Daily Papers

Windows OS kernel memory is one of the main targets of cyber-attacks. By launching such attacks, hackers are succeeding in process privilege escalation and tampering with users data by accessing kernel mode memory. This paper considers a new example of such an attack, which results in access to the files opened in an exclusive mode. Windows built-in security features prevent such legal access, but attackers can circumvent them by patching dynamically allocated objects. The research shows that the Windows 10, version 1809 x64 is vulnerable to this attack. The paper provides an example of using MemoryRanger, a hypervisor-based solution to prevent such attack by running kernel-mode drivers in isolated kernel memory enclaves.

The security of a computer system depends on OS kernel protection. It is crucial to reveal and inspect new attacks on kernel data, as these are used by hackers. The purpose of this paper is to continue research into attacks on dynamically allocated data in the Windows OS kernel and demonstrate the capacity of MemoryRanger to prevent these attacks. This paper discusses three new hijacking attacks on kernel data, which are based on bypassing OS security mechanisms. The first two hijacking attacks result in illegal access to files open in exclusive access. The third attack escalates process privileges, without applying token swapping. Although Windows security experts have issued new protection features, access attempts to the dynamically allocated data in the kernel are not fully controlled. MemoryRanger hypervisor is designed to fill this security gap. The updated MemoryRanger prevents these new attacks as well as supporting the Windows 10 1903 x64.

Windows OS is facing a huge rise in kernel attacks. An overview of popular techniques that result in loading kernel drivers will be presented. One of the key targets of modern threats is disabling and blinding Microsoft Defender, a default Windows AV. The analysis of recent driver-based attacks will be given, the challenge is to block them. The survey of user- and kernel-level attacks on Microsoft Defender will be given. One of the recently published attackers techniques abuses Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) and Security Reference Monitor (SRM) by modifying Integrity Level and Debug Privileges for the Microsoft Defender via syscalls. However, this user-mode attack can be blocked via the Windows 'trust labels' mechanism. The presented paper discovered the internals of MIC and SRM, including the analysis of Microsoft Defender during malware detection. We show how attackers can attack Microsoft Defender using a kernel-mode driver. This driver modifies the fields of the Token structure allocated for the Microsoft Defender application. The presented attack resulted in disabling Microsoft Defender, without terminating any of its processes and without triggering any Windows security features, such as PatchGuard. The customized hypervisor-based solution named MemoryRanger was used to protect the Windows Defender kernel structures. The experiments show that MemoryRanger successfully restricts access to the sensitive kernel data from illegal access attempts with affordable performance degradation.

One of the main issues in the OS security is providing trusted code execution in an untrusted environment. During executing, kernel-mode drivers dynamically allocate memory to store and process their data: Windows core kernel structures, users' private information, and sensitive data of third-party drivers. All this data can be tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Attacks on Windows-based computers can cause not just hiding a malware driver, process privilege escalation, and stealing private data but also failures of industrial CNC machines. Windows built-in security and existing approaches do not provide the integrity and confidentiality of the allocated memory of third-party drivers. The proposed hypervisor-based system (AllMemPro) protects allocated data from being modified or stolen. AllMemPro prevents access to even 1 byte of allocated data, adapts for newly allocated memory in real time, and protects the driver without its source code. AllMemPro works well on newest Windows 10 1709 x64.

This paper envisions a revolutionary AIOS-Agent ecosystem, where Large Language Model (LLM) serves as the (Artificial) Intelligent Operating System (IOS, or AIOS)--an operating system "with soul". Upon this foundation, a diverse range of LLM-based AI Agent Applications (Agents, or AAPs) are developed, enriching the AIOS-Agent ecosystem and signaling a paradigm shift from the traditional OS-APP ecosystem. We envision that LLM's impact will not be limited to the AI application level, instead, it will in turn revolutionize the design and implementation of computer system, architecture, software, and programming language, featured by several main concepts: LLM as OS (system-level), Agents as Applications (application-level), Natural Language as Programming Interface (user-level), and Tools as Devices/Libraries (hardware/middleware-level). We begin by introducing the architecture of traditional OS. Then we formalize a conceptual framework for AIOS through "LLM as OS (LLMOS)", drawing analogies between AIOS and traditional OS: LLM is likened to OS kernel, context window to memory, external storage to file system, hardware tools to peripheral devices, software tools to programming libraries, and user prompts to user commands. Subsequently, we introduce the new AIOS-Agent Ecosystem, where users can easily program Agent Applications (AAPs) using natural language, democratizing the development of software, which is different from the traditional OS-APP ecosystem. Following this, we explore the diverse scope of Agent Applications. We delve into both single-agent and multi-agent systems, as well as human-agent interaction. Lastly, drawing on the insights from traditional OS-APP ecosystem, we propose a roadmap for the evolution of the AIOS-Agent ecosystem. This roadmap is designed to guide the future research and development, suggesting systematic progresses of AIOS and its Agent applications.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is being used to search for indicators of attacks that might have compromised an enterprise network for a long time without being discovered. To have a more effective analysis, CTI open standards have incorporated descriptive relationships showing how the indicators or observables are related to each other. However, these relationships are either completely overlooked in information gathering or not used for threat hunting. In this paper, we propose a system, called POIROT, which uses these correlations to uncover the steps of a successful attack campaign. We use kernel audits as a reliable source that covers all causal relations and information flows among system entities and model threat hunting as an inexact graph pattern matching problem. Our technical approach is based on a novel similarity metric which assesses an alignment between a query graph constructed out of CTI correlations and a provenance graph constructed out of kernel audit log records. We evaluate POIROT on publicly released real-world incident reports as well as reports of an adversarial engagement designed by DARPA, including ten distinct attack campaigns against different OS platforms such as Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our evaluation results show that POIROT is capable of searching inside graphs containing millions of nodes and pinpoint the attacks in a few minutes, and the results serve to illustrate that CTI correlations could be used as robust and reliable artifacts for threat hunting.

One of the main issues in the OS security is to provide trusted code execution in an untrusted environment. During executing, kernel-mode drivers allocate and process memory data: OS internal structures, users private information, and sensitive data of third-party drivers. All this data and the drivers code can be tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Microsoft security experts integrated new features to fill this gap, but they are not enough: allocated data can be stolen and patched and the drivers code can be dumped without any security reaction. The proposed hypervisor-based system (MemoryRanger) tackles this issue by executing drivers in separate kernel enclaves with specific memory attributes. MemoryRanger protects code and data using Intel VT-x and EPT features with low performance degradation on Windows 10 x64.

Linux kernel tuning is essential for optimizing operating system (OS) performance. However, existing methods often face challenges in terms of efficiency, scalability, and generalization. This paper introduces OS-R1, an agentic Linux kernel tuning framework powered by rule-based reinforcement learning (RL). By abstracting the kernel configuration space as an RL environment, OS-R1 facilitates efficient exploration by large language models (LLMs) and ensures accurate configuration modifications. Additionally, custom reward functions are designed to enhance reasoning standardization, configuration modification accuracy, and system performance awareness of the LLMs. Furthermore, we propose a two-phase training process that accelerates convergence and minimizes retraining across diverse tuning scenarios. Experimental results show that OS-R1 significantly outperforms existing baseline methods, achieving up to 5.6% performance improvement over heuristic tuning and maintaining high data efficiency. Notably, OS-R1 is adaptable across various real-world applications, demonstrating its potential for practical deployment in diverse environments. Our dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/LHY-24/OS-R1.

We propose a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously employs multiple deep learning models analyzing contextual and behavioral characteristics of Windows portable executable, producing a final prediction based on a decision from the meta-model. The detection heuristic in contemporary machine learning Windows malware classifiers is typically based on the static properties of the sample since dynamic analysis through virtualization is challenging for vast quantities of samples. To surpass this limitation, we employ a Windows kernel emulation that allows the acquisition of behavioral patterns across large corpora with minimal temporal and computational costs. We partner with a security vendor for a collection of more than 100k int-the-wild samples that resemble the contemporary threat landscape, containing raw PE files and filepaths of applications at the moment of execution. The acquired dataset is at least ten folds larger than reported in related works on behavioral malware analysis. Files in the training dataset are labeled by a professional threat intelligence team, utilizing manual and automated reverse engineering tools. We estimate the hybrid classifier's operational utility by collecting an out-of-sample test set three months later from the acquisition of the training set. We report an improved detection rate, above the capabilities of the current state-of-the-art model, especially under low false-positive requirements. Additionally, we uncover a meta-model's ability to identify malicious activity in validation and test sets even if none of the individual models express enough confidence to mark the sample as malevolent. We conclude that the meta-model can learn patterns typical to malicious samples from representation combinations produced by different analysis techniques. We publicly release pre-trained models and anonymized dataset of emulation reports.

The use of operating system API calls is a promising task in the detection of PE-type malware in the Windows operating system. This task is officially defined as running malware in an isolated sandbox environment, recording the API calls made with the Windows operating system and sequentially analyzing these calls. Here, we have analyzed 7107 different malicious software belonging to various families such as virus, backdoor, trojan in an isolated sandbox environment and transformed these analysis results into a format where different classification algorithms and methods can be used. First, we'll explain how we got the malware, and then we'll explain how we've got these software bundled into families. Finally, we will describe how to perform malware classification tasks using different computational methods for the researchers who will use the data set we have created.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the possibility of implementing an attack on ALPC connection in the Windows operating system through the kernel without closing the connection covertly from programs and the operating system and to propose a method of protection against this type of attacks. Asynchronous Local Procedure Call technology (ALPC) is used in various Windows information protection systems, including antivirus systems (AV) and Endpoint Detection and Response systems (EDR). To ensure the concealment of malicious software, attackers need to disrupt the operation of AV, EDR tools, which in turn can be achieved by destructive impact on the components of the ALPC technology. Examples of such attacks already exist and are covered in this paper. To counteract such new threats, it is necessary to advance the improvement of information security systems and the ALPC security research was conducted. The most difficult case, Windows kernel driver attack, was considered. Three attacks on the ALPC connection were carried out, based on changing the ALPC structures in the kernel memory, which led to creation of illegitimate connections in the system and the disruption of correct connections. ALPChecker protection tool has been developed. The tool was successfully tested on three demonstrated attacks.

Linux kernel is a huge code base with enormous number of subsystems and possible configuration options that results in unmanageable complexity of elaborating an efficient configuration. Machine Learning (ML) is approach/area of learning from data, finding patterns, and making predictions without implementing algorithms by developers that can introduce a self-evolving capability in Linux kernel. However, introduction of ML approaches in Linux kernel is not easy way because there is no direct use of floating-point operations (FPU) in kernel space and, potentially, ML models can be a reason of significant performance degradation in Linux kernel. Paper suggests the ML infrastructure architecture in Linux kernel that can solve the declared problem and introduce of employing ML models in kernel space. Suggested approach of kernel ML library has been implemented as Proof Of Concept (PoC) project with the goal to demonstrate feasibility of the suggestion and to design the interface of interaction the kernel-space ML model proxy and the ML model user-space thread.

We discuss how to define a kernel for Signal Temporal Logic (STL) formulae. Such a kernel allows us to embed the space of formulae into a Hilbert space, and opens up the use of kernel-based machine learning algorithms in the context of STL. We show an application of this idea to a regression problem in formula space for probabilistic models.

LLM agents increasingly take on long-running tasks whose history grows far beyond a single model context window. Existing approaches compress earlier interactions or extract selected information into fixed memory representations, committing to what to preserve before future needs are known. We present Scroll, a context manager that treats each agent session as an executable Session Environment. The environment is backed by an append-only Event Log and a sandboxed, persistent Python kernel. The kernel maintains a typed namespace across model calls, allowing tool outputs, retrieved history, and derived state to be bound to variables rather than serialized into the prompt at each call. Model-written code searches, materializes, and transforms session state through exec; only explicitly printed projections enter the model's working view for the next call. Context management thus becomes a programming task that inherits the improving coding abilities of LLMs, while the Event Log preserves lossless historical ground truth. As the working view approaches its budget, stale spans are evicted but remain recoverable: an eviction index keeps compact landmarks tied to exact Event Log addresses, so that the agent navigates directly to evicted regions instead of searching the full log. With Qwen3.8-Max as the backbone, Scroll achieves 94.8% on LongMemEval_S; 73.1% on BEAM_10M, surpassing the best published memory system by 5.1 points; and 86.7% on LOCA_256K, exceeding the best published long-horizon agent by 37.4 points.

High quality kernels are critical for reducing training and inference costs of Large Language Models (LLMs), yet they traditionally require significant expertise in hardware architecture and software optimization. While recent advances in LLM-based code generation show promise for complex optimization, existing methods struggle with the vast optimization space due to insufficient hardware domain knowledge, failing to effectively balance exploration and exploitation. We present KernelBand, a novel framework that formulates kernel optimization as a hierarchical multi-armed bandit problem, enabling LLM agents to strategically navigate the optimization space by treating kernel selection and optimization strategy application as sequential decision-making processes. Our approach leverages hardware profiling information to identify promising optimization strategies and employs runtime behavior clustering to reduce exploration overhead across kernel candidates. Extensive experiments on TritonBench demonstrate that KernelBand significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving superior performance with fewer tokens while exhibiting consistent improvement without saturation as computational resources increase.

Modern malware and spyware platforms attack existing antivirus solutions and even Microsoft PatchGuard. To protect users and business systems new technologies developed by Intel and AMD CPUs may be applied. To deal with the new malware we propose monitoring and controlling access to the memory in real time using Intel VT-x with EPT. We have checked this concept by developing MemoryMonRWX, which is a bare-metal hypervisor. MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap all types of memory access: read, write, and execute. MemoryMonRWX also has the following competitive advantages: fine-grained analysis, support of multi-core CPUs and 64-bit Windows 10. MemoryMonRWX is able to protect critical kernel memory areas even when PatchGuard has been disabled by malware. Its main innovative features are as follows: guaranteed interception of every memory access, resilience, and low performance degradation.