Daily Papers

As Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant advancements across various tasks, such as question answering, translation, text summarization, and dialogue systems, the need for accuracy in information becomes crucial, especially for serious financial products serving billions of users like Alipay. To address this, Alipay has developed a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system that grounds LLMs on the most accurate and up-to-date information. However, for a real-world product serving millions of users, the inference speed of LLMs becomes a critical factor compared to a mere experimental model. Hence, this paper presents a generic framework for accelerating the inference process, resulting in a substantial increase in speed and cost reduction for our RAG system, with lossless generation accuracy. In the traditional inference process, each token is generated sequentially by the LLM, leading to a time consumption proportional to the number of generated tokens. To enhance this process, our framework, named lookahead, introduces a multi-branch strategy. Instead of generating a single token at a time, we propose a Trie-based Retrieval (TR) process that enables the generation of multiple branches simultaneously, each of which is a sequence of tokens. Subsequently, for each branch, a Verification and Accept (VA) process is performed to identify the longest correct sub-sequence as the final output. Our strategy offers two distinct advantages: (1) it guarantees absolute correctness of the output, avoiding any approximation algorithms, and (2) the worst-case performance of our approach is equivalent to the conventional process. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the significant improvements achieved by applying our inference acceleration framework. Code is avaliable: https://github.com/alipay/PainlessInferenceAcceleration.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is pivotal for the continuous evolution of GUI agents, yet existing evaluation paradigms face significant limitations. Rule-based methods suffer from poor scalability and cannot handle open-ended tasks, while LLM-as-a-Judge approaches rely on passive visual observation, often failing to capture latent system states due to partial state observability. To address these challenges, we advocate for a paradigm shift from passive evaluation to Agentic Interactive Verification. We introduce VAGEN, a framework that employs a verifier agent equipped with interaction tools to autonomously plan verification strategies and proactively probe the environment for evidence of task completion. Leveraging the insight that GUI tasks are typically "easy to verify but hard to solve", VAGEN overcomes the bottlenecks of visual limitations. Experimental results on OSWorld-Verified and AndroidWorld benchmarks demonstrate that VAGEN significantly improves evaluation accuracy compared to LLM-as-a-Judge baselines and further enhances performance through test-time scaling strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exploded a new heatwave of AI, for their ability to engage end-users in human-level conversations with detailed and articulate answers across many knowledge domains. In response to their fast adoption in many industrial applications, this survey concerns their safety and trustworthiness. First, we review known vulnerabilities of the LLMs, categorising them into inherent issues, intended attacks, and unintended bugs. Then, we consider if and how the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques, which have been widely developed for traditional software and deep learning models such as convolutional neural networks, can be integrated and further extended throughout the lifecycle of the LLMs to provide rigorous analysis to the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs and their applications. Specifically, we consider four complementary techniques: falsification and evaluation, verification, runtime monitoring, and ethical use. Considering the fast development of LLMs, this survey does not intend to be complete (although it includes 300 references), especially when it comes to the applications of LLMs in various domains, but rather a collection of organised literature reviews and discussions to support the quick understanding of the safety and trustworthiness issues from the perspective of V&V.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.