--- pretty_name: STEER license: cc-by-4.0 language: - en task_categories: - multiple-choice - question-answering tags: - economics - rationality - decision-making - game-theory - social-choice - reasoning - benchmark size_categories: - 10K//`, unique in the dataset | | `base_id` | string | one question (16 hex digits of a content hash); shared by its parts | | `part` | int32 | 0-based part index within `base_id`; most questions have one part | | `template_id` | string | `//`: the template the question was filled from | | `question_text` | string | the prompt | | `options` | list | answer options in presentation order, without letter labels | | `grading` | string | `answer` or `consistency` | | `correct_index` | int32 | 0-based index of the correct option; null for consistency-graded rows | | `consistency_group` | string | rows scored together (`/`); null for answer-graded rows | | `consistency_rule` | string | `:`; null for answer-graded rows | | `type` | string | question type within the element (`default` if the element has one) | | `domain` | string | subject matter of the wording (e.g. `consumer_goods`) | | `perspective` | string | `first_person`, `second_person`, `anon`, `man`, `woman`, `ai_assistant`; null if none | | `tags` | list | other template descriptors (may be empty) | | `difficulty` | int32 | difficulty level within the element: 1 is its easiest, up to its number of levels; not comparable across elements | | `setting` | string | setting of the taxonomy | | `module` | string | module of the taxonomy | | `generator` | string | `autosteer@+` that generated the row | | `seed` | int64 | with `element` and `template_id`, regenerates the question | `difficulty` is relative to the element: its levels are numbered from 1 (the element's easiest) up to its number of levels, and many elements have a single level. Levels can be compared within an element, not across elements. ## Grading **Answer-graded** rows (`grading == "answer"`) have one correct option, `options[correct_index]`. The score of an element is accuracy over its questions; a model's answer is the index of the option it chooses. **Consistency-graded** rows (`grading == "consistency"`) have no correct option. They test for a behavioural bias: the parts of one question (rows with the same `consistency_group`) are presented separately, and the choices count as consistent if the tuple of chosen option indices, in `part` order, is one of the allowed tuples listed in `consistency_rule` (`:`, tuples written as digit strings separated by commas). The score is the share of consistent groups. ```python def consistent(choices, rule): # choices: chosen option index per part, in part order allowed = rule.split(":", 1)[1].split(",") return "".join(map(str, choices)) in allowed ``` Example: `same_brand:02,11` means choosing option 0 in part 0 and option 2 in part 1, or option 1 in both, is consistent. `pairwise_complete` (completeness, completeness_risk) is the exception: its comma-separated tokens are not allowed tuples but one token per part, in `part` order, of six digits `abpqic`: the part compares alternatives `a` and `b` (0-based, in the order the question describes them), and `p`, `q`, `i`, `c` are the option indices of "prefer a", "prefer b", "indifferent" and "cannot decide". The group is consistent (complete) if no part's choice is its `c`; the transitivity of the answered pairs is a secondary measure (`autosteer.release.consistency.score_transitivity`). The rules: | rule | elements | consistent when | |---|---|---| | `common_ratio_same_side` | `certainty_effect` (type two_part) | the sure option and its scaled-down version, or the lottery in both parts. | | `ellsberg_seu` | `ambiguity_aversion` | the pairs that one subjective probability can explain (the known-odds bet in exactly one part, or indifferent in both). | | `mirror_trade` | `endowment_effect` | Yes in exactly one part, or indifferent in both. | | `pairwise_complete` | `completeness`, `completeness_risk` | no pair answered "cannot decide" (the answers are complete). Reported besides: whether the answered pairs are transitive. | | `reflection_same_side` | `reflection_effect` (type two_part) | the same side in both parts. | | `same_brand` | `independence` | the same brand in both parts, or no preference in both. | In type `stated_prior` the question states which option the reader chose in an earlier, related choice; the keyed option is the one on the same side. ## Elements Per setting, in paper order. [ELEMENTS.md](ELEMENTS.md) has the full description of every element (how its questions are generated, what varies, how the answer and distractors are computed, how it is graded); `elements.csv` and `elements.jsonl` have the same information for programs. **Foundations** | id | config | element | grading | test questions | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1.1.a | `add_sub` | Addition and Subtraction | answer | 200 | | 1.1.b | `mult_div` | Multiplication and Division | answer | 240 | | 1.1.c | `compute_expectations` | Compute Expectations | answer | 200 | | 1.2.a | `micro_utility` | Optimize over a Discrete Set | answer | 200 | | 1.2.b | `optimize_continuous` | Optimize a Continuous Function | answer | 200 | | 1.2.c | `constrained_optimization` | Constrained Optimization | answer | 240 | | 1.3.a | `prob_basic` | Compute Probabilities of Outcomes | answer | 280 | | 1.3.b | `complement_rule` | Complement Rule | answer | 200 | | 1.3.c | `bayes_rule` | Bayes' Rule | answer | 200 | | 1.4.a | `categorical_syllogism` | Categorical Syllogism | answer | 200 | | 1.4.b | `conditional_syllogism` | Conditional Syllogism | answer | 640 | | 1.4.c | `equiv_contrapositive` | Logical Equivalence of Contrapositive | answer | 200 | | 1.5.a | `first_order_false_belief` | First-Order False Belief | answer | 320 | | 1.5.b | `second_order_false_belief` | Second-Order False Belief | answer | 320 | **Decisions in Single-Agent Environments** | id | config | element | grading | test questions | |---|---|---|---|---| | 2.1.a | `completeness` | Completeness | consistency | 240 | | 2.1.b | `transitivity` | Transitivity | answer | 200 | | 2.1.c | `independence` | Independence | consistency | 200 | | 2.2.a | `sunk_cost` | Avoidance of the Sunk Cost Fallacy | answer | 320 | | 2.2.b | `endowment_effect` | Avoidance of the Endowment Effect | consistency | 200 | | 2.2.c | `time_inconsistency` | Avoidance of Time Inconsistency | answer | 200 | | 2.3.a | `completeness_risk` | Completeness over Lotteries | consistency | 240 | | 2.3.b | `transitivity_risk` | Transitivity over Lotteries | answer | 200 | | 2.3.c | `independence_risk` | Independence over Lotteries | answer | 200 | | 2.4.a | `compute_expected_utility` | Compute Expected Utility | answer | 200 | | 2.4.b | `maximize_expected_utility` | Maximize Expected Utility | answer | 200 | | 2.4.e | `loss_aversion` | Avoidance of Loss Averse Behavior | answer | 200 | | 2.5.a | `gamblers_fallacy` | Avoidance of the Gambler's Fallacy | answer | 200 | | 2.5.b | `certainty_effect` | Avoidance of the Certainty Effect | mixed | 200 | | 2.5.c | `reflection_effect` | Avoidance of the Reflection Effect | mixed | 200 | | 2.5.d | `ambiguity_aversion` | Avoidance of Ambiguity Aversion | consistency | 200 | **Decisions in Multi-Agent Environments** | id | config | element | grading | test questions | |---|---|---|---|---| | 3.1.a | `interpret_games` | Interpret Games | answer | 200 | | 3.1.b | `best_response` | Best Response | answer | 200 | | 3.1.c | `dominant_strategies` | Dominant Strategies | answer | 200 | | 3.1.d | `dominated_strategies` | Avoidance of Dominated Strategies | answer | 200 | | 3.1.e | `iterated_removal` | Iterated Removal of Dominated Strategies | answer | 240 | | 3.1.f | `pure_nash` | Pure Nash Equilibrium | answer | 200 | | 3.2.a | `backward_induction` | Backward Induction | answer | 200 | | 3.2.b | `subgame_nash` | Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium | answer | 480 | | 3.4.a | `feasibility` | Feasibility in Infinitely Repeated Games | answer | 240 | | 3.4.b | `enforceability` | Enforceability in Infinitely Repeated Games | answer | 200 | | 3.4.c | `trigger` | Trigger Strategies | answer | 200 | | 3.5.a | `bayes_nash` | Bayes-Nash Equilibrium | answer | 200 | **Decisions on Behalf of Other Agents** | id | config | element | grading | test questions | |---|---|---|---|---| | 4.1.a | `pareto_sc` | Pareto Efficiency in Social Welfare Functions | answer | 240 | | 4.1.b | `sc_monotonicity_rules` | Monotonicity in Social Welfare Functions | answer | 240 | | 4.1.c | `sc_transitivity_rules` | Transitivity in Social Welfare Functions | answer | 240 | | 4.1.d | `sc_nondictatorship` | Non-Dictatorial Social Welfare Function | answer | 360 | | 4.2.a | `plurality_voting` | Plurality Vote | answer | 200 | | 4.2.b | `borda_count` | Borda Count | answer | 200 | | 4.2.c | `copeland_method` | Copeland's Method | answer | 480 | | 4.2.d | `fair_division` | Fair Division Algorithms | answer | 200 | | | `condorcet_criterion` | Condorcet Winner | answer | 200 | | 4.3.a | `dsic_mechanism` | Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility | answer | 380 | | 4.3.b | `bic_mechanism` | Bayesian Incentive Compatibility | answer | 800 | | 4.3.c | `ir_mechanism` | Individual Rationality | answer | 640 | | 4.3.d | `budget_balance` | Budget Balanced | answer | 480 | | 4.4.a | `top_trading` | Top Trading Cycles | answer | 400 | | 4.4.b | `auctions_risk` | Optimal Auction for Bidders with Differing Risk Attitudes | answer | 480 | | 4.4.c | `auctions_affiliated` | Optimal Auction for Bidders with Affiliated Values | answer | 960 | ## License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). You may share and adapt the data with attribution; please cite the paper below. ## Citation ```bibtex @inproceedings{ramansteer, author = {Narun Krishnamurthi Raman and Taylor Lundy and Samuel Joseph Amouyal and Yoav Levine and Kevin Leyton{-}Brown and Moshe Tennenholtz}, title = {{STEER:} {A}ssessing the {E}conomic {R}ationality of {L}arge {L}anguage {M}odels}, booktitle = {Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, {ICML} 2024, Vienna, Austria, July 21-27, 2024}, publisher = {OpenReview.net}, year = {2024}, url = {https://openreview.net/forum?id=nU1mtFDtMX} } ```