagrees with the current benchmark, it must submit evidence; an auditor adjudicates the dispute; and accepted revisions update the benchmark before models are scored. Across four AtS rounds, expert micro-gold accuracy rises to 90.9%, indicating experts are substantially more reliable as auditors than as one-shot labelers. We instantiate AtS as DeepFact-Bench, a versioned DRR factuality benchmark with auditable rationales, and DeepFact-Eval, a document-level verification agent (with a grouped lite variant) that outperforms existing verifiers on DeepFact-Bench and transfers well to external factuality datasets.

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the benchmark for causal inference, yet field implementation can deviate. We here present a remote audit - a design-based, preregistrable diagnostic that uses only pre-treatment satellite imagery to test whether assignment is independent of local conditions. The conditional randomization test of the remote audit evaluates whether treatment assignment is more predictable from pre-treatment satellite features than expected under the experiment's registered mechanism, providing a finite-sample valid, design-based diagnostic that requires no parametric assumptions. The procedure is finite-sample valid, honors blocks and clusters, and controls multiplicity across image models and resolutions via a max-statistic. We illustrate with two RCTs: Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program, where the audit corroborates randomization and flags selection and missing-data risks; and a school-based trial in Bangladesh, where assignment is highly predictable from pre-treatment features relative to the stated design, consistent with independent concerns about irregularities. Remote audits complement balance tests, lower early-stage costs, and enable rapid design checks when baseline surveys are expensive or infeasible.

QDNA-ID is a trust-chain framework that links physical quantum behavior to digitally verified records. The system first executes standard quantum circuits with random shot patterns across different devices to generate entropy profiles and measurement data that reveal device-specific behavior. A Bell or CHSH test is then used to confirm that correlations originate from genuine non classical processes rather than classical simulation. The verified outcomes are converted into statistical fingerprints using entropy, divergence, and bias features to characterize each device. These features and metadata for device, session, and random seed parameters are digitally signed and time stamped to ensure integrity and traceability. Authenticated artifacts are stored in a hierarchical index for reproducible retrieval and long term auditing. A visualization and analytics interface monitors drift, policy enforcement, and device behavior logs. A machine learning engine tracks entropy drift, detects anomalies, and classifies devices based on evolving patterns. An external verification API supports independent recomputation of hashes, signatures, and CHSH evidence. QDNA-ID operates as a continuous feedback loop that maintains a persistent chain of trust for quantum computing environments.

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

Regulatory compliance auditing across diverse industrial domains requires heightened quality assurance and traceability. Present manual and intermittent approaches to such auditing yield significant challenges, potentially leading to oversights in the monitoring process. To address these issues, we introduce a real-time, multi-modal sensing system employing 3D time-of-flight and RGB cameras, coupled with unsupervised learning techniques on edge AI devices. This enables continuous object tracking thereby enhancing efficiency in record-keeping and minimizing manual interventions. While we validate the system in a knife sanitization context within agrifood facilities, emphasizing its prowess against occlusion and low-light issues with RGB cameras, its potential spans various industrial monitoring settings.

Sustainability disclosure standards (e.g., GRI, SASB, TCFD, IFRS S2) are comprehensive yet lengthy, terminology-dense, and highly cross-referential, hindering structured analysis and downstream use. We present SSKG Hub (Sustainability Standards Knowledge Graph Hub), a research prototype and interactive web platform that transforms standards into auditable knowledge graphs (KGs) through an LLM-centered, expert-guided pipeline. The system integrates automatic standard identification, configurable chunking, standard-specific prompting, robust triple parsing, and provenance-aware Neo4j storage with fine-grained audit metadata. LLM extraction produces a provenance-linked Draft KG, which is reviewed, curated, and formally promoted to a Certified KG through meta-expert adjudication. A role-based governance framework covering read-only guest access, expert review and CRUD operations, meta-expert certification, and administrative oversight ensures traceability and accountability across draft and certified states. Beyond graph exploration and triple-level evidence tracing, SSKG Hub supports cross-KG fusion, KG-driven tasks, and dedicated modules for insights and curated resources. We validate the platform through a comprehensive expert-led KG review case study that demonstrates end-to-end curation and quality assurance. The web application is publicly available at www.sskg-hub.com.

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Computer-use agents hold the promise of assisting in a wide range of digital economic activities. However, current research has largely focused on short-horizon tasks over a limited set of software with limited economic value, such as basic e-commerce and OS-configuration tasks. A key reason is that creating environments for complex software requires significant time and human effort, and therefore does not scale. To address this, we introduce Gym-Anything, a framework for converting any software into an interactive computer-use environment. We frame environment creation itself as a multi-agent task: a coding agent writes setup scripts, downloads real-world data, and configures the software, while producing evidence of correct setup. An independent audit agent then verifies evidence for the environment setup against a quality checklist. Using a taxonomy of economically valuable occupations grounded in U.S. GDP data, we apply this pipeline to 200 software applications with broad occupational coverage. The result is CUA-World, a collection of over 10K long-horizon tasks spanning domains from medical science and astronomy to engineering and enterprise systems, each configured with realistic data along with train and test splits. CUA-World also includes CUA-World-Long, a challenging long-horizon benchmark with tasks often requiring over 500 steps, far exceeding existing benchmarks. Distilling successful trajectories from the training split into a 2B vision-language model outperforms models 2times its size. We also apply the same auditing principle at test time: a separate VLM reviews completed trajectories and provides feedback on what remains, improving Gemini-3-Flash on CUA-World-Long from 11.5% to 14.0%. We release all code, infrastructure, and benchmark data to facilitate future research in realistic computer-use agents.

Penetration testing and vulnerability assessment are essential industry practices for safeguarding computer systems. As cyber threats grow in scale and complexity, the demand for pentesting has surged, surpassing the capacity of human professionals to meet it effectively. With advances in AI, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), there have been attempts to automate the pentesting process. However, existing tools such as PentestGPT are still semi-manual, requiring significant professional human interaction to conduct pentests. To this end, we propose a novel LLM agent-based framework, AutoPentester, which automates the pentesting process. Given a target IP, AutoPentester automatically conducts pentesting steps using common security tools in an iterative process. It can dynamically generate attack strategies based on the tool outputs from the previous iteration, mimicking the human pentester approach. We evaluate AutoPentester using Hack The Box and custom-made VMs, comparing the results with the state-of-the-art PentestGPT. Results show that AutoPentester achieves a 27.0% better subtask completion rate and 39.5% more vulnerability coverage with fewer steps. Most importantly, it requires significantly fewer human interactions and interventions compared to PentestGPT. Furthermore, we recruit a group of security industry professional volunteers for a user survey and perform a qualitative analysis to evaluate AutoPentester against industry practices and compare it with PentestGPT. On average, AutoPentester received a score of 3.93 out of 5 based on user reviews, which was 19.8% higher than PentestGPT.

Auditing involves verifying the proper implementation of a given policy. As such, auditing is essential for ensuring compliance with the principles of fairness, equity, and transparency mandated by the European Union's AI Act. Moreover, biases present during the training phase of a learning system can persist in the modeling process and result in discrimination against certain subgroups of individuals when the model is deployed in production. Assessing bias in image datasets is a particularly complex task, as it first requires a feature extraction step, then to consider the extraction's quality in the statistical tests. This paper proposes a robust methodology for auditing image datasets based on so-called "sensitive" features, such as gender, age, and ethnicity. The proposed methodology consists of both a feature extraction phase and a statistical analysis phase. The first phase introduces a novel convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture specifically designed for extracting sensitive features with a limited number of manual annotations. The second phase compares the distributions of sensitive features across subgroups using a novel statistical test that accounts for the imprecision of the feature extraction model. Our pipeline constitutes a comprehensive and fully automated methodology for dataset auditing. We illustrate our approach using two manually annotated datasets. The code and datasets are available at github.com/ValentinLafargue/FairnessDetails.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

Under a unified operational definition, we define LLM memory as a persistent state written during pretraining, finetuning, or inference that can later be addressed and that stably influences outputs. We propose a four-part taxonomy (parametric, contextual, external, procedural/episodic) and a memory quadruple (location, persistence, write/access path, controllability). We link mechanism, evaluation, and governance via the chain write -> read -> inhibit/update. To avoid distorted comparisons across heterogeneous setups, we adopt a three-setting protocol (parametric only, offline retrieval, online retrieval) that decouples capability from information availability on the same data and timeline. On this basis we build a layered evaluation: parametric (closed-book recall, edit differential, memorization/privacy), contextual (position curves and the mid-sequence drop), external (answer correctness vs snippet attribution/faithfulness), and procedural/episodic (cross-session consistency and timeline replay, E MARS+). The framework integrates temporal governance and leakage auditing (freshness hits, outdated answers, refusal slices) and uncertainty reporting via inter-rater agreement plus paired tests with multiple-comparison correction. For updating and forgetting, we present DMM Gov: coordinating DAPT/TAPT, PEFT, model editing (ROME, MEND, MEMIT, SERAC), and RAG to form an auditable loop covering admission thresholds, rollout, monitoring, rollback, and change audits, with specs for timeliness, conflict handling, and long-horizon consistency. Finally, we give four testable propositions: minimum identifiability; a minimal evaluation card; causally constrained editing with verifiable forgetting; and when retrieval with small-window replay outperforms ultra-long-context reading. This yields a reproducible, comparable, and governable coordinate system for research and deployment.

This paper introduces the Hazard-Aware System Card (HASC), a novel framework designed to enhance transparency and accountability in the development and deployment of AI systems. The HASC builds upon existing model card and system card concepts by integrating a comprehensive, dynamic record of an AI system's security and safety posture. The framework proposes a standardized system of identifiers, including a novel AI Safety Hazard (ASH) ID, to complement existing security identifiers like CVEs, allowing for clear and consistent communication of fixed flaws. By providing a single, accessible source of truth, the HASC empowers developers and stakeholders to make more informed decisions about AI system safety throughout its lifecycle. Ultimately, we also compare our proposed AI system cards with the ISO/IEC 42001:2023 standard and discuss how they can be used to complement each other, providing greater transparency and accountability for AI systems.

Legal compliance in AI-driven data transfer planning is becoming increasingly critical under stringent privacy regulations such as the Japanese Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI). We propose a multi-agent legal verifier that decomposes compliance checking into specialized agents for statutory interpretation, business context evaluation, and risk assessment, coordinated through a structured synthesis protocol. Evaluated on a stratified dataset of 200 Amended APPI Article 16 cases with clearly defined ground truth labels and multiple performance metrics, the system achieves 72% accuracy, which is 21 percentage points higher than a single-agent baseline, including 90% accuracy on clear compliance cases (vs. 16% for the baseline) while maintaining perfect detection of clear violations. While challenges remain in ambiguous scenarios, these results show that domain specialization and coordinated reasoning can meaningfully improve legal AI performance, providing a scalable and regulation-aware framework for trustworthy and interpretable automated compliance verification.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

The global economy is increasingly dependent on knowledge workers to meet the needs of public and private organizations. While there is no single definition of knowledge work, organizations and industry groups still attempt to measure individuals' capability to engage in it. The most comprehensive assessment of capability readiness for professional knowledge workers is the Uniform CPA Examination developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). In this paper, we experimentally evaluate OpenAI's `text-davinci-003` and prior versions of GPT on both a sample Regulation (REG) exam and an assessment of over 200 multiple-choice questions based on the AICPA Blueprints for legal, financial, accounting, technology, and ethical tasks. First, we find that `text-davinci-003` achieves a correct rate of 14.4% on a sample REG exam section, significantly underperforming human capabilities on quantitative reasoning in zero-shot prompts. Second, `text-davinci-003` appears to be approaching human-level performance on the Remembering & Understanding and Application skill levels in the Exam absent calculation. For best prompt and parameters, the model answers 57.6% of questions correctly, significantly better than the 25% guessing rate, and its top two answers are correct 82.1% of the time, indicating strong non-entailment. Finally, we find that recent generations of GPT-3 demonstrate material improvements on this assessment, rising from 30% for `text-davinci-001` to 57% for `text-davinci-003`. These findings strongly suggest that large language models have the potential to transform the quality and efficiency of future knowledge work.

Text-to-SQL parsing has achieved remarkable progress under the Full Schema Assumption. However, this premise fails in real-world enterprise environments where databases contain hundreds of tables with massive noisy metadata. Rather than injecting the full schema upfront, an agent must actively identify and verify only the relevant subset, giving rise to the Unknown Schema scenario we study in this work. To address this, we propose TRUST-SQL (Truthful Reasoning with Unknown Schema via Tools). We formulate the task as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process where our autonomous agent employs a structured four-phase protocol to ground reasoning in verified metadata. Crucially, this protocol provides a structural boundary for our novel Dual-Track GRPO strategy. By applying token-level masked advantages, this strategy isolates exploration rewards from execution outcomes to resolve credit assignment, yielding a 9.9% relative improvement over standard GRPO. Extensive experiments across five benchmarks demonstrate that TRUST-SQL achieves an average absolute improvement of 30.6% and 16.6% for the 4B and 8B variants respectively over their base models. Remarkably, despite operating entirely without pre-loaded metadata, our framework consistently matches or surpasses strong baselines that rely on schema prefilling.

Assurance cases can be used to argue for the safety of products in safety engineering. In safety-critical areas, the construction of assurance cases is indispensable. Trustworthiness Derivation Trees (TDTs) enhance assurance cases by incorporating formal methods, rendering it possible for automatic reasoning about assurance cases. We present Trustworthiness Derivation Tree Analyzer (Trusta), a desktop application designed to automatically construct and verify TDTs. The tool has a built-in Prolog interpreter in its backend, and is supported by the constraint solvers Z3 and MONA. Therefore, it can solve constraints about logical formulas involving arithmetic, sets, Horn clauses etc. Trusta also utilizes large language models to make the creation and evaluation of assurance cases more convenient. It allows for interactive human examination and modification. We evaluated top language models like ChatGPT-3.5, ChatGPT-4, and PaLM 2 for generating assurance cases. Our tests showed a 50%-80% similarity between machine-generated and human-created cases. In addition, Trusta can extract formal constraints from text in natural languages, facilitating an easier interpretation and validation process. This extraction is subject to human review and correction, blending the best of automated efficiency with human insight. To our knowledge, this marks the first integration of large language models in automatic creating and reasoning about assurance cases, bringing a novel approach to a traditional challenge. Through several industrial case studies, Trusta has proven to quickly find some subtle issues that are typically missed in manual inspection, demonstrating its practical value in enhancing the assurance case development process.

The global economy is entering the era of Agentic Commerce, where autonomous agents can discover services, negotiate prices, and transact value. However adoption towards agentic commerce faces a foundational trust gap: current systems are built for direct human interactions rather than agent-driven operations. It lacks core primitives across three critical stages of agentic transactions. First, Task Delegation lacks means to translate user intent into defined scopes, discover appropriate agents, and securely authorize actions. Second, Payment Settlement for tasks is processed before execution, lacking verifiable evidence to validate the agent's work. Third, Audit Mechanisms fail to capture the full transaction lifecycle, preventing clear accountability for disputes. While emerging standards address fragments of this trust gap, there still remains a critical need for a unified infrastructure that binds the entire transaction lifecycle. To resolve this gap, we introduce TessPay, a unified infrastructure that replaces implicit trust with a 'Verify-then-Pay' architecture. It is a two plane architecture separating control and verification from settlement. TessPay operationalizes trust across four distinct stages: Before execution, agents are anchored in a canonical registry and user intent is captured as verifiable mandates, enabling stakeholder accountability. During execution, funds are locked in escrow while the agent executes the task and generates cryptographic evidence (TLS Notary, TEE etc.) to support Proof of Task Execution (PoTE). At settlement, the system verifies this evidence and releases funds only when the PoTE satisfies verification predicates; modular rail adapters ensure this PoTE-gated escrow remains chain-agnostic across heterogeneous payment rails. After settlement, TessPay preserves a tamper-evident audit trail to enable clear accountability for dispute resolution.

Code auditing is the process of reviewing code with the aim of identifying bugs. Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities for this task without requiring compilation, while also supporting user-friendly customization. However, auditing a code repository with LLMs poses significant challenges: limited context windows and hallucinations can degrade the quality of bug reports, and analyzing large-scale repositories incurs substantial time and token costs, hindering efficiency and scalability. This work introduces an LLM-based agent, RepoAudit, designed to perform autonomous repository-level code auditing. Equipped with agent memory, RepoAudit explores the codebase on demand by analyzing data-flow facts along feasible program paths within individual functions. It further incorporates a validator module to mitigate hallucinations by verifying data-flow facts and checking the satisfiability of path conditions associated with potential bugs, thereby reducing false positives. RepoAudit detects 40 true bugs across 15 real-world benchmark projects with a precision of 78.43%, requiring on average only 0.44 hours and $2.54 per project. Also, it detects 185 new bugs in high-profile projects, among which 174 have been confirmed or fixed. We have open-sourced RepoAudit at https://github.com/PurCL/RepoAudit.

Software Quality Assurance (SQA) is critical for delivering reliable, secure, and efficient software products. The Software Quality Assurance Process aims to provide assurance that work products and processes comply with predefined provisions and plans. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) present new opportunities to enhance existing SQA processes by automating tasks like requirement analysis, code review, test generation, and compliance checks. Simultaneously, established standards such as ISO/IEC 12207, ISO/IEC 25010, ISO/IEC 5055, ISO 9001/ISO/IEC 90003, CMMI, and TMM provide structured frameworks for ensuring robust quality practices. This paper surveys the intersection of LLM-based SQA methods and these recognized standards, highlighting how AI-driven solutions can augment traditional approaches while maintaining compliance and process maturity. We first review the foundational software quality standards and the technical fundamentals of LLMs in software engineering. Next, we explore various LLM-based SQA applications, including requirement validation, defect detection, test generation, and documentation maintenance. We then map these applications to key software quality frameworks, illustrating how LLMs can address specific requirements and metrics within each standard. Empirical case studies and open-source initiatives demonstrate the practical viability of these methods. At the same time, discussions on challenges (e.g., data privacy, model bias, explainability) underscore the need for deliberate governance and auditing. Finally, we propose future directions encompassing adaptive learning, privacy-focused deployments, multimodal analysis, and evolving standards for AI-driven software quality.

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.

We introduce TeMLM, a set of transparency-first release artifacts for clinical language models. TeMLM unifies provenance, data transparency, modeling transparency, and governance into a single, machine-checkable release bundle. We define an artifact suite (TeMLM-Card, TeMLM-Datasheet, TeMLM-Provenance) and a lightweight conformance checklist for repeatable auditing. We instantiate the artifacts on Technetium-I, a large-scale synthetic clinical NLP dataset with 498,000 notes, 7.74M PHI entity annotations across 10 types, and ICD-9-CM diagnosis labels, and report reference results for ProtactiniumBERT (about 100 million parameters) on PHI de-identification (token classification) and top-50 ICD-9 code extraction (multi-label classification). We emphasize that synthetic benchmarks are valuable for tooling and process validation, but models should be validated on real clinical data prior to deployment.

Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (AI) is based on seven technical requirements sustained over three main pillars that should be met throughout the system's entire life cycle: it should be (1) lawful, (2) ethical, and (3) robust, both from a technical and a social perspective. However, attaining truly trustworthy AI concerns a wider vision that comprises the trustworthiness of all processes and actors that are part of the system's life cycle, and considers previous aspects from different lenses. A more holistic vision contemplates four essential axes: the global principles for ethical use and development of AI-based systems, a philosophical take on AI ethics, a risk-based approach to AI regulation, and the mentioned pillars and requirements. The seven requirements (human agency and oversight; robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency; diversity, non-discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental wellbeing; and accountability) are analyzed from a triple perspective: What each requirement for trustworthy AI is, Why it is needed, and How each requirement can be implemented in practice. On the other hand, a practical approach to implement trustworthy AI systems allows defining the concept of responsibility of AI-based systems facing the law, through a given auditing process. Therefore, a responsible AI system is the resulting notion we introduce in this work, and a concept of utmost necessity that can be realized through auditing processes, subject to the challenges posed by the use of regulatory sandboxes. Our multidisciplinary vision of trustworthy AI culminates in a debate on the diverging views published lately about the future of AI. Our reflections in this matter conclude that regulation is a key for reaching a consensus among these views, and that trustworthy and responsible AI systems will be crucial for the present and future of our society.

Digital identity is unsolved: after many years of research there is still no trusted communication over the Internet. To provide identity within the context of mutual distrust, this paper presents a blockchain-based digital identity solution. Without depending upon a single trusted third party, the proposed solution achieves passport-level legally valid identity. This solution for making identities Self-Sovereign, builds on a generic provable claim model for which attestations of truth from third parties need to be collected. The claim model is then shown to be both blockchain structure and proof method agnostic. Four different implementations in support of these two claim model properties are shown to offer sub-second performance for claim creation and claim verification. Through the properties of Self-Sovereign Identity, legally valid status and acceptable performance, our solution is considered to be fit for adoption by the general public.

DSperse is a modular framework for distributed machine learning inference with strategic cryptographic verification. Operating within the emerging paradigm of distributed zero-knowledge machine learning, DSperse avoids the high cost and rigidity of full-model circuitization by enabling targeted verification of strategically chosen subcomputations. These verifiable segments, or "slices", may cover part or all of the inference pipeline, with global consistency enforced through audit, replication, or economic incentives. This architecture supports a pragmatic form of trust minimization, localizing zero-knowledge proofs to the components where they provide the greatest value. We evaluate DSperse using multiple proving systems and report empirical results on memory usage, runtime, and circuit behavior under sliced and unsliced configurations. By allowing proof boundaries to align flexibly with the model's logical structure, DSperse supports scalable, targeted verification strategies suited to diverse deployment needs.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Smart contracts are essential to decentralized finance (DeFi) and blockchain ecosystems but are increasingly vulnerable to exploits due to coding errors and complex attack vectors. Traditional static analysis tools and existing vulnerability detection methods often fail to address these challenges comprehensively, leading to high false-positive rates and an inability to detect dynamic vulnerabilities. This paper introduces SmartLLM, a novel approach leveraging fine-tuned LLaMA 3.1 models with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of smart contract auditing. By integrating domain-specific knowledge from ERC standards and employing advanced techniques such as QLoRA for efficient fine-tuning, SmartLLM achieves superior performance compared to static analysis tools like Mythril and Slither, as well as zero-shot large language model (LLM) prompting methods such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. Experimental results demonstrate a perfect recall of 100% and an accuracy score of 70%, highlighting the model's robustness in identifying vulnerabilities, including reentrancy and access control issues. This research advances smart contract security by offering a scalable and effective auditing solution, supporting the secure adoption of decentralized applications.

Text-to-SQL enables users to interact with databases using natural language, simplifying the retrieval and synthesis of information. Despite the remarkable success of large language models (LLMs) in translating natural language questions into SQL queries, widespread deployment remains limited due to two primary challenges. First, the effective use of text-to-SQL models depends on users' understanding of the model's capabilities-the scope of questions the model can correctly answer. Second, the absence of abstention mechanisms can lead to incorrect SQL generation going unnoticed, thereby undermining trust in the model's output. To enable wider deployment, it is crucial to address these challenges in model design and enhance model evaluation to build trust in the model's output. To this end, we introduce TrustSQL, a novel comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate text-to-SQL reliability-defined as a model's ability to correctly handle any type of input question by generating correct SQL queries for feasible questions and abstaining from generating infeasible ones (e.g., due to schema incompatibility or functionalities beyond SQL). We evaluate existing methods using a novel penalty-based scoring metric with two modeling approaches: (1) pipeline-based methods combining SQL generators with infeasible question detectors and SQL error detectors for abstention; and (2) unified methods using a single model for the entire task. Our experimental results reveal that achieving high scores under severe penalties requires significant effort and provide a new perspective on developing text-to-SQL models for safer deployment. TrustSQL is available at https://github.com/glee4810/TrustSQL.

Smart contracts are decentralized applications built atop blockchains like Ethereum. Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) have potential in auditing smart contracts, but the state-of-the-art indicates that even GPT-4 can achieve only 30% precision (when both decision and justification are correct). This is likely because off-the-shelf LLMs were primarily pre-trained on a general text/code corpus and not fine-tuned on the specific domain of Solidity smart contract auditing. In this paper, we propose TrustLLM, a general framework that combines fine-tuning and LLM-based agents for intuitive smart contract auditing with justifications. Specifically, TrustLLM is inspired by the observation that expert human auditors first perceive what could be wrong and then perform a detailed analysis of the code to identify the cause. As such, TrustLLM employs a two-stage fine-tuning approach: it first tunes a Detector model to make decisions and then tunes a Reasoner model to generate causes of vulnerabilities. However, fine-tuning alone faces challenges in accurately identifying the optimal cause of a vulnerability. Therefore, we introduce two LLM-based agents, the Ranker and Critic, to iteratively select and debate the most suitable cause of vulnerability based on the output of the fine-tuned Reasoner model. To evaluate TrustLLM, we collected a balanced dataset with 1,734 positive and 1,810 negative samples to fine-tune TrustLLM. We then compared it with traditional fine-tuned models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, CodeT5, and UnixCoder) as well as prompt learning-based LLMs (GPT4, GPT-3.5, and CodeLlama-13b/34b). On a dataset of 263 real smart contract vulnerabilities, TrustLLM achieves an F1 score of 91.21% and an accuracy of 91.11%. The causes generated by TrustLLM achieved a consistency of about 38% compared to the ground truth causes.

EVMbench, released by OpenAI, Paradigm, and OtterSec, is the first large-scale benchmark for AI agents on smart contract security. Its results -- agents detect up to 45.6% of vulnerabilities and exploit 72.2% of a curated subset -- have fueled expectations that fully automated AI auditing is within reach. We identify two limitations: its narrow evaluation scope (14 agent configurations, most models tested on only their vendor scaffold) and its reliance on audit-contest data published before every model's release that models may have seen during training. To address these, we expand to 26 configurations across four model families and three scaffolds, and introduce a contamination-free dataset of 22 real-world security incidents postdating every model's release date. Our evaluation yields three findings: (1) agents' detection results are not stable, with rankings shifting across configurations, tasks, and datasets; (2) on real-world incidents, no agent succeeds at end-to-end exploitation across all 110 agent-incident pairs despite detecting up to 65% of vulnerabilities, contradicting EVMbench's conclusion that discovery is the primary bottleneck; and (3) scaffolding materially affects results, with an open-source scaffold outperforming vendor alternatives by up to 5 percentage points, yet EVMbench does not control for this. These findings challenge the narrative that fully automated AI auditing is imminent. Agents reliably catch well-known patterns and respond strongly to human-provided context, but cannot replace human judgment. For developers, agent scans serve as a pre-deployment check. For audit firms, agents are most effective within a human-in-the-loop workflow where AI handles breadth and human auditors contribute protocol-specific knowledge and adversarial reasoning. Code and data: https://github.com/blocksecteam/ReEVMBench/.

We present ExpliCIT-QA, a system that extends our previous MRT approach for tabular question answering into a multimodal pipeline capable of handling complex table images and providing explainable answers. ExpliCIT-QA follows a modular design, consisting of: (1) Multimodal Table Understanding, which uses a Chain-of-Thought approach to extract and transform content from table images; (2) Language-based Reasoning, where a step-by-step explanation in natural language is generated to solve the problem; (3) Automatic Code Generation, where Python/Pandas scripts are created based on the reasoning steps, with feedback for handling errors; (4) Code Execution to compute the final answer; and (5) Natural Language Explanation that describes how the answer was computed. The system is built for transparency and auditability: all intermediate outputs, parsed tables, reasoning steps, generated code, and final answers are available for inspection. This strategy works towards closing the explainability gap in end-to-end TableVQA systems. We evaluated ExpliCIT-QA on the TableVQA-Bench benchmark, comparing it with existing baselines. We demonstrated improvements in interpretability and transparency, which open the door for applications in sensitive domains like finance and healthcare where auditing results are critical.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more pervasive across various users and scenarios, identifying potential issues when using these models becomes essential. Examples of such issues include: bias, inconsistencies, and hallucination. Although auditing the LLM for these problems is often warranted, such a process is neither easy nor accessible for most. An effective method is to probe the LLM using different versions of the same question. This could expose inconsistencies in its knowledge or operation, indicating potential for bias or hallucination. However, to operationalize this auditing method at scale, we need an approach to create those probes reliably and automatically. In this paper we propose the LLMAuditor framework which is an automatic, and scalable solution, where one uses a different LLM along with human-in-the-loop (HIL). This approach offers verifiability and transparency, while avoiding circular reliance on the same LLM, and increasing scientific rigor and generalizability. Specifically, LLMAuditor includes two phases of verification using humans: standardized evaluation criteria to verify responses, and a structured prompt template to generate desired probes. A case study using questions from the TruthfulQA dataset demonstrates that we can generate a reliable set of probes from one LLM that can be used to audit inconsistencies in a different LLM. This process is enhanced by our structured prompt template with HIL, which not only boosts the reliability of our approach in auditing but also yields the delivery of less hallucinated results. The novelty of our research stems from the development of a comprehensive, general-purpose framework that includes a HIL verified prompt template for auditing responses generated by LLMs.

AI-powered development platforms are making software creation accessible to a broader audience, but this democratization has triggered a scalability crisis in security auditing. With studies showing that up to 40% of AI-generated code contains vulnerabilities, the pace of development now vastly outstrips the capacity for thorough security assessment. We present MAPTA, a multi-agent system for autonomous web application security assessment that combines large language model orchestration with tool-grounded execution and end-to-end exploit validation. On the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, MAPTA achieves 76.9% overall success with perfect performance on SSRF and misconfiguration vulnerabilities, 83% success on broken authorization, and strong results on injection attacks including server-side template injection (85%) and SQL injection (83%). Cross-site scripting (57%) and blind SQL injection (0%) remain challenging. Our comprehensive cost analysis across all challenges totals 21.38 with a median cost of 0.073 for successful attempts versus 0.357 for failures. Success correlates strongly with resource efficiency, enabling practical early-stopping thresholds at approximately 40 tool calls or 0.30 per challenge. MAPTA's real-world findings are impactful given both the popularity of the respective scanned GitHub repositories (8K-70K stars) and MAPTA's low average operating cost of $3.67 per open-source assessment: MAPTA discovered critical vulnerabilities including RCEs, command injections, secret exposure, and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities. Findings are responsibly disclosed, 10 findings are under CVE review.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

This paper presents SiliconHealth, a comprehensive blockchain-based healthcare infrastructure designed for resource-constrained regions, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. We demonstrate that obsolete Bitcoin mining Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) can be repurposed to create a secure, low-cost, and energy-efficient medical records system. The proposed architecture employs a four-tier hierarchical network: regional hospitals using Antminer S19 Pro (90+ TH/s), urban health centers with Antminer S9 (14 TH/s), rural clinics equipped with Lucky Miner LV06 (500 GH/s, 13W), and mobile health points with portable ASIC devices. We introduce the Deterministic Hardware Fingerprinting (DHF) paradigm, which repurposes SHA-256 mining ASICs as cryptographic proof generators, achieving 100% verification rate across 23 test proofs during 300-second validation sessions. The system incorporates Reed-Solomon LSB watermarking for medical image authentication with 30-40% damage tolerance, semantic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) for intelligent medical record queries, and offline synchronization protocols for intermittent connectivity. Economic analysis demonstrates 96% cost reduction compared to GPU-based alternatives, with total deployment cost of $847 per rural clinic including 5-year solar power infrastructure. Validation experiments on Lucky Miner LV06 (BM1366 chip, 5nm) achieve 2.93 MH/W efficiency and confirm hardware universality. This work establishes a practical framework for deploying verifiable, tamper-proof electronic health records in regions where traditional healthcare IT infrastructure is economically unfeasible, potentially benefiting over 600 million people lacking access to basic health information systems.

Although randomized smoothing has demonstrated high certified robustness and superior scalability to other certified defenses, the high computational overhead of the robustness certification bottlenecks the practical applicability, as it depends heavily on the large sample approximation for estimating the confidence interval. In existing works, the sample size for the confidence interval is universally set and agnostic to the input for prediction. This Input-Agnostic Sampling (IAS) scheme may yield a poor Average Certified Radius (ACR)-runtime trade-off which calls for improvement. In this paper, we propose Input-Specific Sampling (ISS) acceleration to achieve the cost-effectiveness for robustness certification, in an adaptive way of reducing the sampling size based on the input characteristic. Furthermore, our method universally controls the certified radius decline from the ISS sample size reduction. The empirical results on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet show that ISS can speed up the certification by more than three times at a limited cost of 0.05 certified radius. Meanwhile, ISS surpasses IAS on the average certified radius across the extensive hyperparameter settings. Specifically, ISS achieves ACR=0.958 on ImageNet (sigma=1.0) in 250 minutes, compared to ACR=0.917 by IAS under the same condition. We release our code in https://github.com/roy-ch/Input-Specific-Certification.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

Distributed applications need identifiers that satisfy storage efficiency, chronological sortability, origin metadata embedding, zero-lookup verifiability, confidentiality for external consumers, and multi-century addressability. Based on our literature survey, no existing scheme provides all six of these identifier properties within a unified system. This paper introduces Source Known Identifiers (SKIDs), a three-tier identity system that projects a single entity identity across trust boundaries, addressing all six properties. The first tier, Source Known ID (SKID), is a 64-bit signed integer embedding a timestamp with a 250-millisecond precision, application topology, and a per-entity-type sequence counter. It serves as the database primary key, providing compact storage (8 bytes) and natural B-tree ordering for optimized database indexing. The second tier, Source Known Entity ID (SKEID), extends the SKID into a 128-bit Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) compatible value by adding an entity type discriminator, an epoch selector, and a BLAKE3 keyed message authentication code (MAC). SKEIDs enable zero-lookup verification of identifier origin, integrity, and entity type within trusted environments, with a big-endian byte layout that preserves chronological ordering in lexicographic UUID string comparisons. The third tier, Secure SKEID, encrypts the entire SKEID using AES-256 symmetric encryption as a single-block pseudorandom permutation, producing ciphertext indistinguishable from random bytes while remaining compatible with standard UUID data-type parsers in string representation. Deterministic bidirectional transformations connect all three tiers.

Modern machine learning models are sensitive to the manipulation of both the training data (poisoning attacks) and inference data (adversarial examples). Recognizing this issue, the community has developed many empirical defenses against both attacks and, more recently, provable certification methods against inference-time attacks. However, such guarantees are still largely lacking for training-time attacks. In this work, we present FullCert, the first end-to-end certifier with sound, deterministic bounds, which proves robustness against both training-time and inference-time attacks. We first bound all possible perturbations an adversary can make to the training data under the considered threat model. Using these constraints, we bound the perturbations' influence on the model's parameters. Finally, we bound the impact of these parameter changes on the model's prediction, resulting in joint robustness guarantees against poisoning and adversarial examples. To facilitate this novel certification paradigm, we combine our theoretical work with a new open-source library BoundFlow, which enables model training on bounded datasets. We experimentally demonstrate FullCert's feasibility on two different datasets.

While LLMs exhibit remarkable fluency, their utility is often compromised by factual hallucinations and a lack of traceable provenance. Existing resources for grounding mitigate this but typically enforce a dichotomy: they offer either structured knowledge without textual context (e.g., knowledge bases) or grounded text with limited scale and linguistic coverage. To bridge this gap, we introduce FactNet, a massive, open-source resource designed to unify 1.7 billion atomic assertions with 3.01 billion auditable evidence pointers derived exclusively from 316 Wikipedia editions. Unlike recent synthetic approaches, FactNet employs a strictly deterministic construction pipeline, ensuring that every evidence unit is recoverable with byte-level precision. Extensive auditing confirms a high grounding precision of 92.1%, even in long-tail languages. Furthermore, we establish FactNet-Bench, a comprehensive evaluation suite for Knowledge Graph Completion, Question Answering, and Fact Checking. FactNet provides the community with a foundational, reproducible resource for training and evaluating trustworthy, verifiable multilingual systems.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

The past year has seen over 20 open-source document parsing models, yet thefield still benchmarks almost exclusively on OmniDocBench, a 1,355-pagemanually annotated dataset whose top scores have saturated above 90%. Athree-stage audit pipeline we run on OmniDocBench screens its 21,353evaluator-scored blocks and confirms 2,580 errors (12.08%); combined with overa year of public availability, both annotation quality and contamination riskcall its rankings into question. To address these issues, we presentPureDocBench, a programmatically generated, source-traceable benchmark thatrenders document images from HTML/CSS and produces verifiable annotations fromthe same source, covering 10 domains, 66 subcategories, and 1,475 pages, eachin three versions: clean, digitally degraded, and real-degraded (4,425 imagestotal). Evaluating 40 models spanning pipeline specialists, end-to-endspecialists, and general-purpose VLMs, we find: (i) document parsing is farfrom solved: the best model scores only ~74 out of 100, with a 44.6-point gapbetween the strongest and weakest models; (ii) specialist parsers with <=4Bparameters rival or surpass general VLMs that are 5-100x larger, yet formularecognition remains a shared bottleneck where no model exceeds 67% whenaveraging the formula metric across all three tracks; (iii) general VLMs loseonly 0.99/8.52 Overall points under digital/real degradation versus 4.90/14.21for pipeline specialists, producing ranking reversals that make clean-onlyevaluation misleading for deployment. All data, code, and artifacts arepublicly released.

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.