{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00261/2020","text":"Due to formal reasons, the Spanish Data Protection Authority (AEPD) decided to admit a claim against Asturias Healthcare System (the controller) for not satisfying a data subject's access request to medical records of data subject’s deceased mother, but without any economic fine nor warning, because, during the AEPD's investigation process, such right of access was finally fulfilled by the public administration.\n\nDispute\nMight be a request of access considered as duly fulfilled by the controller when it was not attended in due time and proper course?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/526196/ HA RK / 21-01","text":"The applicant’s marriage to Ms D was converted into a registered partnership, after which the applicant and Ms D entered into a covenant for the termination of the registered partnership and a partial dissolution of the matrimonial community of property. The community of property was successfully dissolved in 2004.\nIn the abovementioned covenant, the applicant and Ms D had agreed to continue their joined ownership of the life insurance policy. In particular, there was first an obligation to share the value with each other upon payment and second Ms D had the obligation to reimburse the applicant annually for the subscription of the insurance.\nA dispute arose in relation to ASR’s compliance with the GDPR obligations. Hence, the applicant will be referred to as the data subject and ASR will be referred to as data controller.\nIn particular, the data controller informed the data subject of the personal data kept on him by the data controller. However, the data subject believed that this information was inaccurate and incomplete. Therefore, the data subject initiated several procedures against the data controller.\nThe first four requests concern the right to inspection. Precisely, a request for full access of the data subject’s data kept by the data controller, based on article 15 GDPR. Moreover, a request for an overview of the contacts the data controller had with third parties, as well as a list of documents added to the data subject’s file on request of third parties. Finally, the data subject requested a copy of the complete file of his documents from either 2004 or 2016 onwards.\nWith his final three requests, the data subject asked the court to order the data controller to handle the agreement with the data subject in accordance with the GDPR, to delete all personal data of the data subject after proper termination of the agreement and to order a payment of the material and immaterial damages suffered by the improper implementation of the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Datainspektionen - DI-2019-7782","text":"On 2 May 2019, the Swedish DPA received a complaint from a relative of the data subject according to which Gnosjö's Social Affairs Committee (Socialutskott) processes personal data of a resident at one of the municipality's LSS homes (housing with special services for adults), through CCTV cameras. The Social Affairs Committee placed the CCTV cameras to increase the security of the resident, as the resident has demonstrated serious self-harming behaviour.\n\nDispute\nThe complainant claimed that the Social Affairs Committee should have stated that CCTV camera surveillance takes place and ask the consent from the resident's family or guardian."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Nottinghamshire County Council","text":"Nottinghamshire County Council is the data controller. It has a service called Council Assessment Service (CAS), which prepares Child and Family Assessments (CFA). CFA is prepared by social workers and looks into the well-being of children where there are concerns regarding the capacity of their parents or caregivers to take proper care.\nThe data subjects are the users of CAS and the children whose well-being is assessed.\nA social worker who had prepared the CFA sent out an unredacted copy of the assessment report of two children to their mother and her two ex-partners, each father of one of the children. The assessment report contained sensitive personal data, which should have been redacted from the copies sent to the ex-partners of the mother. Before sending, the assessment report was required to be signed off by the manager, who also did not look into the same, resulting in the distribution of unredacted copies.\nBefore this incident, 16 incidents of unredacted information being shared had occurred at Nottinghamshire County Council."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS (Netherlands) - 202001625/1/A3","text":"This matter concerns an appeal to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State in which the data subject stated that his right to privacy was violated by the fact that he could only purchase a bus ticket by card (as opposed to cash payment). He previously raised a request to the AP (the DPA) to take action against Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer N.V. for the decision to abolish cash payments, through application of the GDPR. This request was denied and underlies the current appeal.\nOn appeal, the data subject argued that “the court erred in finding that the processing of personal data is necessary for the performance of a contract” in that:\n1. The data subject did not enter into an agreement with Connexxion “of his own free will” and that consent for the processing of his personal data was not given freely and unambiguously as Connexxion has a monopoly on which public transport users depend. He argued that the General Conditions for City and Regional Transport 2015 are insufficient to serve as a legal basis within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR.\n2. The purpose of the data processing is not well-defined, explicit and justified.\n3. The effect on safety of banning cash payments is not clear as this measure is one of a group consisting of 23 measures."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 201906880/1/A3","text":"The Dutch DPA (the Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, or 'AP') imposed an order subject to a periodic penalty payment on the municipality of Arnhem ('the Municipality'). The Municipality had infringed the then applicable Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens or 'Wbp') by storing and retaining the personal data of individuals who disposed their waste in underground containers on the card readers attached to the containers. The order required the Municipality to open all underground containers without the use of a card, and to delete all personal data already stored and retained no later than 1 October 2017.\nOn 14 March 2019, the AP decided to lift the order subject to penalty payments imposed on the Municipality at the request of the Municipality. The Municipality wanted the underground containers to be accessible only to residents and businesses of the Municipality, and therefore wanted to open a new waste card system. With the new system, residents are given a card with an internal chip code which is linked to their residential address. When the card is held in front of the card reader, the chip code is processed and compared to a whitelist of chip codes. To do this, the chip code is stored on the card reader's volatile memory. It is then converted almost instantly into a generic 9999 number, and removed from the whitelist when the container is closed. The AP could not foresee any violation of the GDPR by this new system, namely because data may be processed on the basis of Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, which states that a controller may process personal data which is lawful and necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest.\nIn a decision of 16 July 2019, the AP dismissed an objection made by an appellant against the decision to lift the order as unfounded as unfounded. In a judgment of 5 September 2019, the District Court of Gelderland ('the District Court') declared an appeal lodged by the appellant against the decision as unfounded.\nIn the present case, the appellant appealed the judgment by the District Court. They argued that the District Court erred in finding that the processing of personal data can be based on Article 6(1)(c) GDPR. In particular, the appellant argued that pursuant to Article 6(3) GDPR, a public interest task under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR must be established by Union law or Member State law in a formal sense, and must satisfy criteria set out in Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR'). The appellant also stated that in this case, the necessity for processing has not been demonstrated because the question of whether the waste card system is necessary for the performance of a duty under the Dutch Environmental Management Act was not adequately addressed. The District Court should have examined whether the duty could also be fulfilled without the processing of personal data. By not doing so, the District Court applied a test that was too light. The appellant requested that the AP take effective enforcement against any processing of personal data of residents in Arnhem without their consent, including when they deposit their household waste."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00082/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that the defendant has installed a video surveillance system allegedly pointing to a parking area without the consent of the owner of such area. The complaint included pictures proving that the video surveillance system was installed. The claimant was the landlord of the defendant.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the AEPD investigation requests stating that:\n(i) it has installed the corresponding information poster,\n(ii) it has installed six cameras in order to ensure the safety of its establishment,\n(iii) the cameras pointing to the parking are only recording heavy equipment, and, considering that the property is leased and that the defendant and the claimant do not have a good relationship, the defendant understands that this complaint is a pressure measure by the lessor, and\n(iv) the defendant is planning to leave the property before May 2020. The AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure; after that, the defendant submitted the corresponding pleadings document, in which it declared that it has left the property and uninstalled all the cameras, attaching pictures of the same as a proof. As a result of its investigation, the AEPD considered that the claimant had a video surveillance system with an excessive orientation to an area out of its property, and without due cause: two of the six cameras were directly recording not only the entrance, but also the sidewalk and nearby road; in order to ensure the safety of the establishment it was not necessary to record such a big area."}
{"_id":"facts_High Court - McShane v Data Protection Commission (2025) IEHC 191","text":"The data subject was a fire prevention officer working for the Irish Health Service Executive (HSE) and was provided with a work phone to be used for work purposes.\nIn May 2021, the HSE suffered a significant data breach and ransomware attack which compromised a large number of HSE computers and devices, including the data subject’s work phone.\nIn June 2021, the data subject noticed that his personal email account and personal cryptocurrency account, both of which he had accessed on his work phone, had been compromised. Cryptocurrency to the value of €1,400 had been stolen.\nAfter being left unsatisfied with the HSE’s response to a complaint he had filed in relation to the incident, the data subject complained to the DPC on 15 December 2021.\nIn an email to the data subject about the issues he raised, the DPC noted that the HSE was not the data controller in respect of the data subject’s non-work-related personal data which was on the work phone as the device was only supposed to be used for work purposes. It was found that there was “no basis” upon which the HSE could be considered the data controller when the personal data (personal email and cryptocurrency account) was stored on the device without the HSE’s knowledge or agreement.\nOn 15 August 2022, the data subject sought a judicial review before the High Court of the DPC’s decision.\nThe data subject claimed that the work-related data comprised “personal data” under Article 4(1) GDPR, that the HSE was the data controller in respect of it in accordance with Article 4(7) GDPR, and that the DPC had erred in their findings in respect of their decision. This, according to the data subject, rendered their decision “unreasonable” in accordance with the test laid out in Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 2 I.R. 70. This decision established some criteria for which an administrative decision can be judicially reviewed in Ireland. The data subject also claimed that the DPC had failed in their obligation to investigate the breach of the GDPR which he complained about. The applicant thus sought an order annulling the DPC’s decision.\nThe DPC opposed the application for judicial review, submitting that the breach considered in the data subject’s complaint to the DPC related solely to the non-work-related personal data present on the device for which the DPC found that the HSE was not the data controller. The decision did not, according to the DPC, consider the work-related personal data on the device. The DPC also noted that the rejection of the complaint amounted to a legally binding decision in accordance with s. 150(12) of the Data Protection Act 2018, and as such, the data subject should have sought a statutory appeal in lieu of a judicial review."}
{"_id":"facts_DSB (Austria) - 2020-0.303.727","text":"In June 2019, the complainant requested erasure of her personal data from the respondent's website, claiming that an article on that website contained wrong statements about her. After the respondent’s refusal to do so, the complainant lodged a complaint with the DSB.\nThe respondent argued that publishing the article on its website qualified as processing carried out for journalistic purposes under Article 85 GDPR and § 9(1) of the Austrian Data Protection Act (Datenschutzgesetz - DSG). Due to the derogations in § 9(1) DSG, the DSB would hence not be competent to handle the complaint.\n\nDispute\n  * Is the DSB competent to handle the complaint or is the processing on the respondent's website subject to Article 85 GDPR and § 9(1) of the Austrian Data Protection Act?\n  * Did the respondent violate the complaint's right to erasure under Article 17 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202205791","text":"The data subject requested Google LLC (the controller) to delete from its search engine specific Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) which linked to their personal data. The data subject claimed that their personal data was published without consent. However, the controller did not provide any reponse to the erasure request within the required time limit.\nAs a result, the data subject complained to the Spanish DPA. During the proceedings, the controller blocked the requested URLs, exceeding the one month time limit for responding to an access or erasure request."}
{"_id":"facts_KamR Göteborg - 2232-21","text":"In March 2020, the Swedish DPA Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY) fined Google €7,200,000 (SEK 75 million) for violating Article 17 GDPR (the right to erasure). In particular, the IMY considered that Google had violated the right to erasure in connection with two complaints from data subjects (Complaint No. 2 and Complaint No. 8 in the supervisory case), as well as because of its general practice of regularly informing webmasters when search results are being removed.\nGoogle appealed that decision before the Stockholm Administrative Court (FiS). In December 2020, the FiS upheld that Google had breached the right to erasure with respect to Complaint No. 2, but found no such breach with respect to Complaint No. 8. In both cases, however, the FiS concluded that Google had acted contrary to data protection law because of its practice of notifying webmasters of deleted search results. The FiS further justified a reduction of the overall fine calculated by IMY for the breaches that were upheld.\nGoogle further appealed the FiS decision before the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg. In the context of these appeal proceedings, IMY argued that Google had breached the right to erasure with respect to both Complaint No. 2 and Complaint No. 8, and had also acted contrary to data protection law because of its practice of notifying webmasters of removed search results. IMY wanted the overall fine to be set at €6,300,000 (SEK 66 million). In particular, the proposed fine of €6,300,000 included:\n  * a fine of €96,639 (SEK 1 million) for not respecting the right to erasure with respect to Complaint No. 2;\n  * a fine of €1,448,547 (SEK 15 million) for not respecting the right to erasure with respect to Complaint No. 8; and\n  * a fine of € 4,800,000 (SEK 50 million) for the practice of regularly informing webmasters of deleted search results."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00427/2021","text":"On 28 April 2021, a data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against the bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA). According to the complainant, the BBVA had called and sent him several messages about non-payments and appointments. The complainant had asked the bank to delete his data, but the bank replied that it could not do so because there was no customer on their records with the phone number listed in the complaint.\nThe AEPD requested information from BBVA about what had happened and the bank replied that the communications had been an internal error. BBVA alleged that it was testing the operation of a tool designed to send notifications to its customers, and that the messages received by the complainant were fictitious test notifications that BBVA believed it had sent to an idle phone number. In addition, the entity said it had taken appropriate security measures to correct the situation."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00142/2020","text":"On 13/11/19 the AEPD received a written submission from the complainant in which it was stated the following: I periodically receive SMS messages on [my phone] from some service to which I have not subscribed, nor have I consented to any use of my data and it is also impossible to communicate my cancellation. The messages in dispute are attached to the written submission.\nIn view of these facts, the Subdirectorate General for Data Inspection proceeded to carry out actions for their clarification. The entity AIRE NETWORKS DEL MEDITERRÁNEO and the entity DIGITAL VIRGO ESPAÑA, S.A were contacted so that they could indicate the identification data and the ownership of the telephone lines from which the messages had been sent. DIGITAL VIRGO ESPAÑA, S.A sent written response, establishing that the owner of the line under investigation was BUBO MEDIA, S.L. by virtue of a contract for the provision of telecommunications services.\nOn 17/04/20, the entity BUBO MEDIA, S.L. sent to AEPD an e-mail indicating that the way that their customers know about their products and services is through a website and that the way that their costumers request their services is through a phone number. They also stated that the contracting of the services is not accompanied by a written contract and that the conditions of the service and the purposes of the use of the data are indicated in the aforementioned website. As regards for the provision of consent and the contractual relationship, they stated that the costumers are also aware of the contract conditions by the website and that the fact that the customer contacts them by making a phone call to show interest in their services constitutes a clear affirmative act. They made also reference to the fact that they consider that the provision of their consultancy services includes appropriate interaction with the user and that they have recently included the option to unsubscribe from commercial communications by means of a link that appears in the first confirmation sent to costumers.\nBy its side, the AEPD verified the information that appears in the \"Privacy Policy\" of the web, where it stands out; among other aspects, that the responsible of the processing is BUBO MEDIA and that the costumers can withdraw their consent given at any time using a mechanism devised for that purpose.\n\nDispute\nCan BUBO MEDIA’S actions be regarded as unsolicited sending of commercial communications by SMS, without the offering of a mechanism to oppose the processing of personal for marketing purposes, prohibited by article 21.1 of the LSSI?\nIn this case, there was no dispute. BUBO MEDIA acknowledged that their actions were not in line with article 21.1 LSSI, recognized their responsibility and paid the fine in advance, thus mitigating the amount to be paid for such infringement."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202318430","text":"On 28 September 2022, the local police force of the city of La Palma submitted a report to the Spanish DPA (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos – AEPD). The police had discovered 1,404 letters on an abandoned plot of land. The letters should have been delivered by Correo Inteligente Postal, here the controller. The letters had been sent off between February and May 2022.\nOn the 17 November 2022, the AEPD received another report from the police force of the Balearic islands showing that 5,354 letters were left in two different locations in the city of Palma. The police had been informed by a citizen who had sent an email to the city stating that they had found letters in the city’s river. The documentation provided by the police showed that most of the letters were closed and some had been tampered with.\nAfter the AEPD alerted the controller of the reports, the controller stated that they had identified the responsible employees and had started disciplinary proceedings. Further, the controller stated that the letters found had not been opened and therefore the leaked data was limited to the names and addresses on the envelopes. It therefore concluded that there had been no risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects.\nThe AEPD initiated an ex-officio investigation on the 28 December 2022 assessing the measures implemented by the controller to track shipments and training provided to employees."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-012","text":"This decision follows from a previous decision of the French DPA (SAN 2021-023 of 31 December 2021), in which said DPA fined Google LLC €90,000,000 and Google Ireland Limited €60,000,000 for violating Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act. This Act transposes the ePrivacy Directive into domestic French law. Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act is the national equivalent to Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC), which stipulates that the storing of user information or the gaining of access to information already stored, is only permitted on the condition that the user has already given their informed consent. The French DPA had fined Google LLC and Google Ireland Limited in decision SAN 2021-023 for failing to offer users a way of rejecting cookies. It ordered Google to bring its processing activities into compliance and imposed an additional periodic fine of €100,000 per day if Google failed to bring its processing activities into compliance within 3 months.\nOn 24 April 2022, Google sent the French DPA its proposed cookie amendments, which included a button titled \"reject all.\" Between April and June 2022, Google sent further information to the French DPA, and on 5 August 2022, the French DPA re-investigated the matter to ensure that the updated cookie system was compliant. On 25 January 2023 the French DPA requested further information from Google on their system, which Google provided on 28 April 2023."}
{"_id":"facts_Datainspektionen - DI-2018-9274","text":"The Swedish DPA finalised an audit of Google’s handling of individuals’ right to have search result listings for searches that includes their name in 2017. In its decision, the DPA concluded that a number of search result listings should be removed and subsequently ordered Google to do so.\nDuring the DPA’s follow-up audit in 2018, it was critical to the fact that Google did not properly remove two of the search result listings that the DPA had ordered them to remove back in 2017. In one of the cases, Google has done a too narrow interpretation of what web addresses need to be removed from the search result listing. In the second case, Google has failed to remove the search result listing without undue delay. Google claimed it had followed the order and that the handling of the delisting requests had been lawful.\nFurther, when Google removes a search result listing, it notifies the website to which the link is directed in a way that gives the site-owner knowledge of which webpage link was removed and who was behind the delisting request. This allows the site-owner to re-publish the webpage in question on another web address that will then be displayed in a Google search. The DPA criticised this practice, alleging it puts the right to delisting out of effect. However, Goggle claimed this practice has been in accordance with Article 6.1(f) GDPR.\n\nDispute\nThe dispute concerned whether Google had followed the DPA’s order and sufficiently removed search links on request of data subjects or not.\nIt was also in dispute if Google’s practice to inform site-owners of the removal of search results had a legal basis."}
{"_id":"facts_TRL - 7159/08.7TBCSC-A.L1-7","text":"“A” brought an executive action against “B”. After this, an enforcement proceeding was started with an order to impound two vehicles. However, it became clear that it was impossible to impound the vehicles. After this, the pursuing creditor requested the controller to provide information about the journeys of these vehicles in question since a specific date.\nThe controller is an entity responsible for collecting toll fees on highways with the use of an electronic system, thus monitoring the passage of vehicles at certain points installed on the road for this purpose. The controller is therefore able to register traffic and collects personal data from its clients. The controller is also responsible for the treatment of such data.\nThe controller stated that it couldn't supply information concerning toll records (date, time and place) because this was part of the the concept of protection of privacy. These toll records could only be shared with the consent of data subjects, the owners of the cars. After this, the pursuing creditor requested the lifting of professional confidentiality from the controller so the record of the journeys of the cars could be disclosed, whic could result in the cars being seized."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 85/2021","text":"The complainant received a letter for a political campaign from candidate to the local elections. The candidates used the \"list of seniors\" held by the municipality. One of the candidates was working for the municipality, had access to the database at stake, and was subject to a disciplinary procedure after the use of the database was revealed. The candidate died after the complaint was filed. However, it could not be established that the other candidate had access to the database and would be the controller for the sending of the letters he signed.\nwas subject to a disciplinary measure by the municipality."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/673049 / HA RK 19-338","text":"A minor has been placed under supervision of the Amsterdam Centre for Youth and Family (Stichting Jeugdbescherming regio Amsterdam; the defendant). The mother (plaintiff) requests a copy of the complete file from the defendant containing her personal data. The defendant provides the requested data, but removes some phrases and didn’t provide internal notes.\n\nDispute\nAre internal notes and correspondence containing personal data subject to article 15 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-31-5085","text":"The data subject previously served as a board member and a managing partner in two companies (controllers). After the sale of the companies, the acquiring entity initiated a civil lawsuit against, among others, the data subject. The dispute concerned alleged manipulation of accounting and thus overrated value of the acquired businesses.\nOn 16 February 2021, the data subject exercised their right under Article 15 GDPR and requested access to information about them from the controllers. The request related to information about the data subject's work and the ongoing legal proceedings.\nFirst, the controllers extended the request processing time by two months because of the high volume and complexity of the requested information. Later, on 18 May 2021, the controllers provided the data subject with 66 documents relating to travel planning, practical matters related to the board meetings, know-your-customer (KYC) information, separate documents with e-mail logos and a few personal e-mails regarding dinner and sports. Unsatisfied with the response, the data subject complained to the DPA on the same day."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00234/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of a sanction procedure started by the AEPD against the defendant due to a complaint submitted by the Spanish company Neptunos Formación, S.L. (the claimant). The main points of the complaint include the following: (i) the defendant had published copyrighted material in its website without the consent, (ii) the website did not include information on the identity of the defendant, (iii) the claimant requested the erasure of all the content through the contact form, (iv) all personal data obtained from such contact form were transferred to a third company (Formación Universitaria, S.L.) which directly contacted the claimant, (v) the claimant requested again all the erasure of the data during that phone call, without result, (vi) the comments provided in the contact form were published on the website without the user's consent.\n\nDispute\nThe AEPD assessed the controller's compliance with the applicable legislation. The Authority focused on whether or not: (i) the privacy policy included information on the data controller; (ii) the data subject was given an effective way to exercise his/her GDPR rights (as the email address provided refused each email received); (iii) the website offered an option to provide a specific and separate consent for the different purposes; (iv) the first layer of the website included any banner on cookies or information on their use."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W274 2237071-1","text":"After multiple years as a member of a union the data subject decided to quit and sent the union a letter requesting termination of the membership and the deletion of personal data. Among other information the letter contained the membership number and the handwritten signature of the data subject.\nThe union immediately terminated the membership of the data subject. In terms of the erasure request, however, the union asked for a copy of the ID of the data subject in order to progress with the deletion. Although the name and membership number were known to the union, it could not verify that also the signature on the letter was from the data subject.\nThe union argued that although the data subject stated to be known to the union due to their long membership, the size of the union with over 1.2 million members and different administrative responsibilities did not constitute a personal relationship with the data subject. Moreover, the consequences of the data deletion would be severe compared to a resignation given that the data was necessary for a later re-entry in the union to continue the data subject’s membership. Therefore, and in accordance with Article 12(6) GDPR additional measures of identification were required.\nThe data subject refused to provide a copy of the ID seeing a contradiction in providing even more data to achieve its deletion. The data subject argued that sending a copy of the ID does not mean any higher degree of reliability or proof of identity since it could be stolen, forged or used by another person. According to the GDPR additional information may only be requested if there are reasonable doubts about the identity of the natural person which does not allow for routine identity checks in all data subjects' rights."}
{"_id":"facts_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5112.13.2020","text":"The GGK published personal data in the form of information obtained from land and property registers (including land register numbers) from 90 poviat starosties only on the basis of agreements concluded with them.\n\nDispute\nWas the publishing of the land register numbers by the GGK on the GEOPORTAL2 (geoportal.gov.pl) lawful, in accordance with Articles 5(1)(a) and 6(1) GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-003","text":"On 23 September 2021, the French DPA (“CNIL”) carried out an inspection on Foriou’s premises (“controller”), in particular regarding the legal basis of the processing and the security measures taken. The controller was in the business of marketing and managing loyalty programs and cards. In order to promote its programs, until 2021, the controller carried out telephone canvassing campaigns using prospect files purchased with several data suppliers who collected the data via entry forms for online competitions. The personal data collected was the following: surname, first name, title, email address, date of birth and postal address.\nDuring its investigations, the CNIL discovered that the data suppliers all had similar forms on their websites: there were fields which enabled the data subject to enter their contact details. Underneath these fields were a “Validate”, “I validate” or “I answer questions to apply” button. Above or below this button, a text specified that by clicking on it, the user declared that they read the data supplier’s data protection policy and accepts that the data collected would be used to send them offers from the company’s partners. Hyperlinks were provided to access the data protection policy as well as the list of partners concerned. However, the list did not mention the controller. At the end of the text it was specified that if the user wished to continue without receiving offers from the data supplier’s partners, they could click a link in the text (“click here”).\nTherefore, data subjects could either click on the “Validate” button and accept that their data would be used to send them offers from the data supplier’s partners or on the “click here” link to continue without receiving these offers.\nThe controller also submitted 2 other forms in its observations. These forms contained “Validate my coordinates” and “Continue” buttons to validate participation in the game and transmit data to partners. The “click here” button remained unchanged and was still presented in the body of the text.\nRegarding security measures, the CNIL found that the controller indicated that they would keep customer data for a period of 5 years from the date of the end of the contract in an active database with no intermediate archiving mechanism implemented."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00303/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of a sanction procedure started by the AEPD against the defendant due to a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that the defendant had sent him a message thanking the successful acquisition of a new phone line he did not recognize (as he is a client of another telecommunications company) and that such message also specified that the new phone had a period of stay. Additionally, the claimant specified that he later received a document by the defendant requesting him to pay a debt he did not recognize.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the AEPD investigation requests stating that it requested the payment of the phone services contracted online by the claimant, but it did not attach any evidence of his acceptance; afterwards, the defendant attached a copy of the alleged contract containing the personal data of the claimant, but with no evidence at all that he has signed nor accepted it in any manner. The AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202100213/1/A3","text":"Controller is the municipality of Eindhoven. The data subject found out that an email that they sent to the municipality on 15 January 2017 (in which they complained about their neighbours), had been forwarded and had ended up with their neighbours, without blacking out their email-address. Because they had not given consent for this, and the processing for personal data was not necessary to fulfil a public interest, the data subject requested the municipality to (1) rectify personal data mentioned in letters of 7 April 2016 and 14 November 2018, and (2) compensation for damages caused by forwarding their personal data without a legal basis.\nAfter the municipality had rejected the request, the data subject brought the issue before court. The District Court of Oost-Brabant dismissed this appeal, after which the data subject appealed this judgement before the Council of State. On appeal, the data subject argued that (1) The municipality had exceeded the decision period of one month as per Article 12(3) GDPR for their request to rectify the personal data, (2) the municipality should have also rectified personal data in the letter of 14 November 2018, and (3) The District Court had wrongly considered that the data subject was not entitled to compensation."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 138/2022","text":"This decision concerns the use of a surveillance camera which partly pointed at the living space and garden of some neighbors (the data subjects). The controller stated that the purpose of the cameras was to protect its collection of high value motorcycles and that it had never been its intention to violate someone else's privacy. The data subjects filed separate complaints at the DPA which were combined in a single procedure. One of the data subjects also went to the police, which resulted in a police investigation at the controller’s place at 27 October 2022. The police came to several conclusions, amongst others the fact that the controller didn't register the purpose of the video surveilance before he placed the security camera. It was obligatory to register the purpose of camera surveilance to the police before the camera was placed. The police also found that the controller didn't notify the police about the placement of the surveillance camera, despite the fact that this was a legal obligation under national law (Article 7(2)(2) Camerawet). The DPA conducted an investigation into the controller. The investigations unit held that the controller violated Articles 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c), 5(2) and 24(1) GDPR. The investigations unit also held that the controller violated several local legislations, specifically Article 5 Camerawet, Article 3 Koninklijk Besluit 10 February 2008 and Articles 7, 8, 9 Camerabesluit."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202305323/1/A3","text":"In 2021, two data subjects requested the deletion of their personal data related to their Covid-19 vaccination records and Covid-19 personal data held at the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment. The controller, the Minister of Public Health, Welfare and Sport, provided them with two options to confirm their identity: by sending either a scan of their passport or by physically identifying themselves before the Ministry. The data subjects did not use either option and the controller subsequently rejected their requests.\nThe data subjects filed a complaint before the court of first instance. The court ruled that the minister was justified in dismissing the objections as unfounded. It ruled that the minister was entitled to disregard the requests on the ground that the identity of the persons concerned could not be established. Plus, while the Covid-19 measures were still in effect, deletion of the vaccination data would make it impossible for an individual to prove that they where vaccinated via the government application for Covid-19.\nThe data subjects appeal the decision of the court of first instance before the Council of State.\nThe data subjects argued that the identification options given by the minister were unreasonable since by sharing a copy of their passports they incurred many risks. Second, physical identification at the Ministry unreasonably burdens the data subject. Third, they proposed the alternative to be identified with the last three digits of their BSN, combined with telephone verification."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-018","text":"On 2 June 2021, the French DPA (“CNIL”) informed a French municipality (“the controller”) that they had not named a DPO. The municipality did not respond, therefore on 25 April 2022, the CNIL gave formal notice to the municipality to designate a DPO within four months of this notice. The controller neither replied to the DPA, nor complied with its requests.\nThe French DPA started a sanctioning procedure against the controller on 8 February 2023."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-009","text":"On 15 June 2023, the French DPA (CNIL) fined the online advertising company Criteo - the controller - €40,000,000. The DPA’s decision followed complaints lodged by the NGOs Privacy International and None of Your Business (noyb).\nCriteo used a behavioural targeting approach that tracked data subjects’ online activities to display personalised advertising. By collecting browsing data through its tracking tool (the cookie \"Criteo\") Criteo analysed data subjects’ browsing habits to determine the most relevant ads for each data subject. Online advertising companies participated then in real-time bidding and displayed personalised ads if they won the bid."}
{"_id":"facts_VG Berlin - 1 K 391/20","text":"In November 2019, the church tax office (controller) sent the data subjects questionnaires to provide information on the religious affiliation of their two minor children. In December 2019, the data subjects requested the controller to refrain from such requests. Nevertheless, the controller requested the data subjects to complete the forms again in January 2020. Consequently, in August 2020, the data subjects filed a complaint with the Berlin DPA (Berliner Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationssicherheit). They claimed that the questionnaire was unlawful under data protection law. The DPA dismissed the complaint, arguing mainly that it was not competent to decide on the matter because of the church's special competence. Furthermore it did not find a breach of data protection law. Before the court, the data subjects pursued their claim."}
{"_id":"facts_Corte di Cassazione - 18168","text":"The judgement of the Court of Appeal of Milan was appealed following its confirmation of the ruling of the Court of First Instance, which had established the illegitimacy of the dismissal of a manager (the defendant) by Banca Widiba Spa (the applicant) on 8 May 2018.\nThe defendant was fired due to conduct of insubordination and breach of the duties of diligence and loyalty as well as of the general principles of fairness and good faith for having relations with competing businesses and for having avoided a preventive technical assessment, causing doubts over the genuineness of the illness underlying his many absences.\nThe Court of Appeal, agreeing with the Court of First Instance, ruled the illegitimacy of the first two disciplinary charges as they were the result of investigative monitoring of company e-mails and tailing, which did not ensure the proportionality and procedural guarantees against arbitrariness of the employer and lacked justification for such invasive monitoring, violating the right of the worker’s right to respect for his correspondence.\nThe applicant filed for an appeal against the decision to the Supreme Court of Cassation (Supreme Court)."}
{"_id":"facts_Raad van State - ECLI:NL:RVS:2023:4155","text":"On 15 June 2019, the data subject made an access request under Article 15 GDPR to the Dutch Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD). The FIOD is a government agency in the Netherlands responsible for investigating financial crimes, and is under the administration of the Ministry of Finance.\nOn 7 August 2019, the FIOD responded to the data subject, stating that no personal data which the GDPR applied to was being processed by them. Instead, the data subject’s data was processed under the Police Data Act, which offered no equivalent right of access as under the GDPR. The data subject challenged the FIOD’s response at a District Court.\nIn a judgment dated 22 November 2022, the District Court dismissed the data subject’s claims on the grounds that the FIOD’s activity’s fell under Article 2(1)(d) GDPR. This Article provides that the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data ‘by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security.’ Consequently, the data subject had no right of access as the GDPR did not apply to the FIOD’s processing activities.\nThe data subject appealed the District Court’s decision to the Council of State (Raad van State), the Netherlands’ highest administrative court.\nOn 11 October 2023, the Council of State heard the data subject’s appeal. In the appeal, the data subject submitted that the District Court had erred in its reading of Article 2(1)(d) GDPR and should not have interpreted the Article as applying to the FIOD, as the FIOD was under the administration of the Ministry of Finance and was not a police body. As a result, the data subject argued that their data held by the FIOD fell under the GDPR’s material scope, and thus, they had a right of access to the data."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 104/2022","text":"The controller is media outlet De Tijd. The data subject had an electric scooter business that was acquired by another company in 2018.\nThe controller published an article about the data subject and his (previous) business, which is now in its online archives. The data subject asked the controller to anonymize the article. The controller refused.\nOn 23 March 2021, the data subject submitted a request for mediation to the DPA about the controller's refusal to honor their right to be forgotten. The data subject stated that the article had a negative connotation (even after a revision of inaccuracies at their request). Furthermore, the article would pop up when you searched their same on a search engine, which hurt their professional career.\nThe controller stated that it is not obligated to remove or anonymize the article, based on the freedom of expression and the integrity of media archives. As for the negative connotation, it followed that the way an article is written falls under editorial freedom. Moreover, the data subject actively sought out and profited from the media attention."}
{"_id":"facts_GHSHE - 200.297.497 01","text":"Controller is Stichting Veilig Thuis, a public organisation that deals with cases or suspicions of (suspected) domestic violence or child abuse. The data subject is a 11-year-old child that had been missing school several times. After Veilig Thuis received reports from the data subject’s school regarding truancy, it sent the mother an email, in which it stated (among other things) that “Veilig Thuis has made the agreement with the obligatory education officer that she will contact Veilig Thuis if the safety of the child is jeopardised again or continues to be so (e.g. when you do not accept the help that is offered)”. The mother did not agree with the wording and requested to rectify the dossier, pursuant to Article 16 GDPR, by removing the word “again”. Moreover, she requested to have the whole dossier erased, pursuant to Article 17 GDPR. Veilig Thuis rejected both requests, which led the mother to bring the matter before court.\nThe District Court of Zeeland-West-Brabant, however, rejected the appeal. Regarding the deletion request, it decided that it cannot be assumed that the interests of the child’s legal representative (the mother) and the child will always coincide. Moreover, it noted that Veilig Thuis had been involved with the family for some time, had concerns about the child’s school negligence. Thus, it found that Veilig Thuis had a reasonable chance to judge that the substantial interest of the child required that Veilig Thuis saved the data, and that this substantial interest of saving the data outweighed the interest of the mother to erase the data. Regarding the rectification request, the Court considered that the right to rectification is not meant to correct or remove impressions, opinions, research results and conclusions with which the person concerned does not agree. The District Court, however, did not order the mother to bear the cost of proceedings.\nBoth the mother and Veilig Thuis appealed this judgement: the mother on the grounds that the erasure request must be honoured, and Veilig Thuis on the grounds that they should not pay their own costs of proceeding since they won the case."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 13/2024","text":"At the end of 2021, the Hellenic DPA (HDPA) became aware of the Ministry of Migration and Asylum's (the controller) development and deployment of the \"Centaurus\" and \"Hyperion\" Programmes Closed Control Facility Centres for third country nationals on the Aegean islands (Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos). The HDPA also received requests for an investigation and opinion from the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, as well as from civil society organisations, on the use of the systems in the asylum facilities.\nThe Centaurus project is reportedly an integrated digital system for the management of electronic and physical security around and within the facilities. The controller uses CCTV systems, artificial intelligence behavioral analytics (AI) algorithms and unmanned aerial vehicles to process images and personal data. The Hyperion programme is described as an integrated entry/exit control system, with the purpose of monitoring the entry and exit of the guests and certified members NGOs through the processing of personal data, in particular biometric data.\nIn response to the HDPA's request for explanations of the programmes and their data processing, the controller stated that the legal basis for the Centaurus project's video surveillance was the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority pursuant to Article 6(1)(e) GDPR. It argued that prior alternative protection measures, such as fencing of the property and patrols, were not as effective as video surveillance in dealing with illegal activities. With regard to the use of drone surveillance, the controller stated that they are only used in cases of emergency, such as fire or unrest. It claimed that the retention period of Centaurus system data is 15 days unless an incident is detected, in which case it is kept for up to 1-3 months and that access to data subjects' data is restricted to authorised police users; if copies of footage need to be provided, persons are blurred so as to minimise data. Information was provided to data subjects with notifications and warning signs on CCTV systems. Further, anti-malware software, passwords, system maintenance and software-level security policies were cited as security measures.\nIn the case of the Hyperion programme, the controller seems to have argued that no biometric data was not used to identify data subjects, but nonetheless citing Article 6(1)(e) GDPR as the legal basis for such processing if it does occur. Where any processing of special categories of data (namely fingerprints and biometric data) occurred for identification purposes, the controller cited Article 9(2)(b), (c), (g) and (j) GDPR as its legal basis. In a later communication, it clarified that its primary legal basis in this regard was based on substantial public interest pursuant to Article 9(2)(g) GDPR. Regarding consent, data subjects entering the accommodation facility were prompted to fill out a personal data recording form which included a consent request. Finally, the controller noted that a partial Data Protection Impact Assessment was carried out for both the Centaurus and Hyperion programmes.\nThe controller also claimed that there was no processing of personal data by either programme that extracted special categories of data - as a result, it found that Article 9 GDPR did not apply."}
{"_id":"facts_LG Stuttgart - 27 O 60/24","text":"The controller is a telecommunications company. The data subject and the controller entered into a mobile phone contract. During the conclusion of the contract the controller provided the data subject with an information sheet that included information about the transfer of personal data to the Schufa, a credit rating agency.\nSubsequently, the controller transferred the name, the date of birth, the address, and information about the conclusion of the contract to Schufa.\nFollowing his request, Schufa informed the data subject about the data forwarded by the controller.\nIn a press release made public on 19 October 2023, Schufa informed the public that it was going to delete information transferred by telecommunication companies by the 20 October 2023. Schufa noted that the Conference of the German Data Protection Agencies (Datenschutzkonferenz der Länder) was of the opinion that the transfer and processing of so called positive data (i.e. data without connection to a payment default or another violation of the contract by the data subject) required the consent of the data subject. Data concerning the conclusion of a contract would constitute such positive data.\nWith his lawsuit, the data subject claimed, inter alia, €4,000 in non-material damages."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 7587/163/20","text":"On 28 September 2020, the data subject filed a complaint with the Finnish DPA against a bank (the controller) where they used to be a customer. On multiple occasions, the data subject had requested the controller to delete their data which was no longer necessary for processing after they ceased being a customer. However, the controller did not comply with the requests and did not provide the data subject with the required information under Articles 12(3) and 12(4) GDPR. When responding to the DPA, the controller explained that the violation happened because of a human error in the customer service department. The controller subsequently complied with the data subject's deletion request."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02178","text":"In 2019, a company enabled automatic forwarding of an employee's emails during a sick leave, because the employee had \"failed to enable her out of office reply\". The company admitted that they had breached §§2 and 3 of a national regulation concerning employers' access to employees' inboxes and other electronically stored material, that they had no legal basis as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and that they had failed to inform the employee as per Article 13 and the national regulation.\nThey argued, however, that because the employee had failed to enable her out of office reply, they had legitimate grounds to enable automatic forwarding of her emails. Despite objections from the employee, the company continued to forward her emails, as long as she didn't herself enable the out of office reply. In the end, the company did this on her behalf, but only after having monitored her emails for five weeks."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 9707/152/19","text":"A data subject requested their psychotherapist (data controller) to give access to their patient documents multiple times between 2017 and 2019, both personally and through a third party who had a letter of attorney signed by the data subject. The data controller received these requests but did not respond to them. Therefore, on 16 December 2019 the data subjecy filed a complaint with the Finnish DPA.\nThe Finnish DPA requested a statement from the data controller on 11 February 2020, which the controller failed to provide in time. The DPA then asked for a statement again on 23 March 2021 and, this time, received a response. In the statement, the data controller acknowledged that the data subject had submitted a request under Article 15 GDPR. The data controller also recognised that it had not fulfilled the data subject's right to access and that it would implement it on 24 March 2021.\nHowever, according to the data subject, the data controller exercised their right under Article 15 GDPR only in April 2021, but not within the deadline set by the GDPR, even though the third party assisting the data subject provided guidance to the controller about how to comply with the GDPR requirements and informed it of the urgency of enforcing the right. The data subject further showed that previously, on 20 July 2018, the data controller informed the data subject that it had decided to grant access to the requested information. However, this did not happen.\nThe data subject claimed to have suffered damage as a result of the delays in obtaining the requested information; it affected the legal actions he had initiated and had financial impacts since the data subject had to use a third party to request personal data from the data controller.\nIn response, the data controller stated that the request of the data subject was first submitted in a formally incorrect manner, and subsequently, correctly. Secondly, it noted that the health of the data subject contributed to the controller's decision not to exercise the right under Article 15 GDPR within the time limit, and acknowledged that exceptional circumstances had influenced its actions, due to a decrease in turnover and denied deriving any financial benefit from not fulfilling GDPR requirements.\nThus, the DPA decided to assess whether the data controller implemented the data subject's right to access in accordance with Article 12(3) GDPR and Article 12(4) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_VG Ansbach - AN 14 K 20.00941","text":"The data subject took part in a three day seminar organised by the controller in January 2020. The controller sent the data subject a document listing the participants of the seminar, noting who wanted to arrive a day earlier and indicating the room categories booked and whether breakfast had been booked.\nOn 22 January 2020, the data subject requested access under Article 15 GDPR, including information about the controller’s authorisation to store data, the time, recipient and purpose of the forwarding of data and the purposes for processing.\nOn 15 February 2020, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Bavarian DPA (“Bayerischen Landesamtes für Datenschutzaufsicht”) for the misuse of personal data of participants in a seminar by sending out the participants list and failure to provide information about the use of the data subject’s personal data. The data subject explained that in addition to the names, the list of seminar participants sent by the controller also showed the room category booked, from which conclusions could be drawn about the financial situation of the participants.\nOn 6 March 2020, the DPA requested the controller to provide the data subject with the information under Article 15 GDPR.\nOn 12 March 2020, the controller replied, stating that they deleted the data subject’s personal data and only saved the email address, which was needed for the seminar and would be deleted afterwards. The controller further stated that sending out the list of participants to the data subject was an oversight and would not happen again.\nOn 24 March 2020, the DPA sent the data subject a final notification that they requested the controller again to provide information. No other supervisory measures under Article 58(2) GDPR were needed according to the DPA and the case was considered closed.\nThe DPA informed the data subject it was welcome to contact the DPA again if it did not receive the information from the controller within four weeks, which the data subject did after the deadline. The DPA then replied that since the controller stated that it had deleted the data subject’s personal data, the controller also complied with the access request as there was no information on the data subject anymore. Therefore, the matter had definitely been closed.\nThe data subject filed a lawsuit against the DPA at the Administrative Court of Ansbach (“Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht Ansbach”), requesting the court to order the DPA to take a corrective measure against the controller under Article 58(2) GDPR.\nThe data subject objected against the closure of the case, arguing that the controller must still have the data subject’s personal data as they would need to keep contract documents for the tax office. Even if the personal data was deleted, the controller should not be able to disregard data protection, knowingly \"misuse\" data and subsequently delete everything and then no longer be obliged to provide information. The data subject had clearly requested information about all personal data concerning them and its purposes.\nThe DPA argued that the data subject is not entitled to the DPA adopting a supervisory measure and that this is at the DPA’s discretion. Such an entitlement can only be considered if the violation was of sufficient severity. However, the DPA found no serious breach of data protection in this case, but only that no information was provided by the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against a Property Owners Association","text":"A data subject filed a complaint against a property owners association from the Municipality of Iasi after it disclosed their personal data. While the DPA conducted the investigation, the association did not cooperate in providing the requested information."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO - FS50848833","text":"The Department of Education (the DfE) was requested to provide the entire audio recording of a Professional Conduct Panel hearing into a case against five teachers - so called Trojan Horse affair. (This involved investigations into the alleged infiltration of Islamist extremists into the education sector in Birmingham. These hearings investigate whether there has been unacceptable professional misconduct by these five teachers) The hearing took place in public and was recorded by the National College for Teaching and Leadership (NCTL). The panel’s decision was announced on the government’s website.\nThe complainant argued with the DfE that the audio files contain important information not found elsewhere such as how statements were spoken including intonation and emotion. He further argues that this is essential for public scrutiny and transparency in this case.\nThe request was refused by the DfE under section 40(2) (personal information), 31(2) (law enforcement) and 14 (vexatious request) of the FOIA.\n- Section 40 of the FOIA provides exemptions from the right to information if it is personal data as defined in the DPA.\n-Section 14 states that the public authorities do not have to comply with vexatious requests.\nThe complainant filed a complaint against the DfE with the ICO about the way his request for information had been handled by the DfE.\n\nDispute\nThe ICO had to determine whether the DfE has correctly withheld information within the scope of the request on the basis of section 14 of the FOIA or either of the exemptions at section 40(2) or 31(2) of the FOIA.\nFirst, the ICO had to assess if the requested information imposes the burden upon the DfE.\nSecond, the ICO analyzes if the withheld information includes personal data and if the disclosure of that data will contravene the DP principles."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9815665","text":"The municipality (the controller) published on its online Public Notice Board, as well in a press release, information about the data subject's dismissal from work. The publication contained a matriculation number, which made the data subject identifiable.\nSubsequently, the data subject decided to file a complaint with the Italian DPA. The DPA initiated proceedings and requested more information from the controller.\nThe controller argued that the information had been put through pseudonymisation first and only employees knew how to decrypt it. Furthermore, the online Notice Board was not indexed in search engines. With regards to the press release, the controller argued that the text was anonymous and did not allow for the identification of the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - E/10529/2021","text":"Background\nAbout a month after the \"Schrems II ruling\" by the CJEU (CJEU - C-311/18 - Schrems II) the NGO noyb filed 101 complaints regarding data transfers from EEA based websites to Google LLC and Facebook Inc. in the U.S (see here and here). In order to coordinate the work of all involved DPAs, the EDPB created a special task force.\n\nComplaint\nOn 18.08.2020, a data subject (represented by noyb) filed a complaint with the DSB against both the website provider (in its role as data exporter) and Google LLC (in its role as data importer), arguing that both respondents violated Articles 44 et. seqq. GDPR in light of the \"Schrems II\" ruling by transferring their personal data to Google LLC. As Google LLC qualifies as \"electronic communication service provider\" under 50 U.S. Code § 1881(b)(4), it is subject to surveillance by U.S. intelligence services and can be ordered to disclose data of European citizens - such as the data subject - to them.\nThe complaint was filed against the Spanish Royal Academy (Real Academia Española, \"RAE\").\nThe controller alleged that it is a public law institution that uses Google Analytics tools solely and exclusively for fulfilling the general interest purposes that constitute its ultimate goal, which is to ensure the development, dissemination, proper use and update of the Spanish language; in order to achieve that, it is necessary to have access to statistical data related to the access and use of these instruments, and also to know its evolution and adaptation to the reality of the use of the language at any given moment (e.g. statistics related to the use of terms not included in the dictionary can allow a better knowledge of the evolution in the use of the language and the possible inclusion of such terms in the future).\nThrough the use of Google Analytics, the controller can know essential information related to the use of the language and its diffusion worldwide.\nThe controller also alleged that it only had access to aggregated data that did not allow for identification of users. The controller had no access to personal data whatsoever, nor IPs or any other information. Hence, no personal data was processed.\nThe controller also indicated that it had subscribed a contract with Google LLC (Conditions for the Processing of Data) and that therefore the RAE was a controller while Google was a processor.\nFurthermore, the controller alleged that it had only used the most basic functionalities of Google Analytics, guaranteeing the minimization of the use of data, so only aggregated data was processed.\nOnly the following data was gathered:\n 1. Identification of the geographic area (city and country) from which the user of the user accessed the website and statistics by country.\n 2. Language.\n 3. Source from which the visit originates.\n 4. Statistical flow of visits to the Web Site.\n 5. Statistical analysis of visits, offering percentages of recurrent or first access visits.\n 6. Browser used for access.\n 7. Type of mobile device used.\n 8. Screen resolution of the device and its operating system.\nNor Google Signals nor Comparatives were activated.\nOn 08.09.2020, the AEPD verified that the code of the website included the creation and storage of Google Analytics cookies.\nOn 27.10.2021, the AEPD confirmed that such code was not on the website anymore."}
{"_id":"facts_ΣτΕ - 658/2025","text":"In 2019, the Ministry of Interior, in implementation of a Greek legislation, introduced the ‘special foreign electoral registry’ (the Registry) for the facilitation of the exercise of electoral rights by voters outside the Greek Territory, containing voters personal data, including their email address.\nOn 1 March 2024 a Greek MEP associated with the Party used the personal email addresses that Greeks abroad had used for their registration in the special electoral list for Greeks abroad in the year 2023 through the web portal of the Ministry of Interior \"apodimoi.gov.gr\", to send them unsolicited political communication.\nBetween 1 March and 16 May 2024, the DPA (Hellenic Data Protection Authority-HDPA) received several complaints from Greeks living abroad against the MEP and the Ministry of Interior (the Ministry) for the unauthorised leakage of their email addresses to the MEP.\nThe DPA initiated investigations and discovered that in June 2023 the Ministry leaked that data from the Registry through the WhatsApp platform to some executives of the Party in governmental positions, amongst which, the General Secretary of Expatriates (the Secretary). The latter used some data from the Registry for statistical analysis of the results of the 2023 parliamentary elections for political conclusions. In January 2024, the MEP requested and received from the Secretariat of Expatriates the full register.\nThe DPA imposed a fine to the Party in the amount of €30,000 for violating Article 25(1) and Article 32 GDPR. It found that the technical and organisational measures taken by the Party, as a controller, did not include the activities of its secretariats and that the party executives did not sign a confidentiality agreement. Their privacy policy regarding the use of personal devices by its executives was incomplete and limited and left without supervision or guidance party executives and staff who were known to process personal data. Moreover, the DPA imposed a fine in the amount of €10,000 for the violation of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 6(1) GDPR, finding that the Secretary unlawfully used the data from the Registry on behalf of the party for demographic statistical analysis serving the purposes of the party. With the same decision the DPA also imposed a fine to the Secretary and to another Party executive for the unlawful processing of personal data.\n\nThe Party contested the decision of the DPA before the Supreme Administrative Court (Council of State – ΣτΕ)."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-432-0047","text":"In February 2020, the Danish DPA published a guide on the processing of personal data of website visitors. As a follow-up to this, and to focus on whether the rules in this area were complied with, the DPA decided in October 2020 to investigate the website www.naestved.dk, which is administered by the Næstved Municipality. The cookie banner on the website stated \"The website uses cookies to improve your experience, assess the use of the individual elements of the website and to support the marketing of our services. By clicking on the website, you accept the website's use of cookies.\" Visitors could then choose between \"OK\" or \"Show details\"."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 74/2020","text":"A couple has installed a video surveillance system on their property. The couple's neighbors lodged a complaint because some of the cameras were placed in such a way that they were filming part of the public road as well as their private property, and had filmed the complainants while driving on the public road or entering private property of their own. The complainants asked that the video surveillance system would be taken down.\nThe complainants also opposed the further use of the recordings made by the video surveillance system, which were subsequently shared by the defendants with an expert in the context of another (environmental law) dispute between the defendants and the complainants.\nThe defendants took a photograph of the complainants with a smartphone, to establish an alleged breach of environmental law. The complainants also fought the making of such photograph and the further processing thereof.\n\nDispute\nIs the processing of personal data included in photographs and camera images lawful under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00285/2020","text":"A claimant filed a complaint with the DPA to report several infringements of the GDPR coming from the Asturian Handball Federation. They alleged that the federation did not have a DPO, that they did not obtain valid consent from the children above 14 or their parents, nor they verified the legitimacy of such consent, that they were publishing photos of minors without such consent, that they did not inform about the data processed according to Article 13 GDPR and that they made reference in their privacy policy to the old Spanish Data Protection Act.\nThe Asturian Handball Federation alleged that they had two websites, one with domain .es and another with .com, and that they were coexisting due to an administrative error. The old one was not up-to-date, what is what caused the reference to the old Data Protection Act and the fact that they had non-updated forms for gathering data.\nAdditionally, the federation appointed a DPO during the course of these proceedings and amended their privacy policy to include everything that Article 13 requires.\n\nDispute\nDid the Asturian Handball Federation incur in any violation of GDPR given these facts?"}
{"_id":"facts_IP - 07120-1/2021/181","text":"IP received a letter stating that an individual is an employer of a primary school where they would like to publish the minutes of the parent council online. The individual was interested in how it is with the publication of the names and surnames of teachers, together with their evaluation (praise, criticism). Also, should he enter in the record the full name, only the initials of the specific teacher, or perhaps only the subject he is teaching (to know who/what was being talked about)? The names of students, parents and attendance lists are not published."}
{"_id":"facts_Cass.Civ. (Italy) - 28358","text":"The appellant in the present proceeding was an association which used an algorithmic system to objectively calculate the reputation rating of the natural and legal persons who created a profile (the data subjects) on their platform. The case stems from an investigation the Italian DPA had conducted on the appellant. At the end of the investigation, the Garante prohibited under Article 154(1)(d) of the Italian Privacy Code the mentioned data processing operations due to a breach of Articles 2, 3, 11, 23, 24 and 26 of the Code.\nThe DPA decision was appealed by the company and ended up before the Italian Supreme Court, for three reasons. First, the appellant claimed that the previous instance did not adhere to well-established Supreme Court case-law on consent. Second, it highlighted that the math scheme of the algorithm was already available in the EU Patent Registry and easily recognizable. Lastly, the violation and wrongful application of Article 41 of the Civil Code, Article 8(2) of the European Charter for Fundamental Rights, Articles 13, 23, 26 of the Italian Privacy Code, as applicable at the time of the facts, and Article 7(4) GDPR with regards to the protection of the principle of economic initiative."}
{"_id":"facts_Commissioner (Cyprus) - Decision of 27 November 2023","text":"On 30 March 2023, the Open University of Cyprus, the controller, notified a personal data breach to the Cypriot DPA (Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, DPC) in accordance with Article 33 GDPR. In addition to this, 11 complaints were filed with the DPC by data subjects stating that their data had been leaked following the incident.\nAccordingly, the DPC started investigating the case and asserted that the leaked data related to students, alumni and other partners of the controller and it was cached on the controller's servers and generally processed by its employees.\nIn its submissions, the controller sent to the DPC a list of actions it intends to implement by 2026 in order to improve the security of its processing operations."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 13.03.2023","text":"A data subject made an objection request to marketing communications received from a fashion retailer (the controller). The controller indicated that it would comply with the request, but continued sending marketing communications to the data subject.\nThe data subject filed a complaint with the Romanian DPA which started an investigation on that matter.\nThe investigation revealed that, in order to exercise their right, the data subject had to submit a written, dated and signed request. Moreover, it revealed that the information notice did not cover the information on data recipients, retention terms or the right to lodge a complaint to the DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/00872","text":"In February 2021, the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) notified the Norwegian DPA Datatilsynet about a personal data breach where they had published CVs without a legal basis. The DPA had also received 18 complaints from data subjects regarding the incident.\nNAV, the controller, has since 2001 had online solutions for making job applicants' CVs available for logged-in employers. In February 2019, they launched a new online tool where job applicants could voluntarily register their CVs. The controller, however, also made these available to employers through a candidate search, by default, including CVs where the data subjects had not given their consent. In addition, the controller had required data subjects to publish their CV to receive certain social services and benefits.\nIn 2020, a data subject contacted NAV's Data Protection Officer about the processing and, consequently, the controller launched an internal review. They concluded that they lacked a legal basis as per Article 6(1) GDPR for publishing the CVs, as far back as 2001. The controller had assessed legal bases in national laws pertaining to them, but found that these could not be relied upon for this particular situation. The controller now also realised that they did not either have a legal basis for requiring data subjects to publish their CV like this to receive certain social services and benefits.\nThe CVs contained information about data subjects' name, place of residence, date of birth, telephone number, e-mail address, education, work and other relevant experience, courses, driver's licenses, access to vehicles, various approvals and certifications, language, stated competencies and job wishes. This information is subject to confidentiality as per national regulations applicable to the controller.\nThe controller informed the DPA that 535,900 CVs was part of the 2019 system and they estimated that the maximum number of affected data subjects was 1,8 million. When the controller realized the breach, they notified the DPA and tried to inform every affected data subject personally by email or letter, as well as via their website."}
{"_id":"facts_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 05-10-2023","text":"The DPA received an anonymous petition stating that EOS Matrix had unauthorized processing of a large number of personal data (of debtors). A USB stick containing 181,641 personal data of natural persons in the structure of first and last name, date of birth and OIB, who had outstanding debts to initial creditors that were purchased by EOS Matrix based on the cession agreement. Likewise, in the petition, it was stated that the database also includes 294 natural persons who were minors at the time."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2020-009","text":"CARREFOUR BANQUE is a subsidiary owned 40% by BNP PARIBAS SA and 60% by CARREFOUR SA, the parent company of the CARREFOUR group. CARREFOUR BANQUE is a banking company whose main activities are consumer credit, portfolio management, insurance brokerage and investment services.\nAs part of its activities, the company publishes the website www.carrefour-banque.fr and markets a payment card for customers of the CARREFOUR group, which can be attached to the group's loyalty programme.\nHaving received several complaints against the CARREFOUR group, the CNIL carried out inspections between May and July 2019 at CARREFOUR FRANCE (retail sector) and CARREFOUR BANQUE (banking sector). On this occasion, the CNIL noted shortcomings in the processing of data on customers and potential users. The President of the CNIL therefore decided to initiate sanction proceedings against these companies.\nFollowing an online inspection carried out by the CNIL on 5 July 2019, the rapporteur noted several breaches of the GDPR and the French Data Protection law (Loi informatique et libertés).\n\nDispute\nIn this case, the French data protection authority investigated several issues :\n  * Does the transmission of data by CARREFOUR BANQUE to CARREFOUR France when joining the loyalty programme comply with the principle of fair and transparent processing contained in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR?\n  * Is the information relating to personal data processing operations easily accessible within the meaning of Articles 12 and 13 GDPR?\n  * Is the information provided to data subjects throughout the subscription process in compliance with the provisions of Article 13 GDPR?\n  * Does placing 39 cookies on the data subjects' computer before any act of consent or refusal on its part violates the French data protection law, Article 82?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - 9519423 \\ CV EXPL 21-35975","text":"The data subject had a car insurance and suffered an incident. They reported the incident to the insurance company, the controller.\nThe controller alleged that they provided incorrect information about the collision and considered the report as a fraud. It then registered the data subject in two databases: the CBV of the Dutch Association of Insurers (used by insurers to coordinate investigations and perform analyses) and the external referral register (used by financial institutions when assessing insurance applications and claims).\nThe data subjects sought to cancel both registrations, but the controller denied to do deregister them, so they filed an action before the Court.\nThe Court had to determine whether these registrations should be cancelled under the provisions of the GDPR, namely Articles 21(1), 17(1), and Article 6(1) (e) and (f)."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9861289","text":"Rovigo Hospital, the data controller, stored the data subject's medical records in another patient's folder and inadvertently disclosed their health data to the latter. Upon becoming aware of this, the data controller asked the third party to return the documents and adopted technical and organisational measures to prevent similar data breaches. The controller notified the DPA and the DPA opened an investigation. There was no dispute as to the facts."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00315/2019","text":"The controller processed personal data without providing an easily accessible privacy policy. Furthermore, the privacy notice did not fully inform the users on their rights under the GDPR.\n\nDispute\nWhether the privacy policy should be easy to find and what level of details it should include with regard to the user's rights."}
{"_id":"facts_CNPD (Luxembourg) - Délibération n° 16FR/2022","text":"On 14 February 2019, the Luxembourg DPA decided to open an investigation into the companies of Group A and particularly into Company A, a bank institution (controller). The purpose of this investigation was to verify the compliance with the GDPR of the controller's video surveillance and company's cars geolocation systems.\nSurveillance cameras\nThe investigation showed that surveillance cameras were indeed in place. Cameras’ fields of view included safe rooms, meeting rooms, the reception desk, the cash desk, offices, a computer room and a room where employees take breaks. The head of the investigation considered this to be permanent surveillance of employees at their workplace, which could create psychological pressure. He described the surveillance as “disproportionate to the purpose” and an “excessive intrusion into the employees’ private sphere”. He added that employees had no way of escaping the surveillance.\nAfter receiving the minutes of this visit, the Company wrote a letter in which it explained that distinction should be made between two types of locations filmed, depending on their economic and strategic sensitivity: the counters and the safe room on one hand, and other locations on the other. It also considered that employees were not filmed permanently since they could avoid the cameras' field of vision. The company also argued that the presence of certain cameras was justified in relation to the purpose.\nFor example, a camera positioned in the safe where one of the employees was stationed and where the company kept precious metals and physical securities. The company stressed that the room is locked for security reasons and that the camera made it possible to see if the employee was \"feeling unwell\". The company also explained that this is an ad hoc workstation, subject to patrols, which means that the employee working there was not filmed at all times.\nAnother example was given by the cameras placed upon the counters. The company explained that employees were only filmed from behind and that their hands, faces, private or professional equipment were not targeted. According to the company, the presence of these cameras was therefore necessary and proportionate to the aims pursued.\nFinally, with regard to the surveillance of the public highway, the investigation showed, among other things, that buildings not belonging to the company were filmed. The company argued that this was necessary to effectively protect their building. The head of the investigation however considered this surveillance to be disproportionate.\nInformation on surveillance cameras\nThe investigation showed that data subjects were informed about the use of surveillance cameras by a pictogram and an old CNPD authorisation sticker at the entrance door and at a passageway closed to the public. According to the head of the investigation, this information was incomplete because it did not provide, among other things, the following elements: the retention period, the purposes of the processing, the right to rectification and erasure. The GDPR intranet section did not contain sufficient information either.\nIn its letter in response to the minutes of the visit, the company explained that the pictograms were the first step of a various steps information which included the GDPR intranet section and mandatory trainings on data privacy. The company also reported that it had initiated the replacement of the pictograms and would indicate the missing information in the future.\nWith regard to third parties, the agents noted that a sign was installed containing a camera image and the words \"locals under video surveillance\".) The company considered that informing third parties was not an absolute obligation under Article 13 (which states that it is not required when communication is impossible or would require disproportionate effort).\nGeo-location system on company's cars\nThe investigation did not demonstrate the existence of such geo-location systems."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9872646","text":"A working video surveillance camera was put up in a shop owned by Stefano Molena (controller). The camera was able to capture footage of the store's clients and employees (data subjects).\nOn February 2 2022, the Guard of Finance of Seregno (Guardia di Finaza di Seregno) performed an inspection at the controller's shop which resulted in a report that was transmitted to the Italian DPA (Garante).\nOn May 18 2022, the DPA notified the controller of the initiation of sanctioning proceedings. The controller stated that at the time of the inspection, the camera was not functioning and not connected to the contrtoller's computer system. The controller further stated that the camera was never made operational and had currently been removed.\nOn February 20 2023, the controller provided evidence that it had removed the camera and its monitor."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 38/2021","text":"The plaintiff, an associate in a limited company, had decided with their co-associate to reduce their company's capital, for which a publication in the Belgian State Journal (Moniteur belge) is an obligation under the Belgian corporate law. The notary mandated by the associates to do the publication in their name not only informed about the reduction of capital but also mistakenly indicated the amount reimbursed to the associates as well as their personal bank account number. The plaintiff asked the notary to proceed to the erasure of these complementary and in their eyes unnecessary information. Following this, the notary requested that the Belgian federal public service (SPF, the defendant), responsible for the journal, erased the plaintiff's data of whom he acted on behalf of. The request was met with a refusal, the SPF mostly arguing that whatever the data published, since they were linked to publication required by the law, they could not be erased. After further exchanges and with the SPF still refusing to erase the concerned data, the plaintiff lodged a complaint with the Belgian DPA, mainly claiming that the SPF had no actual legal basis pursuant to Article 6 GDPR for processing the litigious data.\n\nDispute\nCan a legal obligation under national law justify the processing of data that may be unnecessary for the intended purposes of the processing?"}
{"_id":"facts_AP (The Netherlands) - z2019-28837","text":"The controller, Ambitious People Group (“APG”) is a recruitment agency. To match jobseekers with a suitable job, the controller asked for the name, address, email address, phone number, date of birth and CV of the jobseeker and stored this in a database. After finding a relevant vacancy, the controller would contact the jobseeker via e-mail. The controller operated under five different labels that each focus on a specific market: LMH, SAM, Four Life Sciences, Ardekay and Five Finance.\nOn 30 November 2018, the Dutch DPA (\"Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens\") received a complaint by three data subject against the controller for failing to comply with their requests for erasure. Even after multiple erasure requests, the three data subjects received e-mails from the controller with open vacancies.\nData subject 1 first requested erasure on 15 November 2018 and still received e-mails from the controller's label SAM with vacancies on 28 November 2018. Even after a second erasure request on 28 November 2018, data subject 1 still received an email with vacancies from the controller on 10 January 2019.\nData subject 2 received an email on 26 March 2018 from the controller's label LMH Engineering with a vacancy. Data subject 2 requested erasure on the same day. On 30 November 2018, data subject 2 still received an email from the controller. On the same day, data subject 2 requested erasure again. On 19 February 2019, data subject 2 still received an email with a vacancy from the controller.\nData subject 3 received an email on 17 October from the controller's label Five Finance with a vacancy. Data subject 3 requested erasure on the same day, also for the controller's label LMH Engineering. The controller replied on 19 October 2018 that this was a one-time non-recurring e-mail. Data subject 3 replied on the same day with another erasure request, which was confirmed by the controller on the day itself. However, data subject 3 still received an e-mail with a vacancy on 20 March 2019 and 1 August 2019 from the controller's label LMH Engineering.\nThe DPA started an investigation to review the possible violation by the controller and thereby send information requests to the controller. The controller confirmed that they erased the personal data of the three data subjects on 11 September 2019, and informed the data subjects the next day about this erasure via e-mail.\nFurthermore, the controller explained to the DPA that individuals can request erasure via a designated email address provided in their privacy policy. The requests of the three data subjects were not made to their designated email address, but to the recruiters themselves who send the data subjects emails with vacancies. The controller has since then updated their internal procedure so that erasure requests send to recruiters are also forwarded to the designated email address that handles erasure requests."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202213437","text":"Two data subjects held accounts with Caixabank (data controller). Data subject one held two accounts in their own name with their mother being an authorised account holder. Data subject one and two also shared a third account, with no other authorised account holder.\nDue to an error in the controller’s systems, data subject one was prohibited from performing any actions on the third account via online banking without the signature of their mother (who was not an authorised account holder in respect of that account). Furthermore, data subject one’s mother was able to see card information relating to the third account.\nIn January 2021, the data subjects attempts to resolve the issue through the Controller’s customer service department to no avail.\nIn February 2021, the data subjects file a formal complaint with the controller. The controller’s legal representative offers a settlement of €150 in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint, which the data subject rejects as the matter remains unsolved.\nOn 19th October 2023, the data subjects filed a complaint with the AEPD (Spanish DPA)."}
{"_id":"facts_GHDHA - 200.274.807 / 01","text":"The appellant has a complicated credit history with the ING bank, which resulted in debts and outstanding payments. At some point her name was added to the Central Credit Information System of the Dutch Credit Registration Office. In 2017 the appellant paid all her debts, but the registration with the Credit Registration Office is to remain for the period of 5 years until 2022. In 2019 the appellant submitted the request for erasure which was rejected by ING. Subsequent Judgement of the Court of First Instance upheld this decision, which is now being contested by the appellant.\n\nDispute\nThe appellant requests the Court, among others, to order ING to remove the registration with the Credit Registration Office, limit its duration period or remove the registration temporarily until she gets another loan. The appellant claims that the necessity and proportionality balance assessment done by the Court of First Instance was wrong: for example, she can not get the mortgage she needs to improve her life. Her objection to processing follows from Article 21(1) GDPR. ING argues that Article 21(1) GDPR cannot be relied on in this case because it applies only to personal data processed under legitimate interest or public interest, but not under a legal obligation which is the case here."}
{"_id":"facts_AN - SAN 1863/2021","text":"A gas distribution company appealed the decision PS/00188/2019 of the Spanish DPA (AEPD) for considering that it was against the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity of the law, enshrined in Article 9(3) of the Spanish Constitution, as the the Spanish DPA fined the controller in accordance with the GDPR, and the alleged infringement had occurred in April 2018, before the GDPR came into effect. Therefore, GDPR should not had applied."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 47/2022","text":"The Brussels South Charleroi Airport (the controller in that case) monitored passengers' temperature via thermal cameras between June and March 2021. All passengers with a temperature over 38°C detected by the camera had their temperature measured again manually by a medical service. Passengers suspected to be infected by COVID-19 were asked to leave the airport and were not allowed to board.\nAfter having been alerted by the press, the Board of Directors asked the inspection service of the Belgian DPA to investigate the matter. The inspection service sent its report with the alleged violations to the litigation chamber."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - AWB 21/3724","text":"On 20 December 2018, the data requested access to his personal data from his previous employer, the Minister of Finance. On 5 February 2019, he filed a complaint with the Dutch DPA (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) to take enforcement action against the Minister, because the Minister did not timely and fully comply with his access request. At the same time, he filed administrative appeal against the Minister’s failure to make a timely decision, and brought the issue before Court. On 9 April 2019, the Court acknowledged his claim and ordered the Minister to comply with the access request, which the Minister did on 1 May 2019.\nOn 8 January 2021, the DPA rejected the data subject’s complaint for enforcement against the Minister, for two reasons. First, because the Court had already ruled that the decision had not been made within due time, the DPA would not have to rule anymore whether or not the decision had been made timely. Second, regarding the question whether or not the request had been fully complied with, the DPA considered that this would require further investigation. However, the alleged infringement was not considered to be harmful enough, according to the DPA’s own \"Policy Rules on Prioritising AP Complaints Investigation\", and therefore did not handle the complaint.\nAccording to the data subject, the Court’s judgement proves that the Minister violated the GDPR and the DPA therefore had to take enforcement action. Hence, he appealed to the DPA’s rejection of his complaint, before Court and claimed that the DPA should issue a fine against the Minister. Moreover, he requested to be compensated for immaterial damages."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 52/2021","text":"Seventeen individuals submitted complaints before the Hellenic DPA (HDPA) against gas supplier company ZENITH (controller) for unlawful processing of personal data for purely marketing purposes. Zenith signed a contract with One Way Private Company (processor) which undertook the processing of the controller's customers' personal data for marketing purposes. The processor used an automated mechanism randomly selecting telephone numbers from a list of customer contact details in order to contact individuals for marketing purposes. Some customers had previously clearly waived their consent for the controller to have their contact details. The telephone numbers of these individuals were supposed to be precluded from this list. However, due to a mistake by one of the processor's employees, many of these customers were not excluded from the list and consequently received calls from the processor for marketing purposes."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/02293","text":"The Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) investigated a complaint from a data subject who had been credit rated by a company they had no relationship with. The company admitted they had no cooperation, customer relationship or any form of connection with the data subject, but argued that the credit rating was a mistake. A project manager at the company had used Google to find the invoicing address to a new customer and then mixed up this person with the data subject when conducting the actual credit rating.\nThe company claimed that the DPA should not impose a fine, because they had not been registered with any prior violations."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-023","text":"Google LLC is a subsidiary owned wholly by Alphabet Inc. Google Ireland Limited ('GIL') \"presents itself\" as the headquarters for the Google group's operations in the EEA and Switzerland.\nIn March 2020 the French DPA (CNIL) carried out an online inspection of the website \"google.fr\" in the context of a previous procedure against Google LLC and GIL. The purpose of this inspection was to verify their compliance with the Loi 'Informatique et Libertés', and in particular with Article 82 thereof. This resulted in this decision, that Google appealed.\nFollowing this decision, the CNIL received more complaints about the methods of refusing cookies from the website \"google.fr\". It therefore reopened the case and launched a new investigation."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00367/2019","text":"The AEPD examined a complaint submitted against the political party VOX. The data controller had sent an email without blind copying, to the affiliates of the said political party. Following the filing of the complaint, the data controller acknowledged the facts and implemented the necessary security measures.\n\nDispute\nIs the unintentionality and the adoption of measures to remedy the infringing conduct relevant for the fine reduction?"}
{"_id":"facts_FiS - 7565-20","text":"This case was initiated when the DPA followed up on an earlier supervisory decision against Google. In the earlier decision, the DPA had ordered Google to remove certain search results relating to a handful of data subjects who had exercised their right to be forgotten under Article 17. Upon follow-up, the DPA found that Google had not fully complied with the previous supervisory decision in relation to two complaints from data subjects.\nAdditionally, Google routinely notifies webmasters when a search result has been removed from the search results list. This allows the website owner to republish the webpage in question at a different web address, which will then show up in a Google search. This effectively overrides the right to delist. Google considers that informing webmasters is necessary for purposes related to the fundamental right of search engine providers, webmasters and internet users to freedom of expression and information under Article 17(3).\nThe DPA issued a sanction fee because Google failed to comply with the two complaints and because it found that the practice of informing webmasters had no legal basis. Google appealed the decision to the Administrative Court of Stockholm (FiS).\n\nDispute\n 1. Did Google process personal data in breach of the GDPR by not removing some search results relating to the two complaints without undue delay?\n 2. Was Google's practice of routinely notifying webmasters of removed search results lawful under the GDPR?\n 3. The sanction fee."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00293/2021","text":"The controller, a bank, sent an incomplete response to the data subject's access request, prompting the data subject to file a complaint with the Spanish DPA.\nInitially, the DPA held that the controller was not obliged to fulfill the data subject's access request because the data were documents relating to a contractual relationship between the two parties. The DPA had agreed with the controller, who argued that, for the data requested, the right of access (Article 15 GDPR) was overridden by more specific provisions in the Spanish law 16/2011, of June 24, on consumer credit contracts (LCCC).\nHowever, the DPA issued a final decision in response to a \"recurso de reposición\" (an appeal to an administrative authority to reconsider its own decision) lodged by the data subject.\nOn appeal, the data subject argued that the LCCC did not control because the data at issue related to a contract that had already been concluded, not an ongoing contractual relationship. In support of their claim, the data subject pointed out that, while the LCCC has provisions specifically governing access to contractual documents prior to and during their validity, it does not mention documents relating to a concluded contract."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Noord-Holland - HAA 21/6573","text":"On 20 May 2021, the data subject (claimant) received a letter from the Dutch Inland Revenue, notifying him that he had been unlawfully registered in the Dutch Inland Revenue's (Belastingdienst) database - the Fraud Signalling Facility (FSV). The controller in this case was the minister of Finance, as the Dutch Inland Revenue is under the administration of the ministry of Finance\nOverall, the use of this facility did not comply with the GDPR, as too many employees had access to the data and the data retention period was too long. Some individuals’ data was wrongly included and wrongly used. The controller attempted to rectify this by revoking tax employees' access to the FSV on 27 February 2020 and removing it as a point of use from the Tax Administration's implementation of (tax) legislation.\nIn a letter dated 25 June 2021, the data subject objected to the recording of his data in the FSV. In this letter, he made an access request under Article 15 GDPR, a data rectification request under Article 16 GDPR, and an erasure request under Article 17 GDPR.\nThe controller responded on 22 July 2021, partially responding to the access request (Article 15 GDPR), but refusing the requests made under Articles 16 and 17 GDPR. The data subject brought claims against the incomplete response to his data access request, and refusal of data rectification and erasure requests."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-0076","text":"The controller, l’Institut du cerveau et de la moelle épinière (The Brain and Spinal Cord Institute), requested that the CNIL authorise their plans to undertake automated processing of personal data from national health databases to conduct a study on epilepsy. In pursuit of this they conducted a data protection impact assessment (DPIA) under Article 35 GDPR and consequently sought to consult with the CNIL, as necessitated by Article 36 GDPR.\nThe elements of the DPIA under scrutiny were the sources of the data used and the purpose of processing.\nIn relation to the sources of data used, in its DPIA, the controller outlined that it sought to use data from the National Health Database of patients who had been prescribed anti-epileptic drugs, patients who had been hospitalised or were receiving on-going care for epilepsy, and patients who had a long-term condition relating to epilepsy. In total, this consisted of the personal data of 1.5 million data subjects. The controller also sought to use data from the combined patient database from Paris hospitals, relating to patients who had received anti-epileptic treatment. In total, this consisted of the data of approximately 340,000 people.\nIn relation to the purpose of processing, the controller sought to rely on Article 5(1)(b) GDPR to justify further processing of the national health data. This provision establishes that further processing for purposes in the public interest or for scientific, historical, or statistical research is compatible with the principle of purpose limitation. The controller noted that their processing was for the purposes of quantifying the national demand and supply of care for patients with epilepsy, to identify and improve the pathways of case for people with epilepsy, and to quantify the cost of the disease for the national health service. The controller argued that these purposes were compatible with the principle of purpose limitation as the processing aimed to conduct scientific and statistical research for the public interest."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Noord-Nederland - 8187989","text":"On 1 July 2016 the municipality put a piece of land with an unused shooting range up for sale for a symbolic amount of 1 EUR. The claimant was interested in buying it. To reuse the old shooting range, claimant was required to get an environmental permit from the municipality. The online form available on the sites of the Dutch municipalities, has two options for such permit applications: the complete form, which is available to competent authorities only, and the publicly available version of this form. The information that an applicant wants to keep private is removed from the publicly available version. More specifically, the publicly available version doesn’t contain the applicant’s social security number (BSN) and phone number. When submitting the digital application, an applicant is presented with the following choice: Do you give permission to make publicly available personal and address details of the applicant/notifier and, if applicable, the authorised representative? The claimant submitted his environmental permit application on 9 December 2016. He filled in his social security number, last name, initials, address, phone number and email. He consented to making his data publicly available. On 7 October 2017 and 7 December 2017 the municipality published a draft statement and draft decision, making them available on its site, on the Government Gazette (Staatscourant) and on www.ruimtelijkeplannen.nl. On 2 December 2018 a local journalist twitted about the fact that the municipality has published claimant’s data on its website, including the social security number and phone number. On the same day the claimant reported the data breach to the municipality under GDPR, telling the municipality to remove his data and mentioning non-material and material damages (for the costs involving increased house security). On 3 December 2018 the municipality has included the claimant’s environmental permission application as an agenda item in the council’s meeting and published the agenda on its site, including the claimant’s email, phone number and social security number. Social security and phone numbers were removed from the site on 4 December 2018. The municipality has admitted that personal data breach took place but asked the claimant to substantiate any material damage resulting from the municipality's actions, as it was not prepared to pay non-material damages. The claimant responded with a list of security measures that would be necessary to prevent burglary, blackmail and/or threats. On 10 April 2019, the municipality rejected the claims for material and non-material damages as not sufficiently substantiated.\n\nDispute\nShould the claimant be awarded a (non-)material damage compensation from the municipality for the data breach?"}
{"_id":"facts_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2020-10696","text":"Nordax (controller) is a Swedish bank. The bank entrusted a processor, Iper Direct AB (Iper), to manage its customers' address register. According to Nordax, this processor was the controller in all matters regarding this register and was also responsible for answering data subjects requests related to any processing of this register's personal data. Iper's task was to provide another processor of Nordax a selection of e-mail addresses, which were used by this second processor for direct marketing purposes on behalf of Nordax. The selection of addresses from Iper's address register was also carried out on behalf of Nordax and was based on selection criteria determined by Nordax.\nIt is not explicitly mentioned in this decision whether or not the data subject used to be a (former) customer of the controller. It is also not explicitly stated that the data subject received direct marketing e-mails from the controller. The latter is however most likely, looking at the objection of the data subject against direct marketing, which was eventually granted by the controller (will be further discussed below).\nRound 1 (Access 1 and Erasure 1)\nOn 5 December 2018, the data subject filed an access request and an erasure request at Nordax, which were answered by the controller on 6 December 2018.\nThe access request inquired on all data relating to him and the way Nordax used it. The controller replied to the access request that it did not process and/or store the personal data of the data subject and was therefore unable to comply with the request. Rather, the controller informed the data subject of the fact that personal data was processed by its appointed processor, Iper, which was responsible for the address register of the bank and for managing data subject rights related to any processing regarding this register. Furthermore, Nordax also did not classify the request of the data subject as an access request at first, but as an objection to processing. Based on information in the data subject's e-mail, Nordax determined that the data subject's primary wish was to be blocked from the controller's direct marketing e-mails. In its reply, the controller only provided information on how the data subject could block himself from the direct marketing of the controller. In order to block the data subject from direct marketing, Nordax requested the data subject's name and address.\nOn the same day, 5 December 2018, the data subject also submitted an erasure request. The scope of the erasure request was not specified in this decision. In its reply to the erasure request, and along the lines of the answer to the access request, the controller stated that it did not store the data subject's personal data. It was therefore also not able to erase it, since it was stored in Iper's register.\nRound 2 (Access 2, Erasure 2 and Objection 1)\nAround two months later, on 11 February 2019, the data subject submitted new requests for erasure and access. This time, the data subject also specifically objected to the controller's direct marketing operations for the first time. The controller answered all off these requests on 12 February 2019.\nIn its reply to the access request, Nordax referred to its earlier reply of 6 December 2018 to the data subject's first access request. The same was true for the controller's response to the erasure request.\nIn its reply to the data subject's objection, the controller stated that the request for objection had now been granted and that the controller had taken measures to block the data subject from direct marketing. Besides the fact that Nordax did not specify what specific measures it had taken, this also turned out to be incorrect information. Nordax had not yet taken any measures to block the data subject from direct marketing. According to Nordax, this incorrect information was provided because of human error.\nRound 3 (Objection 2)\nAnother four months later, on 9 July 2019, Nordax received another objection against the controller's marketing operation from the data subject.\nIn its reply to the second objection, the controller reiterated again how the data subject could block himself from the direct marketing operation of the controller, just like it did when answering the first access request (which it had mistaken for an objection). The controller also repeated its request for additional information from the data subject in order to block the data subject from its direct marketing. Strangely enough, the controller then blocked the data subject from its direct marketing without the requested information. The controller also did not inform the data subject that it had finally complied with his objection to processing.\nData subject files complaint\nEven after three rounds of requests, Nordax had failed to comply with the data subject's requests for access and erasure, and did not inform the data subject that his objection to processing had been granted.\nThe data subject filed a complaint at the Norwegian DPA (date not disclosed), which transferred the complaint to the Swedish DPA, the supervisory authority in this decision. The concerned authorities were the DPA's of Norway, Denmark, Finland and Germany. In this complaint, the data subject stated that the controller did not respect his rights by not responding to his requests.\nDuring the investigation of the DPA, Nordax already acknowledged that it was the controller in this case and that it should have complied with the data subject's request for access, by requesting the help of its processor, according to Article 28 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Gelderland - C/05/404834 / HA ZA 22-245","text":"The controller advises and guides companies on matters such as brand positioning, corporate identity, business models and revenue models. The data subject had a business that facilitates spaces for retreats, trainings and workshops. The controller believed that the data subject wrongfully failed to pay its invoice, and it claimed payment of the invoice, among other things. The data subject disputed this and refused to pay the additional invoices. Therefore, the controller took the matter to court.\nTo substantiate their defence, the data subject requested the Court to order the controller to provide digital copies of all recordings it made of conversations and (Zoom) video conferences between them, pursuant to article 843a of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) and/or Article 15 GDPR. The data subject stated that during the Zoom-calls, they were notified by an on-screen notification at the beginning of the call that it would be recorded."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00454/2019","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by another Spanish citizen stating that the defendant has installed a video surveillance system allegedly pointing to the common swimming pool of the housing association; such complaint included pictures proving that the video surveillance system was installed.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant did not answer to any AEPD investigation requests, so the AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure. The AEPD highlighted that private individuals can install video surveillance systems as long as they comply with the corresponding information obligations, but they shall preferably record their own domicile, avoiding to intimidate adjacent neighbours, and never recording freely the whole public road (such activity is reserved for the Spanish law enforcement agents)."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W274 2246166-1","text":"The data subject has requested access to their personal data under Article 15 GDPR. The controller (Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich) did not fulfill the request at first. Later – during the administrative proceeding – the controller, however, did. Thereupon, the DSB (Austria) informally closed the proceeding. The data subject objected to the termination of the proceedings on the grounds that the answer to their request was too late and was insufficient. The DSB maintained its decision arguing that the data subject has no right to have a past violation of the GDPR determined and that the assertion of insufficiency is be regarded as a new submission under § 13(8) AVG since it changes the substance of the matter."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00080/2022","text":"A woman, acting as a third party, received documentation about authorisations for medical clinic tests by an insurance company. Those tests belonged to other data subjects that the woman did not know and to whom she had no link. It occurred on numerous occasions, and it was sent via email. The woman reported the situation to the insurance company every time she received such an email but they answered by redirecting her complaints to other offices within the company. Hence, the issue was not resolved, and the woman kept receiving more emails. The documents included the authorisation number, the data of the insured (name, surname, number of insurance policy) and the type of medical tests."}
{"_id":"facts_IP (Slovenia) - 0603-56/2024/6","text":"The data subject was a third-country national employed in Slovenia under a resident and work permit. In March 2024, he moved to Cyprus where he held a valid residence permit until 2026. After this move, the data subject’s Slovenian employer withdrew their application for renewal of his Slovenian work permit. In response, the Slovenian authorities recorded a removal order and entry ban against the individual in the Schengen Information System (SIS II).\nFollowing an access request, the data subject sought the deletion of this information from the SIS II under Article 17 GDPR, as he had legally left Slovenia and held a residence permit in another EU Member State. The Police (the data controller) refused this request, arguing that the information could only be deleted if he could prove he had left Slovenia within a 10 day period following the issuing the recording of the removal order.\nThe data subject then complained to the IP (Slovenian DPA), arguing that his request for erasure of the information should have been actioned as he held a residence permit in Cyprus. During the course of the IP’s investigation, the Police argued that as Cyprus was not a Schengen member, they were not obliged under Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 (The Schengen Information Regulation) to consult with Cyprus to verify the data subject’s claims."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS-00085-2024","text":"The data subject submitted a complaint against the data controller, a legal entity representing the community of residents, for sharing with all members of the community a document with individualized heating consumption. Since the information would identify the number of each house, it was considered that the document held personal data. The Spanish DPA, then, proposed an agreement with the data controller for the payment of a reduced amount of the foreseen fine, considering the likelihood of the data breach."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Birmingham Children's Trust Community Interest Company","text":"The Birmingham Children's Trust Community Interest Company (BCTCIC) is an organisation owned by Birmingham City Council that works independently to deliver services to the council. This case is related to the Child Protection and Review (CP&R) department which provides services to support families in the Birmingham area focused on making a positive difference to their lives. The employees of BCTCIC (CP&R) are primarily trained social workers and the department regularly processes both personal data relating to children and criminal offence data.\nOn 10 November 2022, a personal data breach occurred involving inappropriate information related to a data subject being included in a Child Protection Plan (CP Plan). The information was contained in a summary statement of a meeting between BCTCIC and West Midlands Police, the full statement was copied verbatim into the CP Plan which was then approved and sent to a family by the CP&R department.\nThe CP Plan was received and read by the recipient subsequently resulting in inappropriate access to both sensitive criminal data, specifically criminal allegations and the personal identifiers of an individual under the age of 18."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-442-13989","text":"In August 2021, the University of Southern Denmark (Syddansk Universitet) reported a personal data breach to the Danish DPA. The University uses an HR system where employees are assigned to roles so that they can access applications. Due to an update of the system, the role management was reset completely, so that all 7011 employees of the university had access to more than 400 applications for a period of 14 days. These applications contained personal data such as name, social security number and health data of the applicants. Normally only about 400 employees have access to this kind of information. The university had not performed an adequate testing of the software update before it was implemented. It claimed that they had no knowledge that the update would make a change in the role management.\nThe university also did not keep access logs, so that it was not able to see whether unauthorised employees accessed the data in that time period or not."}
{"_id":"facts_TS - 1039/2022","text":"The data subject submitted a complaint to the Basque DPA following the inclusion of unrelated sensitive medical data (her gender reassignment) in a report about her injured foot. After investigating, the DPA issued a warning to the controller, Osakidetza-Servicio Vasco de Salud, for violating the principle of data minimisation Article 5(1)(c).\nThe controller appealed the decision to the Administrative Court No. 2 of Vitoria-Gasteiz, which upheld the appeal. The DPA then appealed that court's decision to the Administrative Chamber of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country, which upheld the DPA's appeal. Finally, the controller appealed the High Court's decision to the Spanish Supreme Court.\nBefore the Supreme Court, the controller argued that, in light of the fact that the personal data had been lawfully collected, the data subject was required to exercise her right of restriction of processing Article 18 GDPR before she could file a complaint with the DPA. As a secondary point, the controller argued that the DPA disregarded relevant circumstances, namely that the medical records were intended only for the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_VG Magdeburg - 1 A 217/22 MD","text":"The controller runs a web portal that connects operators of holiday homes to potential guests by allowing the operators to place ads on the portal. To acquire new operators to present their holiday homes the controller advertises their service via phone. They were using the services of a call centre in Kosovo for this purpose. Call centre staff members would search for phone numbers of landlords and operators of hotels and holiday homes and called them. They presented the portal to them and tried to close a contract about a cost free test entry or a “premium entry” on the portal. During the call, the call centre staff asked for data related to the customer and their accommodation. Subsequently, the controller provided the new client with information and a confirmation via e-mail. Persons who said they did not want to be contacted anymore were blacklisted.\nFollowing 20 data protection complaints, the Saxony-Anhalt DPA (Landesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz Sachsen-Anhalt) got to know about the business practices of the controller and, in particular, that a client will receive more calls after opting for the cost-free test ad on the portal. The DPA then conducted an official hearing of the controller.\nAfter the hearing, the Saxony-Anhalt DPA ordered the controller under Article 58(2)(f) GDPR to refrain from the processing of phone numbers and other personal data for the purpose of advertisement if these phone numbers are related to an identifiable natural person. This order included an exception for cases in which the person had either consented to the processing of their data or concrete facts indicate that the person had a factual interest in an advertisement entry on the controller’s page and is awaiting the call or at least would react positively to the call.\nFurthermore, it ordered the controller under Article 58(2)(g) GDPR to delete all personal data that could not be processed anymore under the aforementioned order.\nIn addition, the DPA ordered the controller under Article 58(1)(a) GDPR to demonstrate to the DPA the compliance with the orders by showing which measures were taken.\nIn case of non-compliance the DPA threatened an administrative fine.\nThe controller appealed this order before the Administrative Court Magdeburg (Verwaltungsgericht Magdeburg – VG Magdeburg)."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant - AWB- 20 9345","text":"In September 2020, a mother requested copies of the youth files of three of her children from a private foundation that provides assistance under the Dutch Youth Act (Jeuwgdwet). About six weeks later, in October, she sent the foundation a letter stating that it had failed to respond to her request within the statutory time limit and demanding financial compensation.\nIn early November 2020, the mother filed an administrative appeal regarding the foundation's failure to respond to her request. In the request, she referred to the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, AwB), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Dutch Youth Act (Juegdwet), the GDPR and the former Dutch Data Protection Act (Wbp), which was in force before the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202202762/1/A3","text":"A data subject underwent psychiatrist examination within a court proceeding. The court assigned that task to Netherlands Institute for Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (Nederlands Instituut voor Forensische Psychiatrie en Psychologie). During the examination, the Institute created the final report and additional documents, including the feedback report, which was not shared with the court. The feedback report contained, inter alia, the notes and comments of doctors performing patient's examination.\nThe data subject filed an access request in reference to the feedback report with the Minister of Legal Protection. The Minister excluded the application of the GDPR and didn’t disclosed the data.\nThe appeal proceedings, initiated by the data subject resulted in the dismissal of the Minister’s decision. The District Court of First Instance of Gelderland (Rechtbank Gelderland) examining the appeal found the GDPR applied to the case. However, the access request didn’t cover the personal data within the meaning of the GDPR.\nThe data subject lodged an appeal with the Dutch Council of State (Raad van State; the Supreme Administrative Court)."}
{"_id":"facts_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-22-2024 (gambling websites)","text":"Two controllers that offered gambling and betting activities online included cookie banners on their websites. The banners did not distinguish different purposes for processing, making a single request for consent. The controllers' privacy policies also lacked information about the legal basis for processing, the types of cookies used, the purpose of each cookie and the cookie storage periods. In addition, one of the controllers processed personal data prior to obtaining data subjects' consent."}
{"_id":"facts_LG Kiel - 13 O 220/23","text":"The controller is a telecommunications company. The data subject and the controller entered into a mobile phone contract. During the conclusion of the contract the controller provided the data subject with an information sheet that included information about the transfer of personal data to the Schufa, a credit rating agency.\nFollowing the closure of the contract, the controller transmitted personal data of the data subject to Schufa, such as the fact that a contract was formed, name, date of birth, address, date of the contract closure, and the contract identifier. The data subject had not explicitly consented to this transfer.\nIn a press release made public on 19 October 2023, Schufa informed the public that it was going to delete information transferred by telecommunication companies by the 20 October 2023. Schufa noted that the Conference of the German Data Protection Agencies (Datenschutzkonferenz der Länder) was of the opinion that the transfer and processing of so called positive data (i.e. data without connection to a payment default or another violation of the contract by the data subject) required the consent of the data subject. Data concerning the conclusion of a contract would constitute such positive data.\nWith his lawsuit, the data subject claimed, inter alia, non-material damages and a declaratory judgement that all future damages arising from the alleged GDPR infringement have to be borne by the controller. This declaratory judgement concerning damages is a standard in German law due to statutory limitation that would otherwise prevent the person claiming damages from bringing any claims after a period of three years (such as for long-term consequences of a car accident)."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 6629/163/21","text":"The Finnish DPA was notified that a healthcare provider (the controller) charged a fee for handing over copies of magnetic resonance images (MRI) when data subjects requested access to their personal data in accordance with Article 15 GDPR.\nThe DPA had asked the controller to explain how it facilitated the exercise of data subject rights under Article 15 GDPR in situations where a data subject would request their MRIs without explicitly referring to their right under the GDPR.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that it provided the MRIs free of charge when a patient made an access request in accordance with Article 15 GDPR. The controller also stated that it provided patients with medical records once a year free of charge when they invoked the right of access under the GDPR. However, the controller considered that when a patient requested a recording of their MRI examination directly from the MRI scanning, the right of access was not invoked, and the recording was chargeable.\nThe controller also stated that in its price list, it was mentioned that the provision of material related to the right of access would be free of charge if the request was made using an access request form or from the controller's registry office and that in other cases, a fee was charged for the request. It added that when the patient requested access to their personal data, the controller did not separately ask whether it was a request regarding the right of access under the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 21/2022","text":"The IAB Europe's Transparency & Consent Framework ('TCF') set up by the Interactive Advertising Bureau Europe ('IAB Europe') facilitates the capture of website users' response to Consent Management Platforms ('CMPs'), namely whether they consented to the collection and sharing of their personal data, or objected to various types of processing based on the legitimate interests of ad tech vendors.\nUsers' responses are coded and stored in a “T[ransparency and] C[onsent] string”, which are shared with the organisations participating in the OpenRTB system (the most widely used protocol for “Real-Time Bidding”) so that they know to what the user has consented/objected. The CMP also places a cookie (euconsent-v2) on the user’s device. When combined, the TC string and the euconsent-v2 cookie can be linked to the IP address of the user, therefore making the author of the preferences identifiable. The TCF plays a pivotal role in the architecture of the OpenRTB system, as it is the expression of users’ preferences regarding potential vendors and various processing purposes, including the offering of tailor-made advertisement.\nSince 2019, the Belgian DPA received a series of complaints about the Transparency & Consent Framework ('TCF'). The complaints related to (i) the conformity of the TCF with the principles of legality, appropriateness, transparency, purpose limitation, storage restriction and security, as well as to accountability, and (ii) the responsibility of IAB Europe and other actors involved. Four of the nine total \"identical or very similar\" complaints were filed directly with the Belgian DPA, the rest with other DPAs which passed them on through the IMI system. They were considered by the Litigation Chamber of the DPA as its administrative dispute resolution body (Article 32 Belgian Data Protection Act)"}
{"_id":"facts_VGH München - 6 ZB 23.530","text":"A plaintiff servant who worked for the defendant sued to get his ability to work reinstated, as allowed by German law (Section 46 BBG). The lawsuit was most likely against the German government, but the court decision (which hasn't been made public yet) didn't clarify this.\nThe dispute centered on whether certain documents should be removed from the man's personnel file and other police records. These documents included disciplinary files, a statement about a \"reactivation review,\" and related information. Both the plaintiff and the defendant disagreed with the initial court ruling issued by the Administrative Court of Regensburg (judgment of January 25, 2023) and appealed.\nThe plaintiff wanted more documents deleted, while the defendant appealed to keep the \"reactivation review\" statement."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Enel Energie Muntenia SA","text":"A customer of Enel Energie Muntenia S.A. (controller) received an email from the controller addressed to another customer (data subject). The email contained files including the data subject's personal information. The customer that received the email filed a complaint with the DPA about this incident, which started an investigation.\nThe controller didn't explain why one of its employees accidently replied to the wrong customer. Additionally, it didn't demonstrate any corrective measures to stop further unauthorized access or disclosure and did not provide evidence of notification of this incident to the DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-441-4364","text":"On 3 January 2020 the Copenhagen Zoo reported a breach of personal data security to the Danish DPA. A software engineer informed the Zoo that via a self-developed script he acquired access to annual cardholders' log-in information (username and associated password). In turn, it was possible to gain unauthorized access to card numbers, names, addresses and e-mails of approx. 140,000 annual cardholders registered.\nThe Zoo was unable to say how many of data subjects were affected and for how long. It stated that the engineer gained access to the data but did not use it. Following the analysis of web page views, the Zoo concluded that it was unlikely that annual cardholders data were exposed to unauthorized parties.\nThe Zoo partially notified the data breach to data subjects on 3 January 2020 via e-mail and website. However, it did not inform data subjects about the likely consequences of the breach or an approximate indication of the period during which the breach lasted. Subsequently, the Danish DPA found out that the communication had not reached all of the annual cardholders registered.\nAfter the breach of personal data security, the Zoo introduced a new log-in feature: (1) \"i'm not a robot\" feature and (2) a feature that blocks log-in for one hour after three erroneous log-in attempts. All annual card holders were forced to change their password.\n\n\nDispute\nDid the Copenhagen Zoo establish an appropriate level of security for the login page for annual cardholders? Did the Zoo properly assess the risks that the breach posed to the data subjects' rights? How should communication of a personal data breach be delivered to the data subject? How the controller should communicate the risks posed to the data subjects' rights?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 4)","text":"This is the Danish DPA's fourth decision in the case relating to Helsingor municipality's processing of personal data in primary and lower secondary school. Helsingor municipality, the controller, has been using Google Chromebooks and Workspace for Education in violation of several GDPR requirements, as detailed in the first decision of September 2021, the second decision of 14 July 2022 and the third decision of 18 August 2022.\nFollowing the third decision, the municipality submitted more documentation and also requested a consultation with the DPA as per Article 36 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03656","text":"In April 2021, a data subject in Germany owning shares in the company Mowi ASA (controller) was notified by his bank that the controller had requested his personal data. After two unsuccessful attempts at getting information about this processing from the controller, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Norwegian DPA Datatilsynet, which initiated an investigation and contacted the controller.\nThe controller acknowledged that it had not responded to the data subject’s access request because the emails had ended up in the spam filter. It also confirmed that it did not provide information on the processing in question, directly to shareholders or in their privacy policy, but claimed it relied on the exceptions set out in Article 14(5)(a) and Article 14(5)(c) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Noord-Nederland - C/18/190912/HA RK 19-19","text":"On 1 December 2006 plaintiff was arrested and charged of murdering an 8-year old boy. The first conviction was on 6 September 2007 and after multiple appeals on 22 may 2012 the final verdict was 11 years and 7 month prison followed by an involuntary commitment. The European Court of Human Rights rejected the application he made there. During the whole time, there was a lot of media coverage about this case and all proceedings. On 24 May 2015 the involuntary commitment started, and it has been extended with two years twice on 2 June 2017 and 29 May 2019. There was also media coverage about these extensions.\nWhen searching using Google search for the name of plaintiff, a lot of search results are found with publications about the crime he committed and the legal proceedings afterwards. After a request, Google removed 100 search results, but denied to remove 82 other results. It explained that with: \"It is Google's understanding that the information about your client on these URL's - with regard to all the circumstances of the case we are aware of - is still relevant in relation to the purposes of data processing, and therefore the reference to this document in our search results is justified by the public interest.\"\n\nDispute\n\nPlaintiff\nThe search results include information about criminal convictions and background of the crime. Based on Article 10 GDPR data processing about criminal convictions is only allowed under the control of an official authority. Data processing would also be allowed if processing is authorised by Union or Member State law, but this does not apply. Based on this, Google may not process this data. Article 32 GDPR and Article 33 GDPR also cannot justify the processing.\nBased on CJEU - C-131/12 Google Spain, Hoge Raad - 15/03380 and Article 17 GDPR a weighing of the interests should take place as defined in the Costeja ruling.\nApplicant's right to privacy shall normally outweigh Google's economical interests.\nIn this case applicant's right to privacy shall prevail because information about a crime committed 12 years ago is not relevant any more. Every month, there are just 110 searches made about this case. Applicant is released from prison, and want to start a new life. This becomes impossible because of these search results. Applicant is not a public figure, but even if he is, the public does not need this particular information any more. There is no longer a discussion about the conviction of applicant.\nThe search results make it difficult for applicant to find a job. Employers use Google to find information about applicants. This causes him to limit the jobs he can find. The only relevant information could be the extension of the involuntary commitment, but the public discussion about problems related to involuntary commitment should not hurt him.\nNot only the current list of URL's should be considered, but Google must also be forced to remove all future search results.\n\nDefendant\nBased on Article 17 GDPR and Article 21 GDPR it is only possible to request to delete specific search results, because a weighing of the interests must be made for every search result.\nThe right to be forgotten can only be based on Article 17 GDPR and/or Article 21 GDPR. In this case this does not apply.\nApplicant bases his request on Article 10 GDPR. The goal of article 10 was never forbid search engines to process any special categories of personal data. Based on CJEU - C-136/17 - GC et al v. CNIL, a weighing of the interests must also be made for special categories of personal data. Article 17(3)(a) GDPR contains an exception to protect the freedom of expression and information which also applies to personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences. The balancing of interests is to his disadvantage. Applicant does not point to any wrong information found on the pages linked to in the search results. So the data processing by Google is correct. Because of the seriousness of the crime for which he was convicted, the extent to which that crime shocked society, the fact that his criminal trial has been subject of public debate in several instances and the fact that the criminal case has been reported by many media, it is logical and balanced that a large proportion of the search results relate to the crime committed.\nThere is a public interest in finding information about the crime committed by the applicant. The seriousness and severity of the crime committed by the applicant, as well as the subsequent investigations, indictments and convictions have resulted in almost all Dutch media and also some foreign media reporting about him. The murder of the victim has become an act of history. As opposed to \"right to be forgotten\" there is also a \"right to remember\". Applicant is a public figure. His fame is a direct and inevitable consequence of his own actions. Applicant wrongly claims that the public no longer has an interest in the contested information because there is no longer a public debate about his conviction and because the crime took place 12 years ago. However, the public has an interest in information about current and recent criminal cases, but also in information about known criminal cases that lie further in the past. Moreover, in 2017 and 2019, many more news items were published about the extension of the term of applicant's involuntary commitment. Applicant is still in a forensic position. In 2021, a new assessment will be made as to whether the term of applicant's involuntary commitment will be extended once again or whether applicant will be released. The developments in the criminal case of applicant are therefore still relevant and topical at this time. At the present state of affairs, it is difficult to see that applicant should be indemnified against any association on the internet with the criminal offence he has committed in the event of an unaccompanied leave of absence or an attempt to apply for a job. Against this background, the request by applicant to have the search results in his name removed is premature."}
{"_id":"facts_CE - N° 434684","text":"Several private companies challenges the guidelines of the CNIL on cookies on several grounds, including excess of powers.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_LG Essen - 18 O 204/21","text":"The controller is a private health insurance company. The data subject is a customer of the controller. The parties are in dispute about the validity of several increases to the insurance premiums. The data subject requested refund of overpaid premiums as well as information on all adjustments to the premiums in the form of notification letters sent to the data subject and supplements to the insurance policy to verify the lawfulness of the increases. The controller rejected both claims. Consequently, the data subject filed a lawsuit against the controller with the Regional Court of Essen (Landgericht Essen - LG Essen)."}
{"_id":"facts_DSB (Austria) - 2020-0.191.240","text":"The complainant (hereinafter the \"company\") is a limited company under Austrian law conducting business as pharmacy wholesale. It was subject to an audit of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit im Gesundheitswesen (hereinafter \"BASG\"), the Austrian Federal Office for Safety in Health Care. In the course of this audit, the BASG processed personal data of the company.\nThe company lodged a complaint with the DSB, claiming that the BASG had violated the company's right to confidentiality of personal data pursuant to §1(1) DSG by unlawfully collecting, processing, disclosing and failing to delete the company's personal data ex officio.\nThe BASG contested the company's entitlement to lodge a complaint with the DSB, as the company was not a natural person.\nFurther, the BASG contested to have violated any data protection rights, mainly because under Austrian Law the BASG was under a legal obligation to process the data in connection with the audit.\n\nDispute\n  * Does §1 DSG apply to legal persons?\n  * If so, do the provisions of the DSG, which deal with the procedure before the DSB, also apply to legal persons?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00264/2020","text":"FACUA - Asociación de Consumidores y Usuarios en Acción (FACUA) filed a complaint against Asociación de Afectados por las Asociaciones de Consumidores (ASOCAPAC). The complaint concerned ASOCAPAC's cookie banner.\nThe Spanish DPA (AEPD) identified the following proven facts. Firstly, the cookie banner on ASOCAPAC's website did not provide concise and intelligible information as it only mentions: \"This website uses its own and third party cookies to offer you a better experience and service (...)\". This undermines the clarity of the message.\nThe Spanish DPA also established that the cookie policy (in the second layer of the banner or on the Privacy Policy page) provided additional information on what cookies are and first and third party cookies are used for. However, there was no information on the identification and the time that they were active.\nAdditionally, the DPA found that there was no mechanism to reject all cookies.\n\nDispute\nIs the lack of information and the lack of a possibility to \"refuse all cookies\" on a cookie banner a breach of Article 22(2) LSSI?"}
{"_id":"facts_RvS (Netherlands) - 202006082/1/A3","text":"A data subject submitted an an access request to the Municipality of Leeuwaarden concerning information on the collection, processing, and storage of data by the chip card reader attached to the waste container at his home address.\nThe request included the following words:\n\"Yours faithfully but with kind regards,: [appellant name]: I AM Without Prejudice UCC 1-308 Beneficiary, Authorized Agent and Representative for the legal fiction [appellant name]\"\nIn response, the Municipality asked the data subject to submit his request online and signed with his DigiD within 14 days, or to identify himself at the town hall with a valid identification document. DigiD is an identity management platform used by government agencies in the Netherlands. The Municipality explained that the request concerns personal data, which must not be provided to the wrong person, and it is therefore important to properly establish the data subject's identity. Indeed, Recital 64 GDPR states that the controller should take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a data subject requesting access. And, following Article 12(6) GDPR, if there is reason to doubt the identity, additional information may be requested that is necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject.\nWhen the data subject did not identify himself in the way it requested, the Municipality issued a decision stating it would not consider his request. The data subject lodged an objection to this decision, which the Municipality declared unfounded.\nOn 2 October 2020, the District Court of Northern Netherlands dismissed an appeal by the data subject regarding the Municipality's decision to reject his request. The data subject ('appellant') then appealed to the Council of State.\nThe appellant argued that the District Court erroneously ruled that the Municipality could reasonably doubt his identity and could therefore ask him to identify himself. In particular, this is because the Municipality had previously sent letters to him, which he had answered without further identification being necessary. It is unlikely that the data requested by him would not reach him along the same route. Further, in another procedure from 2018 against the Municipality about a municipal tax assessment, he signed his letters in the same way and that was no reason for the college to doubt his identity. In those proceedings, the Commission itself referred to data from the waste processor to demonstrate that waste had been presented. It is contradictory that the Board now refuses to provide such information to him.\nThe appellant also argued that the Municipality's request for him to submit his request digitally with DigiD or to visit the town hall to identify himself was a disproportionate way to establish his identity, partly because it concerns data from the waste processing of the residential address where only he lives. Lastly, in view of the non-sensitive nature of that data, the Commission could have sent the data to his address without any problem."}
{"_id":"facts_CE - N° 444937","text":"The parties asked the French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat) to suspend the centralisation and data processing of personal data relating to Covid-19 on the health data platform ‘Health Data Hub’ (data controller). The EU subsidiary of the American corporation Microsoft, established in Ireland, has access to personal data on the Hub as it licenses the software necessary to operate it (data processor). The data centre is located in the Netherlands.\nThe parties also asked the Court to request the French DPA (CNIL) to rule on the implication of the invalidation of the Privacy Shield agreement in relation to personal data processed in the Health Data Hub.\nThe parties highlighted that the condition of urgency was met. This is due to the urgent nature of the Covid-19 pandemic, the sensitive nature of the data centralised and processed in the Health Data Hub and the recent CJEU decision (“Schrems II” of the 16th July 2020).\nFinally, they deemed that there was a serious violation of the right to privacy and to protection of personal data. This is due to the fact that the company in charge of the Health Data Hub’s technical aspects, Microsoft, is subject to US law. The risk that this posed to the above-mentioned rights were outlined in the Schrems II decision.\n\nDispute\nIs the contract between the French Health Data Hub and Microsoft, as a company subject to US surveillance law, in violation of Article 44 to 49 GDPR following the Schrems II decision?"}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 20/2020","text":"A data subject complained that 401 Athens General Military Hospital unlawfully processed personal data of people entering the hospital, collecting details from their ID and information about where exactly in the hospital they intend to go, time of entrance and exit.\nThe Military Hospital claimed that this information was necessary for the security of the hospital and that in any case, the DPA was not competent to deal with the case as it concerns data related to activities concerning national security.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_LG München - 31 O 16606/20","text":"Controller is Scalable Capital, a financial services company via which customers can invest in shares etc. Data subject is a customer of this company. Upon registration, they provided numerous personal data to the controller inter alia a photo of their ID-card. On 19.10.2020, the controller informed the data subject of a data breach. Unauthorised third parties had acquired access to the following personal data of data subject: first- and last name, title, address, e-mail address, mobile phone number, place of birth, place and country of birth, nationality, marital status, tax residence and tax ID, IBAN, copy of identity card, portrait photo, which was taken in the Post-Ident procedure. Moreover, this data was accessed by these third parties on three separate instances in the period from April to October 2020. In total, these third parties had copied and stolen 389,000 records of 33,200 affected persons.\nThe attackers were able to access the whole IT system of controller because they had acquired the access information via controller’s former IT Service provider, CodeShip Inc. Although this service provider no longer provided IT services to controller since late 2015, the access data to controller’s system had never been changed. The stolen personal information was used to obtain loans, and was offered for sale on the Darknet.\nBecause data subject feared for identity theft and other fraud, they brought the action before Court and claimed compensation pursuant to Article 82(1) GDPR, because controller violated Article 32(1) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 48/2021","text":"The plaintiff lodged a complaint with the Belgian DPA after their former employer, the defendant, sent them the remaining money they were owed to an address obtained by consulting the national register for natural persons. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had not processed the data lawfully, since they had not consulted the register within its defined purposes.\nTo this the defendant replied that they were unsure of their former employees' address and thought that the national register could be consulted in any case, because they had access to it within the scope of their profession.\n\nDispute\nCan the collection by a notary of personal data contained in the national register for natural persons be justified by the sole fact that within the scope of their work they can already access said register?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2023:6043","text":"On 2 December 2022, the data subject made an access request to the University of Utrecht (the controller), under Article 15 GDPR. In the request, the data subject asked for 'all information about my [their] records'.\nOn 11 January 2023, the controller responded asking the data subject to clarify their request, as the original request was too general and not specific enough.\nOn 13 January 2023, the data subject replied, noting that they did not need to provide the controller with any more information.\nOn 10 February 2023, the controller set aside the data subject's request due to their lack of response and notified them thereof. The data subject subsequently brought a claim against the controller in the Central Netherlands District Court for the lack of response to their access request."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-014","text":"The CNIL received 16 complaints between 2018 and 2019 specifying that users were facing difficulties for deleting or rectifying their data on the annuairefrancais.fr website. The website hosts information about companies registered in France that are published on the SIRENE database - a public database managed by the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). The website annuairefrancais.fr offers the possibility of creating an account allowing users to get information about registered companies and to subscribe to commercial offers from these companies. After an initial inspection, the CNIL found that the processing was not compliant with the GDPR and issued a formal notice giving the company two months to bring its processing practices into compliance by implementing a clear policy regarding data deletion and rectification, establishing a record of processing activities and dealing with the data subjects' requests."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - 22/4916","text":"A data subject had submitted an access request to the Board of Public Prosecutor’s office seeking to obtain information about any personal data about him being processed by the Board. The Board, as a defendant, treated his request as a general access request under Article 15 GDPR and Article 39(i) Judicial and Criminal Records Act (Wet justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens - WJSG). Under Article 39(i) of the WJSG, data subjects have the right to request the Board to obtain confirmation as to whether criminal records about them is being processed and, if so, to obtain information about the processing thereof.\nOn 31 August 2022, the Board thus provided the data subject with two separate documents, one regarding the criminal records about him that were being processed under the WJSG and the other containing all other personal data about him being processed under the GDPR. The data subject, the plaintiff claimed that the response was incomplete. The defendant thus asked him to substantiate his request and the data subject answered that he wished to receive all data concerning him that was being processed. The defendant then added additional personal data and criminal records of the plaintiff that were found in its database.\nStill unsatisfied with the response, the plaintiff appealed against the judgment."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10065894","text":"The controller installed five video surveillance cameras on their external wall, with three of them functioning and recording an alley area where property ownership was disputed.\nThe cameras were capable of capturing the secondary doors and windows of neighboring houses. While the controller claimed exclusive ownership of the alley and argued that neighbors had illegally built doors and windows on the perimeter wall, they failed to adjust the cameras' angle after being notified by the DPA to do so."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Global Ports’s Services S.R.L.","text":"The controller installed a GPS monitoring system in a company car. According to the controller, the purpose of this installation was the necessity of keeping track of the working time of employees. Data subjects were not informed about the existence of such a tracking device.\nThe data subject, an employee, filed a complaint with the DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02368","text":"An employee (the data subject) had quit their job and was supposed to assist the employer (the controller) during the notice period. However, due to disagreements, the controller blocked the data subject's access to email and business systems and enabled automatic forwarding of emails to the general manager of the company.\nThe data subject objected to this processing, but the controller upheld it for several weeks and only stopped it when the general manager realized it could be problematic. The Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) launched an investigation after receiving both a notification from the controller, as well as a complaint from the data subject.\nThe controller explained to the DPA that they had enabled automatic forwarding of the emails because the data subject had refused to enable an out of office reply. They further argued that this was necessary to uphold customer relations and daily operations, and because they had discovered that the data subject had violated work duties a few months earlier.\nThe controller also claimed that the data subject had consented to the processing, however this was denied by the data subject and the controller was unable to document their assertion."}
{"_id":"facts_DPC (Ireland) - Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Instagram) - IN-18-5-7","text":"In order to access Instagram, an online social network service operated in the EU by “Meta IE”, a user was required to provide certain information and accept a series of terms and conditions (the “Terms of Use”).\nUnder the GDPR, Instagram was obliged to have a lawful basis for the processing of personal data of its users. Article 6(1) GDPR details the lawful bases upon which such data can be processed. The company was also obliged to provide detailed information to users at the time their personal data was obtained in relation to, among others, the purposes of any data processing and the legal basis for such processing. To continue to access the Instagram platform, all users were required to accept the updated Terms of Use prior to 25 May 2018, the date the GDPR became applicable. Those existing users who were not willing to accept the new terms were advised of the option to delete their Instagram account.\nA Belgian Instagram user, the “data subject” and “complainant”, filed a complaint against Meta IE, the controller. The complainant was represented by “noyb – European Centre for Digital Rights”, a privacy NGO based in Austria. The complainant alleged that Meta IE’s data processing practices on the Instagram platform amounted to “forced consent”, and constituted a violation of the GDPR. The complaint, originally filed with the Belgian DPA (APD), advanced a number of grounds upon which the consent of the data subject could not be considered “freely given”.\nFirstly, there existed a clear imbalance of power between controller and data subject. This is likely to affect the voluntariness of the latter’s consent for the processing of personal data. The complaint alleges that, in this case, the controller undisputedly has a dominant market position in the area of social networking services and, in combination with the “lock in” and “network” effects, the data subject is left with no other realistic alternatives.\nSecondly, the use of the Instagram service is conditional upon the data subject’s consent to collection of their data, when such data processing is not necessary for the provision of the service. Article 7(4) GDPR, which defines the conditions for consent, specifically states that “utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract… is conditional on consent to the processing that is not necessary for the performance of that contract”. As such, the “consent” upon which the controller seeks to rely is invalid.\nAdditionally, the complaint raises the issue of granularity, as the controller relies on an overall bundled consent to anything contained in the terms and the privacy policy. This represents an “all-or nothing” approach contrary to the requirement of the GDPR for “specific” consent to processing.\nFinally, the controller shall enable the data subject to refuse consent without any detriment. However, in this case, the data subject faces significant disadvantage, as their account would be deleted – as a consequence of withdrawal – and they would lose a crucial form of social interaction.\nThe Belgian DPA (APD) referred the case to the Irish DPA (DPC) under article 56 GDPR, and in accordance with the procedure outlined in Article 60 GDPR.\nIn response to the complaint Meta IE submitted, among other points, that agreeing to the Terms of Use amounts to a contractual agreement and is not an act of consent for the purposes of Article 6(1)(a) GDPR. The company stated that it “does not in any way seek to ‘infer’ consent from a user to process personal data based on their agreement to the Terms of Use” (Para 41).\nOn 1 April 2022, the DPC shared its Draft Decision with the other Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) in accordance with Article 60(3) GDPR. Ten DPAs (AT, DE, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, NL, NO, SE) raised objections, in accordance with Article 60(4) GDPR, to the Draft Decision. On 11 August 2022, the matter was referred to the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). The EDPB adopted a binding decision on 5 December 2022 and the DPC issued its Final Decision on 31 December 2022, published on 11 January 2023."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Nr. 2020123144","text":"In Iceland, the processing of personal data relating to the creditworthiness of individuals is regulated, among others, by Article 2 of Regulation no. 246/2001 as well as Article 15 of the Icelandic Data Protection Act no. 90/2018. In particular, companies willing to publish information relating to the creditworthiness of individuals must first obtain an operating license from the Icelandic DPA, which sets out specific terms for the processing of personal data for the purpose of credit scoring.\nSuch a license was delivered by the Icelandic DPA to the company Creditinfo on 29 December 2017. According to the terms of this operating license, Creditinfo had to, prior to the publication of any financial data relating to individuals, inform them by sending an information notice by letter. The operating license does not require such letters to be registered letters. The information notice is supposed to give to data subjects the opportunity to present objections (for example, if the data are inaccurate or incomplete, or if a settlement had been reached).\nOn 28 December 2020, the Icelandic DPA received a complaint from a data subject (hereinafter the Complainant) regarding the publication of information about him in the default register of Creditinfo. The Complainant claimed that he hadn't received any information prior to the publication of these data, and that, in spite of his erasure request, Creditinfo had refused to delete the concerned data.\nCreditinfo, for its part, was arguing that a letter dated March 16, 2020, had been sent to the complainant, and provided evidence thereof to the Icelandic DPA. Credit info further specified than in case the individual does no longer live at the indicated address, the letter is normally returned, and the address is corrected by taking into account the data of the National Registry. In that case, however, Creditinfo informed the Icelandic DPA that the letter had not been returned."}
{"_id":"facts_CNPD (Portugal) - Deliberação 2021/533","text":"The Portuguese National Statistical Institute (\"Instituto Nacional de Estatística\") was undertaking the 2021 census by collecting data through forms on their own website \"CENSOS 2021\", and using various website security and content delivery services of Cloudflare, a service provider headquartered in the United States.\nThe Portuguese DPA (\"Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados\", CNPD) received various complaints from people, mainly that citizens were obliged to disclose their full name, but also that personal data was being sent to the United States, due to the use of Cloudflare as a service provider.\nThe DPA's investigation found that the Institute's use of Cloudflare as a content delivery network did not guarantee that personal data would be processed in the European Union or in other countries, some of which may not ensure the adequate level of protection of the personal data required by the GDPR, given Cloudflare's network extended to more than one hundred countries. Cloudflare's service uses anycast to route incoming traffic to the nearest data centre to the user, using IP addresses registered in the United States.\nAlthough the algorithm that routes the traffic is supposed to chose the closest server possible to the origin of the request, it is not guaranteed that the data is not sent to other servers located in countries without such level of protection.\nThe DPA also noted that the census website used Cloudflare's own certificates to encrypt website traffic, rather than encryption using the Institute's own private and public keys. Accordingly, the security protocol used by Cloudflare deprives the Institute of control regarding the transfer. Such protocol is fully controlled by Cloudflare, which possess both the private and public key of the encryption.\nAt the time of the investigation, more than six million Portuguese citizens had completed the census, what amounts to more than half of the Portugal population. The 2021 national census was mandatory and included the collection and processing of special categories of personal data, including health and religious beliefs."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202208230","text":"A package from Carrefour was to be delivered to the data subject's address. In case the data subject was not at home, they gave the permission to deliver their package to their neighbour. However, the package was delivered to someone else.\nAs the controller, Carrefour has a contract with a processor responsible for deliveries, Fourth Party Logistics SL. In this contract, it is established that the processor should notify the controller in case of contracting a subprocessor. Even though a subprocessor did the delivery, Carrefour was not notified of the existence of any subprocessor.\nThe processor (Fourth Party Logistics SL) explained that there were two subprocessors involved in the delivery, Envialiva World SL. and The Bee Logstics SL, however no contract between these parties was presented to the DPA. The processor Fourth Party Logistics SL did not comply with their contract with the controller and there were no formal agreements with the subprocessors."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-432-0056","text":"Following the Danish DPA's (Datatilsynet) decisions (from September 2021 as well as July and August 2022) related to Helsingor municipality's processing of personal data using Google products and services, Aarhus municipality reassessed their risk assessment during August 2022. On 1 September, they sent the DPA a request for consultation as per Article 36 GDPR along with the relevant documentation, as they were using the same processing setup (Google, Google Chromebooks, Google Workspace for Education)."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9542096","text":"On 19 September 2019, the data subject requested Poliambulatorio Talenti S.r.l. to access his and his two minor daughters' personal data. On 23 October 2019 he filed a complaint with the Garante as he had not received a response from the polyclinic yet. On 18 November 2019, the DPA invited Poliambulatorio Talenti to comply with the request within 20 days. Two days later, the polyclinic replied to the data subject and apologized.\nFollowing the polyclinic’s answer, the data subject complained to the Supervisory Authority that in the forms related to one of his daughters’ consent to the processing of personal data, and to receive reports from the clinic via email, there was the name of a male individual. The Garante hence asked Poliambulatorio Talenti for clarifications, in particular concerning the possibility of a data breach, and concerning the measures implemented to ensure the accuracy and confidentiality of personal data.\nIn response to the request for information, the healthcare facility clarified that the reason for the incorrect name entered in the system was due to the fact that the male individual shared the same surname as the mother of the complainant's minor daughters. The polyclinic also stated that there was no communication of the personal data of the complainant’s daughters to said male individual, or to anyone, since the data is kept only in paper form and is accessible only by authorised internal personnel.\nIn subsequent documentation sent to the Garante, Poliambulatorio Talenti argued that the delay in replying to the data subject was due to issues with the hardware system, and that the inaccuracy in the name entered in the system was caused by “a material mistake due to the decision to copy by hand the data of the minor's mother”. During a hearing, the clinic also asked the Garante to close the case, or apply the lowest possible fine."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-020","text":"KASPR runs a Chrome browser extension which allows users to get the business details of people whose LinkedIn profile they had visited. On the 28 July 2022, the French DPA (Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés – CNIL) carried out a compliance check with KASPR, the controller.\nThe investigation showed that approximately 160 million contacts were included in the controller’s database. These entries included the surname, first name, e-mail address, telephone number, LinkedIn profile URL or other social networks, employer, company, job title, skills, professional interest, career, date of hiring and end of post, training, place of work, source of data and date of collection.\nHarvesting the data from LinkedIn and storage\nOn LinkedIn, users can choose between four different visibility options: 1 – Only visible to me, 2 – Anyone on LinkedIn, 3 – 1st degree connections and 4 – 1st and 2nd degree connections.\nThe controller collected the contacts details of LinkedIn users who had made their details visible to all (Option 2) as well as those whom had limited the visibility to 1st and 2nd degree connections (Options 3&4).\nProviding information\nFour years after the implementation of the KASPR tool, the controller notified data subjects by sending an email which informed them of the practice and gave the option to object to the processing by clicking on a link in the email. When data subjects filed access requests under Article 15 GDPR, the controller merely responded that their personal information was retrieved from publicly available sources.\nThe controller’s argument\nThe controller argued that the processing is based on its legitimate interest to facilitate connection between working professionals aligning with the intentions of data subjects active on LinkedIn. Further, it argued that identity verification should reasonably be expected by users of a professional networking service and that data was collected according to the selected options on LinkedIn."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Den Haag - C/09/581706 / HA RK 19-593","text":"The applicant asked Google to remove search results for his name, under the \"right to be forgotten\". Google decided not to take action on certain URLs. Two months later, the applicant submitted a new (repeated) request, which was rejected by Google for the same reasons. The applicant then lodged a complaint in front of the Dutch civil courts.\nIn Netherlands, the instigation of legal proceedings against a data controller on the basis of the GDPR has been further regulated by the \"GDPR Implementation Act\". According to Article 35(2) of this local law, data subjects who wish to challenge a data controller' decision on a request made on the basis of Articles 15 to 22 of the GDPR, shall lodge their petition in front of the civil courts within six weeks of receipt of the decision. According to the Dutch case law, exceeding this six-week period leads, in principle, to inadmissibility.\nConsequently, Google was of the opinion that the applicant's petition was inadmissible as it was submitted later than six weeks after Google's first reply, and therefore not within the period prescribed by Article 35(2) of the GDPR Implementation Act.\nOn the contrary, the applicant was of the opinion that his second (repeated) request started a new time-limit. According to the applicant, neither the GDPR nor its Implementation Act limits the number of applications which may be submitted. In that regard, the applicant refers to the text of Article 21(1) of the GDPR, which states that requets for removal can be made \"at any time\".\n\nDispute\nShould the applicant's complaint be declared inadmissible for not respecting the time limits as set out to in Article 12(5) of the GDPR and Article 35(2) of the Dutch GDPR Implementation Act?"}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W214 2233132-1/27E","text":"A data subject filed a complaint with the DSB claiming a violation of his right to access under Article 15 GDPR. The DSB partially upheld the complaint of the data subject, ordering the controller, an address publisher and direct marketing company, to disclose to the data subject information about the target groups of personal data about him being processed for advertising purposes and the names of the recipients of such data as it failed to fully comply with the access request.\nThe controller then appealed the decision before the BVwG, claiming that it is not obliged to disclose such information. The BVwG started evaluating the case but then suspended the proceedings, pending the decision of the CJEU in case C-154/21 and issued only a partial decision on 17 May 2022 (BVwG - W214 2233132-1/13E) annulling parts of the DSB's decision.\nIn January 2023, the CJEU delivered its judgment in case C-154/21 and the BVwG continued the case in May 2023."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Den Haag - SGR 22/2863","text":"In the decision leading to the appeal, the Dutch Employee Insurance Agency, the controller, refused to grant the data subject access to an anonymous tip, which led to an investigation into their sickness (ZW) benefits.\nThe investigation revealed that the data subject had failed to comply with the duty to provide information, resulting in the recovery of €6,010 in unlawfully paid ZW benefits and a fine of €253.33. Following the request of their file, the data subject received all documents except the anonymous tip.\nThe controller argued that the data subject’s interests were not harmed by the tip, stating that it was the investigation, not the anonymous tip, which constituted the direct cause for the recovery and the fine. Article 7(6)(i) Dutch Access and correction rights regulation (Regeling inzage en correctierecht UWV 2018) (hereinafter: the Dutch Access and correction rights regulation), based on the GDPR, further allows for the controller to deny the data subject’s request to access where this is necessary and proportionate to protect the rights and freedoms of others.\nThe data subject claimed ongoing harassment by an anonymous tipster, involvement in the childcare benefits scandal, issues with national institutions, privacy violations by the controller, and finally, an intent to initiate civil proceedings against the tipster.\nThe controller responded by clarifying that the tipster wished to remain anonymous, constituting a situation where the general public interest in maintaining anonymity and ensuring continued reporting outweighs the personal interest of the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_LfD (Lower Saxony) - Fine EUR 900,000 against bank","text":"A commercial bank (controller) used personal data of current and former customers (data subjects) to identify customers with an affinity for digital media usage, in order to address them more intensely through electronic communication channels for further commercial communication (advertisement).\nA service provider analyzed digital usage behavior on behalf of the controller, including the total amount of app-store purchases, the usage frequency of bank statement printers as well as the total amount of transfers in online banking system (in comparison to the offline usage in their local branch offices). The results were compared and further enriched with data from a commercial credit reporting agency. Most customers were informed in advance, but no consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR was obtained.\nThe controller based the data analysis, data enrichment and the subsequent creation of customer profiles on legitimate interest as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_NS - 33 Cdo 347/2023","text":"In 2019, the data subject brought a complaint to the Czech Telecommunications Office regarding the billing of telephone calls from January 6 to February 5 2019. The company providing the publicly available electronic service network did not provide information on outgoing calls on 15 January (compared to other days in which calls were made), and did not provide information on incoming calls. The Czech Telecommunications Office upheld the data subject’s complaint. The case was appealed by the company to the District Court in Bruntál (January 2022) and the Regional Court in Ostrava (September 2022). Both Courts dismissed the appeals, and the case was brought to the Supreme Court on September 2023.\nThe company argued that retaining data on incoming calls for a specified period was not in the scope of the Czech Electronic Communications Act, and that the data processed was personal data covered by “special legislation” (the GDPR is not mentioned here, however, the Court then includes the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive in its reasoning)."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W211 2230221-1","text":"The data subject filed a complaint with the Austrian Data Protection Authority (DSB) against the controller, requesting to be provided with recipients to whom the personal data had been shared under Article 15(1)(c) GDPR, rather than mere categories of recipients.\nThe controller refused, arguing that a controller has a right to choose whether to provide a data subject with information on actual data recipients or rather just categories thereof. Further, the controller argued that the disclosure of actual data recipients would reveal its trade secrets.\nThe DSB upheld the data subject's complaint and ordered the controller to provide the data subject with information on the actual data recipients. The controller filed an appeal against that decision with the Austrian Federal Administrative Court (BVwG), repeating its arguments brought forward before the DSB."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W274 2232028-1/3E","text":"In April 2019, the data subject sent an request for erasure of data on several payment defaults and some address data to the credit reference agency (CRA) CRIF GmbH because the debts had all been cleared. The CRA refused the erasure, stating that the data was still relevant for the purposes of assessing the data subject's creditworthiness.\nIn June 2019, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Austrian DPA (Datenschutzbehörde - DSB), stating that all debts still stored in the CRA's data base have been cleared and that several debts only concerned insignificant amounts.\nThe DSB rejected the complaint regarding the data on payment defaults but ordered the CRA to delete data on an old address of the data subject. The DSB held that the data on the payment defaults concern a total amount of more than EUR 3,000 and that none of the debts has been cleared more than 5 years ago. Under case law by the BVwG (see BVwG - W211 2225136-1), CRAs are allowed to store data on payment defaults or insolvencies for a five-year period after the clearance of the debt.\nThe data subject filed an appeal against this decision by the DSB. In this appeal he/she also argued (for the first) time, that the CRA had also violated Article 14 GDPR because the data subject had never been informed about the processing of his/her data. Hence, the data must also be deleted under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR.\n\nDispute\nWas the CRA allowed to still store data on payment defaults after the debts have been cleared? If so, for how long?\nDoes the failure to inform the data subject under Article 14 GDPR result in the general unlawfulness of the processing and the obligation for the controller to delete the data under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 39/2020","text":"A local political association has sent out election advertisements to the residents of the municipality for the local elections in 2018. For this purpose, the association used the electoral roll from 2012 and compared it with that of 2018.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 51/2024","text":"The controller offers services that allow a device user to remain identified even when browsing in incognito mode or using a VPN by assigning them a unique identifier. A demo on the controller’s website showed that a unique ID is assigned to each visitor of the website, which, when combined with the user’s location, allows to track, among other things, the number of visits.\nThe data subject sent an access request and indicated that he may decide to delete this data after receiving the access request.\nSince contacting the controller, the data subject had been receiving marketing emails.\nThe data subject lodged a complaint with the Belgian DPA (“APD”). The complaint was twofold: on the one hand, the data subject criticized the services provided by the controller and considered that there was probably no legal basis for these processing operations. On the other hand, they challenged the controller’s failure to provide a positive response to their erasure request.\nThe data subject also indicated that other parties could potentially use the same technology in a way that does not comply with the GDPR.\nThe data subject attached a mail summary which shows an email exchange between the data subject and the controller, but the actual content of the email exchange was not shared with the APD."}
{"_id":"facts_AP (The Netherlands) - Boete voor gemeente Voorschoten","text":"The municipality of Voorschoten implemented a waste collection system using chipped containers and tokens to regulate household waste disposal. The system collected personal data, including addresses, container/token numbers, and timestamps of waste disposal. The municipality stored this data for extended periods (up to five years for tokens and indefinitely for containers).\n\nAt the end of 2018, the above-ground shared containers were replaced by underground containers to serve residents of high-rise buildings. Undergroung containers can only be opened with a token, which contains a chip with a unique number. It can be determined for each underground container which tokens have access to the container. A container can be opened five times a day, after which access to the container is denied. After the container has been opened with a token, the municipality stores data in a municipal IT system. This concerns token number, address details, date and time of the dumping, location details and type of waste. This data was stored for five years.\nIn March 2019, all grey residual waste containers were replaced by new containers with a chip for low-rise buildings. Each household (residential address) now has only one container. The garbage truck is equipped with a reader that can read the number of the chip. If it is recognised, the container is emptied. The municipality then stores data in an IT system of the municipality's collection service. This concerns the chip number, the associated address, date and time of emptying, location data of emptying and type of waste. The container cannot then be emptied again for two weeks because the garbage truck will not accept the container. This data remained in the IT system as long as the container was in use and the data was deleted from the system when the container was replaced."}
{"_id":"facts_TA Luxembourg - 46578","text":"Several companies in the Amazon group collected data about the behavior of visitors (the data subjects) on Amazon websites and used them to displaying interest-based advertising, under the legal basis of legitimate interest. The data were also disclosed to third parties in order to enable interest-based advertising on third-party websites.\nIn 2018 French non-profit La Quadrature du Net filed a complaint with the French data protection authority. La Quadrature du Net claimed, among other things, that Amazon could not rely on the legal basis of legitimate interest for collecting personal data for the purpose of providing interest-based advertising. La Quadrature du Net also claimed that Amazon failed to comply with the exercise of several rights of the data subjects.\nUnder the European cooperation mechanism, the Luxembourgish DPA was the lead supervisory authority to decide on the matter under Article 56 GDPR.\nIn an unpublished decision from 2021, the Luxembourgish DPA held that the data controller (an unnamed Amazon subsidiary referred to as \"AA\") unlawfully processed personal data for interest-based advertising, did not properly inform the data subjects about the processing of their data, failed to transparently inform the data subjects about the processing of their data, failed to respond to access requests as well as requests for erasure, and did not provide data subjects with an easy way to opt out of interest-based advertising. Overall, the controller violated Articles 6(1), 12, Article 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 21 GDPR.\nThe data controller filed an appeal with the Luxembourgish Administrative Court seeking the reversal, if not the annulment, of the decision. The appeal challenged many aspects of the Luxembourgish DPA’s decision.\n\nThe legal basis of legitimate interest\nThe DPA held that the controller could not rely on the legal basis of legitimate interest to process personal data for the purpose of providing interest-based advertising. The controller challenged this finding in several ways.\nDuring the procedure with DPA, the controller claimed that its processing of personal data was based not only on the controller’s own commercial interest but also on the interests of the wider community in a vital and growing Internet economy. The controller claimed that the DPA failed to take this broader interest into account in its assessment of legitimate interest.\nFurthermore, the controller contested the DPA’s finding that the processing of personal data was not necessary to pursue the controller’s commercial interest.\nAdditionally, the controller claimed that the DPA failed to properly assess the balancing of legitimate interest. Specifically, the DPA did not take into account the limitations and safeguards put in place by the controller.\nFinally, the controller claimed that it changed its interest-based practices and relied on consent “in almost all cases”.\n\nThe controller's transparency obligations\nThe DPA held that the data controller failed to properly inform data subjects about the processing of their data for interest-based advertising. In the DPA’s view, the privacy notices on the controller's websites lacked essential information, including:\n- Information about the specific legitimate interest pursued and the balancing of that interest against the rights and freedoms of data subjects;\n- the logic behind the processing of personal data and the consequences of the processing for the data subjects\n- the categories of recipients of personal data\n- the data retention periods\n- the categories of personal data obtained by third parties\n- the non-EEA countries to which the controller transferred personal data, and the non-EEA recipients of these data.\nThe DPA also held that the controller made the information unclear by dividing it between three distinct notices. Finally, the DPA held that one of these notices could lead data subjects to believe that their data were not processed and shared with third parties.\nThe controller contested all of the DPA's findings and claimed that its notices provided all the information required by the GDPR. The controller claimed that providing in-depth, item-by-item information on certain aspects of the data processing (the data retention times for each category of personal data collected, the categories of personal data collected from third parties, and the non-EEA jurisdictions and non-EEA recipients involved in the controller’s data transfers), would have made the information unclear. In the controller’s view, generic information on these topic was both sufficient under the GDPR, and more comprehensible for the data subjects. Likewise, the controller claimed that explicitly referring to legitimate interest as the legal basis for processing personal data, would have made the information unclear because the expression \"legitimate interest\" is not widely understood. Finally, with regards to data transfers, the controller claimed that the GDPR did not require it to provide information on every single non-EEA Country and recipient involved.\n\nThe right to object\nIn its original decision, the Luxembourgish DPA held that the data controller violated Article 21 GDPR by making it difficult for data subjects to opt out of interest-based advertising. This was the case because the controller offered different opt-outs for different forms of interest-based advertising. The data controller challenged this finding: it argued that offering granular choices is more respectful of the users’ wishes than offering a single, generalized opt-out.\n\nOther data subject's rights\nThe Luxembourgish DPA’s decision held that the controller violated the GDPR by denying a data subject access to their data, by failing to allow data subjects to rectify their data, and by failing to comply with a request for erasure.\nThe controller challenged these findings. It claimed that interest-based advertising does not require the identification of the data subject and that the controller could not be required to identify the data subject under Article 11 GDPR. The controller also claimed that re-identification would have created privacy and security risks for all of the controller’s customers."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - ING Bank N.V. Amsterdam – Bucharest Branch (2)","text":"A controller's contractual partner received from a controller's processor, on two different dates, files containing outdated information in order to issue insurance policies. As result, 270 individuals were affected.\n\nDispute\nDoes processing personal data by violating the working procedure leads to a violation of the GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - C/10/576091/HA RK 19-701","text":"The plaintiff asked to the State to grant him access to procedural files in which he was involved against the State of the Netherlands concerning forgeries offence. The applicant claimed that the procedural files contained his personal data and evidences which could help him to prove his innocence in the aforementioned case and all the cases in which he would have been involved as party against the State. The State refused to grant him the access.\n\nDispute\nThe Court clarified the interplay between the right to inspection under the ePrivacy Directive and the right to access under the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Case no. 2021101926","text":"The data subject's complaint concerned the display of search results in Google's search engine. The search results referred to articles which discussed the alleged bullying which took place at the complainant's workplace. Google LLC, the controller, denied the complainant's request to remove the search results on the basis that there was no indication that the press coverage were false. Moreover, Google LLC argued that the press coverage was still considered to serve the public interest since it was published a short time ago.\nAlthough the exact circumstances are not further elaborated in the decision, the DPA acknowledge that the data subject had a role in public life."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2020-016","text":"The PERFORMECLIC Company's activity is the sending of commercial e-mails on behalf of advertisers. As such, the company holds a database of 20 million e-mail addresses that it has purchased from a third party company.\nFollowing the report made by the SIGNAL SPAM association, the French DPA carried out an on-site inspection at the company's premises on 18 September 2019.\n\nDispute\n  * Insofar as the operational activities of the company were implemented from Morocco, is the GDPR applicable and is the CNIL competent in this case?\n  * How is the notion of \"consent\" to be understood in the context of email prospecting operations?\n  * Is the processing of the telephone number in the context of prospection operations carried out solely by e-mail contrary to the principle of data minimisation provided for in Article 5(1)(e) GDPR?\n  * Is the simple opening of a prospecting e-mail sufficient to characterise the prospect's interest in the products and services of the sender of the message, and thus to extend the retention period of this data?\n  * Is the apposition of a standard mention at the bottom of a prospecting e-mail sufficient regarding the information standards provided for in Article 14 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 25/2022","text":"A loan and credit management Company (controller) was repeatedly contacting a data subject by telephone-call regarding the repayment of their alleged debt.\nThe data subject had already declared personal bankruptcy according to Article 8(2) Law Nr. 3869/2010 and the insolvency court had granted a discharge of the debt in question. After that, the attorney of the data subject filed an objection to the processing of their data according to Article 21 GDPR. The data subject requested the controller to cease contacting them regarding the alleged debt and to erase their personal data according to Article 17 GDPR.\nThe controller refused to respond to the request claiming that the data subject could not be identified with certainty, due to the data subject's ID number stated on the power of attorney not matching the one kept in the controller's record. The controller claimed that the data subject should first update their personal identification information by visiting a branch office in person.\nConsequently, the data subject lodged a complaint with the DPA regarding the processing of their data. The controller stated before the DPA that the data processing was lawful according to Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, since the data subject was still obliged to repay the debt on a legal basis not covered by precedent created from the insolvency court's decision. Regarding the data subject's requests, the controller argued that the data subject acted in bad faith by refusing to update their identification information."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2020092288","text":"In September 2020, the Icelandic DPA initiated an investigation on a digital gift card application provided by the Ministry of Industries and Innovation (the Ministry), and developed by the company YAY ehf (YAY). The aim of the application was to issue a digital gift certificate to all Icelanders over 18 years old in order to stimulate domestic tourism in the summer 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.\nAfter the app was published on 18 June 2020, the DPA became aware that, in order to be able to use the digital gift card, the users of the application had to submit their personal data, such as, email address, phone number, age and gender. Moreover, the users were also required in some cases to give an access to their phones´ camera, microphone, GPS location, calendar, contact information as well as data on USB storage.\nThe DPA decided to open an investigation to assess whether the collection of users´ data and the acquisition of access rights to their mobile devices by the digital gift card application were in compliance with the GDPR and the Icelandic Act no. 90/2018 on data protection and the processing of personal data. In the context of this investigation, the Icelandic DPA found that the Ministry was the controller of the personal data and that YAY was a processor of the personal data."}
{"_id":"facts_APDCAT (Catalonia) - EXP202409570","text":"Parents registered their son to play in junior football Summer Camp with Club Esportiu (controller). At the time of registration, the parents indicated on the form that they did not wish to consent for photographs to be taken of their son.\nThe club followed up with the parents, urging them to consent to the photographs being taken in order for the registration to continue. The club noted that in any event, they could not guarantee that their child would not appear in photographs taken.\nThe parents filed a complaint with the Catalan DPA (APDCAT) on June 19th 2024.\nDuring the proceedings, the controller argued that they did not have facial recognition technology and could thus not guarantee that specific children did not appear in group photos taken during the camp. They also claimed that the photos taken were only for use in club publications and their social network pages, and that the complaint should be dismissed."}
{"_id":"facts_AP (The Netherlands) - 7.04.2022","text":"The Dutch Tax and Customs Administration kept a list to register indications of fraud, the Fraud Signaling Facility (FSV). The list contained over 270,000 entries and was maintained for more than six years. Characteristics such as nationality and appearance were often included as fraud risk factors in the FSV. People were often wrongly labeled as fraudsters, with far-reaching consequences. The Dutch DPA conducted a thorough investigation on the Tax and Customs Administration, finding several violations of the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202209001","text":"On 1st of August 2022, the data subject submitted a complaint against a neighbor since he had installed a video surveillance camera on his property facing the data subject’s property, more specifically at the swimming pool, without being authorized to do so."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/693399 / HA RK 20-337","text":"Whenever a consumer in the Netherlands obtains credit, the debt must be registered in a central register of the foundation Bureau Krediet Registratie (BKR).\nThe case at hand involved a person with whom the bank, Rabobank, had made a special agreement. He was to pay part of a loan and was forgiven the repayment of a remaining part of the loan. After he had paid the amount agreed with the bank, Rabobank nevertheless reported him to the BKR register with a special code. This prevented him from taking out new loans, even though he was in a good financial situation. For this reason, he took the matter to court.\nThe claimant had two mortgages on two homes with his ex-partner. Following the couple's divorce, they were forced to sell both houses. After the houses had been sold in 2015 and 2016, a residual debt of €119,979 remained. The partners were jointly responsible for the full repayment of the debt.\nAlmost immediately after the sale of the first home, the applicant voluntarily started repaying the remaining debt at the rate of €500 per month. In November 2015, the applicant's 7 monthly repayments totalled €3500. In February 2017, Rabobank sent a letter to the applicant. The bank had calculated that the applicant could repay €1486 per month, but that this would not enable him to repay the entire debt within 5 years. The bank offered him alternative payment models; if he accepted the special arrangement, he would not have to repay the entire remaining debt.\nThe applicant and the bank agreed that the applicant would pay €1388.89 per month for 36 months (€50,000 in total) and that the bank would pay €62,015.83. It was also agreed that the €3500 that the applicant had already paid would be deducted from the amount that the applicant owed. The applicant fully complied with the payment plan and repaid the debt between September 2017 and May 2020.\nOn 29 May 2020, Rabobank registered the applicant in the BKR's Central Credit Information System with a special code of 3. This code indicates that a previous loan had been written off by €250 or more. The code would be visible for 5 years and would disappear after 29 May 2025.\nThe applicant objected to the registration with code 3 as early as 8 May 2020. On 5 June, Rabobank gave a negative response to the objection and stated that it was non-negotiable that it would report the applicant with special code 3.\nThe applicant filed a new objection on September 4, 2020, arguing that there were new facts that needed to be considered. However, Rabobank again rejected the objection and gave reasons for its decision. Rabobank wrote that it had looked at the new information and weighed the various interests. Nevertheless, it concluded that the applicant was not eligible for a deletion of his Code 3.\nThe applicant made a request to the district court of Amsterdam to force Rabobank to comply with his request.\n\nDispute\n\nWas the case admissible?\nRabobank held that the application for the order should be dismissed. Rabobank referred to Article 35(2) of the Dutch Act implementing the GDPR (UAVG), which provides that an interested party (i.e. data subject) who disagrees with a decision of a non-administrative body in response to a person exercising their rights under Articles 15-22 GDPR may file a civil dispute application within six weeks for a court to grant or reject the application.\nHowever, the time limit does not apply if the non-administrative body responds later than 6 weeks. In the present case, Rabobank stated that the applicant's first request was made on 12 December 2019 and that it responded only one day later. Thereafter, the applicant had submitted identical applications several times. Rabobank argued that it cannot be the intention of Article 35(2) of the GDPR Implementation Act (UAVG) that a data subject can circumvent the six-week period by submitting several identical requests if no new facts or circumstances have been brought forward.\nThe applicant, on the other hand, believed that his most recent petition, filed on September 4, 2020, rather than the one filed on May 8, 2020, should govern the deadline. This was because Code 3 was added to the registry after he filed the objection in May 2020. In addition, the applicant believed that his desire to be able to lease a car was a new circumstance that warranted a new assessment.\n\nThe BKR Registration\nThe applicant sought an injunction to cause Rabobank or BKR to remove Code 3. The applicant also requested that the injunction be accompanied by the threat of a penalty payment of €1,000 per day, up to a total of €30,000 for non-compliance, commencing 3 days after service of the injunction.\nThe applicant claimed that the Code 3 registration was unlawful. He argued that the repayment agreement, which the applicant had complied with, had the effect of releasing him from any further liability for the unpaid loan. In addition, the claimant objected that he had not been informed that code 3 had been assigned to him.\nAdditionally, the applicant claimed that Rabobank was wrong not to remove the special code. He claimed that he had a good payment history and that the bank never had any problems with his repayment. He claimed that the remaining debt was due to a special, unique situation that he had to sell his house after a divorce.\nFurther, he claimed that the code prevented him from getting a new mortgage on his home and from leasing a business vehicle even though he had a good financial situation. The applicant stated the consequences of keeping the code on him was disproportional to the origins of why he had a Code 3 put on him."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 20/2021","text":"The complainant requested to stop receiving promotional emails by the company. The promotional emails didn't stop even after he followed all the directions on the company's website and even after he submitted a request of erasure of his personal data held by the company, for which he received a confirmation email stating that all his data we deleted by the company's servers. The company stated that due to technical errors and duplicate registration of the data subject's email address, the process of the deletion of the complainant's data was not successful.\nThe personal data processed by the company were recorded electronically in a database referred to as the ‘Master Database'. All changes to personal data, such as deletions from email lists or requests submitted by data subjects are initially entered in the Master Database, and are then integrated/ copied into the individual databases that connect to the Main Database through a synchronization process which takes place automatically on a daily basis. One of these such databases linked to the Main Database is also the Email Database.\nDue to a technical error in the computer systems, there was a double registration of the email address of the complainant in the Email Database. This double entry error was detected and corrected immediately so as not to be repeated in the future. However, the duplicate address file remained in the E-mail Database, with the result while the first address file was deleted, the address file remained in the E-mail Database. Thus, when the complainants requested deletion from the E-mail Database using the delete / unsubscribe link, the request was recorded successfully in the Master Data Sheet, but the synchronization process failed to replace / delete the duplicate entry of the email address of the complainant in the E-mail Database. This is the reason why the complainant continued to receive emails about jobs offered by the company."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W214 2242817-1","text":"The data subject alleged a violation of Article 5 GDPR by the complainant and brought his complaint to the Data Protection Authority (Datenschutzbehörde - DSB). They claimed that the president of the complainant had discussed his person in confidential telephone calls with various offices. According to him, the information discussed was suitable to portray him negatively.\nThe complainant argued that the oral discussion at a general meeting was not subject to the material scope of Article 2 GDPR. Furthermore, it argued, that even in case of the application of the GDPR, Article 5 hat not been violated.\nThe DSB decided in favour of the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202309359","text":"On 22 May 2023, a data subject filed a complaint with the AEPD against Motorsport Network España (the controller). The complaint alleged that the controller’s webpage used a ‘pay or okay’ scheme in its cookie banner, requiring data subjects to either consent to cookies and use the page or free, or to subscribe for a fee in order to reject any cookies.\nIn its investigation, the AEPD noted that upon entering the webpage for the first time, the controller utilised non-technical cookies, which require consent under the ePrivacy Directive, without the prior consent of the user.\nAfter the cookies were already applied, the controller prompted data subjects with a cookie banner that provided two options in its first layers. First, the user could accept the cookies and use the webpage for free. In this case, the webpage continued to use the same cookies that it had utilised prior to the consent being prompted or given. Second, the user could select a box marked ‘Demonstrate the Options’, which brought users to a second banner that showed all cookie use marked as ‘off’ except for analytics cookies, which were marked as ‘on’. Additional details about each type of cookie could be obtained, but only in English. If a data subject wished to reject all of the cookies by clicking the ‘Confirm my preferences’ button (without manually adjusting any of the settings, including the default ‘on’ setting for analytics cookies), the webpage would continue using the cookies that it utilised prior to requesting consent. A new pop-up would then appear prompting data subjects to either become subscribers for a monthly fee and access the webpage without advertising, or to accept all of the cookies.\nThe AEPD also considered the options for users to withdraw consent. The controller provided such options in a ‘Manage Preferences’ link at the bottom of the webpage. Therein, data subjects could access the cookie control panel and manually switch each cookie from ‘on’ to ‘off’. Nonetheless, when they hit confirm preferences, they were faced with the same option to either accept all cookies or to begin a paid subscription.\nOn 18 December 2023, the AEPD initiated sanctioning proceedings against the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Dante International SA (eMAG) - no 3","text":"The controller, Dante International SA, owns the biggest online retailer in Romania (eMAG) and has websites available in three different languages: Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian.\nThe controller received three different data subject requests regarding their Hungarian website:\nFirstly, an account deletion: the request was sent to the controller's generic email address. In response, the controller asked the data subject to send their request dated and signed on paper and then scanned or photographed via email.\nSecondly, data erasure: the data subject sent their request to 3 different email addresses and via an online contact form. However, all of the requests were automatically rejected as a third party email security provider considered them as coming from an unsafe domain.\nThirdly, data rectification: a data subject requested to have their email address updated. Even if their request was initially confirmed by the controller, the data subject still received communications to its former email address.\nThe three data subjects filed complaints with the Hungarian Data Protection Authority which referred them to the Romanian Authority in its quality of lead supervisory authority according to Article 60 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-431-0048","text":"In October 2019, the Danish DPA (Datatilsynet) was notified by a number of municipalities regarding the system \"Schultz Expose\", operated by the company JH Schultz Information A/S. The purpose of the system is to provide management information to the job centers in the municipalities, which on the basis of the information can make decisions concerning the municipality's operations on a database basis.\nDuring a system update, a security component that was supposed to ensure that only the relevant information was available to users with access to the system was temporarily disabled. As the update - due to a process that could not be completed - did not proceed as expected, the security component was not reactivated as scheduled.\nAs a result of the error, it was possible for unauthorized employees in the municipalities to access employment-related information about approx. 1,5 million citizens from other municipalities.\nThe company has stated that access to the system occurred through a login with personal certificates, and that access to the system is logged. Thus, the processor was able to establish that three named employees in three municipalities accessed the system during the period when the security component was deactivated. Furthermore, in two of the three cases, data sets were retrieved containing information about citizens who did not belong to the municipality in question.\nTypes of personal data unlawfully accessed:\n  * gender, age and citizenship\n  * information about unemployment benefits, job clarification and similar, as well as corresponding target groups (unemployment benefit recipient, cash benefit recipient, etc.)\n  * job status: fully/partially unemployed\n  * work type: flex jobs, company internships, ordinary jobs, etc.\n  * place of work: the individual companies or organizations that are responsible for a given activity/job\n  * number of calls, type and time\n  * number of absences, exemptions and durations of these in connection with activities"}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 12/2022","text":"An online course teacher of foreign languages in a private school filed a complaint against the Greek DPA (Hellenic Data Protection Authority - HDPA), because the school's director was constantly monitoring her lessons by attending and intervening in the Zoom calls where the sessions were taking place.\nThe teacher stated that the employer’s presence in her online lessons via Zoom made it difficult for her to express herself and to perform, and that she felt that her freedom of speech and her status as a teacher were being infringed. The teacher also claimed that not only had she not consented to this monitoring, but in fact had expressly objected to it on numerous occasions. Furthermore, the teacher claimed that she was never was informed by employer of the type of personal data collected in the process of monitoring her lessons, the purpose of the processing in question, who had access to those data, and her right of access to the data concerning her. Finally, she claimed that the purposes of continuous monitoring relied on by the employer, namely to ensure the quality of the courses, the actual attendance of pupils, and the technical functioning of the platform, could have been achieved by less intrusive means, and that therefore the principle of proportionality was not respected in the contested processing.\nThe employer on the other hand, justified the continuous monitoring of the online course in order to ensure the satisfaction of the school's customers (in particular the parents of the underage pupils), and for reasons regarding the technical functionality of the courses. The employer also stated that the monitoring activity did not include any recording of the sessions. Additionally, the employer stated that the employee was aware of the Privacy Policy related to the tutorials, and that the consent form provided to all employees for the monitoring of the lessons was not signed due to the employee’s own negligence."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W258 2247028-1","text":"The controller is an employer who allegedly surveilled its employees work phones and work email accounts from January until March 2021. The DSB (Austrian Data Protection Authority) heard of this conduct in media reports and initiated an ex officio investigation into the matter on 31 March 2021. On 29 July 2021 the DSB adopted an administrative act in which it declared the processing of the controller unlawful.\nThe controller initiated court proceedings against the act claiming that its conduct was lawful and that the DSB - neither under national law nor under the GDPR - had the power to declare the processing unlawful. It argued that Article 58(2) GDPR does not provide a DPA with such a power, because \"declaring the unlawfulness\" is not listed there. Moreover, § 24 DSG (Austrian Data Protection Act) which provides the DPA with the power to make such a declaration only applies to proceedings which were initiated by a complaint and not by the DSB itself."}
{"_id":"facts_Hoge Raad - 20/02950","text":"Controller Google and data subject is a plastic surgeon who had been conditionally suspended in 2016 for a lack of aftercare after an operation. Because Google then displayed search results that linked to articles about the data subject and their conditional suspension, the data subject requested Google to delete the search results pursuant to Article 17 GDPR. After Google rejected this request, the data subject brought the issue before Court, which upheld data subject’s claim. After Google appealed to this judgement, however, the Court of Appeal annulled the Court of First Instance’s judgement. According to the Court of Appeal, the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information of Google and of third parties, namely information providers and the general public, outweighed the right to privacy and personal data protection of the data subject.\nThe data subject, however, argued that their request must be assessed on the basis of Article 10 GDPR. Moreover, the data subject also stated that they were wrongly ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings in both instances. According to the data subject, it follows from Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 79 GDPR, that they should not be ordered to pay those costs if their challenge is unsuccessful. Hence, the data subject then appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00421/2020","text":"The client of a financial institution lodged a complaint before the Spanish DPA (AEPD) due to the delivery of a mail for commercial purposes, even though he had expressly rejected the delivery of commercial communications and promotional offers.\n\nDispute\nAre the electronic communication sent by a financial entity to its clients to be considered as necessary for contract fulfilment or do they have commercial purposes (and thus would breach the principle of Article 21(1) of the Spanish Information Society Services Act (LSSI) regarding the delivery of electronic commercial communications to data subjects without prior authorization)?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - KG ZA 23-440","text":"In 2018, the data subject secured a loan from ING bank (the controller). Following this, several unauthorized activities occurred on his checking account, and the controller subsequently placed registrations with respect to the data subject in the Dutch Central Credit Information System (CKI). These registrations contained payment behaviour data, among other things the fact that for a certain period, the data subject was unable to fulfill their payment obligations set out with the controller. The data subject objected the CKI registrations on the basis of Article 21 GDPR, explaining that it had an impact on a loan he was taking out for a new house. The controller denied the request and further considered it as inadmissible under national provisions."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01627","text":"In December 2019, the Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) was contacted by the National Criminal Investigation Service regarding a tip they had received about a webcam livestreame from a town's city centre, and consequently launched an investigation.\nThe company (Dragefossen AS, the controller) had installed a camera on the roof of the building they were located in. The camera rotated 360 degrees in the span of two minutes, but due to the setup, only about 270 degrees was in practice captured. A public road, the parking lot and entrance to several shops, a liquor store, bank, the town hall and several other buildings were recorded.\nFootage was then livestreamed to their YouTube channel, which had 1090 subscribers on 26 May 2020 and 1530 subscribers on 1 October 2020. The DPA noted that they did not know how many in total had viewed the livestream, which had started on 19 August 2019, but that a prior livestream sent on 28 January 2019 had received 13,000 views during 140 days.\nRecordings were saved on a dedicated server for 14 days before deleted, and had been shared with the police on several occasions in relation to events in the city centre.\nThe controller had informed about the webcam on their Facebook page and claimed that it was setup as a service to the town's inhabitants. They claimed that due to the low quality and distance of the recording, number plates or faces would not be recognisable."}
{"_id":"facts_OLG Stuttgart - 2 U 63/22","text":"On May 2021, Dansk Retursystem sent to the data subject an advertising letter advertising products from X. Lebensversicherung AG. As a result, the data subject demanded information from the controller and the deletion of his data.\nThe controller replied that it had received the data from the company AD from Switzerland and processed it on behalf of X. Lebensversicherung AG for marketing purposes on the basis of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, without transmitting the data to the data subject himself.\nThe data subject claimed for non-material damages pursuant to Article 82 GDPR in the amount of EUR 3,000.00, as well as pre-trial legal costs, for violation of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, affirming that he did not consent to such processing of his personal data and there was no customer relationship with the defendant or its business partners.\nThe Court dismissed the claim, recognizing that advertising can be a legitimate interest within the controller's business. Also, the data subject's interests do not outweigh the interests of the controller. In addition, they highlighted that having a customer relationship before the direct advertising it is not a requirement.\nUnsatisfied, the data subject appealed, requesting a compensation for his non-material damage in the amount of €3,000.00 and the reimbursement of the appeal in the amount of €603.93."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Island) - 2020122992","text":"In December 2020, the DPA received a complaint by the complainant that their authorisation had been invoked by Netgíró ehf. (the controller) due to credit rating information given by Creditinfo Lánstrausts without prior to informing the claimant i.e. data subject of data transmission.\nThe data subject argued that to gain access to Creditinfo's information about themself, they had to agree to the company's use of certain additional information from its debt position system when calculating their credit rating. Additionally, Creditinfo allegedly used incorrect information from the debt position system in the calculation, as the IL fund communicated information to the system about the complainant's debt to the fund even though they had already paid the debt in question.\nNetgíró ehf. have been prohibited from using information about Creditinfo's credit rating, which has been incorrectly calculated, and that the company is obliged to notify the borrower (this case the complainant) in advance when it intends to cancel the borrower's authorization due to changes in Creditinfo's credit rating.\nThe defendants in this case argued that the data subject had in fact been notified and reminded that they can withdraw their consent at any point and that Creditinfo was considered a processor in the debt position system."}
{"_id":"facts_LG Baden-Baden - 3 O 277/22","text":"The controller run some websites that make use of Google tools. When users interacted with such tools their personal data were transferred to the US, allegedly in violation of the GDPR. The data subject visited some of these websites via web crawling and claimed damages for data protection violations. The controller considered the data subject's request unfounded and brought an action for injunctive relief before the Regional Court of Baden-Baden. The controller asked the court to order the data subject to refrain from further warnings and requests, as the data subject had no right to compensation under the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W256 2226003-1/5E","text":"A data subject made an appeal to the Federal Administrative Court concerning a decision of the Austria Data Protection authority. The authority had dismissed the data subject`s complaint about a violation of the right to rectification as unfounded. The data subject had applied for the correction of data in a legal notice (Bescheid), which was in connection with investigative actions relating to the data subject's claims for compensation under the Police Powers Compensation Act (PolBEG)."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9867661","text":"In 2014, two Italian media outlets - \"Il Sole 24 Ore\" and \"Società Editoriale il Fatto\" (the controllers) - published online two articles regarding a judicial dispute where the data subject was involved. The data subject's name appeared in the publications and thus it became a keyword for searches on external search engines.\nMonths later, the competent Italian court found that the data subject was in no meaningful relationship with the facts at issue in the judicial proceeding. After the judgment, the data subject contacted the two publishers asking for the erasure of the articles from their online pages because the information violated the data subject's right to be forgotten under Article 17 GDPR. The data subject considered the publications outdated and deceptive.\nNevertheless, instead of erasing the articles, the controllers updated them by including the final judicial decision."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Decision of 2 December 2022","text":"A company (the controller) had informed a number of its customers via e-mail that a former employee (the data subject) had committed criminal offences during their employment period and, as a result, had been dismissed. The data subject then issued a complaint with the Danish DPA alleging that the controller had passed on said information to a number of the company's customers without any due reason."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202100165/1/A3","text":"The controller is the Municipal Executive of Bladel (an administrative body). The data subject is a dog trader (and her partner).\nIn 2013, the police started an investigation to combat malicious dog trading. The data subjects were included in a report that was drawn up regarding this investigation. The investigation resulted in an enforcement action in 2016. The data subjects started administrative and civil proceedings on the (lawfulness of the) enforcement action.\nIn March 2018, the data subjects submitted a request for erasure at the controller, concerning their personal data laid down in said report. The controller denied this request by decision of October 2018. The data subjects appealed this decision up until the Administrative Division of the Council of State. The Division found that the controller's decision lacked substantive reasoning and ordered it to issue a new one.\nThe controller denied the data subjects request again by decision of November 2020. It held that retention of the personal data was necessary pursuant to Article 17(3)(e) AVG, to substantiate it's defense in the civil proceedings started by the data subjects.\nThe data subject appealed this decision, stating that the controller cannot invoke the exception of Article 17(3)(e). She argued that the Article specifically refers to the establishment, exercise or substantiation of a legal claim, however it does not include the defense against one."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 6/2024","text":"The data subject was called on the phone by his employer (\"controller\") during their regular leave. The controller used the data from the geolocation system installed in the company car because the data subject did not answer their phone calls for 3 times. The controller declared that they were concerned for the employee's health due to a previous accident.\nThe data subject lodged a complaint with the Hellenic DPA (\"HDPA\") considering that this processing was illegal and that he was not given clear information regarding the use of this geolocation data.\nThe controller argued that the use of the car had been granted to the data subject for meeting official needs and only within working hours. The controller brought to the attention of the DPA the actions it took after the incident was reported, in order to exclude any possible future misuse of the tracking systems in question. These actions included the installation of new geolocation systems, with the ability to be disabled by users, the designation of a responsible operator, the updating of the user instructions and the drafting of new installation and operation notification documents."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 31/2025","text":"The data subjects made an access request to the controller, an association for persons with autism spectrum disorders ‘H Ασπίδα του Δαυίδ’, regarding personal data of their minor child who was being treated there. They specifically asked for CCTV footage from the controller’s premises on certain dates, in order to find out how certain marks on their child's head and hands were caused.\nThe controller did not reply to the data subjects’ access request.\nThe data subject’ lodged a complaint before the DPA against the controller's failure to satisfy their access request. They also claimed that the controller unlawfully transferred their child’s health data to a third company for external evaluation of the child's existing intervention program, without their prior notification and consent.\nThe controller claimed that it could not provide the CCTV footage because some of its employees appear on it, which refused the disclosure of the footage to the data subjects. Therefore, it must respect its employees privacy rights. The controller also insisted that in any case the recordings were automatically deleted from the system after 48 hours. Regarding the transfers of personal data, it responded that the data subjects should address the matter to the third company.\nThe DPA informed the controller that unless it demonstrated that in the specific case the rights or freedoms of its employees concerned were in fact affected, it had to satisfy the right of access by providing data subjects with the requested parts of the footage.\nThe controller still refused to comply with the DPA’s instructions."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Condor SA","text":"A data subject filed a claim before the Romanian DPA (ANSPDCP) against Condor SA, a parachute and military flight equipment manufacturer, claiming that it had disclosed the personal data (including data on salaries) of its current and former employees to an unauthorised person."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Den Haag - SGR 23/6174","text":"Due to a bankruptcy the data subject was represented by a bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy was lifted on 7 July 2022, ending the trustee’s authorization to represent the data subject. However, on 19 July 2022, an employee of a Dutch bank, ABN AMRO Bank (the controller), shared the data subject’s personal data with the former bankruptcy trustee of the data subject on the phone.\nThe data subject lodged a complaint with the Dutch DPA (“Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens) for an unreported data breach by the controller (i.e. sharing his personal data with his former bankruptcy trustee).\nThe controller admitted to the DPA that the bankruptcy trustee of the data subject should only have been informed that they were no longer appointed due to the discharge from bankruptcy of the data subject, and that therefore information of the data subject would not be shared anymore with them.\nThe DPA interpreted the data subject's complaint as not directly referring to the data breach, but to the unlawful processing of sensitive personal data. To determine whether unlawful processing took place, further investigation would have been required. However, in this case, the DPA refrained from conducting further investigation.\nThe DPA explained why it was not investigating the data subject’s complaint, referring to the criteria on their website. On their website the DPA states that to be efficient and effective, they have to make choices and therefore use the following criteria to determine whether the complaint qualifies for further investigation: the complaint is about a violation that is still ongoing, has a broader societal interest, there are no other proceedings pending, the complaint is specifically about a GDPR issue, and the subject of the complaint has not previously been investigated by the DPA.\nTaking into account the data subject's complaint, the DPA held that the alleged violation did not last long and the phone call took place quite some time ago. There was also no broader social significance and only the data subject was affected and the subject of the complaint did not fall within any of the DPA’s central themes of 2024. Lastly, the DPA held that the dispute between the data subject and the former bankruptcy trustee was not primarily a GDPR violation.\nThe data subject appealed the DPA’s decision to not further investigate at the District Court of The Hague (“Rechtbank Den Haag”).\nThe DPA argued that further investigation was not needed to establish wrongdoing. The controller’s sharing of the data subject’s personal data with the former bankruptcy trustee was unlawful. However, the DPA stated that the controller acknowledged the violation and mistakenly did not report the breach to the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100764","text":"The data subject claims that the Community/condominium, to which he belongs, has posted on a bulletin board, located in a common area (at the entrance of the doorway next to the elevator), a judgement in which his personal data (name, address and information about the judicial process) appears.\nExposure of the document allegedly took place since May 17, 2021 without, at the date of the complaint (July 26, 2021) having being deleted or anonymized despite the clear warning on the document itself for non-dissemination to non-interested parties without prior dissociation of personal data: \"it will be contrary to the Law to disseminate non-anonymized Judicial documents that have not been anonymized\".\nAdditionally, on November 24, 2017 the data subject had already filed a complaint against the Community before the AEPD for facts of identical nature. This was processed under procedure A/00001/2018 with a warning result (R/00601/2018) for infringement and a requirement to remove the information improperly exposed.\nThe Community alleged that on October 13, 2021 it proceeded with the withdrawal of the document exhibited on the notice board."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 103/2021","text":"A data subject (the Complainant) requested a search engine provider to erase one or more links to web pages where his name was appearing. The search engine provider rejected the erasure request of the Complainant. The Complainant therefore filed a complaint with the Belgian DPA, but then decided to withdraw his complaint before the Belgian DPA had come to any conclusion."}
{"_id":"facts_UODO (Poland) - ZSZZS.440.768.2018","text":"Primary school in school Gdańsk processed special categories of personal data (biometric data) of 680 children when they used the school canteen after receiving their parents' consent. The solution has been in place since 1 April 2015. The parents get informed via the canteen's website. Children whose parents have consented get their meals with priority. Two people, the system administrator and the authorising officer, have access to the database. The server is protected against unauthorized access with a password.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Kaufland Romania SCS","text":"A data subject made an access request asking to receive a copy of the video recordings from when they visited a Kaufland supermarket.\nKaufland refused to offer all the existent footage that included the data subject, arguing that disclosing such material would affect the rights and freedoms of the other individuals who were also captured in that video footage."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00446/2021","text":"On 20 May 2021, a Spanish natural person (the data subject), filed a complaint to the AEPD because of the video surveillance system installed by its neighbour (the controller). The surveillance system of the controller entailed a set of four cameras that, according to the data subject, covered part of the public road and went beyond what could be considered adequate for the surveillance of the property. Accordingly, this would constitute a breach of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-008","text":"On 13th November 2018, the French DPA (CNIL) carried out an inspection at the Brico Privé's premises, a DIY company, to inspect the company's data retention periods, the information it provides to data subjects, its compliance with requests for the deletion of personal data, data security, and compliance with the obligation to obtain data subject consent to receive commercial prospecting by e-mail.\nIn order to complete its investigations, the CNIL carried out an online inspection of all processing accessible from the bricoprive.com domain on 6 February 2020.\nOn 13 January 2021, as the company indicated that changes had been made to the methods of depositing cookies, a delegation from the CNIL carried out a new investigation of any processing accessible from the bricoprive.com domain in order to update the findings made on 6 February 2020."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9746047","text":"The Municipal Police of the Municipality of Florence informed the Italian DPA that Private club Ruian had video surveillance system in place with two external cameras oriented towards the sidewalk and street in front of the club, lacking an appropriate information sign."}
{"_id":"facts_CNPD (Luxembourg) - 10FR/2023","text":"Following a general check carried on all Luxembourg municipalities in the summer of 2022, the Luxembourg DPA decided to open an investigation on the Municipal Administration of Leudelange (the controller).\nSpecifically, the controller aimed to evaluate the controller’s conformity with its obligation to appoint a DPO and whether it communicated the DPO's contact details to the DPA, as provided by Article 37(1)(a) GDPR and Article 37(7) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Valoris Center S.R.L.","text":"The controller is a bank that, inter alia, provides internet banking services. The processor is Valoris Center S.R.L., a company that provides call center services on behalf of the bank. In their communication with a customer of the bank, an employee of Valoris had, by mistake, attached an excel file containing personal data of the controller’s customers who used the internet banking service. Hence, pursuant to Article 33 GDPR, the controller notified the Romanian DPA of a personal data breach.\nIn the course of the investigation, the DPA found that this breach led to the unauthorised disclosure and access to personal data. The excel file contained e-mail addresses, user names, user ID’s, telephone numbers, customer names, customer codes, customer PIN’s, of the bank’s customers. In total, 11,169 natural persons were affected by the incident."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00198/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of a sanction procedure started by the AEPD against the defendant due to a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that, since 2015, the defendant (i) not only has used the phone number of the claimant to train its employees, but also (ii) it has unauthorizedly accessed his/her client profile and (iii) has sent him/her a big amount of SMS and even made 534 phone calls from number 1002. The claimant attached the SMS and phone calls as evidence of his/her claim.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the AEPD investigation requests stating that, in June 2020, it sent an email to the claimant informing that new measures have been taken in order to block the calling phone number (1002); it also stated that it has checked the detail of the SMS provided by the claimant as an evidence and, although some measures have been already taken in order to avoid such situation, those measures have been strengthened. The defendant also declared that it has included technical measures in order to prevent commercial agents and any business area to manually call the claimant; between such measures, the defendant included an information message (\"This phone number is related to a real client, so any unlawful use is forbidden\"). The AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202000948/1/A3","text":"The Council of Mayor and Aldermen of Uithoorn (which exercises the executive power of the municipal government) rejected the request of appellant to erase his personal data. He attached a certified copy of his passport to this request, but it was deemed insufficient to establish the applicant's identity properly and irrefutably. The Council of Mayor and Aldermen of Uithoorn requested the appellant to visit the town hall in person. Subsequently, the appellant requested that a DigiD link be e-mailed to enable him to identify himself, but such identification via DigiD was not yet possible at the municipality.\nBy decision of 10 February 2020, the District Court of Amsterdam dismissed the appellant’s appeal against that decision as unfounded. The Court ruled that the Council of Mayor and Aldermen of Uithoorn could reasonably request the appellant to come and identify himself personally at the town hall, in order to prevent fraud. Such requirement was not deemed disproportionate, considering the irreversibility of the erasure of data and the importance of proper identification in this respect.\nThe appellant lodged an appeal against this decision.\n\nDispute\nDoes the presentation of a copy of a passport provide sufficient information to verify the data subject's identity?"}
{"_id":"facts_CE - 451423","text":"The French DPA had received a complaint on 28 May 2018 regarding the lawfulness of processing by Amazon Europe Core ('Provider' or 'The company'). The French DPA had forwarded this complaint to the Luxembourg DPA under the 'one stop shop' mechanism of Article 56 GDPR. The luxembourg DPA started an investigation regarding Amazon's use of cookies and its compliance with the GDPR and the ePrivacy directive. However, the French DPA started its own investigation into Amazon's compliance with Article 82 of the French Data protection act, a national implementation of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive. (directive 2002/58/EC). This investigation regarding Article 82 had resulted in decision SAN-2020-013. In this decision, the French DPA fined Amazon €35,000,000 for the failure to obtain prior consent and the failure to inform users of their rights with regards to the processing of their data, which was mandatory under Article 82 of the Data Protection Act. The DPA found that when a user visited the \"Amazon.fr\" site, a large number of cookies with advertising purposes were automatically placed on the data subjects computer. Because this type of cookie was not essential to the service provided by the controller, the DPA considered that the controller had not complied with the obligation to obtain the consent of Internet users before depositing the cookies.\nAmazon appealed this decision at the Conseil d'Etat, the French Supreme Administrative Court, and requested its annulment. Amazon also asked the Conseil to refer several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.\nAmong other arguments, Amazon claimed that the French DPA had made an incorrect interpretation of the law regarding its competence and had disregarded its competence by imposing the contested sanction. The controller also stated that the involvement of the French DPA, when the Luxembourg DPA was already involved, constituted a violation of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to this article, the same person may not be prosecuted more than once for the same acts."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant - 10072897 AZ VERZ 22-61","text":"Chetu Inc (the controller) is a Florida based company that has a branch in the Netherlands. It develops, produces and publishes software and provides consultancy and support for information technology. The data subject worked for the controller since 14 January 2019. The data subject signed a statement stating that his employment was “at-will employment”, meaning that the company may terminate the employment relationship without cause or previous notice, at any time.\nOn 23 August 2022, the data subject received an e-mail from the controller announcing his attendance for the Corrective Action Program (CAP)-virtual classroom where he had to be logged in during the entire work day, to share his screen and leave his camera on. On 25 August 2022 the data subject responded, stating he was uncomfortable being monitored 9 hours a day by camera, and that it was an invasion of his privacy, as he already has his activities on his laptop and his screen being monitored. After two more warnings for the data subject to his camera on, the controller sent an e-mail the same evening, stating that the data subject’s employment is terminated with the reason being: “Refusal to work, Insubordination.”."}
{"_id":"facts_DPC (Ireland) - WhatsApp Ireland Limited - IN-18-12-2","text":"This DPC decision is the result of an own-volition inquiry pursuant to section 110 Data Protection Act 2018. It was prompted by various complaints sent by individual data subjects as well as a mutual assistance request from the German Federal Data Protection Authority concerning WhatsApp’s transparency obligations following the entry into force of the GDPR in May 2018.\nThe inquiry focused on:\n 1. WhatsApp’s transparency obligations in the context of non-users under Articles 14 and 12(1) GDPR\n 2. WhatsApp’s transparency obligations in the context of users under Articles 13 and 12(1) GDPR.\n 3. WhatsApp’s transparency obligations in the context of its relationship with other Facebook Companies and any sharing of user data in the context of that relationship.\nFollowing an investigation lasting from December 2018 to December 2020, the DPC submitted a composite draft decision to other DPAs in accordance with Article 60 GDPR. On 24 December 2020, it referred the objections to the EDPB, as required by the Article 65(1)(a) dispute resolution mechanism. The EDPB then adopted its binding Article 65 GDPR decision on July 28 2021.\nConsequently, the DPC amended its draft to take into account the EDPB’s determination of the various objections from the other DPAs which it deemed to be “relevant and reasoned” for the purpose of Article 4(24) of the GDPR. Notably, it required the DPC to find that WhatsApp failed to comply with the key principle of transparency set out in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, a matter it had not originally assessed."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W211 2225136-1","text":"In 2010, the data subject had been subject to insolvency proceedings. In 2012, he was ordered to repay 70% of his open debts and managed to fulfil this payment plan by mid-March 2018. The competent court consequently accepted his request to remove information on the insolvency from the public insolvency register (Insolvenzdatei).\nThis publicly available information of the data subject's insolvency had also been stored in the database of the credit reference agency KSV 1870 Information GmbH. The data subject is also the sole managing director of a limited company. The database entry on his insolvency has also been linked with the data stored on this company.\nThe data subject requested the erasure of the data on his insolvency under Article 17 and 21 GDPR, stating that he has paid back his debts in line with the payment plan and that data on his insolvency are no longer published in the insolvency register.\nAfter KSV 1870 Information GmbH refused to delete the data, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Austrian DPA (Datenschutzbehörde - DSB). The DSB rejected the complaint and the data subject filed an appeal with the Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG).\n\nDispute\nIs a credit reference agency such as KSV 1870 Information GmbH allowed to store data on the insoleveny of an individual beyond the availability of that data in the official insolveny register? If so, for how long?"}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W258 2217446-1","text":"Facts pertaining to the case\nThe Austrian Postal Service (Österreichische Post AG) had been selling data on natural person's party \"affinity for a political party\" to their customers. In light of broad media coverage on this topic the Austrian Data Protection Authority (Datenschutzbehörde - DSB) started an ex-officio investigation against the Austrian Postal Service. The DSB investigated i.a the records of processing activities and the data protection impact assessment of the Austrian Postal Service. Further, it investigated records that must be maintained under § 151 Trade Regulations Act (Gewerbeordnung 1994 - GewO).\n\nDecisions by the Austrian Data Protection Authority\nWith its decision dated 22.01.2019, the DSB\n 1. held that the Austrian Postal Service had processed personal data on the \"affinity for a political party\" without a legal basis, as these data qualify as special categories of personal data under Article 9(1) GDPR. Their processing would require the data subjects' explicit consent under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR and § 151(4) GewO,\n 2. ordered the Austrian Postal Service to stop the processing of these data effective immediately and to erase such data within a period of two weeks (unless a derogation under Article 17(3) GDPR was applicable),\n 3. held that the Austrian Postal Service had failed to carry out a data protection impact assessment prior to 25.05.2018,\n 4. held that this data protection impact assessment was incorrect because it did not take into account that data on the \"affinity for a political party\" qualify as special categories of personal data,\n 5. held that the records of processing activities maintained by the Austrian Postal Service was incorrect, because it did not take into account that data on the\"affinity for a political party\" qualify as special categories of personal data\n 6. ordered the Austrian Postal Service to carry out a new, correct data protection impact assessment regarding the processing on data on the \"affinity for a political party\".\n\nAppeal by the Austrian Postal Service\nOn 11.03.2019 the Austrian Postal Service filed an appeal against the DSB's decision with the Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG), claiming incorrect legal evaluation of the case by the DSB. The Austrian Postal Service argued\n  * that data on the \"affinity for a political party\" do not qualify as personal data as they only express a probability.\n  * these data could not be rectified under Article 16 GDPR and therefore would not qualify as personal data,\n  * these data would qualify as \"marketing information and classifications\" under § 151(6) GewO which would not be considered as personal data by the Austrian legislator and\n  * even if these data were to be qualified as personal data they would not qualify as special categories of personal data.\n\nDispute\n  * Do data on a natural person's (presumed) \"affinity for a political party\" qualify as personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR?\n  * If so, do they also qualify as special categories of personal data?\n  * Did the Austrian Postal Service process these data unlawfully?\n  * Did the Austrian Postal Service violate Article 30 GDPR by not considering data on the \"affinity for a political party\" as special categories of personal data?\n  * Did the Austrian Postal Service violate Article 35 GPPR by not carrying out a data protection impact assessment prior to 25.05.2018 and by not considering data on the \"affinity for a political party\" as special categories of personal data?\n  *"}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9938413","text":"On 27 August 2020, the complainants, two spouses, brought a complaint to the Italian DPA regarding the publication on the website of an Italian Bar Association (data controller) about certain hearing postponements. According to the complainants, the website of the data controller presented information on hearings of criminal proceedings where the complainants appeared as defendants. This document, which was not anonymised, could also be found and downloaded following a search of their names through the Google search engine.\nIn a follow-up on 22 September 2020, the complainants provided updates on the matter, informing the DPA that although the document was removed from the website, it still remained indexed on Google and that other non-anonymised documents remained on the web. The complainants argued that the publication of such information had resulted in prejudice against them and damages. For example, they were denied from renting a property because the owner stated to not rent property to convicted criminals.\nFollowing the complaint, the DPA requested the data controller for further information. The data controller issued a response saying that from a procedural point of view, as certain hearings are held in public, the publication of the relevant documents on the website was legitimate. Moreover, these documents were also always posted uncensored on the doors of the Courtrooms and on the notice boards of the Palace of Justice. They further clarified that the lack of information regarding the complainants’ place and date of birth and the tax code prevented their identification.\nWith regard to the request relating to the anonymisation of the documents in question, the controller stated that it had promptly taken action, when requested by the complainants, to remove the documents from their website. However, they could not take them down from the web portals of other bodies, such as that of the local Court.\nFollowing the statement, the DPA began its proceeding."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100897","text":"The data subject submitted a complaint against a training academy (the controller) for unlawfully publishing their personal data on a website. The publication contained results of a selection process in which the data subject participated. Specifically, the document contained a list with names, last names, anonymised ID numbers and categories assigned to participants. The list allowed the identification of health data relating to disabilities.\nIn addition, the list corresponded with the provisional publication of results by the Galician Health Services (SERGAS), the authority competent for the examination and selection of candidates. Both lists were different, thus the controller made a re-work of the official list by selecting some candidates, grouping them by categories, breaking down their marks (studies, work experience, other activities) and assigning them a position according to their total score.\nThe Spanish DPA started a sanctioning proceeding against the controller due to an alleged violation of Article 6(1) GDPR for the lack of legal basis for processing of personal data, including special categories of personal data. Furthermore, the publication allegedly did not include the mandatory information regarding the origin of the data nor the right to object.\nIn response, the controller argued that the legal basis was legitimate interest since the academy offered training courses and the publication showed the participants, in a clear way, the position obtained. The controller stated that it was not processing carried out in the context of their usual activity since it was done only once, in relation with that specific selection process. Another argument was that the information had been made public by SERGAS and that candidates who participated in the public selection process expected their data to be published due to transparency obligations."}
{"_id":"facts_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH/2020/2729/15","text":"A construction company had installed a video surveillance system on a construction site to protect the property and the physical integrity of employees. However, cameras partially captured a social room and activities of the employees. They had not been sufficiently informed about that while signing a contract, having knowledge only about the video system monitoring the property.\n\nDispute\nIs a video surveillance system that partially captures activities of employees without their knowledge compliant with Article 5 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Energy Suite Limited","text":"Energy Suite is a company marketing \"boiler, heating, insulation, glazing and other energy-saving grants to homes under government-funded schemes.\" Between 1 March and 13 November 2020, Energy Suite connected at least 1,246 calls to subscribers whose numbers were listed on the TPS (Telephone Preference Service Ltd) register. Three complaints were made against Energy Suit during this period as it called people who had not given their no-objection to receive marketing calls.\nBefore the ICO, Energy Suite claimed that it had purchased \"details of 11,005 live, validated landlines and 88,995 live HLR-checked mobiles\" from third parties, without conducting any in-house checks."}
{"_id":"facts_CE - 449212","text":"On December, 7 2020, the French DPA imposed a financial penalty of 60 Million euros fine against Google LLC and a 40 million euros against Google Ireland Limited in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and ePrivacy Directive, for lack of transparency, inadequate information and lack of valid consent regarding for violating the regulation on cookies while operating the website google.fr.\nThe sanction was accompanied by an order to comply with article 82 of the French Law on data protection (Law Informatique et Libertés), under three months on penalty of a €100000 fine per day of delay.\nThe companies appealed to the Conseil d’État in interim procedure against the CNIL's decision, arguing that the French DPA was not the competent authority because it was not the lead supervisory authority for Google LLC or Google Ireland Limited.\n\nDispute\nIs the CNIL territorially competent to investigate and sanction a company for violating the information principle when depositing cookies if it is not the lead supervisory authority of the company? The CNIL considered that Google does have EU headquarters in Ireland, but that this Irish entity ‘did not have a decision making power’ in relation to the relevant cross-border data processing activities to which the complaints related. For that reason the CNIL decided that the One Stop Shop mechanism did not apply and that the CNIL, like any other European supervisory authority, was therefore competent to make a decision."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 65/2022","text":"In this case an individual, the data subject, who had taken part in a phone call with a polling company, the controller, submitted an access request (Article 15 GDPR) to obtain a copy of the recorded conversation. The company did not respond to her request and, subsequently, she filed a complaint with the Greek DPA.\nWhen asked to provide submissions to the DPA, the controller responded to the complaint by stating, firstly, that it is not a commercial sales company and therefore does not record conversations or collect personal data in any way. Secondly, they explained that they have a three-month period for which they keep personal data on their files and so, had there been any collection of the data as suggested, it would have been deleted. The company also speculated that the subject’s access request (submitted via email) probably ended up in a “pile of unwanted corporate correspondence”."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-431-0031","text":"Controller is the Conservative People's Party. They had sent letters to a certain number of households in connection with an election campaign. The names and addresses of the recipients had been obtained from information that was publicly available, and information about voting habits in different areas had been gathered through statistical analyses. The letters, however, did not contain the information as listed in Article 14(1) and Article 14(2) GDPR. Instead, the controller had published an page on its website, on which they had provided this information.\nAfter having been notified by multiple data subjects, the Danish DPA decided to investigate the Conservative People's Party's actions, and whether they were in accordance with the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_CPDP (Bulgaria) - PSPN-01-243.2021","text":"A journalist (Controller 1) published images of a data subject’s medical diploma and criminal record. Controller 1’s post claimed that the data subject’s diploma was not legitimate and that his convictions should be shared on Facebook. The documents contained personal data including the data subject’s names, PIN, date and place of birth, current address, parents’ names and father’s birth date.\nOn 3 October 2020, the data subject requested that Facebook remove the posts. The social network rejected the data subject’s requests to remove the post because the documents had not been provided by the data subject. The data subject subsequently filed a report with the district prosecutor’s office, which refused to initiate pre-trial proceedings. The data subject then filed a complaint with the Bulgarian DPA (CPDP).\nController 1 stated that they had previously received reports of abuse and mistreatment by the data subject from medical patients in the community. It claimed that a doctor from the same clinic as the data subject (Controller 2) sent them the information and documents about the data subject.\nIn the course of its investigation, the CPDP verified that Controller 2 had provided Controller 1 with the information. It also confirmed with the National Register of the Bulgarian Medical Association that the data subject was a registered doctor legitimately graduated in general medicine.\nController 1 argued that they had visual problems and as a result, did not realise the complete contents of the document or that the diploma contained personal data as their son, who is also their assistant, makes publications on Controller 1's behalf. They also argued that they had not actually posted the content for journalistic purposes and were merely sharing information they considered relevant to the public. The data subject rejected Controller 1's arguments, pointing out that they should have verified their claims with the Bulgarian Medical Association in any case. The data subject also argued that the publication's near 250 interactions made their data available to an unlimited number of people."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9949453","text":"Scionti Selezioni Superiori S.r.l. (the data controller) faced scrutiny following numerous complaints received by the Italian DPA in 2022. The complaints highlighted unauthorised phone calls promoting the \"Caffè Scionti\" brand, particularly targeting individuals registered in the Italian Public Opt-out Registry (RPO). The RPO is an Italian registry extended to all national phone numbers, which allows citizens to opt-out of unwanted telemarketing calls.\nFollowing the DPA's request of 22 November 2022 for information, the controller explained that the unauthorised phone calls happened due to random typing errors. In this regard, it explained that its development and turnover are based on word-of-mouth marketing of customers, as well as by carrying out telephone promotional activities 'in manual mode', which it admitted to have an average of 8 to 12 errors of typing monthly.\nIn early 2023, the DPA received more complaints related to unsolicited phone calls by the controller. Thus, on 24 February 2023, the DPA requested the controller to provide more information for a complete evaluation of its processing activities.\nThe controller confirmed that the database at its disposal for marketing purposes contained data obtained from third parties who, in turn, had been advertising the Scionti brand. But it also complained that its brand had been used by third parties without any authorisation and that it was unable to register to the RPO as an operator and therefore keep track of the existing objections to telemarketing."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - S.C. Marsorom S.R.L.","text":"The DPA conducted the investigation after being notified that on the website in question, some personal data of the website's customers were visible. If customers placed an order on the website, some of their personal data could be accessed without authorisation.\n\nDispute\nDid the website operator, in its role as data controller, take sufficient technical and organisational measures to protect the personal data of its customers? Furthermore, did the controller act in breach of the storage limitation principle?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - C/10/583910/KG ZA 19-1062","text":"The plaintiff asked from the Erasmus University Medical Centre Rotterdam (“EUMCR”) to provide her the DNA material of a person died in 2018 alleging that this person was her father. The deceased man had participated in a medical-scientific research at the EUMCR, prior to which he had filled in a “patient consent form”. According to this form, he expressed his wish that his body material would be treated confidentially. The EUMCR refused to provide the plaintiff the DNA material claiming that:\n  * there is no legal basis under which it is obliged to provide this material,\n  * the man’s wish had been expressed unambiguously, thus such a disclosure would contravene the GDPR and\n  * it is bound by professional secrecy.\n\nDispute\nThe Court had to balance the plaintiff’s right to personality which includes her right to know her parents and the right of the deceased man and his family to privacy which is here protected by the EUMCR’s duty of confidentiality."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00032/2020","text":"A user of the website of Iberia, an airline, lodged a complaint before the Spanish DPA (AEPD) saying that they had not been given an option to reject the cookies when using the website, and that they had been obliged to accept them to keep browsing.\nDuring the investigation, the AEPD also found that cookies were placed before obtaining consent. Additionally, they found that the information about cookies was incomplete and misleading."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202212247","text":"The data subject, a former employee of the controller, complained to the DPA against the controller’s practice of using scans of employees' faces to register entry and exit to the work place.\nThe data subject had advanced an access request under Article 15 GDPR, asking for specifications regarding the purpose and category of data processing. To the date of the complaint, they had received no answer to this request by the controller.\nThe DPA deemed it appropriate to start an investigation. The investigation revealed the following:\n  * the data subject was an employee of the controller.\n  * the controller received the data subject´s access request and confirmed that the procedure started. However, no further reply to the access request was given.\n  * the controller replied via fax (to an address that was not present in the data subject´s request) which lacked both floor number and door. The reply only contained a generic reference to the type of data, not the actual data, without mentioning facial recognition or biometric data, daily records of working hours.\n  * the data subject signed a consent form for the processing of their personal in the context of employment relationship. Moreover, under lawfulness, the payroll processing´s purpose is deemed to be the fulfillment of a legal obligation. The document does not contain any section to select affirmative consent, or to withhold it, nor any option to revoke consent, nor any invitation to consent, nor any invitation to accept a processing operation.\n  * a representative of the controller forced the data subject to sign in at the entrance to work with a facial recognition device, not providing any alternative means.\n  * the system used by the controller would use a 3D recognition system, and the biometric data would be subsequently stored in the software´s own database. Thus, the controller recorded the workers´ clocking in a database. Once identification has been made, information is sent to an access database confirming of the employee´s registration.\n  * the controller used this facial recognition system until 29.05.2023.\n  * the controller did not respond to the claims related to special categories of data, as per Article 9 GDPR, stating that it had already provided for a lot of information and that the data subject signed the consent form."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00098/2019","text":"A citizen had to give his personal details, as well as his daughter’s personal details when filling the official form aimed at authorizing underage children travelling (“travel permit”) provided by the Directorate-General of the Spanish Civil Guard. While completing the travel permit with the personal data required, the citizen noticed that no information was given regarding the collection of personal data, and the purposes of the processing, or about the recipients. The citizen – the complainant – filed a complaint with the AEPD claiming the unlawfulness due to the lack of information concerning personal data required, under Article 13 GDPR.\n\nDispute\nDoes the travel permit form provide for the mandatory information, as foreseen by Article 13 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - fine to Enel Energie Muntenia SA","text":"The energy company Enel Energie Muntenia SA was investigated after a notification sent by a customer to the DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.3.2021","text":"The DPA was notified of a data breach situation by an insurance brokerage company. The company played two roles in data processing. On the one hand, it was a data controller, and on the other hand, a processor acting for insurance companies.\nThe data breach involved emails containing identifying data being sent to the wrong recipients. The emails contained analyses of insurance needs and an insurance offer referencing name, surname, PESEL number, town, postal code and other information about the subject of insurance.\nThe insurance brokerage company, as the controller of the name and surname data, decided to report the breach of personal data protection to the Polish DPA. The company considered that the combination of this data, in conjunction with the data contained in the attached documents, could result in a breach resulting in a risk of infringement of an individual's rights or freedoms. The erroneously sent correspondence contained personal data contained in quotes and calculations from several insurance companies.\nInvestigation carried out by the Polish DPA revealed that in connection with the incident, several insurance companies, including data controllers, had notified them of the data breach. However, no such notification was received from Sopockie Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń ERGO Hestia S.A (“Company”).\nThe Company had conducted an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals resulting from the breach, based on which it concluded that it was not obliged to report the data breach to the DPA or to inform data subjects of the data breach."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-025","text":"Between March 2022 and October 2022, the French DPA (“CNIL”) carried out on-site inspections of TAGADAMEDIA (“controller”), as well as online inspections of their website. The CNIL discovered that the controller collected data (first name, surname, date of birth, postal address, e-mail address, phone number) from prospects through forms when offering them to participate in competitions or product testing on its website.\nThe controller used two forms to do so: before 2017, the controller used a single-button form – below the fields allowing data subjects to enter their details, there was a single “I VALIDATE” button with a green background and an arrow. Above the button, a text in a much smaller font stated that by clicking on the button, the user accepted that the data collected would be used to send offers from the controller’s partners and hyperlinks provided access to the data protection policy. The end of the text indicated that if the data subject wished to continue without receiving offers from the company’s partners, they could click on a link in the text (“I click here”), allowing the data subject to accept, or refuse that their personal data be sent to the controller’s partners.\nThe second form implemented from 2017 until the notification of the sanction report in 2023 was a two-button form with an “I VALIDATE” button written in white on a red background and an “I REFUSE” button written in black on a grey background, in a font smaller than the first button. Above these buttons, a text written in a font much smaller than that used for the buttons specified that by clicking on the \"I VALIDATE\" button, the user accepted that the data collected would be used to send offers from the company's partners.\nThe CNIL initiated a sanctioning procedure against the controller on 22 June 2023. During this procedure, the controller proposed a new form composed of an “I ACCEPT” button and a “NEXT STEP” button, both written in white on a red background and having a text in a much smaller font specifying that by clicking on the “I ACCEPT” button, the data subject accepted that the data would be used to send them offers from the controller’s partners, whereas the “NEXT STEP” button allowed them to continue without receiving offers from partners."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-421-0028","text":"The Datatilsynet conducted some investigations at Udbetaling Danmark focusing on the answers to access request and thus on the compliance with Articles 12 and 15 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.22.2021","text":"The President of the District Court (the controller) reported the loss of an unencrypted USB-Stick by a probation officer. This USB-Stick contained the personal data of 400 persons, subject to probation supervision. Besides names, dates of birth, addresses, data on convictions etc., the stick also contained sensitive data (health data).\nThe controller stated that he had implemented a system of rules to secure the protection of personal data (the Security Policy), updated the documentation constantly. To ensure the effectiveness of these measures, the controller provided stationary and e-learning trainings to all of the District Court's employees.\nOne of the rules forbade the use of private \"information carriers\" for processing business data. However, although users of USB-Sticks (like the probation officer) had the obligation to store the stick in a lockable work bag, measures like encryption and password protection of media, were not obligated. The user was, ultimately, responsible to implement appropriate safeguards for the storage on the USB-Stick. Lastly, although the controller claimed that the DPO conducted ad hoc checks, with additional system security evaluation by the IT department, he did not provide any evidence to the DPA that confirmed that such tests actually occurred."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00071/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of an investigation procedure started by the AEPD against the defendant due to a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that he/she had requested his/her right to be forgotten in relation to nine (9) URLs, but this right was not approved by the defendant.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the AEPD investigation requests stating that one (1) of the URLs had been duly erased, and during this procedure, another two (2) URLs were also erased, but it declared that the other six (6) had not been approved as they were referring to the professional life of the Spanish citizen, and not to his/her personal life. The defendant also added that such not-erased-information was related to the activity of the claimant as candidate for different public jobs, so erasing it would not be compliant with the legitimate public interests."}
{"_id":"facts_VG Berlin - 2 K 98/20","text":"The plaintiff, a journalist, sought access to information in connection with the granting of \"old-age compensation due to health problems\" to former members of the Bundestag. He requested an anonymised or otherwise redacted overview of cases between 2000 and 2020 from the Bundestag, broken down by year and with information regarding whether they had been decided positively and negatively, as well as the number of cases since 2006 in which compensation had been paid out without their requirements being met. In addition, he requested an affirmation regarding the correctness and completeness of the information as well as access to all relevant administrative files.\nThe German Bundestag rejected the plaintiff's applications on the grounds that access to information was contrary to the protection of personal data. It was highly likely that the applicant would be able to identify the persons concerned. This resulted from the fact that only a relatively small number of MPs left the German Bundestag prematurely. Since the career of individual MPs could be easily traced (e.g. by means of an internet search) the information and the files could be attributed to a narrowly defined group of persons, even if the documents were redacted.\nInsofar as the MPs were deceased, the disclosure would be contrary to the post-mortem right of personality. None of the persons concerned and none of the relatives of the deceased had declared their consent. The interest of the data subjects in secrecy outweighed the interest in information of the plaintiff, because the requested information was connected to the political mandate of the individuals concerned. In addition, it concerned sensitive health data."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 34/2020","text":"In May 2019 the Inspection service of the GBA started an investigation into the Federal Public Service Mobility and Transportation. GBA wanted to know about the information portal NV Informex, its access to the national data-bank of vehicles and the fact that data from this data-bank was shared with insurance companies for the purposes of creating personalized price offers to its potential customers. The report of the Inspection service found the following violations: 1. Breach of the principles of purpose limitation (Article 5) and lawfulness (Article 6) of processing; 2. Breach of the responsibilities of a controller (Article 24), security of processing (Article 32) and violation of the obligation to notify supervisory authority of the personal data breach (Article 33); 3. Breach of the requirements for designation (Article 37) and position (Article 38) of data protection officer; 4. Breach of the obligation to cooperate with the supervisory authority (Article 31); 5. Breach of transparency (Article 12) and information provision (Article 13) obligations.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 21/3636","text":"This dispute was between a divorced father (the data subject) and the chief of police of Rotterdam (the controller). In 2020, the data subject found out that Veilig Thuis (an advice and reporting centre for domestic violence and child abuse) had registered two reports on him in their database. The first registration stated that he had committed domestic violence and that subsequently he was temporarily denied entrance to the home he had previously shared with his ex-wife. According to the data subject, these allegations were unfounded. According to the data subject, the second registration was also inaccurate since the report did not adequately state that his ex-wife had moved to a new place with their son, without informing him of the new location.\nHe requested to have the first report deleted, and the other rectified, but Veilig Thuis refused. The data subject then brought the issue before Court, which decided that Veilig Thuis did not have a substantial interest in retaining the personal data, and that it had to delete the first report and amend the second one. Because Veilig Thuis had received the information from the Rotterdam police, the data subject subsequently requested the police to delete the inaccurate personal data and rectify the reports. The police, however, claimed that the information was accurate, and refused to rectify their files on the data subject.\nThe data subject then brought the issue before the District Court of First Instance of Rotterdam (hereinafter the Court), basing his claim on Article 12 GDPR on transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject, and his right to obtain from the controller the rectification of inaccurate personal data pursuant to Article 16 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W252 2246581-1/6E","text":"The data subject filed a complaint against the controller - a credit ranking agency.\nIn the original procedure before the Austrian DPA, the data subject claimed that their rights resulting from Article 15(1)(h) GDPR were infringed as the controller did not sufficiently inform them about the logic and algorithm used for the processing of their personal data in the context of an automated decision about the data subject's creditworthiness.\nThe controller replied that the processing at issue was not 'automated decision-making' pursuant to Article 22 GDPR, but only 'light profiling' under Article 4(4) GDPR. Therefore, the controller claimed that Article 15(1)(h) GDPR did not apply in the first place. Moreover, the controller argued that the algorithm regulating profiling could not be disclosed, being part of business secrets of the company.\nThe Austrian DPA upheld the complaint and issued a decision against the controller, ordering the latter to provide access to the information requested by the data subject.\nThe controller appealed the decision with the Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG), stating that they provided the data subject with sufficient information."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Gelderland - C/05/400739 / KG ZA 22-54","text":"The controller is Stichting Bureau Krediet Registratie (BKR), which manages the credit information register (CKI). This register provides an overview of the creditworthiness of people since credit providers (banks etc.) can register (severe) debts of individuals. There were three registrations related to the data subject in the CKI, with special codes that indicated that there had been several payment arrears. In 2021, the data subject requested the BKR to have these registrations and/or these special codes erased, but the controller refused. The data subject then brought the issue before Court, which granted his claim and ordered BKR to erase the codes. The controller then appealed this decision.\nAfter some initial hesitations, the controller removed the codes from the registrations, but added a new code “9 Dispute”. The data subject then requested the controller to remove this new code because he claimed that it also negatively affected his creditworthiness (even more than with the previous codes), but the controller refused and explained that this code had been added to explain that the removal of the special codes is still disputed in court (namely: the appeal).\nAfter the data subject was refused credit from a credit provider because of this new special code, he brought the issue before court to have this code “9 Dispute” erased pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) GDPR, and to keep having this code erased."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00274/2019","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that the union representative of the defendant had openly published an electoral census list (which was exclusive of the union and contained personal data such as the ID numbers of all voters considered regular staff) in an open WhatsApp group (in which almost all the workers of the radiodiagnosis Madrid central unit are included).\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the first AEPD investigation requests stating that: (i) it considered that the data publication was legally covered by the Spanish law on public workers elections, (ii) the publication was made during a legal elections process and due to the request of several members of the WhatsApp group (in which the claimant was included), as they had some difficulties to access the intranet of the union in which such data were already published. The defendant also answered to the subsequent evidence investigation requests by the AEPD stating that: (i) the resolution proposal is not doing an adequate balance of the right to union freedom and the right to the data protection, (ii) there is public interest and legitimate interest in the data processing made by the publication of such data, as it was in the interest of the workers, (iii) there has never been a lack of responsibility in the acts of the union representative, (iv) all the members at the WhatsApp group accessed such information voluntarily, including the claimant, as they are also included in such electoral census list, (v) the communication area claimed is less than other publication media used by the electoral census, (vi) the union is concerned about data protection, and so it contracted the corresponding law firm in order to ensure a full compliance of the regulation, (vii) the claimant avoided to use the reporting channels offered by the defendant. After the investigation process, the AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure, and understood that: (i) the processing activity consisting of the publication of the personal data would only be legal if its covered by Article 6(1) GDPR, (ii) with basis on several other Spanish regulations, (such as the Worker's Statute, the Spanish law on public workers elections, the Spanish law on private workers elections) there is neither a legal basis to do such publication in the way it has been made, as it shall be made by the polling station at the notice board, (iii) the publication cannot be legally covered by the legitimate interest neither, as the specific personal data published by the union representative were excessive to the alleged purpose, (iv) regarding the balance over data protection right and union freedom right, the union was never obliged to do such publication, so it significantly surpassed the boundaries of Spanish labour law to that respect.\nThe AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00317/2019","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that the defendant had not complied with her right of access; such complaint included diverse documentation in order to prove it (i.e. she stopped receiving propaganda, but she did not receive an answer to her right of access).\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the AEPD investigation request, stating that, before receiving the request for the right of access by the claimant, her email address had already been included in a Robinson list, but, due to a mistake, they had sent her an email without marketing content. It also stated that, since then, (i) it had reinforced the training of its staff in order to avoid new mistakes like that one, and that (ii) it had created a single email address only for data protection issues. Afterwards, the defendant finally answered the right of access, but the AEPD considered it not enough, so the defendant sent a second email to the claimant including (i) the origins of the email address, (ii) a declaration that the defendant did not process any other personal data of the claimant, and (iii) the defendant had not sent such personal data to third parties."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202303454","text":"SD IBERIAN PORTFOLIOS, S.A (the controller) bought a credit from a data subject’s bank. The bank was informed of the data subject's insolvency proceedings. Data relating to the data subject's debt was included at the controller's request in ASNEF (Spanish National Registry of Financial Statistics, a public credit registry). The data subject requested ASNEF in November 2022 to erase the data, and in response ASNEF deleted the data as a precautionary measure.\nThe data subject later filed an access request in 2023 and found out that the data was included in the ASNEF database again. The data was transferred despite the fact that said debt was exonerated following insolvency proceedings in 2021. The data subject requested the data to be deleted, and presented a complaint to the DPA in January 2023. In response, ASNEF temporarily removed the data for up to three months.\nIn this case, the controller has a contract with SERVDEBT ESPAÑA, S.L (the processor) to manage proceedings of the debts bought by the controller. The controller argued that the data subject never sent a confirmation of debt forgiveness, and that it should not be expected to consult the public registry (Registro Público Concursal) every time it acquires a new credit.\nIt is interesting to note that the controller is established in Luxembourg. However, the Luxembourgish DPA allowed the Spanish DPA to issue the decision, because the affected data subjects were in Spain (Article 56(2) GDPR and 56(5) GDPR). Furthermore, Article 77 GDPR allows the data subject to file a complaint to a supervisory authority of the Member State of their habitual residence. The DPA began the sanctioning proceedings against the controller in February 2025."}
{"_id":"facts_DPC (Ireland) - TikTok","text":"In an investigation of their own volition, the Data Protection Commission (Irish DPA) launched an inquiry into the lawfulness of TikTok’s (controller) transfers of personal data of EEA users to China. The inquiry also looked at TikTok’s compliance with their transparency requirements.\nThroughout the investigation, TikTok maintained that they did not store EEA user data on their Chinese servers. In April 2025, TikTok corrected this and informed the DPC that due to an error, some EEA user data had in fact been stored on Chinese servers, but this was no longer the case.\nDuring the investigation, TikTok claimed that transfers via remote access do not require a transfer mechanism as mandated under Article 46(1) GDPR. In an assessment of Chinese laws provided by TikTok to the DPC during the investigation, TikTok had themselves identified that the Chinese legal framework would preclude a finding of “essential equivalence”, as required, in addition to the adoption of appropriate safeguards and supplementary measures. In this assessment, TikTok made reference to the Chinese Anti-Terrorism Law, the Counter-Espionage Law, the Cybersecurity Law and the National Intelligence Law.\nThe investigation also revealed that TikTok’s October 2021 EEA privacy policy did not name the third countries, such as China, where personal data was transferred. Furthermore, the policy did not specify that personal data held by TikTok in Singapore and the United States could be accessed remotely by personnel in China."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100300","text":"A worker of a University filed a complaint against their employer with the Spanish DPA (AEPD). The data subject claimed that the controller had not answered a rectification request from Article 16 GDPR.\nThe data subject wanted the employer to rectify a productivity record deriving from the Pegasus application, alleging that the result was not adequate. This application took into account the degree of satisfaction of the users (foreseeably students). The worker alleged that the coefficients used by the formula that calculated the productivity were not disclosed, which led to a lack of transparency. Additionally, the worker alleged that the process was not objective, impartial and was discriminatory. The worker further argued that productivity must be considered personal data."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 154/2023","text":"On 6 October 2023, an employee (data subject) in a shop lodged a complaint with the Belgian DPA against their employer. The employer (controller) had installed several surveillance cameras in their six shops.\nIn the complaint, the data subject alleged that the cameras were installed in such a way as to place employees under constant surveillance, contrary to the stated purpose of the cameras, which was to provide security in the event of theft or aggression.\nThe data subject claimed that they received regular comments from the security company in relation to their performance at work. In the complaint, the data subject submitted that the surveillance was in violation of Collective Labour Agreement (CLA) No. 68 (on the protection of workers' privacy with regard to camera surveillance in the workplace)."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2022-441-12449","text":"Salling Group (the controller) is Denmark's largest retail group which serves 11 million customers per week. In 2021, they implemented a system allowing customers to shop on its websites (namely Føtex, Bilka, Netto, Salling and Carl Junior) using the same username and password (Salling Group profile). The controller also established a monitoring tool to record incidents and events about customers' access to the websites. However, in May 2022, the controller found that the monitoring system's log file stored customers' usernames and unencrypted passwords for the website \"hjem.foetex.dk\" by mistake. As a result, 146 people employed by the controller had technical access to the data. If an unauthorised person used the login credentials, they could access the customer's name, address, email address, telephone number, masked card information and purchase history. The controller reported the breach to the DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202202898","text":"The electricity and gas company (controller) billed a data subject illegally, in absence of a valid contract for that.\nOn 14 February 2022, the data subject filed a complaint to the Spanish DPA. The data subject provided several invoices and transaction data from his bank account, which were related to a contract that he had not agreed to. The data subject also showed that he had complained about this issue to the controller several times.\nOn 18 April 2022, the controller acknowledged that there had been an internal error which had resulted in the unjustified contracting. The controller used a two-step system for contract-signings over the phone. The first step was informing data subjects on the phone about the nature of the service provided by the controller. The second step followed after data subjects accepted the conditions on the phone, after which the controller would send a contract to the data subject by SMS for a signature in order to give consent. According to the controller, the data subject had accepted the conditions, but did not sign the contract and did therefore also not consent to the contract. However, due to an internal synchronisation error at the side of the controller, it seemed that the data subject had signed the contract by SMS and had consented to the contract."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-015","text":"Between November 2019 and January 2021, the French DPA received 31 complaints relating to ‘cold’ calls, a form of sales solicitation by phone from businesses to customers who have never interacted with the business before, and issues with the complainants’ exercise of their rights by GROUPE CANAL+ (the company), which specialises in the publishing of channels and the distribution of pay-TV offerings. Five of these complaints have been upheld in the present proceedings. Specifically, two of the complainants claimed that their right to erasure had not been complied with, and a third complainant stated that his request for an objection to the processing had also been disregarded.\nThus, in January 2021, the DPA held an online inspection of the processing operations carried out by the company, and in March 2023, a rapporteur was appointed to examine the documents.\nAt the end of the investigation, on 11 May 2023, the company was sent a report detailing the breaches of Article 12 GDPR, Article 13 GDPR, Article 14 GDPR, Article 15 GDPR, Article 28 GDPR, Article 32 GDPR and Article 33 GDPR, as well as of Article L. 34-5 of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code (the CPCE). Following this, the company submitted additional observations, and on 14 September 2023, the rapporteur and the company presented oral observations to the DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Gerechtshof Amsterdam - 200.258.736/01","text":"In the context of a litigation with his brother, the applicant requested access to a series of banking information to ABN AMRO, which refused to grant access to these data."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-31-4326","text":"In January 2020, a complainant (a member of Jo:ga) contacted Sport Solution to inform them about possible security issues in relation to the registration and membership management system on Jo:ga's website and app. The complainant claimed that the company uses its members´ dates of birth as a permanent password to login to its website and app, and that the members cannot change it. Additionally, the complainant argued that the company had not implemented any access restrictions after several failed login attempts.\nSport Solution confirmed that Jo:ga was one of its customers but informed the complainant that the customer decides on its own which security measures should be implemented regarding registration and login. Sport Solution however informed that it would contact Jo:ga and notify them about the issue.\nIn August 2020, the complainant noticed that no improvement were made since January 2020 and filed a complaint with the Danish DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2020112830","text":"A student filed a complaint with the Icelandic DPA (Persónuvernd) against Reykjavík University regarding the online monitoring of an examination which was taken at home on Zoom due to the COVID19 pandemic. The student claimed that it had been forced to consent to the online monitoring, and that their objection to the monitoring had not been taken into account, that they had not received sufficient information regarding the processing and security of their personal data in this context (including if other students could record the session), and that it was possible that personal data related to their spouse’s remote health care consultation could have been filtered into the audio recordings.\nThe university, in their defense, stated that they had a legitimate interest to monitor the examination in order to ensure its integrity, and that the student had been given the option to take the exam in person, but that this option was declined. The University also clarified that the option for attendees to record the session was disables, and that audio-recordings only took place during the beginning of the session during the attendance roll call, and that afterwards during the actual exam, only video recordings were made, and students were told to turn off their microphones."}
{"_id":"facts_CE - 464445","text":"On March 27, 2018 the Data Subject filed a complaint on CNIL againt Euronext group, specifically addressing the handling of her personal data by the Irish Stock Exchange, her employer, a subsidiary of Euronext.\nOn March 28, 2022, the case was closed by CNIL because the Authority understood that the Irish Data Protection Authority is the one competente for addressing the issue, since the Data Subject employer, the Irish Stock Exchange, is a company located in Ireland. In addition, the Data subject and personal data processed was limited to this location.\nDissatisfied with this outcome, the Data Subject sought annulment of the CNIL's decision for abuse of power and requested that the CNIL be instructed to sanction the companies involved."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - NTT Data Romania SA","text":"Consulting and IT services company NTT Data Romania SA (the data controller) suffered a data breach due to a cyberattack. Personal data from a significant number of data subjects were unlawfully accessed. The data included names, signatures, addresses, contract information, identity documents, employment and financial data, and data about employees' health. The controller reported the breach to the Romanian DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 22/2125","text":"A data subject made an access request with the Dutch Tax Administration (the controller). The controller decided to deny the request. The data subject raised several objections against this decision, but the controller declared it unfounded. The data subject appealed this decision.\nThe Court considered the appeal grounded and ordered the controller to fulfill the access request. Following this first decision, the controller answered the request with a general indication of the personal data it processed and for what purpose (information usually available in privacy policies). It also provided the data subject with their most commonly processed personal data. Last, the controller generally referred to Article 13(4), Article 14(5) and Article 23 GDPR for possible non-disclosure.\nThe data subject found the answer incomplete and lodged a further appeal to the Court.\nIn an attempt to explain why some information had not been included in the response, the controller argued that the response was based on what it could find on its general system. The other IT systems had not been searched, because there were too many and this would therefore constitute a disproportionate burden."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202001651/1/A3","text":"The appellant is a civil servant at the municipality of Leiden. He does not want the municipality to share his personal data with third parties because he fears he would lose control over his data. The municipality of Leiden outsources its HR administration to Service71; Service71 uses YouForce as the HRM tool which is offered by RAET B.V. On 15 January 2018 the municipality denied appellant’s request to delete his performance reports and assessments from YouForce. Appellant has also objected to the processing of his data by the company Mindtree in India. In the appealed decision the Court of First Instance of the Hague considered that the municipality had compelling and legitimate grounds for the data processing, which override the interests of the appellant. The Court found no evidence that the appellant’s personal data was processed in India by the employees of Mindtree.\n\n\nDispute\nThe appellant argues that: 1. The Court failed to recognize that his request should also be considered as an access request because it was not possible for him to make sure that the data processing in question was lawful. 2. The municipality has no legal basis for sharing his data with Service71 and RAET B.V. and that the data processing itself is excessive. 3. Personal data of employees, including the appellant, can be accessed by the company Mindtree in India."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00182/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen (the claimant) stating that the defendant has charged him five invoices of a third person, and that, despite the fact that he is not a client of the defendant and he has contacted the defendant to solve this situation, it did not offer any kind of solution.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered the first requirements of the AEPD stating that (i) the claimant had been informed on the steps to follow in order to solve the situation, (ii) in the end, the invoices were not paid by the claimant, and (iii) that the banking information on the invoices was provided by a bank, so there was no breach of the lawfulness principle. The AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_Gerechtshof Amsterdam - 200.251.466/01","text":"The complainant asked his bank (ING Bank N.V.) to remove his data from the BKR registration (office for credit) under Article 21 GDPR. The bank did not answer to the request. The data subject brought a complaint before the Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance found the complaint inadmissible and the complainant appealed the decision."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W298 2274626-1/8E","text":"The data subject had brought a complaint to the Austrian DPA against the controller, a political party.\nThe data subject detailed that he had visited the controller’s website and noticed that Google reCaptcha was being used on the website even though the data subject had deactivated Google reCaptcha. After the data subject had deactivated all cookies and functions such as Google reCaptcha, he clicked on the “become a member” page on the website, which showed the transfer of 615 packages of information from and to Google. The data subject declared that he had not agreed to the data transfer and that he wasn’t adequately informed that his IP address and the connected data would be transferred to Google. Therefore, Google would have knowledge of which party the data subject wanted to become a member of.\nThe controller told the DPA that the information on the data subject’s membership sign-up remained entirely confidential and could not be accessed by others. The controller saw itself responsible for the content of the website while the design was carried out by an external person. Further, users had the option to reject cookies through the cookie banner. If cookies were rejected then no storage nor data transfer took place.\nThe data subject added on the 20 April 2023, that after the complaint with the DPA, the controller continued the practice. Google Fonts was automatically downloaded and users were only informed of this in the privacy policy after the download had been completed.\nThe DPA found that the data subject’s right to privacy had been infringed upon through implementing Google reCaptcha and processing the data subject’s IP address, certain unique identifiers and browser data. The cookie “_GRECAPTCHA” was held not to be of technological necessity and therefore required the data subject’s explicit consent. Therefore, none of the legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR applied.\nThe controller appealed this decision to the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht – BVwG). It argued that the DPA had not analysed with which browser and operating system the data subject had accessed the website."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/692003/HA RK 20-302","text":"The challenge was brought by four Uber drivers, each of whom had received a separate message from Uber stating that their Uber Driver account had been deactivated because Uber had determined that they had violated the applicable contractual terms and conditions of Uber by being guilty of fraud. According to the applicants, Uber's decision was taken completely automatically without meaningful human intervention. The decision led to the immediate termination of the agreement between Uber and the applicants and to loss of income.\nAdditionally, according to the applicants Uber violated the principle of transparency by not informing them about the underlying logic, the importance and the expected consequences of the processing for them, not informing them of the type of fraud they are accused of and by not informing them that their accounts would be blocked in the event of fraud. In addition, Uber failed to explain the grounds for the decision in intelligible words.\nUber argued that it did not deactivate the accounts of the drivers solely on the basis of automated decision-making. The controller demonstrated that the decision to deactivate the account of one of the applicants was a result of an investigation which included actions taken by an Uber employee such as carrying out a personal conversation with the driver about consequences of the fraud, followed by a written confirmation. According to Uber, after a fraud signal the driver's access to the Driver app is automatically temporarily blocked until the driver has contacted an Uber employee. Access to the Driver app is reactivated as soon as the driver has made contact.\n\nDispute\nDoes automated termination of contract by Uber fulfil scope of automated decision making under Artcle 22 GDPR? Did Uber violate the transparency principle by failing to inform the applicants about the consequences of the procedure?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-442-8862","text":"The controller is the Capital Region of Denmark (an administrative region). It operates a platform, the “Health Platform”, which is used by the Danish Health and Medicines Authority (the Authority). This platform has integrated the central database of the Authority, which holds all data on the prescriptions and medicine purchases of all Danish citizens. Both on 10 August 2020 and 8 July 2021, data breaches occurred because the Health Platform was initially updated, and affected the integrated database.\nThe code changes of the first update caused the database to incorrectly display the number of prescriptions patients were to receive, which led to unintended double subscriptions, affecting 2,310 data subjects. Although the controller became aware of the coding error, it did not immediately inform the Authority. The second data breach affected another 1,149 patients. Hence, in total, the two data breaches concerned sensitive personal data (health data) of 4,459 data subjects."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 130/2021","text":"On 19 August 2021, a data subject (the Complainant) reported illegal dumping to the competent municipal services. An official report identifying four suspects was drafted by the competent police force. This official report, including its non-anonymised annexes, was then submitted to the competent authority (the Authority) in the framework of a municipal administrative sanction procedure (Gemeentelijke Administratieve Sanctie or 'GAS' procedure). The fine, including its non-anonymised annexes, was then passed on from the Authority to the four suspects. As a result, the four suspects were informed about the identity of the Complainant.\nOn 16 September 2021, the Complainant was approached by one of the four suspects; the latter confronted her about her initial complaint on the illegal dumping. Because of this, the Complainant realised that her identity had been revealed by the Authority to the four suspects in the context of the GAS procedure. On 20 September 2021, the Complainant therefore filed a complaint with the Belgian DPA against the Authority, on the ground that the latter had unlawfully disclosed her personal data to the four suspects without her consent within the framework of the GAS procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_TADM - 46401","text":"The Luxembourg DPA (\"Commission Nationale pour la Protection des Données - CNPD\") launched an investigation on a group of companies with a subsidiary based in Luxembourg (the controller).\nThe group of companies had appointed a single DPO (the group's DPO) under Article 37(2) GDPR to handle all data protection matters and had appointed a lawyer as the local contact point in Luxembourg to assist the group's DPO. Article 37(2) GDPR allows for the possibility to appoint one DPO for a group of undertakings. The controller had also established a GDPR Board, a committee dedicated to data protection in Luxembourg. The DPO however was not a member of the GDPR Board and was only informed of the subjects discussed there through the minutes of the GDPR Board and through the questions raised by the local contact point during these meetings. The group's DPO did not seat in Luxembourg and was involved mostly indirectly, through the local contact point, in data protection-related matters of the Luxembourg entity. During the course of the investigation, the controller did appoint its own DPO, that started on 1 October 2020.\nThe DPA found that even if the Group's DPO was participating in numerous meetings at a group level and regularly organised meetings with its local points of contact, this was not sufficient to demonstrate the direct, formal and permanent involvement of the DPO in Luxembourg. Therefore, the DPA found that the controller did not sufficiently involve the DPO with data protection matters violating Article 38(1) GDPR and Article 39 GDPR. It further found that the controller did not provided its DPO with the necessary resources and power, violating Article 38(2) GDPR. Thus, the DPA fined the controller €18,000.\nThe controller appealed this decision at the Administrative Court of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (\"Tribunal administratif du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg - TADM\"), seeking annulment of the decision. The controller argued that the DPA used their power excessively in finding violations of Article 38(1) and (2) and Article 39 GDPR. Moreover, the controller argued that the French DPA (\"CNIL\") had investigated its parent company and the other entities located in France and did not find any violations or made any comments regarding the appointment of the group’s DPO. The controller also argued that the fine amount was disproportionate."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 04/2023","text":"The data subject requested the controller to erase his e-mail address, because he kept receiving unwanted marketing e-mails from the controller. The nature of the controller was not specified in this decision.\nThe data subject requested the controller to remove his e-mail address from its address list. The controller stated it was not able to do so because this e-mail address was not included in the controller's list in the first place. The controller asked the data subject if he maybe had another e-mail address, that was coupled to the one the data subject was using currently. This coupling of e-mail addresses could potentially explain the situation. When an e-mail was received by this 'middle man' email-address, it would be forwarded to the data subject's current e-mail address. That could be the reason why the data subject was receiving e-mails on his current e-mail address, despite the fact it was not registered by the controller.\nThe data subject stated that he could not answer this question of the controller because the controller used the 'BCC' feature for sending its marketing e-mails, which made it impossible for the recipient of an e-mail to see other recipients of the same e-mail. It was therefore not possible for the data subject to verify if another of his e-mail addresses was included in the controller's list of recipients. The data subject kept receiving direct marketing messages after this exchange with the controller on his current e-mail address.\nThe data subject filed a complaint at the Belgian DPA at 6 January 2023, because the controller could not comply with his erasure request."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 1150/161/2021","text":"The psychotherapy firm 'Vastaamo Oy's' (hereafter, the Firm) experienced two data breaches in November 2018 and March 2019, where its patient records were hacked by a third party (the attacker). During an investigation conducted by the Finnish DPA, it was found that the Firm had become aware of (at least) the latter data breach at the time it happened.\nThe breaches were not reported to the Finnish DPA until late September 2020, shortly after the Firm had been subject to blackmail by the attacker. The following months, at least 15,000 patients were also blackmailed. In particular, the attacker tried to obtain monetary advantages from them by threatening to publish their personal patients records, and around 300 records were actually leaked online on the Tor network.\nFollowing this affair, the Firm suffered financially and was ultimately declared bankrupt by the District Court of Helsinki in February 2021."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9771545","text":"On 29 September 2020, the Italian DPA received a complaint from a former commercial agent for Palumbo Superyacht Ancona s.r.l. The data subject is the former commercial agent. The controller is Palumbo Superyacht Ancona.\nOn 23 June 20, the controller inhibited the data subject from using her work email address without any notice. She was not allowed to retrieve any information from the account beforehand. The data subject's requests for access to the account were ignored by the controller.\nThe controller stated that the contract with the data subject was terminated over the disclosure of confidential information and that out of court proceedings over said disclosure were ongoing. The controller claimed that the data subject's email account was kept active to investigate the alleged breach of confidentiality, and to store information for later use in the proceedings. The controller argued that the processing was in compliance with the principles of necessity and data minimization, as it neither used the account themselves nor allowed third parties access. The controller also stated that it made itself available to discuss ways for the data subject to access his account and retrieve his personal data, ensuring that she could not alter the information present.\nThe DPA found that the controller did not provide the data subject with sufficient information on their policies regarding work emails. Furthermore, the DPA found that the controller was unable to prove compliance with the information duties under Article 13 GDPR, as the information allegedly provided to the data subject lacked the requirements laid down in said Article, and the relevant documentation was not signed by the data subject. The DPA further noted that email accounts are not a suitable tool to store data for later use as evidence in proceedings."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202103886","text":"The data subject complained to the DPA that it was impossible to purchase an airline ticket from the controller's website without accepting cookies and consenting to receive advertisements. The controller, Vueling Airlines S.A., had a box in its checkout procedure indicating consent to receive ads, but, contrary to the data subject's complaint, it was possible to purchase a ticket without checking the box.\nThe controller's cookie policy allowed users to revoke consent to non-essential cookies by unchecking two pre-ticked boxes, one for \"performance cookies\" and one for \"targeted cookies.\" However, some third-party cookies were incorrectly categorized as essential, so even when users unchecked the relevant boxes or clicked \"reject all,\" non-essential cookies remained."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202002834/1/A3","text":"The appellant, in connection with a dispute with her son's former school, has requested the Dutch Minister of Education, Culture and Science to inspect her and her son's file. The Minister has partially granted the request for access, but wrongly did not grant access to the personal policy views of civil servants.\nFollowing a decision of the Council of State, the Minister amended its order and granted the appellant access to more documents, including to the personal policy views of civil servants, subject to the removal of the personal data of third parties.\nThe appellant appealed, arguing that the Minister has not provided all the documents covered by her request and has therefore failed to comply adequately with the Council of State’s first ruling. Also, according to the appellant, the Minister has glossed over more than just personal data in the documents submitted.\n\nDispute\nHas the Minister provided all personal data covered by the access request of the data subject?"}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 25/2020","text":"A social media encourages both existing users and new joiners to invite their friends to join the platform via a \"invite a friend\" option. The Litigation Chamber examined the legal grounds for the \"invite a friend\" system. The user gave the provider access to his or her list of contacts, so that a message could be sent to those contacts to join the social media platform or, if they were already members of the social media platform, to become part of that user's network of friends on the platform."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9932951","text":"On 17 February 2023 the complainant brought a case to the Italian DPA claiming a violation of her data protection right concerning the dissemination by an Italian newspaper on 23 January 2023 of an article containing a picture of a holographic will of an actress. According to the complainant, the will clearly showed the name, date, place of birth, address and title of witness assumed by the complainant.\nThe complainant further asserted to have requested RCS Mediagroup S.p.a (the data controller) to exercise her rights provided for from Article 15 GDPR to Article 22 GDPR but did not receive feedback. On 2 March 2023, the Italian DPA requested the data controller to respond to the complainant’s requests and to state whether they would comply with them.\nOn 21 March 2023, the data controller declared that the will is a public deed which can be accessed by anyone with an interest and that the information of the witnesses is an integral part of that public deed. Hence, the public nature of the will deprived it of any confidentiality, and the photograph of the page of the will and the publication of the complainant’s personal data took place lawfully.\nTo which the complainant responded that Article 6 of the Deontological Rules, which states that the disclosure of news of major public or social interest is not contrary to respect for the private sphere when the information is indispensable, does not apply and that the data controller should have refrained from disseminating the data of the complainant.\nFollowing this, the DPA issued a statement of the commencement of proceedings."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02042","text":"The complainant was subjected to multiple credit ratings by Innovation Norway*, despite having no customer relationship or any other affiliation with the latter. Nine credit ratings were conducted by one single employee, and it's unclear why the employee had the need to conduct these. One credit rating was conducted by a different employee, however this was due to a misunderstanding when investigating the other credit ratings.\nWhen contacted by the DPA, Innovation Norway admitted they had no legal basis for this processing. They had routines for how to manage credit ratings, however this was found to be too generic, outdated and not adhered to. Innovation Norway had decided not to notify the DPA of the personal data breach, as they didn't consider the incident to have triggered this requirement as per Article 33 GDPR.\n* Innovation Norway is state-owned and the Norwegian government's instrument for innovation and development of Norwegian enterprises and industry. Their programs and services are aimed at stimulating entrepreneurship in Norway. Conducting credit scoring of individuals and companies are common practice and not an issue in itself. The issue here was the misuse of credit scoring by one employee.\n\nDispute\n 1. Did Innovation Norway have a legal basis for conducting credit rating(s) of the complainant?\n 2. Did Innovation Norway have sufficient internal controls for conducting credit ratings?\n 3. Should Innovation Norway have report the personal data breaches to the DPA, cf. Article 33(1)?"}
{"_id":"facts_ICO - FS50908339","text":"A data subject asked the University of London to have access to the names of the examiners who assessed the PhD thesis of President Tsai Ing-wen, the President of the Republic of China, and the date on which the thesis was assessed.\nFrom his point of view, this information would be useful to validate the legitimacy of President Tsai’s thesis. He was concerned that the thesis was not filed with the LSE’s library until 2019 and that the filed copy appeared to be a 'draft document' and casted doubt on the thesis’ validity. Therefore his request should be accepted for a broad public interest.\nThe University of London confirmed the validity of the President Tsai’s thesis and provided a link to the copy of the thesis in question, however it didn't grant the access to the personal data requested to the individual under section 40(2) of the FOIA.\n\n\nDispute\nThe ICO had to determine whether the Council had correctly withheld information on the basis of section 40(2)of the FOIA.\nFirst, the ICO had to assess if the requested information constituted personal data.\nSecondly, the ICO needed to analyse if the information to disclose would contravene the Data Protection principles established by the Art. 5 of GDPR.\nIn particular, as far as the Art. 5 is concerned, the ICO needed to assess if the request was lawful on the basis of a 'legitimate interest' of the individual and, therefore, verify if the criteria of legitimate interest assessment were met."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03823-45","text":"Following receipt of anonymous tips, the Datatilsynet (Norwegian DPA) launched an investigation into Telenor ASA’s (data controller) compliance with the DPO requirements in Articles 37-39 GDPR. As part of the investigation, a site visit was conducted, as well as interviews with executives and employees of the controller.\nDuring the investigation, the controller noted that they had terminated their DPO as they did not believe they met the criteria for requiring one under Article 37(1) GDPR. The DPA requested documentation detailing this assessment but the controller did not provide it. After the investigation was launched, a temporary DPO was appointed.\nThe investigation also showed that contact details of the DPO were not available on the controller’s website, but only on the internal intranet, accessible only by employees.\nThe investigation revealed an incomplete Record of Processing Activity (ROPA) and an absence of evidence of involvement of the DPO in issues relating to data protection. The investigation found that the evidence showed involvement by the DPO as only consisting of meetings between the DPO and certain heads of function across the organisation, and that these meetings only began more recently, after the commencement of the investigation. The investigation concluded that outside of this meeting, the DPO was involved on a case-by-case basis with data protection matters.\nThe investigation revealed that the DPO’s role was split 50/50 between the DPO duties and work as an associate lawyer. The controller claimed that in practice, most of the DPO’s working hours were spent on DPO work. The controller, however, was unable to produce any documentation to demonstrate this. The investigation showed that there was a “major backlog” of data protection related tasks in 2021. It was also shown that the (then) DPO had raised concerns in 2021 about the resources available, requesting 100% full time equivalent (FTE) allocation to the handling of data protection matters until the bottleneck was resolved.\nThe investigation also examined whether the appointed DPO was independent in the exercise of their functions. The controller’s Group Privacy Manual stated that the DPO should be “independent” in their function. The job description of the DPO/Associate attorney role was also inspected. Although the roles of the DPO and associate attorney were stated separately, while acting in the attorney role, the position holder was expected to “inform and provide legal advice in alignment with other attorneys”. It was also revealed the position holder had one email, used for both aspects of their role, with the job title in the signature being “Associate Lawyer and Data Protection Officer (DPO)”. It was also revealed that the budget for data-protection related expenses was allocated on a “case-by-case” basis, and that the DPO needed to seek approval from their line manager to extend the budget. Finally, the investigation revealed that all DPOs in the wider Group held shares in the company and that there were no internal rules to prevent conflicts of interest."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202307696","text":"On the 26 April 2023, the data subject filed a complaint with the AEPD for receiving postal advertising material despite having exercised their right to object to this.\nThe data subject had sent a letter to the controller on the 27 February 2023, requesting that his personal data exclusively be used to manage his credit card.\nOn the 7 March 2023, the controller responded to the data subject confirming the receipt of the request stating that in accordance with Article 21 and 18 GDPR, the controller has begun to give effect to the request. However, on the 23 April 2023, the data subject received advertising related to the granting of a loan contrary to his request.\nFollowing the data subject’s complaint, the AEPD requested information from the controller.\nOn the 6 July 2023, the controller confirmed that the data subject had received another advertisement in the post after having objected to this form of processing of his personal data.\nThe controller argued that a human error of an employee caused the violation. The employee responsible for manually unticking the boxes relevant to the processing had failed to untick three boxes which is why the advertisement reached the data subject. It argued that the mistake had then been corrected on the 9 June 2023 and that therefore the violation had been remedied.\nFurther, the controller argued that a processor was responsible for the violation and therefore requested the dismissal of the proceedings."}
{"_id":"facts_BlnBDI (Berlin) - 631.457.4 521.14765.10","text":"The data subject received an order confirmation by e-mail from a company called \"Healy\" (controller). The data subject informed the controller by e-mail that it had used an incorrect e-mail address. She also informed the controller about her suspicion that an actual customer of the controller had used her e-mail address to place an order. The controller did not respond to this.\nAfter that, the data subject also received shipping confirmations with personal data of the actual customer who had placed the order, as well as the controller newsletters. In addition, the data subject also received information in German concerning a credit balance, as well as the password and username of the actual customer. As would become clear later, this situation was the result of a faulty process with regard to the controller's database. In this database, there was a customer with the same name as the data subject. When the responsible employee of the controller manually entered the e-mail address to send the shipping confirmations to, he confused the data subject's email with the one of the customer who had actually placed the order.\nOn 28 June 2021 and 6 July 2021, the data subject requested the controller by e-mail to delete her e-mail address. Instead of addressing the DPO of the controller, the data subject sent her requests to the controller's customer service. At first, the controller did not comply with the data subject's request for erasure because it's customer service department was of the opinion that the e-mail address was still required to process an open order. The customer service later transferred the complaint to the legal department after 'a delay'. It is not clear from the decision how long this delay was. After this, the data subject received instructions from the controller to log into her (non-existent) customer account, and fill in a form there.\nOn 4 August 2021, The controller deleted the data subject's e-mail after it finally became aware of the situation. On 23 September 2021, The data subject received an email with apologies from the controller. On an unspecified date, the data subject filed a complaint at the DPA. On 22 February 2022, the DPA asked the controller to comment on the present case. On 6 April 2022, the controller confirmed it had sent e-mails to the data subject and provided its explanation regarding the faulty process with its database. (see second paragraph)."}
{"_id":"facts_EDPS - 2019-0878","text":"A data subject complained around cookies and similar technologies used in connection to audiovisual material on the website of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as well as websites displaying the Court's branding that the Court linked to (two firms, Companywebcast and Connectedviews, to host a conference recording), claiming that they did not correctly inform the user or obtain required consent before data processing or storage of information on a terminal device.\n\nDispute\nThe complaint was decided under the data protection regime applying to EU institutions, rather than the GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2018/1725). The dispute concerned:\n- did the laying of cookies by the CJEU violate Article 37 of the Regulation, implementing the requirements of the e-Privacy Directive?\n- did the laying of cookies and the lack of transparent information on a third party website, with CJEU branding, linked to by the CJEU to provide it with services, breach the transparency (art 14) and consent (art 7) requirements of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725?\n- were the conditions for consent met by the CJEU?"}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 80/2021","text":"In a former decision adopted within the so-called 'light procedure', the Belgian DPA ordered a company to stop the processing of the personal data of a complainant who had objected to the sending of direct marketing emails several times.\nThe provider did not comply with the order and the litigation chamber decided to open the case to adopt a decision on the merits (\"décision au fond\").\nNone of the parties sent their submissions, despite the fact that they were invited to do so."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00177/2021","text":"A data subject filed a complaint before the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against a real state company, that had allegedly not provided the information required by Article 13 GDPR when they formalized the first payment for an apartment, for which the data subject had provided personal data."}
{"_id":"facts_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 29-11-2021","text":"The DPA received a complaint regarding a violation of the protection of personal data of X (the data subject). In this regard, the data subject stated that the company in question (the data controller) asked her for a copy of her personal document - identity card when updating her personal data in accordance with special regulations.\nAs evidence of her allegations, the data subject submitted to the DPA the controller's response, information on the processing of personal data, and the email correspondence between the data subject and the data controller.\nIn this specific case, the \"Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act (Zakon o sprečavanju pranja novca i financiranja terorizma - ZSPNIFT)\" applies, which prescribes measures, actions, and procedures that oblige entities and competent state bodies to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing.\nArticle 15 ZSPNIFT mandates customer due diligence, including identity verification via reliable sources, collecting data on the purpose and nature of business relationships, ongoing transaction monitoring to ensure consistency with the customer's profile and risk assessment, verifying the source of funds if needed, and maintaining up-to-date documentation.\nFurthermore, Article 79 ZSPNIFT requires that collected documentation include records used to verify the customer’s identity, such as copies of official personal documents or extracts from relevant registers.\nThe data subject was contacted via letter and telephone to update his personal data and submit a copy of her ID card, as required by ZSPNIFT. The data controller provided the applicant with the choice of how to submit the ID card copy, as evidenced by a letter dated 16 July 2021. The data controller, justified the collection and processing of personal data, including the ID card copy, as necessary to fulfill its legal obligation to verify customer identity under the Act."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202201721","text":"In July 2021, the data subject lost his ID card. A third party went to his bank with the ID card and withdrew all the money available in the account, a total of €9,400, without his authorization or consent. The withdrawal was made in person at the local bank branch. The withdrawal also required the signature of the third party. The third party was able to withdraw the money despite their signature not corresponding to the signature on the data subject's ID card."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/02504","text":"The Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) received a complaint from a data subject who had been credit rated by a private investigation company, whom had informed in their privacy notice that they should be viewed as the controller as per the GDPR, for any such processing of the personal data of third parties.\nThe controller had been hired by the data subject's former partner. She claimed to have a financial claim against the data subject. He disputed this and also claimed he did not have any funds to pay for such a claim, regardless. Consequently, the controller conducted a credit rating of the data subject, to validate his claims.\nFollowing the data subject's complaint, the DPA launched an investigation."}
{"_id":"facts_VG München - M 3 E 22.667","text":"The controller is an elementary school. The data subjects are pupils of the controller. Under the Bavarian Ordinance on Measures for the Prevention of Infection (16. Bayerische Infektionsschutzmaßnahmenverordnung – 16. BayIfSMV) , the controller required the the data subjects to show Covid-19 test certificates before being allowed to in-person classes. Moreover, pupils were obliged to wear face masks in school if they could not provide an exemption certificate by a doctor. The controller stored the certificates for 14 days, as prescribed by the Ordinance.\nOn 31 January 2022, the data subjects requested the controller to delete the stored test certificates and stop further collecting them, which was rejected by the controller. Consequently, the data subjects filed an application for interim relief with the Administrative Court of München (Verwaltungsgericht München - VG München) on 10 February 2022 to order the school to stop storing and collecting the test and mask exemption certificates. In its statement of defense, the controller explained that it does not retain any certificates of the data subjects anymore, because it had filed a criminal complaint against the parents of the data subjects with the prosecutor's office on 7 February 2022 because of the suspicion of forgery of documents and had transmitted all the certificates as evidence in the course of the criminal complaint. The data subjects did not contest this statement of the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_DPC (Ireland) - IN-21-2-5","text":"Virtue Integrated Elder Care Ltd (\"VIEC\"), the controller, operates and manages five nursing homes in Dublin, Ireland. On 15 August 2020, VIEC became aware through a report to their IT helpdesk that one of the users of their internal systems was being blocked from sending emails. The controller subsequently discovered that the email address of one of its managers had been subject to a phishing attack, and that emails had been rerouted to a third party Gmail account.\nOn 19 August 2019, VIEC notified the Irish DPA (the DPC) of a personal data breach. Based on initial analysis of the breach notification and subsequent documentation provided during the breach handling process, the DPC considered that the matter concerned a possible “breach of security potentially leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration or unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed” by VIEC. As a result, the DPC commenced an investigation.\nIn a commencement letter, the DPC informed VIEC that their inquiry would examine whether or not the company discharged its obligations in connection with the subject matter of the personal data breach and determine whether or not any provision(s) of data protection law had been violated by VIEC in that context.\nThe scope of the inquiry was stated to include the following. Firstly, the steps taken by VIEC to comply with the principle of integrity and confidentiality pursuant to Article 5(1)(f) GDPR. Secondly, the technical and organisational measures taken to ensure security of processing pursuant to Article 32(1) GDPR. Thirdly, the ability of the controller to demonstrate ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability of personal data pursuant to Article 32(1)(b) GDPR. Fourth, the process employed by VIEC for regularly testing the effectiveness of measures for ensuring appropriate security pursuant to Article 32(1)(d) GDPR. Fifth, and finally, the ability of VIEC to demonstrate that it had assessed the risk to processing special category information.\nAs part of the investigation the security provider for VIEC, ‘Ortus’, conducted a report which determined that the most likely root cause of the breach was that the credentials of a user account at one of the nursing homes were captured on a fake website. The link to that fake website was likely received in a phishing email. The original email that delivered the malicious link in question was not identified by the security provider. The email account was thereby accessed by an unauthorised third party, using the captured credentials. This resulted in unauthorised access to stored emails, and allowed the bad actor to set up email forwarding of all inbound emails to a third party email account. In addition, this issue had been ongoing since 18 July 2020.\nThe DPC prepared an Inquiry Issues Paper to document the relevant facts of the case, and invited submissions from VIEC, in particular regarding any inaccuracies and/or incomplete facts. Outlining the mitigating factors to be considered, VIEC explained that the assigned DPO was aware of the requirement to report the breach within 72 hours and that this timeline had become exhausted by the time the DPO became aware of the breach. The DPO hastily notified the DPC of the breach and supplemented this notification with additional information. The DPC noted this is an example of good practice on the part of a controller in this regard. In another proposed mitigating factor, VIEC submitted that password for the affected account was reset and a forced logout was performed.\nThe controller also confirmed, among other things, that 213 data subjects had their personal data compromised, and that 129 of these residents had special category data compromised; 117 of these individuals had health data compromised and 12 had biometric data compromised.\nOn 11 November 2022 the DPC provided a draft decision to VIEC, and the controller was invited to make further submissions on the proposed infringements. In its response to the draft decision, VIEC asserted that it considered the proposals too excessive, and made a range of submissions in support of their position. VIEC stressed the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on its ability to implement data security provisions. In particular, they explained that senior managers were redirected to frontline roles, at a time of increased regularity of phishing attacks."}
{"_id":"facts_IP - 07121-1/2020/2281","text":"The Slovenian DPA received a complaint regarding the use of the complainant personal data for advertising purposes inside of a Facebook group. The DPA advised that the group administrator should first provide an appropriate legal basis for transferring the personal data to Facebook for advertising purposes and, second, for transferring personal data to the users of the SNS (Social Networking Service). In such a case, the group administrator will, together with Facebook, act as joint controller for the processing of personal data related to the ads.\nFor the legal basis of processing personal data in the Facebook group, the DPA advised that this is usually determined by the group rules (terms and conditions), which every group member accepts when joining the group.\nFinally, the DPA reasoned that the ad in question, shown only in the Facebook group, was likely only meant for the group members and not for the general public. Publishing the ad inside of a Facebook group, although publicly, doesn't mean it will be read by all Facebook users, but likely only by the group members that are only interested in the content relevant for the group.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 05/2021","text":"A third party visited a shop of the defendant (a provider of cellphone services) to change their mobile phone subscription. This third party used the phone and sim card number of the complaint. During this process, the mobile phone number of the complaint was transferred to a third party so that the complaint could not use its mobile phone number. The SIM of complaint was deactivated for the complaint and the third party had the possibility to access personal conversation data as well as linked accounts (PayPal, WhatsApp, Facebook) for three days.\n\nDispute\nIf a third party has access to a phone number, does this classify as a critical data breach?"}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 19/3036","text":"The controller engaged DEX Online Services to automate its membership administration, which contained personal data of the plaintiff. He also offered its members the opportunity to use the Yogibit app to gain access to their own data, so that they can, for example, deregister and register for lessons. On January 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Dutch DPA against the controller. The DPA rejected the complaint by decision of 27 February 2019, because it found no obvious violation of the GDPR . Plaintiff has objected to this rejection.\nAccording to the DPA, both the controller and DEX Online Services have complied with the claimant's request for removal within the meaning of Article 17 of the GDPR. The controller has a valid basis for the processing of the plaintiff's personal data and it has not been shown that his personal data has been processed in the YogiBit app.\nIn appeal, the plaintiff argues that the controller should have first explicitly requested permission from him before his personal data would be provided to DEX Online Services. According to the plaintiff, the defendant has forgotten to look at the definition of 'consent', as set out in Article 4 (11) of the GDPR . Additionally, it was not necessary for the controller to enable DEX Online Services for its student administration. According to the plaintiff, the controller could also have chosen to hire a secretary. In addition, the plaintiff stated that as a free EU citizen he has the right to choose whether he wants to go along with the choice of the controller for that third party.\nPlaintiff argued that it was up to DEX Online Services to ascertain that the controller complied with the conditions set out in Article 6 of the GDPR . In his view, on the basis of Article 5(2) GDPR the controller has an accountability obligation and must be able to demonstrate compliance with Article 5, first paragraph, of the GDPR . The plaintiff argued that the decision did not provide evidence of such compliance. He stated that this also applied with regard to the entry of his personal data in the YogiBit app.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100639","text":"The Spanish police notified the Spanish DPA (AEPD) that a private individual had placed security cameras facing public and private spaces in the surroundings of their property. The police report stated that they had warned the individual that the cameras should not be pointed in the direction of areas beyond their property, and that there was no sign posted with adequate information related to the functioning of these video cameras.\nDespite the police’s warnings, the individual refused to redirect the cameras, or to place the appropriate sign with information required under GDPR. The AEPD therefore initiated proceedings in order to investigate the issue, and bring the individual into compliance with their obligations related to the use of security cameras under GDPR. The individual did not submit any allegations or proof to contradict the police report, and also ignored the AEPD’s request for information related to their compliance with GDPR on this matter."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Global One 2015","text":"Global One is a charity that aims to impove health, sanitation and agriculture. The Information Commissioner's Office received 539 complaints from individuals who received unsolicited text messages from Global One. These complaints occurred between April 30th, 2020 and May 22nd, 2020, when 573,000 marketing texts were sent overall. The texts did not offer individuals the opportunity to opt-out of further marketing.\nGlobal One had entered into an agreement with a third party (X) that was to provide them with a marketing strategy. The third party (X) informed Global One that it would start an SMS campaign to gain donations. Global One says it assumed that this would be carried out using a marketing list that belonged to the third party (X). However, the third party (X) themselves commissioned another third party (Y) to deliver the test messaging campaign. The third party (Y) claimed that the list of contacts they compiled and used was compliant with relevant laws.\nHowever, there was no evidence of consent being provided for such direct marketing messages. Global One nevertheless claimed to have undertaken due diligence, whilst the third party it contracted with (X) claimed that it only advised Global One of various other agencies who could do the marketing."}
{"_id":"facts_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2021-3422","text":"The Swedish DPA received complaints alleging that on January 20 2021, Indecap (the controller) sent an email message containing a file with personal data about, among other things, customers' finances to other customers.\nThe controller acknowledged the mistake and explained that the breach was due to human error. An employee had attached the incorrect Excel sheet by mistake because it was named similarly to the correct file. The incorrect file contained information about customers' name, social security number, bank, name of bank advisor, e-mail address, selected risk level, allocation to funds (limited to individual fund selection) and the last loaded value of the customers' holdings in these funds. The erroneous mailings involved the personal data of 52,364 data subjects and were received by a maximum of 2,813 individuals. The exact number of recipients could not be determined as Indecap's own investigations showed that the email has been stuck in the mail filter of many of the customers.\nIndecap took various steps to mitigate the damage of the breach. It initiated a major incident investigation together with external experts to identify internal risks and create an internal action plan. They sent information to data subjects about the incident, implemented additional technical security security measures and held extra training sessions for employees. They also contacted the recipients who had received the email with personal data and asked them to delete the message and to confirm that the message had been deleted. Finally, Indecap filed a personal data breach notification to the Swedish DPA and also made a report to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 162/2024","text":"The controller published a press article, which contained the data subject’s personal data, on their website.\nOn 13 July 2021, the data subject sent an erasure request to the controller. The request referred to the article concerned via a web link. The data subject received a confirmation of receipt on 4 September 2022, more than a year later. Then, no further response from the controller was received by the data subject. The data subject reiterated their request three times in January 2024 and made a mediation request to the DPA on 5 February 2024.\nThe controller argued that the request was already granted and that the link no longer led to the article. The DPA transmitted the answer to the data subject in April 2024 and closed the mediation process on 7 May 2024.\nThe data subject filed a complaint to the DPA on 23 May 2024 as the article remained available on the controller’s web site via another link.\nDuring the procedure, the controller erased the article of its website and apologised for the inconvenience, pointing out a technical mistake. The data subject declared themselves satisfied with the controller’s declaration."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9756853","text":"A data subject filed a complaint with the Italian DPA (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali – Garante) due to the publication of his personal data on www.mondoshiatsu.com, a website which shows the contact details of various certified shiatsu massage practitioners. The data subject stated that he was automatically inserted into this portal after having attended an annual training course in this discipline in 2003. Due to the amount of time that had passed since then, and the fact that he never became an actual practitioner, he made numerous requests via telephone and email in order to delete his data, which were not responded.\nThe Garante initiated an investigation, and determined that the company responsible for the publication of the website was Arte del Vivere S.r.l. The Garante then made a request for information related to the company’s failure to respond to the data subject’s request for deletion of his personal data. The Garante was initially unable to notify this request, and had to employ the Finance Police in order to successfully do so. When the company eventually replied, its director stated that they were not the owners of the domain, and had delegated the maintenance of the website to a third party processor. However, the company argued that the website could not be updated because the processor no longer had the credentials to do so. The Garante noted that the contents of the website clearly attribute it to Arte del Vivere, and that as a beneficiary of this website, the company should have contractual or accounting documentation related to the web hosting service. The company was then eventually able to delete the entire website, which had not been updated since 2014, by reporting the issue to the website’s net service host."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03126","text":"Between 21 May and 14 June 2021, Argon Medical Devices, Inc. (the controller) experienced a cyber security incident. It was discovered on 14 June 2021 when the controller's US Senior Vice President of Human Resources noticed missing emails in his inbox.\nUpon further investigation, the controller determined that it had been subject to a business email compromise, perpetrated through an internal platform by an unauthorized third party, most likely through a phishing email. Consequently, the Director of Global IT Security put in place several cyber security measures, which appear to have contained the incident on 14 June 2021.\nOn 15 June 2021, they reported the incident to the local FBI Cybercrime Unit in the US and commenced an internal investigation to determine the extent and nature of the incident.\nOn 19 July 2021 they realized that personal data such as salary and benefits of all of their (20) European employees, including one in Norway, had been affected, and proceeded to assess whether the incident was reportable under Article 33(1) GDPR.\nOn 24 September 2021, after concluding that the incident was indeed reportable, the controller hired a Norwegian law firm to notify the Norwegian DPA. Since the controller has several establishments in the EU/EEA, they also sent similar breach notifications to several other European supervisory authorities.\nIn this regard, they acknowledged that “Argon in the US [i.e., Argon Medical Devices, Inc.] is the data controller with respect to the personal data connected to this Incident”. They also stated that their \"European head office resides in Switzerland, and only its Swiss establishment enjoys a power of direction and control over its other EU/EEA establishments. Therefore, Argon does not have a main establishment in the EU/EEA for the purposes of Article 4(16) GDPR.\"\nConsequently, the DPA concluded that the cooperation mechanism and procedure set out in Article 56(1) GDPR and Article 60 GDPR did not apply in this case and, thus, pursuant to Article 55(1) GDPR, the DPA was competent to perform the tasks assigned to them and exercise the powers conferred on them by the GDPR in relation to the personal data breach notification. The controller did not dispute this in their written representations.\nOn 4 October 2021 the DPA sent the controller a request for further information and asked them to, in particular, clarify why they concluded that the incident was reportable only on 21 September 2021.\nThe controller held that they had acted \"without undue delay, to notify the supervisory authorities within 72 hours\". Their main claim was that it was necessary to investigate the incident in order to determine if it was reportable or not, which they were only able to conclude on 21 September 2021.\nOn 31 January 2022, the DPA sent the controller an advance notification of their intention to fine them NOK 2 500 000 for having violated Article 33(1) GDPR. Despite several exchanges where the controller continued to argue they had indeed sent the notification in time, the DPA upheld their conclusion and issued the final decision on 8 March 2023.\nThe controller then appealed the decision to the Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board, where it's currently pending."}
{"_id":"facts_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2019-11737","text":"Bonnier News AB (now Expressen Lifestyle), the controller, is a media company in Sweden. The Bonnier group processed their customers' data for, among other reasons, marketing purposes. They compiled profiles on their users and made these available to affiliated companies who then provided targeted advertisements for their own products and services through direct mail and telemarketing. They relied on legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR to do so.\nAt the time of the investigation,which followed a complaint from a data subject, there were 15 such affiliated companies, with the personal data being collected from users and website visitors being stored in two group-wide data bases from which it was then shared with the affiliate companies. One of these databases was a “behavioral data base”.\nThe personal data recorded in this database, by means of a cookie identifier, included the URL that the user visited, as well as its category and content type, information on the user’s device and their IP address, behavioral data in terms of time spent and the time the page was viewed and also whether the user logged into the website. In some instances, this data could be linked with the user’s data in the customer data base, resulting in a full behavior profile including the user’s age, gender, their car ownership and some variable based on the users’ residential area, such as their life phase, housing type and purchasing power.\nDuring the course of the investigation, the controller argued that they are not joint controllers in respect of the personal data, and that after the affiliated companies access the data provided in the databases, that they alone are responsible for the legality of that processing.\nThe controller further argued that while the personal data in the customer database was personal data, the data in the behavioral database was comprised of anonymous data and as such was not personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR.\nThe controller stated that they rely on legitimate interest as a lawful basis for the profiling of their customers and users to provide personalised advertisements. The controller identified the legitimate interest as being the need to ensure relevant content and advertisements for their customers so that they can offer competitive services and have attractive advertising spaces. The controller also submitted that this interest outweighed the interest of their customers in the protection of their personal data. The controller claimed that such was the case as the customers could object to the profiling, that the customers already have a direct relationship with one (or more) of the affiliates, either from having purchased from their websites or having visited their website, that the processing was unlikely to adversely affect the data subject’s interests as their interaction with the affiliates was voluntary and, finally, that the processing is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the data subjects."}
{"_id":"facts_OLG Köln - 15 U 60/23","text":"The data subject filed a lawsuit with the first instance court, the Regional Court of Cologne (“Landgerichts Köln”) seeking injunctive relief. The data subject further requested the court to order Google Ireland Limited (the controller) to erase search results that linked to an article which contained false information about the data subject and included a photograph of the data subject that infringed the data subject’s copyright. The article used the photograph to make allegations of the data subject. The photograph was taken by the data subject’s wife, who did not give the website the right to use the photograph for the mentioned article.\nThe first instance court agreed with Google Ireland's view that they are not the controller, but the US based Google Limited Liability Company (LLC), because they make the decisions about how to respond to a search query and how the relevant search results are displayed. Google LLC was also named as the controller in the privacy policy. Although Google Ireland Limited operates the Google search engine in Germany and other European countries, it had no influence on how the search results were generated. The court therefore dismissed the action for injunctive relief and request for erasure.\nThe data subject appealed the decision of the first instance court for failing to recognise that Google Ireland Limited is a controller under Article 4(7) GDPR. It further requested the court to erase the search results related to the article with inaccurate information of the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2025-001","text":"SOLOCAL MARKETING SERVICES (formerly known as PAGES JAUNES MARKETING SERVICES, referred to as the controller) is an advertising company that offers companies to carry out direct marketing campaigns on their behalf (by SMS or e-mail). The controller also transfers the data to the companies in order for them to carry out the direct marketing themselves. To do this, the controller purchases data subjects’ data from data brokers, who collect this data through websites’ entry forms for game contests or online product testing. According to the DPA’s findings, the forms are misleading as they make it significantly easier to consent to having their data being used for direct marketing than not.\nThe DPA carried out on site investigation in 2022, and informed the controller of its findings in July 2024. The controller argued that it should not be held liable for the way in which its partners collect consent, and that its contractual measures were sufficient to fulfill its obligations. The controller also argued that it could have not foreseen the DPA’s investigation because at the time of the investigation the DPA had not published recommendations specific to consent in the direct marketing sector."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W256 2240235-1","text":"The data subject is a retired employee of the municipality of Innsbruck. According to the data subject, the municipality had unlawfully disclosed the data subject's data in the course of a court procedure, inter alia by sharing them with an attorney which represented the municipality. The data subject lodged a complaint with the Austrian Data Protection Authority (Datenschutzbehörde - DSB).\nThe municipality argued before the DSB that the disclosure of the data subject's data to the attorney had been necessary for the exercise of legal claims and therefore for the purposes of the legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The data subject was heard on this statement and filed a submission, arguing that Article 6(1)(f) GDPR does not apply on the municipality as it qualifies as a public authority. The DSB invited the municipality to submit a statement on this reply. The municipality filed a statement (mostly repeating their previous arguments) which was in turn again provided to the data subject who issued yet another submission (also mostly repeating their arguments).\nIn September 2019, the DSB issued its decision, rejecting the complaint. In essence, the DSB (for unknown reasons) did not assess the case under Article 6 and 9 GDPR but held that the disclosure of data under § 1 Austrian Data Protection Act (DSG) was lawful. In particular, Austrian law allowed for parties to be represented by an attorney, which included the sharing of personal data. The data subject filed an appeal with the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG)."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Briza Land SRL","text":"A data subject filed a complaint against a real estate agency (Briza Land SRL) for not adequately granting their request to exercise their right of access under Article 15 GDPR. The controller did not communicate to the data subject the information requested regarding the processing of their personal data, in particular, the totality of personal data processed, the source of this data, as well as the recipients of the data."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/03500","text":"In the fall of 2020, the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) had a personal data breach related to employees' email accounts, discovered after an employee had been contacted by their bank about an attempt of misuse of their payment card abroad. The Parliament discovered that the perpetrators had downloaded various data, including personal data information about their bank accounts, birth dates and health-related data.\nThe Parliament had not enabled two-factor authentication in their email system, despite having identified the lack of such as a \"high risk\" in their risk analysis of March 2020. They had also identified a lack of security culture, low competency and little focus on data protection as very high risks.\nWhen the DPA reviewed the risk analysis in May 2021, two-factor authentication was still not fully implemented. In their notification of a decision, the DPA noted that the Parliament's administration, represented by the Secretary General, was grossly negligent."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 11/2024","text":"On 23 March 2023, an employee of the controller consulted an extract of the data subject's personal data stored in the Belgian National Register, which refers to the information processing system that records, memorizes and communicates information relating to the identification of Belgian citizens.\nAfter that, the data subjectfiled an access request with the controller, requesting clarification into who accessed their data and for what purpose. Due to not receiving any response regarding the access request, the data subject filed a complaint with the Belgian DPA on 14 June 2023.\nOn 7 August 2023, the controller replied to the access request, acknowledging that it consulted the National Register records of the data subject and that the processing was performed by a professional with specific authorization. However, due to professional secrecy, the controller could not disclose the professional's identity or assess whether the consultation complied with legal and ethical obligations."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00347/2020","text":"A data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against a City Council, alleging that they had published a document with data related a public grant, that included their own personal data.\nThe Council alleged that they were, following their bylaw, obliged to publish such data so the rest of the participants in the grant procedure were able to contrast the data. However, they declared that they were willing to change the bylaw if the AEPD determined that such processing was unlawful."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00415/2020","text":"On 9 July 2019, a data subject (\"complainant\") submitted a complaint to the AEPD stating that the products contracted with Vodafone España (\"defendant\") were not delivered in the name of the data subject, but in the name of a third party. The complainant updated the complaint on 13 September 2019 advising that they contacted Data Protection Officer of Vodafone via email requesting them to restore the accuracy of their data. However, no response was received to this request.\nSubsequently, the complainant was contacted by Vodafone and was advised that the issue had been corrected and that the products purchased had been put in their name. However, in September 2019, the complainant contacted the Vodafone's customer service and was addressed in the name of the third party.\nThe complainant also advised that on 11 September 2019, the Municipal Consumer Information Office (“OMIC”) informed them that they had a response to their complaint, and it turned out that Vodafone had responded with the complaint resolution of another customer as well as provided supporting evidence in the name of the third party.\nBased on the evidence provided by the complainant, the AEPD decided to initiate an investigation into the matter and was able to confirm that:\n 1. The defendant was aware of this incident since 03/07/2019 when the data subject complaint about the accuracy of their data.\n 2. The incident was caused by an error in their system due to a system migration.\n 3. The incident had been resolved on 15/07/2019 when a crossover of information in Vodafone’s system had occurred and Vodafone deactivated the third party who appeared to be named on the client ID associated with the complainant. Vodafone provided proof to have resolved the incident on 15/07/2019 and that the complainant's records are currently in the correct name. Vodafone confirmed that it had not disclosed the complainant's personal data to any third party.\n 4. In relation to the response provided to the OMIC, Vodafone confirmed that due to a human error during the complaint response process they had provided the OMIC with the correspondence intended for another individual. Vodafone clarified that the information about the complainant was not shared with an unauthorised third party.\n\nDispute\nWere the actions of the defendant a violation of the principles relating to the processing of personal data contained in Articles 5(d) and 5(f) of the GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Warning issued to Bucharest Municipality (District 4)","text":"The Romanian DPA (ANSPDCP) received a complaint regarding the violation of the GDPR by the General Directorate of 4th District Local Police regarding the personal data processed using portable audio-video surveillance means. The \"BADGE\" surveillance portable device was used by the staff of the Local Police in missions and activities carried out in the field.\n\nDispute\nDoes the controller processed the personal data using the \"BADGE\" surveillance portable device (which processes image and voice) according to Article 5(1)(a) GDPR and Article 6(1) GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd - 2020010677","text":"The Association of Icelandic Municipalities published the opinion of the Parliamentary Ombudsman on its website. However, the opinion contained the name and personal information of the complainant, and was online for several weeks, and was only taken down when the complainant contacted an employee of the Association. The Association responded that the information was published online unintentionally, and that they had not reported the breach to the Icelandic DPA because they did not believe the publication of the opinion would lead to a risk to the complainant's rights and freedoms.\n\nDispute\nDid the Association have a responsibility to report the breach to the DPA? Was there a lawful basis for the processing (i.e. the publication of the opinion) under Article 6(1)GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 37/2020","text":"Individual submitted a complaint on unsolicited political communications (SMS) he received by politician to whom he had no previous connection/relation.\n\nDispute\nIs unsolicited communication via SMS of a politician to whom the recipient never had contact legal?"}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W252 2239742-1/11Z","text":"The complainant saw his right of access violated, since video recordings of therapy sessions had not been sent to him. The DPA dismissed the complaint as unfounded. Consequently, the complainant filed an appeal against this decision."}
{"_id":"facts_VG Cottbus - VG 4 K 1191/19","text":"A water meter with a radio module is installed at the claimant's home (data subject) by a municipal water supplier (defendant, controller). The data subject believes that the installation of the radio water meter violates their fundamental right to data protection, as the device allows conclusions to be drawn about individual water use, which constitutes personal data. At their request, the controller switched off the radio module, for which the controller imposed the costs on them in the form of an administrative fee notice. The data subject appealed the fee notice."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Case no. 2021020294","text":"The controller was a secondary school. The data subject had been a teacher at the school.\nIn November 2018, the data subject requested a meeting with her fellow teachers to discuss the case of another teacher (teacher C) who, according to her, had been bullied for years. The data subject defended teacher C and, among other things, requested that a psychologist was brought in to assess the situation. According to the school administrator, the data subject had been insulting and shown a lack of respect for her colleagues in view of the sensitive topic of discussion during the meeting. Following the incident, the administrator received emails from the data subject's fellow teachers concerning the improper behaviour of the data subject.\nIn February 2019, the controller was informed by the Ministry of Education about a complaint by the data subject, in which she argued that she had suffered mental abuse in the November 2018 meeting.\nThe same year, the school was required to rearrange its employment structure in the course of which the data subject and teacher C were dismissed. In November 2019, the school received a letter from the Parliamentary Ombudsman, requesting the school's opinion regarding the joint complaint of the data subject and teacher C, who argued that their dismissals had been illegal.\nIn 2021, the data subject sent a complaint to the Icelandic DPA. She argued that after she had sent her complaint to the Ministry, the school administer started collecting her personal data through her former colleagues and shared it with the Ministry. Both happened without her consent (see Article 6(1)(a) GDPR) and without informing her of the existence of the data (see Article 14 GDPR). The illegally processed personal data would be used against her in the proceedings in front of the Ministry and the Ombudsman.\nThe administer of the school denied having actively collected information about the data subject from other teachers. The existing information was sent by other teachers to the administrator as a reaction to the data subject's behaviour in the 2018 meeting. All emails containing personal data, to which the data subject's complain related, were dated between January and February 1, 2019. However, the Ministry did not inform the controller about the complaint procedure until February 11, 2019. The controller also argued that the personal data was created due to the administrator's work activities and was therefore not obtained from a third party. As a result, Articles 13 and 14 GDPR would not apply and the controller would be absolved of its information obligation to the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Birthlink","text":"The controller is Birthlink, a company providing after adoption services that maintains the adoption contact register for Scotland. This enables adopted people, birth parents, adoptive relatives and birth relatives to register their details with a view to being ‘linked’ and potentially being reunited. Birthlink maintained manual records stored in filing cabinets containing documents relating to an adopted person’s individual circumstances.\nIn April 2021, records containing sensitive personal data of about 4,800 individuals were destroyed without a clear approval from the board. Some of the files destroyed contained irreplaceable items.\nIn September 2023, following internal investigations, Birthlink notified the Data Protection Authority (Information Commissioner's Office- ICO) about the breach."}
{"_id":"facts_CNPD (Portugal) - Deliberação 2022/140","text":"The Portuguese DPA started an investigation into the Municipality of Setubal (controller) after a journalistic article from the newspaper Expresso was published titled 'Ukrainians welcomed in CDU Chamber by Pro-Putin Russians' (\"Ucranianos recebidos em Câmara CDU por russos Pró-Putin\").\nThis article contained anonymous accounts of Ukrainian refugees. According to the Article, Russian citizens were present in the same room where Ukrainian refugees' personal data was stored (such as copies of identification documents). These Russian citizens - allegedly part of an Eastern European Immigrants' Association (EDINSTVO), an organisation for the support of eastern European migrants - also asked the refugees questions about the whereabouts of their relatives and what they were doing in Ukraine. In total, two members of the EDINSTVO were integrated by the controller into the Setúbal Office of Ethnicities and Immigration (SEI) in order to provide assistance, counselling and help to the refugees. According to the author of the article, these Russian citizens were accused in the article of sharing this personal data with the Russian Government.\nThis all happened in the framework of a Municipal Refugee Helpline (LIMAR), which was created in March 2022. The controller was responsible for the processing done by this helpline. The Helpline used two rooms of the controller's building in order to offer their services, one for the customer service and the other for archiving. Both rooms were only accessible for members of the helpline.\nThe helpline used two forms in order to collect the data from refugees seeking attendance: an assistance form and telephone assistance form. Using these forms, personal data was collected by the controller. Among other things, the controller collected the name, address, date of birth, marital status, information on the support network (identifying the places and people they might stay with and their respective households) and information on the period they might stay with the people in that support network, in addition to describing the specific situation of each refugee. The assistance forms were handwritten and were stored in a filing cabinet. All collected personal data was later also put into an Excel file which was protected by password.\nAdditionally, forms were accompanied by a declaration of consent for processing. The controller asked refugees for consent to 'authorise that the data records collected may be shared with other services or entities for the purpose of to specific responses or to provide social support adjusted to the situation adjusted to the situation, with the guarantees of privacy and non-discrimination'. Furthermore, together with the assistance forms, refugees were also offered to sign up for Portuguese language courses, for which they needed to provide a copy of an identification document.\nIn this context, one of the Russian citizens, who acted as a translator, was on medical leave for some time. This translator was informally substituted by her husband. The translator had given her husband her login-credentials to access the helpline's systems. This change was not documented or formalised in any way. The husband, who was not a controller's employee, helped to collect and copy personal data and documents from various refugees and acted as a translator himself."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00415/2019","text":"The complainant argued that he had received a communication from a debt recovery company claiming payments in relation to Xfera Móviles' services, although the claimant had not been a client of Xfera Móviles since September 2017.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/03293 (decision 2)","text":"In December 2020, the Norwegian DPA initiated an audit of the Directorate of Norwegian Correctional Service (DCS, the controller) regarding their processing of personal data. The DPA first requested an overview of such processing (equivalent to Article 30 GDPR) for purposes related to the Norwegian Execution of Sentences Act, details about the controller, the various processing activities in the correctional services, as well as a description of the roles and responsibilities internally. This lead to a first decision issued in August 2021.\nAs a second step of the audit, the DPA notified the controller in November 2021 about forthcoming physical inspections at various sites. The inspections were conducted on the basis of § 20 of the Norwegian Personal Data Act of 2018 (which also implements the GDPR in Norway) for their responsibilities as controller and internal controls for managing privacy and personal data protection in the organization.\nDuring the audit, the controller created an instruction which placed the controller responsibilities for the whole organization, including underlying agencies, with them (the Directorate). However, after the DPA conducted inspections with the underlying agencies, they concluded that the instruction was not fully implemented everywhere.\nFurther, the DPA noted that the internal control system was insufficient and outdated, especially since the controller evidently registers few violations of routines and regulations, likely as a result of lack of training and lack of a personal data security culture in the organization.\nThe DPA also stated that complex and confusing regulations might have lead to the lack of compliance. The Norwegian Personal Data Act of 2018 and the GDPR do not apply to the processing of personal data related to sentencing, so the legislator continued the Norwegian Personal Data Act of 2000, with corresponding regulations. The legislator announced in 2018 a new law for the processing of inmates' personal data related to sentencing."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 2)","text":"The Municipality of Helsingor used Chromebooks and Google Workspace (formerly G Suite for Education) in primary school education. The Municipality of Helsingor created Google accounts for students, giving them access to programs including Gmail and YouTube, without the parents' knowledge and consent. These accounts were needed to use Chromebooks on which the G-suite program package, a Google product specifically aimed at the education of children and young people, was installed.\nWhen students used these programs with their school accounts, their names, school and class information were displayed on the platforms. Parents did not have the opportunity to correct or anonymise this information, as only the Municipality had access to user management panels.\nThe Municipality had not carried out a risk assessment for the processing in question. It also had not implemented technical or organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk relating to the use of social media using the created school accounts.\nConsequently, in September 2021, the Danish DPA found violations of Articles 5(2), 5(1)(a), 32(1), (33)(1) and (35)(1) GDPR. It ordered the Municipality to bring its processing of personal data using Google Chromebooks and G Suite in line with the GDPR. This was to be done especially by conducting a risk assessment and, if the risk found was to be too high, an impact assessment. Additionally, the DPA issued a warning that the use of G Suite’s supplementary programs without carrying out an impact assessment would be contrary to the GDPR.\nAs a follow-up to the DPA’s decision, in November 2021, the Municipality submitted its risk assessment regarding the use of Google Chromebooks and G Suite for Education and further documentation to prove the legality of the processing activity. In addition, in December 2021, the Municipality submitted further information. The Danish DPA reviewed the Municipality's risk assessment and documentation and issued its decision in July 2022."}
{"_id":"facts_Court of Appeal of Brussels - 2020/AR/1160 (First Interim Decision)","text":"Proximus appeals the provisionally enforceable aspect of its appealed decision of the Belgian DPA.\n\nDispute\nIs the decision of the Belgian DPA provisionally enforceable even though it is under appeal?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 18/02140","text":"In May 2018 a pupil at a school in Bergen notified the ICT helpdesk of a folder he had found online, containing several files with usernames and passwords of over 35,000 users. However, the school management did not follow up on the notice.\nIn August, the pupil logged onto the learning management system as the school's principal and sent a message to several people. He expressed later that he did so because the school had failed to take his first notice seriously. When the school discovered this, it notified the police, who found out that the pupil sent the notification. He admitted he had simply guessed the principal's password.\nThe municipality failed to first notify the Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) of the breaches, who discovered these initially after being contacted by several media outlets (after the municipality sent out a press release the same day).\nThe DPA's investigation revealed that the school had failed to enable two-factor authentication, despite a campaign the DPA conducted in 2013-2014 in the education sector. At the time, the DPA instructed all municipalities in Norway to enable strong authentication on their learning management systems and other administrative systems. Thus, the DPA argues that it is beyond doubt that Bergen municipality was well aware of this security requirement.\nFollowing this incident, the municipality reset all passwords and enabled two-factor authentication."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2021102040","text":"The dispute concerns an issue where the research company Gallup (the controller) looks up data subjects' phone numbers on the online database www.ja.is and stores these in their internal database, to be able to call the data subjects and invite them to participate in surveys. A data subject lodged a complaint against this processing of their personal data, arguing that they never agreed to the processing, nor did the controller inform them about the processing and purposes for the processing.\nThe controller claimed that the processing of personal data in question was necessary because of their legitimate interests in ensuring sufficient research quality and participation rate, including allowing for all adult citizens to have an equal opportunity to respond to national registry surveys. Even without a database, the controller would have to research and call participants. Further, the controller stored personal data in a do-not-call list to avoid contacting data subjects again who had previously objected to this. The controller concluded that the disadvantages for the processing activities were minimal for the data subjects."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202313830","text":"On 22 August 2023, a data subject filed a complaint with the DPA against Silvanergia 2022, S.L. (the controller).\nOn 16 August 2023, an agent of the controller contacted the data subject, claiming to call on behalf of their energy provider, Bassols Energía, S.A. (Bassols), to update the electricity rate according to new government regulations. The agent asserted that they already possess the data subject’s data, requiring solely their confirmation by email. The referred data consisted of the data subject’s full name, ID number, address, Universal Supply Point Code number[1], and 12 digits of their bank account.\nThe controller sent an email to the data subject, reminding them of the pending signature to update the tariff. This contained a contract in the name of Bassols. The data subject refused to sign the contract once they noticed that the controller was not their electricity supply company, as they did not intend to enter into a new contract with the controller.\nThe controller contacted the data subject again to ask why they had not signed the contract. In response, the data subject asked the controller how it obtained their data, in order to exercise their right to erasure (Article 17 GDPR). The controller replied that the data was obtained by third-party firms, despite the data subject denying that they had provided any of their data to them. The data subject tried to contact the controller again but discovered that the e-mail address and phone number of the controller were listed as nonexistent. The data subject then contacted Bassols and requested the deletion of their personal data. Bassols claimed that it had been a victim of identity fraud committed by the controller, as the contract received via email by the data subject was in the name of Bassols.\nDuring its investigations, the DPA found that Bassols was part of a business group, which includes an electricity marketing company named Bassols Energía Comercial SL (BEC). The DPA later identified the controller as the company that had contacted the data subject claiming to be their energy provider, as it was confirmed by the data subject's telecommunications provider. BEC explained to the DPA that it had previously contracted the controller for telemarketing services, in order for the controller to find new clients for BEC. The two companies no longer worked together because the controller had not signed the contract, which would establish it as a processor on behalf of BEC. In addition, BEC claimed that it did not provide the data subject's personal data; this is only done once the processor signs a confidentiality agreement. The DPA requested information from the controller on the sources of the data subject's personal data. The controller claimed the data was obtained through a supplier (anonymised by the DPA), however, was unable to provide evidence.\nOn 22 November 2023, the complaint was allowed to proceed."}
{"_id":"facts_LAG Schleswig-Holstein - 6 Ta 49/22","text":"The controller operated a care service where the data subject was employed. The controller filmed the data subject in their work environment and published a thirty-six second video on Youtube for promotional purposes. The data subject had previously given verbal consent to the filming but had not received any further information about the purpose of the filming or their rights.\nLater, the data subject objected to the use of the video and claimed €6,000 in damages during proceedings before the labour court. The controller deactivated the video immediately afterwards. The parties involved reached an agreement and settled the dispute.\nThe data subject had applied for legal aid for claiming damages up to €6,000. The ArbG Kiel granted it up to the amount of €2,000. Thereupon, the data subject then appealed to the LAG Schleswig-Holstein for legal aid in the amount of €6,000."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 71/2022","text":"A Twitter user notified the Belgian DPA (APD/GBA) of an email she had received from the Belgian National Railway (NMBS) about the \"Hello Belgium Railway Pass\", which is a ticket for Belgian residents providing them with a number of free train rides. After having reviewed the facts provided by the Twitter user, the DPA decided to initiate an investigation into the incident on its own motion. In its investigations, the DPA found that the email contained the general terms and conditions of the NMBS, instructions on how to use the railway pass correctly and Covid related information. However, the communication also included information of promotional nature and no unsubscribe button or link was provided. In the proceedings, the controller brought forward that the email was intended to remind the recipients to always ensure their safety when traveling and to remind them of the contractual conditions. It, therefore, considered the email as necessary for the performance of the contracts concluded with the ticket holders under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_EDPS - 2021-0518","text":"Following an investigation in 2019-2020, the EDPS issued recommendations and the Commission modified the ILA. The EDPS investigated whether these modifications were sufficient to bring processing in compliance with data protection requirements and found infringements.\nData accessed by Microsoft include identity and contact data of users (when signing on to the service and when checking the licenses), data generated by the users while using the software and data generated by Microsoft based on the usage of the software.\nThe EDPS found that the processing presents significant risks as it monitors the behaviour of users, combines datasets and uses artificial intelligence. Reference date is the 12th May 2021, the date when the investigation was launched. Some measures were taken meanwhile by the Commission, which were taken into account in the recommendations issued."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-31-3354","text":"The website first presented visitors with information about the processing activities, after which the visitor could press \"Allow all cookies\" or \"Show details\". There was no other button for users who wanted to refrain from giving consent, and the continued use of the website was interpreted by the controller as consenting to the marketing cookies.\nThe information provided by the website stated:\n\"This website uses cookies\nWe use cookies to personalize our content and ads, to show you social media features and to analyze our traffic. We also share information about your use of our website with our social media partners, advertising partners and analytics partners. Our partners may combine this data with other information that you have provided to them or that they have collected from your use of their services. You agree to our cookies if you continue to use our website.”\nThe website visitor then had the option to click on \"Allow all cookies\" or \"Show details\". If the visitor clicked \"Show details\", he/she was presented with information about which cookies www.golf.dk used. It appeared, among other things, that www.golf.dk used 13 cookies in relation to \"Preferences\", 29 cookies in relation to \"Statistics\", 218 cookies in relation to \"Marketing\" and 19 cookies which were \"Unclassified\".\nFrom the perspective of the website operator, the consent was obtained before the commencement of the proceedings, and the privacy policy on the website stated how consent could be withdrawn.\n\nDispute\nDid the cookie consent mechanism of the website gather valid consent in line with the GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01896","text":"A representative acting on behalf of Gveik AS conducted a credit rating on the complainant's sole proprietorship, despite the latter having no customer relationship or any other affiliation with either the representative or the company. The representative claimed that the credit rating was conducted by mistake and that they had tried to cancel it, unsuccessfully. The DPA noted that the credit rating seems to have been conducted due to \"nosiness\".\nGveik AS didn't have written routines for credit ratings, because these are only conducted for new customers and customers that \"request many new services\".\n\nDispute\nDid Gveik AS have legal grounds for processing the personal data of the complainant for a credit scoring, as per Article 6(1)(f)? And did they have sufficient internal controls for the use of credit scoring in their business?"}
{"_id":"facts_Dublin Circuit Civil Court - 2023 IECC 11","text":"The data subject took a civil claim against the controller, here the Child and Family Agency, for unlawfully disclosing her data. The controller had been in possession of sensitive data relating to childhood abuse suffered by the data subject.\nThe controller accepted that it had caused a data breach, which resulted in the data subject’s now deceased brother having access to the information. The brother had been the subject of the report of abuse made by the data subject to the controller. After the report had been disclosed to her brother, her other siblings and family members also found out about the incident.\nThe data subject reported that this caused her extreme distress and resulted in a lack of trust in the controller and further mental health problems."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202103039","text":"The data subject purchased property from Rodali Gestión Inmobiliaria (controller), a real estate agency. She signed a contract to make a reservation of the property. This document included her personal data. The contract neither included a clause nor was the data subject otherwise informed on how her personal data would be processed. When the data subject discovered this, she filed a complaint with the DPA.\nThe DPA tried to notify the controller about both the complaint and the start of a sanctioning procedure for the alleged infringement of Article 13 GDPR, but was unsuccesful. The notifications were repeatedly rejected and returned."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Softehnica S.R.L","text":"The DPA started an investigation against the IT company Softehnica S.R.L, the controller, after a data breach was notified pursuant to Article 33 GDPR.\nThe investigation by the DPA revealed that the controller´s IT infrastructure was accessed as a result of a ransomware attack."}
{"_id":"facts_Datainspektionen - DI-2020-4534","text":"The housing company set up a surveillance camera to film the door of a tenant who had been objected to harassment and disturbances for a long time. In the camera's recording area, another tenant’s door could be seen, as well as tenants walking in and out of the apartment house. The camera recording was without sound recording or real-time monitoring, and the recordings could only be accessed by five people within the company.\n\nDispute\nDoes the interest of camera surveillance to combat disturbances and harassment in an apartment building outweigh the right to the integrity of the tenants under Article 6(1)(f)?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03177","text":"Lillestrom municipality notified the Norwegian DPA about a personal data breach concerning a document they had published on their website, where they had forgotten to classify the appendices as exempt from public disclosure. The caseworker also failed to notice the error. The document then went through two additional manual quality controls without the error being detected and it was only discovered after a local journalist notified them.\nThe document contained information and personal data about a pupil, including name, birth date, name and address of their parents and their description of their child, description and assessment of the pupil's behaviour and educational challenges from both the school and other public authorities, as well as a concrete assessment of how much special needs tutoring the pupil needs, the pupil's own description of their well-being at home and at school, their tests and assessments and potential diagnoses like dyslexia or ADHD.\nThe document was available online for about two days and was accessed by four different IP addresses before the municipality managed to remove it."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 3116/163/20","text":"On April 2020 an early childhood education unit (pre-school) sent an inquiry along with an informational letter regarding activities to prevent the spread of COVID-19. The families were asked to return the form, providing personal data (including the child's social security number) and stating whether they could arrange childcare at home during the pandemic.\nA letter accompanying the inquiry form stated that handling personal data is based on consent and that the data subject gives consent by returning the form. In reality many parents were told that returning the questionnaire was mandatory.\nThe controller responded to the DPA's request for information, stating that returning the inquiry form was voluntary but strongly desirable. The information was needed to arrange activities during exceptional circumstances due to the COVID pandemic. The controller agreed that the voluntary nature of the inquiry could have been more clearly communicated. They also explained that employees had been given general guidelines for handling personal data, but not specific guidelines for this particular situation.\nThe controller identified Article 6(1)(c) GDPR (necessary for compliance with a legal obligation) as the legal basis for the processing of personal data in this case. Their statement asserted that they needed the information in order to arrange day care for children, accounting for the number of students learning from home, and to arrange lessons in small groups where possible. They also claimed that they required the information in order to refund families if a child was not attending the activities due to the pandemic. However, the controller agreed that a child's social security number was not a necessary piece of information, and that their age would have been enough to verify the identity of the child."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00111/2021","text":"An individual repeatedly received emails containing Vodafone invoices belonging to a third party. They tried reaching out to the company by email and telephone to resolve this issue, but were never properly helped.\nThus, they filed a complaint to the Spanish DPA (AEPD), which informed Vodafone of the issue. The company assured the DPA it had both dealt with the problem and communicated the resolution to the complainant. The complainant nonetheless kept receiving invoices. The DPA communicated this to the company, which then provided evidence the complainant's email address had been deleted from its systems. It claimed the problem was caused by the customer (that the invoices were actually intended for) entering the complainant's email address instead of their own."}
{"_id":"facts_VwGH - Ra 2023/04/0259","text":"The data subject applied for legal aid for court proceedings. The application for legal aid and the data subject’s objection as well as the decision of the district court to grant legal aid were submitted to the lawyer of the other party in the proceedings, who forwarded these documents, including the declaration of assets, to their client. Subsequently, these documents were forwarded by the other party in the proceedings to a third party.\nOn 6 April 2023, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Austrian DPA (“Datenschutzbehörde – DSB”) against the other party for forwarding the documents to a third party. The DPA held that the forwarding of the application for legal aid, including the declaration of assets, violated the principle of data minimisation pursuant to Article 5(1)(c) GDPR.\nThe other party appealed this decision at the Federal Administrative Court (“Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG”). The court upheld the appeal and annulled the DPA’s decision. The court held that the DPA failed to question the third party, to whom the application for legal aid including the declaration of assets had been forwarded to, whether they had already been aware of the transmitted data beforehand. As the DPA had not made any findings on this question, the court could also not establish facts necessary for a decision on this matter. Therefore, the case should be referred back to the DPA to complete the facts of the case quickly and in a cost-saving manner.\nThe DPA appealed this decision at the Supreme Administrative Court (“Verwaltungsgerichtshof - VwGH”) and argued that it cannot be inferred from the wording of Article 57(1)(f) GDPR that the DPA is obliged to investigate beyond \"to the extent appropriate\". In the present case, it could not be said that the \"appropriate extent\" of the investigation was not reached. Moreover, there was also a lack of case law from the Administrative Court on Article 57(1)(f) GDPR. The annulment of the DPA’s decision by the Federal Administrative Court was therefore unjustified."}
{"_id":"facts_CE - N° 430810","text":"CNIL issued a fine of € 50 million against Google in CNIL - SAN-2019-001 after two complaints filed by noyb and La Quadrature du Net on the basis of lack of transparency of the privacy policy and the lack of valid legal basis to process the data. Google appealed the decision of the CNIL on several grounds, including the lack of competence of the CNIL since Google would have its main establishment in Ireland.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W292 2267784-1","text":"In May 2018, a data subject, respresented by noyb - European Centre for Digital Rights, filed a complaint with the Austrian DPA. The latter referred the case to the Irish DPC as lead supervisory authority under Article 56 GDPR and a cooperation procedure under Article 60 GDPR was initiated.\nOn 11 January 2023, the DSB transmitted to the data subject the final decision by the DPC in accordance with Article 60(7) GDPR and informed her that the EDPB’s binding decision under Article 65(1)(a) GDPR would be published thereafter. Two days later, on 13 January 2023, the DSB transmitted the binding decision of the EDPB of 5 December 2022 to the data subject. The DSB informed the data subject that the parts of the original complaint that were not addressed by the DPC's decision are still pending before the DPC.\nOn 7 February 2023, the data subject filed an appeal with the BVwG, claiming that the transmission of the DPC’s decision by the DSB should be considered a partially dismissing or rejection decision within the meaning of Article 60(9) GDPR. Since the DPC and the EDPB failed to address some of the points raised in the complaint, the communications of the DSB, together with the decision of the DPC could not be interpreted as a positive decision in accordance with Article 60(7). In the complainant's view, the communication by the DSB therefore constitutes an official decisions within the meaning of section 58 et seqq. of the Austrian General Law on Administrative Procedures (Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, AVG).\nIn its submissions, the DSB argued that Article 60(7) GDPR applied in this case and the DPC would still be handling the case."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 19/5030","text":"On 28 March 2019, the complainant submitted a DSAR to the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Directorate). The complainant has previously received an email from the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V), containing data about the claimant. According the DT&V, that data originated from the Directorate.\nOn 29 April 2019, the Directorate rejected the complainant’s request of access to his personal data. On 17 September 2019, complainant’s objection to this decision was rejected as unfounded.\nThe complainant appeals against this decision.\n\nDispute\nThe Directorate claims that the complainant’s DSAR cannot be granted because the Ministry is not controller of the affected personal data: the identity investigation in question was ordered by the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V).\nIn addition, after rejecting the complainant’s objection, the Directorate claimed that the complainant was abusing his rights. The Directorate pointed out that complainant has submitted access requests to both DT&V and the Directorate, and that he wanted to use this data in other process, so access to personal data was not the end goal of the request."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 3)","text":"This is the Danish DPA's third decision in the case relating to Helsingor municipality's processing of personal data in primary and lower secondary school. Helsingor municipality, the controller, has been using Google Chromebooks and Workspace for Education in violation of several GDPR requirements, as detailed in the first decision of September 2021 and the second decision of 14 July 2022.\nFollowing the second decision, the municipality submitted over 1,700 pages to the DPA to substantiate and justify their processing, including a data protection impact assessment (DPIA). The municipality agreed with the DPA that there was indeed a high risk to the data subjects using Google Workspace, but claimed to have identified and managed all relevant risks. Finally, the municipality assessed that Google acts solely as a processor, not as a controller."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4680/182/18","text":"The Finnish DPA had asked the controller (OP-Henkivakuutus Oy, a life insurance company) to explain on which legal basis and for what purpose it processed data subjects' health data requested from the health care. The controller was also asked to explain how it processed personal data before the execution of an insurance contract.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that the processing was based on Section 6(1)(1) of the Finnish Data Protection Act, according to which insurance institutions may, despite the general prohibition in Article 9(1) GDPR, process the health data of the insured party and the claimant, which is necessary to determine the liability of the insurance institution. The controller considered that it had the right to process health data at all stages of the life insurance customer relationship: when applying for insurance, during the insurance period and after an insured event has occurred.\nThe controller also stated that it requested all data subjects applying for life insurance for their consent to that the controller may, if necessary, request health data from health care units in order to process the insurance application and possible compensation case, and to ensure the accuracy of the health data. The controller considered it necessary that the consent given by data subjects was valid for the entire duration of the insurance contract.\nThe controller claimed that a situation where the data subject withdraws their consent or does not give it in the first place, but the controller must still issue life insurance and keep it valid, is impossible. In the controller's view, the data subject could have terminated the insurance at any time if they did not want the controller to receive their health data from the health care."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Amsterdam - AMS 20/3251","text":"The data subject owns an apartment in an apartment complex. The Association of (home) Owners (hereafter: VvE), of which the data subject is a member, decided to replace the old surveillance cameras with new ones. According to the data subject, the new surveillance system led to an invasion of her privacy. She also stated that the new cameras could process biometrical data (which is sensitive data, Article 9(1) GDPR).\nThe VvE argued that the purpose of the camera surveillance is to protect the property of the common parts as well as the flats. They added that incidents of burglary and damage had occurred in the past, and that these new cameras are an appropriate security measure. Then, the VvE stated that this measure is not disproportionate since the cameras do not show the public road and do not process more data than is necessary. Moreover, the VvE claimed that protecting the property of the VvE and its residents cannot be achieved in any other way.\nLastly, the VvE argued that their legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR) outweighed the data subject's interest of privacy since data subject is only filmed when she is in common areas, the VvE has built in sufficient safeguards (technical and organisational), and people passing by are notified of the surveillance via a sign.\nThe data subject filed a complaint with the AP (Dutch DPA) and, after the DPA rejected the complaint, brought the action before court."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9853406","text":"From 20 September 2022 onwards, five days before the Italian general elections, Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Meta), the controller, launched a campaign specifically aimed at Italian adults, for the stated purposes of encouraging voting, providing information on the election, and combatting election interference. Specifically, Meta prepared electoral reminders on its Facebook and Instagram services, which redirected users to the website of the Ministry of the Interior where they could find “reliable information about the elections”. These features were available through the Election Day Information (EDI) function on the Facebook service, and by clicking on election day “stickers” (which can be added to shared photos and videos) through the Instagram service.\nThe Italian DPA considered it necessary to acquire further information regarding these activities and, by a letter dated 21 September 2022, sent a list of questions to Meta. In particular, this letter sought to ascertain: the nature and modalities of data processing in relation to the reminders and ‘stickers’, as well as the storage period of the data collected; the agreement allegedly in place with the Ministry of the Interior to redirect users to its website; any relevant corporate and community policies; any agreement with independent fact-checking organisations and the data exchanged with them; the manner in which the processing involved (in particular that which reveals political opinions) had been brought to the data subjects’ attention and the legal basis for such processing; and, finally, the measures put in place to ensure that these features would only be brought to the attention of those over 18 years old.\nMeta responded to the DPA on 22 September 2022, via a letter which did not contain much of the information requested and did not alleviate many of the concerns raised. As a result, on 23 September 2022, the DPA called upon Meta to temporarily suspend the aforementioned processing activity. Late in the evening on 23 September 2022, Meta sent a letter in which it stated its intention not to pause the initiatives in question. Meta provided some additional information, in a non-exhaustive manner, which was still not enough for the DPA to alleviate its concerns. In fact, the information provided by Meta, in some respects, compounded these concerns further; in particular, by stating that the data would be aggregated within 90 days and could be shared with “third parties such as research partners, academia, governmental partners or electoral committees”.\nFurthermore, in its responses to the Italian DPA, Meta stated that the development of the EDI function takes into account the recommendations made by the Irish DPA (DPC), which is the lead data protection authority of Meta, as this is the jurisdiction in which Meta has its main establishment in the EU (Article 56(1) GDPR). In particular, Meta asserted that the product was developed “following a broad consultation on the product characteristics and the relevant transparency safeguards”. Responding to this argument, the Italian DPA notes that the issues they have raised are linked to substantive issues (legal basis of processing, purpose limitation, nature of the data processed, data sharing, storage period and data retention). As such, despite the fundamental importance of transparency obligations, these concerns are not addressed exclusively by a focus on transparency.\nBy means of the voluntary mutual assistance procedure pursuant to Article 61 GDPR, The Italian DPA asked the DPC to: share information on the EDI functionality as a matter of urgency and to clarify whether, as stated by the controller, that functionality had received any form of approval by the DPC; and to consider, as a matter of utmost urgency, the adoption of corrective measures, including a temporary limitation on the processing prior to the holding of the elections in Italy. The Italian DPA rasied serious concerns regarding the assesment of the substantive issues by the DPC, and the feedback they received during this process. Therefore, they considered it necessary to adopt further measures in order to resolve this issue."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00257/2020","text":"Ayuntamiento de Arroyomolinos was found lacking a Data Protection Officer (DPO).\nThe defendant has since adopted corrective measures. A DPO has been appointed pursuant to a service contract from 28.09.2020.\n\nDispute\nWas the municipality Ayuntamiento de Arroyomolinos under the obligation to appoint a DPO?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202407160","text":"A data subject returned a product to a store, Novates Alimentacion Madrid (controller), and was refunded too much money.\nUpon visiting the store again, the data subject was shown CCTV footage of the incident by a staff member of her previous interaction at the checkout. The staff member showed the data subject a recording of this footage taken on her personal mobile phone and sent it to the data subject via WhatsApp.\nIn the video, other customers are visible, and the recording includes the voice of a staff member who remarks “that’s where the failure was”.\nOn 26 April 2024, the data subject filed a complaint with the AEPD (Spanish DPA)."}
{"_id":"facts_APDCAT (Catalonia) - CNS 14/2022","text":"The controller was a rail service that contracted with third-party security services to guard its facilities. Occasionally, when disagreements arose between customers of the rail service and the third-party security guards, customers would request the identification data of the security guards involved.\nThe controller's DPO requested guidance from the Catalan DPA (Autoritat Catalana de Protecció de Dades - APDCAT), asking the following questions:\n 1. Would it be lawful processing to provide a customer the identifcation data of a third-party security guard without the guard's consent?\n 2. What would be the legal basis for such processing under Article 6 GDPR?\n 3. If any, what data could be provided?\n 4. If a customer is provided a security guard's identification data, should that guard be informed?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00190/2020","text":"A Home Owners' Association released a debtors list, that was shown publicly in the building's hall, where address details, name and surname of the claimant could be found.\n\nDispute\nIs a Home Owners' Association allowed to publish such data?"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-442-13805","text":"On 12 July 2021, the Danish Customs and Tax Administration (CTA) reported a personal data breach to the Danish DPA (Datatilsynet). The CTA had sent a letter containing the personal data (of someone else) in the form of identification data, financial information and social security number, to the wrong recipient. The CTA knew already on 8 July that a breach had possibly occured, because the incorrect recipient made them aware. After the CTA's internal investigation, they concluded on 9 July that a personal data breach had indeed happened.\nFrom the report to the DPA, the CTA stated that the affected data subject was informed on 10 July. Because of the information they had provided, the DPA closed the matter on 23 July.\nHowever, on 20 August the DPA received a follow-up from the CTA, stating that they had not, in fact, informed the affected data subject on 10 July, as the initially reported, but on 18 August. The CTA explained that their late follow-up was due to the vacation period.\nBecause of the new information, the DPA decided to reopen the case."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4431/161/21","text":"The Finnish DPA was notified that the Finnish Motor Insurers' Centre (the controller) had requested unnecessary patient information from healthcare providers in order to settle claims. The DPA then asked the controller to explain how it processed patient information disclosed by healthcare providers for the purposes of settling claims.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that, according to Section 82 of the Finnish Motor Liability Insurance Act, it has the right, notwithstanding the obligation of confidentiality or other restrictions on access to information, to obtain statements made by healthcare providers and other information concerning the patients' medical records, health status, ability to work, treatment and rehabilitation.\nThe controller stated that it was impossible to process the claim without the claimants' medical records. The controller processed the patients' healthcare appointment data to determine whether the healthcare provider had charged for visits that were not related to the examination or treatment of injuries sustained in a traffic accident.\nThe controller emphasised that it followed the principle of data minimisation and that the patients’ healthcare appointment data were not requested unnecessarily. The controller also noted that it had to request a large amount of information in case the healthcare providers had omitted information necessary for claims handling."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Oost-Brabant - ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2023:7274","text":"The data subject owned a mobile home, which was permanently pitched at a campsite. Between 31 March 2021 and 4 November 2021, the Municipality of Oisterwijk's tax authority charged the data subject for municipal taxes of sewerage and commuter tax.\nThe data subject objected to the taxes through the Municipality's objection procedure. The data subject founded his objection on GDPR grounds and made the following claims: (i) he made an Article 15 GDPR access request, (ii) claimed that the taxes were invalid as they were calculated through automated means, and invoked his right not to be subject to automated decision-making under Article 22 GDPR, and (iii) made an erasure request under Article 17 GDPR.\nOn 22 March 2022, the Municipality responded to the data subject's objection and provided him with a copy of his data held by them, in the context of the calculation of the commuter and sewerage tax charges. The Municipality rejected the data subject's Articles 17 and 22 GDPR requests.\nThe data subject objected to the Municipality's response and appealed it to the Court of East Brabant."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/502323 / HA RK 20-122","text":"NWO-I (Netherlands Foundation of Scientific Research Institutes) rejected the applicant’s subject access request. More specifically, the applicant wanted to see what personal data was sent to his former employer by email and examine the related documents.\n\nDispute\nNWO-I is of the opinion that the access request is formulated too broadly and must be rejected. Moreover, NMO-I claims that it has checked its personnel files and that these do not contain any personal data of the applicant."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 35/2023","text":"A data subject complained that Alpha Bank (the controller) provided the complainant's wife with information about the maintenance of a credit card in his name, as well as printed receipts of all transactions he had made in the previous 3-4 months, without informing him. This resulted in in the significant disruption of the family peace and the relationship of the complainant with his wife.\nThe Authority invited the controller to provide information, specifying in particular:\nAt the same time, the Bank was requested to submit its relevant policies and to clarify whether the provisions therein were complied with and whether the alleged were treated as a data breach incident, in accordance with Articles 33-34 of the GDPR.\nThe Bank launched an internal investigation and confirmed the committal of the violation, which it attributed to an error of an employee of its local branch. The investigation concluded that employee acted without intention to deceive. This was because:\nRegarding the management of the breach, based on Articles 33-34 of the GDPR, the Bank claimed that the incident was treated as a personal data breach, all relevant procedures for recording and handling it were followed, the responsible employee was referred to the Disciplinary Board and severely punished with a disciplinary dismissal penalty of one (1) month. No notification was made to the Authority under Article 33 GDPR, because it concerned only one subject and the controller thought that there was no possibility that it would affect the rights and freedoms of the subject himself or of other natural persons. While no notification was made to the data subject pursuant to Article 34 GDPR, the controller did not consider this necessary as the data subject had been the one to inform the controller about the incident."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2018-32-0232","text":"A citizen requested the deletion of their personal data into the Copenhagen Civil Registration System (CPR).\nThe personal data have been deleted from the CPR, but the city deletion system results in a new subscription of the citizen’s personal data in the CPR each time deletion requests are made. The consequence is that Copenhagen included the claimant’s personal data in the CPR, even though the person did not live in Copenhaguen for years and had already asked for the deletion of the personal data registered.\nTherefore, the Datatilsynet received a complaint regarding the continuous subscription of citizen's personal data into the Copenhagen CPR.\n\nDispute\nIs the new subscription of personal data upon deletion request adequate, relevant and necessary for the performance of the citizen data collection service?"}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-014","text":"The controller provided remote psychic services via telephone, online chat or text message. On some of its websites, the controller offered personalised chats via telephone, online chat or text message. In order to promote their services, the controller and its partner sent marketing messages to existing and prospective customers via e-mail and text. Prospective customers contact details were obtained through a contact form on either of the two companies’ websites. The controller and its partner set up a shared database for their marketing purposes which on the 6 October 2022 included personal data of more than 1.5 million people.\nOn 15 November 2021, the French DPA (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés - CNIL) carried out an online check of five websites run by the controller or its partner. An on-site inspection was also carried out on 7 and 8 December 2021 at the premises of the two companies. The following details the findings of the investigation:\n1) Data retention period proportionate to the purpose of processing under Article 5(1)(e) GDPR\nThe controller retained the data of its customers for a period of six years after the end of the commercial relationship.\n2) Processing limited to necessary data under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR\nThe controller categorically recorded all telephone conversations with half of the conversations being deleted by the end of the day and the other half being stored for six years. The controller argued that this is necessary so that it would be able to respond to possible judicial investigations as well as for training and quality control purposes.\n3) Prior consent to the processing of special category data under Article 9 GDPR\nThrough its partner's website, the controller gained access to data containing data subjects sex, date, time and city of birth, as well as their e-mail address, but also the sex and date of birth of their partner. During the remote consultations, a plethora of personal information may be disclosed by the customers. The controller argued that this sensitive data is not processed but simply recorded.\n4) Processing for marketing purposes under Article L.34-5 of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code (Article L.34-5 Code des postes et des communication électroniques)\nThe notice included on the contact form did not list the controller by name, nor a list of all other third parties the data is shared with. While users could follow a link which provided some additional information, this link was located much further down on the form. Further, the information included in the link did not mention commercial advertising at all.\nDuring the proceedings the controller changed the format of the contact form to include a very small unintelligible character attached to a word on the form. A click on this character then lead to a footnote which was not visible on the original form listing the controller as the provider of marketing messages.\nThe controller argued that it would be impossible to provide data subjects with a comprehensive list of recipients as this would breach contractual confidentiality clauses."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-812-0035","text":"A prison officer had requested the Prison and Probation Service to get access to documents confirming that he as an employee had been involved in violent incidents. He later clarified that he wanted access to all documents that mentioned his name.\nThe Prison and Probation Service initially rejected the request on the grounds that, for technical reasons, it was not possible to report all the episodes in which the officer had participated and it was only possible to seek reports that the officer had written himself. Then, they claimed that searching all relevant documents that mentioned the complainant's name would be an excessive burden according to Article 12 (5) GDPR.\nThe prison officer then complained before the DPA about the Prison and Probation Service's refusal to grant access."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/542054 / KG ZA 22-341","text":"Data subjects were a group looking for paranormal activities. They visited a cemetery in the municipality of Amersfoort (controller) to conduct a séance, \"looking for energies of the deceased\". This happened with the permission of the director of the cemetery.\nThe parents of two children who were buried at the cemetery later found out about the séance and requested the data subjects' NAW-data (name, address and residence) from the municipality. They wanted to talk to them directly and possibly hold them liable for the damage they suffered as a result of the séance. The mother stated that it is absolutely not allowed to summon \"spirits or devils\" at graves in their Islamic culture. As a result of the séance, she claimed to have suffered serious psychological problems.\nThe data subjects did not want their personal data to be disclosed. They had received serious threats because of the incident and felt unsafe.\nThe municipality apologised for the events but stated that it was not obliged to disclose the personal data to the parents. It did offer to facilitate a conversation between the parties, during which the data subjects would remain anonymous, but the parents declined the offer. The parents were of the opinion that the municipality was acting unlawfully by not providing the personal data, so they brought the case before the court."}
{"_id":"facts_Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2021-03","text":"This case is an appeal of the decision DT-20/02178 by the Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet), in which it imposed a fine of NOK 400,000 (approx. €38,300).\nThe controller argued that the size of the administrative fine imposed, was too high and therefore appealed the decision with the DPA. The DPA reviewed their decision, but upheld it.\nThe case was therefore was submitted to the Privacy Appeals Board (Personvernnemnda) for consideration."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00603/2021","text":"A data subject filed a complaint against Lia's Clothes (an online clothes store) stating that the website did not have an adequate privacy policy or cookie banner.\nThe Spanish DPA (AEPD) initiated an investigation, and determined that once data subjects were prompted to introduce their personal data, there was indeed no information provided related to the protection of personal data, or a link to a privacy policy.\nThe AEPD also verified that when entering the website, non-essential cookies such as Google Analytics are used, without an adequate banner informing data subjects about their use, the possibility to reject them, or consent to them in a differentiated granular manner."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 3831/161/21","text":"The Finnish DPA had asked the controller (Kesko Oyj, Finland's largest retail chain) to explain how it processed and stored personal data in connection with its loyalty program.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that it processed basic customer information, such as the person's name and contact information, and purchasing behaviour data. Purchasing behaviour data indicates customers' detailed and product-specific purchase data. Depending on the situation, the information related to the customer was erased at the end of the customer relationship or anonymised no later than 25 months after the end of the customer relationship.\nThe controller also stated that it processes purchase data for business development, the provision of benefits and services, and the implementation and targeting of marketing. The controller emphasised that unjustifiably prohibiting or restricting the collection and processing of data that benefits the customer would undermine data-driven innovations and product development."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202309454","text":"The data subject was a gym member at a fitness franchise (School Fitness), which allegedly acted as a joint controller together with the local gym. On 7 February 2021, the data subject filed a complaint through the controller’s website as they were unhappy about being filmed during fitness classes without consent.\nIn its reply, the controller asserted that the data subject had given consent by signing the membership contract. The contract contained a clause stating that by signing, the member authorised the company to use all images, photographs, videos, voice recordings, graphics, etc., in which they appeared.\nOn 9 May 2023, the data subject noticed that a phone was recording the class, despite their repeated objections to being filmed. The data subject believed that the contractual clause referred to in the email exchange was abusive and, on 30 May 2023, filed a complaint with the AEPD (Spanish DPA).\nUpon receiving the claim from the DPA, the controller denied the allegations. It asserted that members who signed the contract expressly consented to being recorded and to the dissemination of the recorded material for promotional purposes. It also claimed that verbal consent was obtained during classes.\nDuring the investigation, three main issues arose: first, whether the clause in the membership contract validly obtained consent for recording; second, whether the controller complied with the GDPR principles for processing images; and third, whether there was a properly formalised data processing agreement between the franchise and the local gym concerning the handling of images. Additionally, the data retention policy indicated that images would be kept indefinitely."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 2245/163/2019","text":"The controller is X Oy, a provider of parking services. When paying at a payment machine, the customer could choose to receive a digital receipt, a paper receipt, or no receipt. If the customer wanted a digital receipt, they had to give their phone number, so the receipt would have been delivered via SMS. However, when the receipt-printer in a payment machine had a technical failure, the customer was left with the impression that their only option to receive a receipt, was via SMS. Although the customer could have also requested a paper receipt from the customer service, they were not informed of this option.\nThe data subject did not have the opportunity to receive a paper receipt (due to a technical failure) and filed a complaint with the Finnish DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 13/2019","text":"The plaintiff had used the defendant’s services, a nonprofit organization, for medical care. Afterwards, she received a communication from that same organization, informing her of the enrolment of its managing director on a regional electoral list. Upon receiving the communication, the plaintiff decided to exercise her rights as data subject, in order to obtain more detailed information on the data processing and gain access to the personal data being processed about her. (Art. 12, 15 GDPR). Getting no response from the data controller within the legal deadline (1 month), she also exercised her right to erasure (Art. 17 GDPR) arguing that the data processing could not have been lawful. Obtaining no response whatsoever from the defendant, she finally lodged a complaint with the data protection authority in accordance with Art. 77 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 11/2024","text":"The data subject submitted a data erasure request to Google LLC (the controller) on 8 September 2021, requesting the removal of thirty nine search results from the controller's search engine that were produced with her full name search. The results linked to pages where the data subject's name had been linked to a criminal conviction. As a relative of a public figure, the case generated public interest, and her sensitive data on her criminal situation was extensively published. The data subject stated that it was wrong for websites to publish sensitive data as she was not a public figure. To make sure that information related to her criminal conviction would not appear as a result of a search with her full name. The data subject made several requests to the controller to remove 39 URLs from search results. The data subject stated that the company's rejections based on public interest are not valid as no public interest allows the publishing of sensitive data. The subject also points out that in the absence of a relevant public prosecutor's order under Article 2 of Greek Law 2472/1997 allowing the publication of such data, the company must delete all relevant data from the results of its search engine.\nThe controller upheld that the requests for removal of URLs from (1–12) are related to business activities and refer to felonies allegedly committed by the data subject for which she was convicted. The links (13–14) concern unpaid wages and insurance issues that directly relate to her business activities and are not disputed for accuracy of information. The controller believed the reference to the public interest in the information was valid, and the data subject lacked grounds for the \"right to be forgotten,\" thus they argued against deletion. Finally, the controller stated that for the content of the links (15–39), which do not refer to the data subject and also lead users to websites where content was not available. So the controller will remove links (15–39) from the list of search results that appear on the basis of her name.\nThe data subject argues that it is necessary to delete in total nine URLs (1-6, 11, 13, and 14) because they relate to her personal data related to criminal conviction, along with the fact that she is not a public figure. The data subject points out that the data controller must consider whether the data subject is still active in the same profession when evaluating, as she ceased her professional activities related to the case fifteen years ago. Despite this, the data controller failed to consider specific criteria outlined in the EDPB Guidelines 5/2019, emphasising the sensitive nature of the personal data requested for deletion. Additionally, the data subject pointed out that, according to the CJEU judgement, the right to privacy generally prevails over the public's interest in accessing information, unless the data subject plays a significant role in public life. Since data subjects had no such role in public life, this highlighted the controller's failure to demonstrate the necessity of retaining the information. However the controller held that a legitimate interest of the public to have access to the information is established."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-004","text":"HUBSIDE.STORE (“controller”) has stores in France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy. In France, the controller carried out canvassing campaigns by telephone and SMS from prospect files purchased from two main data brokers, in order to promote the products it sold. The French DPA (“CNIL”) carried out an inspection at the controller’s premises in order to verify compliance with the GDPR and French Data Protection Act.\nDuring this inspection, the CNIL discovered that, regarding commercial prospecting by SMS, the controller carried out these operations using prospect files purchased from data suppliers. These data suppliers collected the data of the persons concerned via entry forms for online competitions, in order to enable their partners to use them in their commercial prospecting.\nThe CNIL indicated that the forms accessible on the websites of the data suppliers were similar: beneath the fields enabling the person to enter their contact details was a “VALIDATE”, “I VALIDATE” or “I ANSWER QUESTIONS TO APPLY” button. Above or below this button, a text specified that by clicking on the button, the data subject declares that they have read the controller’s privacy policy and accepts that the data collected will be used to send them offers from the company’s partners. Hyperlinks were provided to access the privacy policy and the list of partners concerned. At the end of the text, it specified that if the data subject wishes to continue without receiving offers from the controller’s partners, they can click on a link in the text (“click here”).\nThe CNIL also pointed out that the form contains a hypertext link to a nominative lust of partners and not to categories of partners. However, the list did not mention HUBSIDE.STORE.\nThe controller also provided the CNIL with recordings of canvassing calls that they sent to Belgium in order to promote its stores there. The CNIL found that during these calls, the data subjects were only informed that the call had been recorded and that they could register with Bloctel.\nThe CNIL issued a decision regarding the legal basis for the commercial prospecting by SMS, by telephone, concerning the information delivered to the data subjects, and finally regarding the security measures implemented by the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5130.2215.2020","text":"The controller, Fortum Marketing and Sales Polska S.A. (\"Fortum\"), trades in electricity and gas fuel, including the sale of electricity and gas to end customers, both in the business sector and to households. Within the scope of its business activity, Fortum cooperates with the processor PIKA Spółka z o.o. (\"PIKA\"). PIKA provides Fortum with archive services, including digital archives. The parties are bound by a Data Processing Entrustment Agreement from 2018 and a Storage (Document Archive) Agreement with associated services from 2016.\nFortum notified the Polish DPA of a personal data protection breach. According to them, the data of 137,314 customers had been copied. The breach of confidentiality concerned a newly created database containing information on Fortum's customers as follows: name and surname, residential or residence address, PESEL number, type, series and number of an identity document, e-mail address, telephone number, number and address of access point and contract data (e.g. date and number of contract, type of fuel, meter number).\nFortum did not notify the data subjects of a data breach because, in its assessment, there was no high risk of a breach of the rights or freedoms of natural persons. Fortum presented the analysis results that finally established the number of persons to be notified of a personal data breach due to a high risk of infringement of rights or freedoms of natural persons. The explanations indicated that the data of 120,428 persons had been exposed, of which 95,711 persons should have been notified of the breach. The remaining numbers were business customers and deceased persons.\nFindings made in the course of the proceedings indicated that PIKA, as a processor to which Fortum had entrusted the processing of personal data of the persons affected by the breach, was also involved in the data breach. PIKA explained that, in case of changes to the systems, the individual departments of its IT division are required to record any changes made to the systems in their internal project management support and control systems. However, when making changes to the system, actual personal data of the Controller's customers were used. The effectiveness of the security features applied was not verified before the changes to the system were submitted to Fortum to resolve the performance issue. The security functions were not tested during the works carried out. In 2020, the Polish DPA notified PIKA of its recognition as a party to the proceedings."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 23.08.2023","text":"The investigation was initiated following a complaint which alleged that the controller disclosed the data subject’s personal data (controller’s customer) by posting an audio-video recording from its surveillance system on the controller’s social media pages. The investigation confirmed the allegations. An employee at BODY LINE SRL disseminated the data subject’s data on its social media pages by posting an audio-video recording of the data subject and posting the data subject’s nickname, which revealed the data subject’s the ethnic origin. The data subject made an erasure request under Article 17 GDPR but this was ignored."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - UTR 20/2315","text":"VoetbalTV, an initiative of the Royal Dutch Football Association (KNVB) and broadcasting company Talpa Network, is recording and broadcasting amateur football. The Dutch DPA fined VoetbalTV for processing personal data without a valid lawful basis. The Dutch DPA published guidance in which it states that a legitimate interest is only legitimate if it stems from a legal provision. Also, a purely commercial interest can never be a legitimate interest, according to the Dutch DPA. VoetbalTV appealed the decision.\n\nDispute\nDoes a legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR) need to stem from a legal provision and can a purely commercial interest result in a legitimate interest?"}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 03/2024","text":"On 1 August 2023, the data subject received a phone call from the controller: a recruitment agency. On the same day, the complainant contacted the controller requesting to be deleted from their database and to not be contacted.\nOn 2 August 2023, the data subject received an email from an employee of the controller about new job opportunities, to which the data subject replied requesting to not be contacted again. On 4 September 2023, the data subject received another phone call from the controller and on 5 September 2023, the data subject received an email from the employee concerned confirming that their data had been erased.\nAfter receiving another phone call from the controller on 15 September 2023, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Belgian DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9856345","text":"The controller in this the decision was Edison Energia, an Italian energy company. At a certain point, in the context of a marketing campaign, the controller started calling customers and prospective customers with the help of call centres. On 7, 8 and 9 February 2022, several data subjects filed complaints at the Italian DPA, all focused the above-mentioned marketing operation.\nDuring the investigation of the DPA, it became clear that the controller was working with another company (Company XX) which provided the former with a contact list. However, some of the data subjects were also registered in a 'no call' list held by the controller itself. This, however, did not prevent the controller from contacting them. It would later become clear that this 'no call' list was ineffective. It was also not possible to correctly reconstruct the manner and timing when the consent from the data subjects was obtained and when it was ultimately revoked.\nThe DPA also investigated the consent asked by the controller itself when the data subject wanted to register at the controller's website or application. Such consent was not specific as it allowed processing for 4 different purposes, namely, marketing and profiling by Edison and by a third party that might receive the personal data.\nIn its privacy policy, the controller mentioned that it processed personal data for marketing and profiling purposes. However, during the investigation of the DPA, the controller provided contradictory evidence affirming that no profiling nor data sharing with third parties for marketing purposes would take place. This was an obvious information discrepancy.\nThe investigation service of the Italian DPA determined several GDPR violations after being provided access to the controllers' computer systems."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Sanction against Tensa Art Design SA","text":"The concerned controller was an optician and merchant for glasses, sunglasses as well as contact lenses. As part of its business, the controller sent out commercial messages through its newsletter service.\nThe concerned data subject was one of the newsletter's recipients. Although its is not directly stated in the case, it is strongly suggested that the controller processed the data subject's data based on legitimate interest. The data subject objected to the processing, as foreseen by Article 21 GDPR, by clicking the unsubscribe button in the newsletter. Yet, the controller continued to send commercial communication to the data subject's email address in a frequent manner. Consequently, the data subject sent a complaint to the Romanian DPA, prompting the DPA to investigate the matter. The investigation confirmed the data subject's assertions."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Tuckers Solicitors LLP","text":"Tuckers Solicitors (Tuckers) is a limited liability partnership of solicitors and is the data controller. On 24 August 2020, Tuckers became aware that its systems were hit by a ransomware attack. On 25 August 2020, Tuckers determined that the hit had resulted in a personal data breach. It notified the same to the UK DPA (ICO) on the same day and stated, “attack had resulted in the encryption of civil and criminal legal case bundles stored on an archive server. Backups were also encrypted by the attacker”. In total, “972,191 individual files were encrypted. Of these, 24,711 related to court bundles. Of the 24,711 court bundles, 60 were exfiltrated by the attacker” and published on the dark web. As per Tuckers, “the bundles included a comprehensive set of personal data, including medical files, witness statements, name and addresses of witnesses and victims, and the alleged crimes of the individuals.”\nTuckers notified 53 parties (out of the 60) whose bundles were released, as per Article 34 GDPR.\nOn 27 August 2020, Tuckers appointed a third-party investigator to provide a 'Cyber Security Incident Response Report'. The investigators could not find the source of the attack but found “evidence of a known system vulnerability” that could have been used to access Tucker’s networks and exploit them. Subsequently, the investigators released a patch, which Tucker incorporated in its systems in June 2020.\nIn September 2020, Tuckers informed the ICO that it had “moved its servers to a new environment and the business was now back to running as normal, albeit without the restoration of the data that had been compromised by the attacker.”"}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Brazier Consulting Services Ltd","text":"The UK DPA (the Information Commissioner's Office, 'ICO') initiated an investigation into Brazier Consulting Services ('BCS') following a significant number of complaints from individuals in relation to marketing calls about claims management and insurance services."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Overijssel - 9965129 \\ CV EXPL 22-2279","text":"The data subject used to work for Eega (controller), a company that guides disabled people towards employment. After termination of the data subject's employment, her employer restricted her access to the laptop as it was still in the data subject's possession.\nThe controller filed a claim in interim relief proceedings demanding the return of the laptop. The data subject did not object to the laptop being returned. However she wanted to delete her personal data from the laptop first and invoked her right to privacy. The data subject filed a counterclaim to demand that she would be given the chance to erase her personal data from the laptop.\nThe controller did not consider this a reasonable demand because (1) the laptop was meant for work-related purposes only (so not for storing personal information). In addition, (2) access to the laptop would give the data subject unauthorised access to its confidential work environment. The controller thus also invoked its right to protection of privacy-sensitive information."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd - 2020010610","text":"A data subject complained to the Persónuvernd that his personal data was published by another individual on the latter's Facebook page. The complainant also attached a screenshot with the complaint to the DPA, and the individual who had posted the information did not respond to the DPA's invitations to submit explanations regarding the complaint.\nMore specifically, the data published on the Facebook page included the complainant's address, which the complainant had previously removed from a telephone directory for security purposes. Furthermore, the defendant's Facebook page was open and accessible to all those who are registered on social media. If a URL that directly refers to the post in question and the documents that accompany it were used, they were also accessible to those who are not registered.\n\nDispute\nWas the publishing of the information regarding the claimant lawful based on Article 9 of Act no. 90/2018 (the national implementation of Article 6 GDPR)?"}
{"_id":"facts_FG Berlin-Brandenburg - 16 K 2059/21","text":"In 2020, the data subject requested access to data concerning him from the tax authority (the controller) after a tax audit had been carried out on his wife. The controller replied that the data processed in this context did not concern the data subject. In February 2021, the controller reported a data breach to the competent supervisory authority. In the course of the tax audit, the case handler had sent the data subject's mobile phone number to his wife's work email address via unencrypted email without his consent. Subsequently, the data subject filed a complaint with the German Federal Data Protection Authority (BfDI). In March 2021, the data subject filed an action for information. In particular, he desired information on all data about him stored by the controller since 1972, a copy of the data and the deletion of all data."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Royal Mail Group Limited","text":"Royal Mail is the British postal service and is the data controller. On 29 April 2021, Royal Mail submitted a written breach report to the UK DPA (ICO) that due to a technical error, its marketing actions might have sent emails to “215,202 parties who had expressed a desire to no longer receive marketing from [Royal Mail]”.\nRoyal Mail explained that it had a list of 245,850 potential recipients, out of which “30,648 had provided valid and existing consent to receive the direct marketing messages, with 215,202 being deemed to have opted out.” On 20 April 2021, at the time of transmission of the marketing email, Royal Mail had sent the email to 30,648 persons while putting 215,202 in a holding step of the campaign. However, on 27 April 2021, “due to an internal routing error, the 215,202 individuals who had been moved to the “holding step” were accidentally sent a “reminder email” which had been intended only for the 30,648 individuals who had been sent, but had not opened or engaged with, the initial email on 20 April 2021.”\nThe ICO opened an investigation and sought details about the volume of messages and an explanation of the routing error. Before the ICO, Royal Mail submitted the following:\nIt uses an automated system called Eloqua to send marketing emails. Royal Mail maintains a single master database of all individuals, i.e. those who have provided their consent to receive marketing emails and also those who have not consented to receive marketing emails. The single database is maintained to keep it updated as per the latest status of consent.\nIn a campaign, marketing emails are sent by Eloqua to those who have provided their consent. Individuals who have not given their consent are put at the end of the campaign, and the stage of sending them emails is bypassed. A reminder email is sent to persons who have given their consent but have not interacted with the original email.\nIn the present instance, 215,202 customers who were sent the reminder marketing email fell into two groups, “One group was made up of 91,736 customers who were registered with Royal Mail. This group had previously been presented with Royal Mail’s Fair Processing Notice at the point of registering, and subsequently opted out of marketing emails. The second group comprising the remaining 123,466 individuals were customers who had not registered for a Royal Mail account and had, at the time of using a Royal Mail service, checked out as a ‘guest’. These individuals were not asked about their marketing preferences and had not provided consent to receive future direct marketing.”\nAt the stage of sending reminder emails, details of persons who had not given their consent were fed to Eloqua due to a human error. Accordingly, persons who had not given their consent received the reminder email, even as they were not sent the original email. However, of “the 215,202 messages sent, the number delivered was “no more than 213,191”.”\nSince the incident, Royal Mail has introduced several checks to minimize the risk of potential recurrence.\nRoyal Mail received six responses/complaints from subscribers who had received the unsolicited marketing email, in reply to which it apologized."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00475/2021","text":"A Spanish Consumers and Users Organisation lodged a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against MyHeritage, LTD, an online genealogy platform that offers a genetic testing service that analyses the user's DNA. The Spanish branch is part of a company based in Israel.\nThe complainant raised several issues:\n  * International transfers of personal data outside the EEA to countries without adequate guarantees, as stipulated in Article 46 GDPR.\n  * Processing of personal data without a clear legal basis, and lack of adequate information given to the data subject.\n  * Processing of genetic personal data (DNA) that does not seem to comply with any of the exceptions contained in Article 9(2) GDPR.\n  * Disclosure to other users of the personal data of third parties that are included in the genealogical trees.\n  * Disclosure of personal data of users among which \"DNA Matches\" or \"Smart Matches\" (similarities between their DNA) are established.\n  * Assignments to third parties for strange purposes (e.g. to protect their rights or the property of other users).\n  * Doubtful sharing of information with \"Genealogy partners\".\n  * Deficiencies in information and consent related to cookies.\n  * Legitimization of \"investigations\" based on consent. Doubts about whether they really get consent, what this investigation really consists of, its purposes, as well as the information provided to the data subjects.\n  * Doubts about the processing of data for commercial purposes (opposition to the sending of advertising communications and what legal basis is used to send these, clarifying whether cookies are their own or third-party cookies, which is not clear in the privacy policy).\n  * Deficiencies in information about the processing activities.\n  * The privacy policy does not clearly specify that one should send their genetic material and not that of another. This issue could refer to the security measures to prove that a person is sending you their genetic material and not that of another person.\n  * Other deficiencies in the matter of information to users from Article 13 GDPR.\n  * No doors are closed to possible assignments or sales under license of health information or DNA of users who are not Russian, Norwegian and Swedish.\n  * Processing of minors' data between 13 years and the minimum age that each country establishes to provide consent without needing that of their parents or guardians.\n  * Other deficiencies in the drafting of the policy (inconsistencies, duplicities, omissions, ambiguities, etc.)\n  * Issues related to the exercise of rights.\n  * Doubts about the storage period of data once deleted, and the scope of the deletion.\nHence, the AEPD launched a general investigation."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Colour Car Sales Limited","text":"Colour Car Sales Limited (CCSL) is a company acting as a credit intermediary for finance on used cars. It traded under serveral names, including 'immediatecarfinance.co.uk'; 'carfinancetoday.net'; 'achillesuk.com'; and 'taxifinancetoday.com'.\nBetween 2018 and 2019, the UK DPA (Information Commissioner's Office; ICO) received nearly 200 complaints over unsolicited electronic direct marketing text messages. The ICO started a preliminary investigation and contacted CCSL for further evidence. The letter sent was returned undelivered. The company director was then contacted who provided an alternative contact address.\nCCSL confirmed it had sent over 3 million direct marketing messages between 2018 and 2019. CCSL claimed to have gathered consent through an application form with the following statement: \"By starting an application you agree that immediatecarfinance may/will pass your details on to a third party lender or broker, and they may wish to contact you by phone, post, SMS or other electronic means\". CCSL explained that an opt-out would be possible by calling the CCSL office.\nThe ICO investigated the privacy notice available and found that the privacy notice stated that marketing communication was only sent where there was consent of a \"legitimate business interest\"\nFollowing initial cooperation, CCSL did not respond to the ICO any further.\n\nDispute\nWhat classifies as valid consent to send direct marketing messages?"}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W214 2224204-1","text":"The controller is a municipality. The data subject owns property in the controller’s district. The data subject won a lawsuit against the controller, obliging it to connect the data subject’s property to the municipal drinking water supply. The judgement was limited to the supply needed for a single-family home. The controller complied with the judgement and connected the data subject’s property to its water supply system. It also installed an analogous water meter (not a smart meter) at the beginning of the water pipe to measure the consumption of the data subject’s property. The water meter is checked once a year by the municipality. The results are stored in the municipality’s software application which is hosted in an Austrian datacenter. The data is retained for thirty years to exercise or defend against possible legal claims.\nMoreover, because multiple times in the past the data subject used vast amounts of water, exceeding the need of a single-family home by far, the municipality installed a system that measured the daily consumption of the data subject. At the beginning, the system worked as follows: An incremental encoder was installed on top of the water meter. This incremental encoder sent digital signals to a programmable logic controller (PLC) at the water supply facility of the controller every time water was used by the data subject. The programmable logic controller counted the signals and if the usage of the data subject exceeded the threshold of 950 liters per day, the PLC closed the solenoid valve of the pipe, cutting of the water supply to the data subject's property. The counter was automatically reset each day to zero. After five months the controller switched to a system where the water supply was not automatically shut off by the PLC but an employee was notified to check whether the alarm was accurate and, if yes, to shut off the water supply manually.\nAfter the data subject learned about this conduct of the controller, she asked the controller for the information according to Articles 13 and 14 GDPR, objected to the processing pursuant to Article 21 GDPR and requested the restriction of the processing under Article 18 GDPR. The controller provided the data subject with the information according to Articles 13 and 14 GDPR but denied the request for restriction under Article 18 GDPR. As a consequence, the data subject lodged a complaint with the Austrian DPA (Datenschutzbehörde – DSB) asserting a violation of its rights under Articles 17, 18, 21 and 22 GDPR. The Austrian DPA rejected the complaint as unfounded which lead to the data subject initiating court proceedings."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202209596","text":"The data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) against Blu Management Spain, S.L., a recruitment agency, alleging the unauthorized disclosure of her personal information. According to the complaint, the data subject had contacted the agency in May 2023 and participated in a phone interview. Subsequently, on July 27, 2021, she received several WhatsApp messages from a third party who claimed the interviewer at Blu Management had shared her name and phone number.\nThe data subject contacted the agency to inquire about the unauthorized disclosure and submitted both a data deletion request and a data access request. In response, the controller claimed to only possess the personal data included in her resume, such as identification details, academic history, and professional experience, and provided her with a copy. The controller also stated that it had deleted all personal data related to the data subject, including emails, messages, and other communications.\nThe data subject requested compensation, citing the controller's failure to adequately protect her personal information. The controller countered that the disclosure was made by an exchange student who had obtained the data during the interview conducted by one of the controller's employees, asserting that there had been no breach of its systems."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - fine against AG-BROKER ASIGURARE S.R.L","text":"AG-BROKER ASIGURARE S.R.L. (the controller) is an insurance agency that reported a data breach caused by a cyberattack. The attack affected a significant number of customers and a broad range of personal data (including names, birth certificates, email addresses, and phone numbers)."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/531572 / KG ZA 21-672","text":"Stichting Brein is a foundation involved in collectively counteracting and preventing copyright infringements. Ziggo is one of the largest internet service providers (ISPs) in the Netherlands. In december 2020, Brein started the \"FLU-warning campaign\". The aim of this campaign was to send warning letters to holders of IP addresses of which Brein, using special software, had found that they had uploaded copyright infringing material via BitTorrent for at least two times in a span of four weeks.\nSince Brein only had the IP address of these uploaders, and not their name and address details, it needed the cooperation of ISPs to link an IP address to name and address details. Ziggo, however, did not want to cooperate voluntarily. Hence, in this interim relief proceeding, Brein requested the Court to order Ziggo to forward Brein's warning letters to the relevant Ziggo customers."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202211953","text":"A data subject submitted a complaint to the AEPD indicating that the website operator Chatwith.IO infringed GDPR by implementing dark patterns, specifically overloading and skipping when users try to object to the processing of their personal data by third parties. Users are prompted with a pop-up which contains a list of service providers, 1.522 in total, in which 338 of those have the selection box toggled on. If users want to object, they need to toggle off each box individually. The data subject submitted that there should be an option to object to ALL of the legitimate interests at once. Moreover, these selection boxes are shown in a light grey colour which can be easily confused with the white background of the website and it requires an additional visual effort on the parts of users to distinguish the options. Further, the data subject submitted that the legitimate interest of third parties is not explained in a manner that can be easily comprehended and found in the privacy policy unless they have to access to each of the third parties' privacy policies."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 76/2025","text":"A hearing aid retailer (the first controller) used personal data for sending direct marketing papers to home addresses. The first controller obtained the data from a media company specialized in direct marketing (the second controller). In turn, the second controller obtained the data from a chain of commercial data brokers.\nIn 2022, one of the recipients of direct marketing (the data subject) contacted the second controller and requested both access to his personal data, and their erasure. The second controller forwarded the request to both the first controller and the data broker he received the data from. However, the second controller did not itself reply to the request.\nIn 2023 the data subject filed a complaint with the DPA. He claimed that both controllers violated the principle of lawfulness, by processing his data for direct marketing without a legal basis. He also complained that the second controller violated Articles 12 and 15 GDPR by failing to reply to his request."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202200399","text":"On 22 October 2021, the controller, a producer of children's educational magazines, received an e-mail from the individual in charge of its web-portal. This individual stated that an external alleged researcher had managed to access the company's data as a result of a vulnerability in the website. The researcher provided a screenshot as proof with the names of the tables in the database but without providing proof of a data leak.\nThe controller carried out an internal investigation. It stated that this was a case of ethical hacking without malicious intent, since the researcher had notified the web-portal manager about the vulnerabilities. The database contained location information and contact details of data subjects. This data was originally collected through a registration form. Nearly 470,000 people were affected by the breach. The controller sent its affected data subjects an e-mail informing about access by an unauthorised third party to the database. One data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish DPA after receiving the e-mail.\nThe DPA started an investigation in the course of which the controller stated that it hired a security contractor to fix the issues. The controller also argued that its web-portal manager had fixed all the vulnerabilities that enabled the unauthorised access. It had also implemented security incident protocols and regular audits and had provided encryption for the stored data."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01893","text":"The Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund (SPK - Statens pensjonskasse) reported a personal data breach in September 2019. Between 2016-2019, they obtained a large amount of personal data from the Norwegian Tax Administration, much of which was not needed for their purpose. The data was meant to be used for correcting disbursed disability pensions. However, SPK lacked a filter to prevent receiving and storing unnecessary data, as well as organisational measures for deleting the superfluous data.\nSPK themselves categorized the breach as serious, as it involved processing highly sensitive personal data about a vulnerable group of people (those receiving disability pensions). In total, about 44,000 people were affected by the breach, of which about 24,000 receiving disability pension."}
{"_id":"facts_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-1743/2021","text":"A data subject submitted a complaint with the Hungarian DPA for the unlawful processing of their personal data and the personal data of their child, including special categories of data. The complaint was made regarding the recording and subsequent sharing of a private conversation between the defendant and the complainant, as well as an employee of a daycare attended by both of their respective children. The recording contained personal data, including sensitive information about the health of a minor. It was then shared by the controller within a Facebook group containing of all the parents whose children attend the daycare, as well as via e-mail with other parties. Upon questioning, the defendant admitted that they had no legal grounds for the collection or sharing of this data."}
{"_id":"facts_EWHC (QB) - Damavand Media Ltd v DMA Media Ltd","text":"The claimant, Mr. Farhadbahman through Damavand Media Ltd, entered into an employment agreement with the defendants, IITV.\nThroughout the existence of the contract the claimant made various publications on social media which were not in line with IITV’s editorial guidelines. The claimant alleged that he was not subject to these editorial guidelines due to the nature and scope of his employment and the contractual terms related thereto. Approximately one year after the conclusion of said contract the defendant terminated the contract on the grounds of a material breach having been committed by the claimant for not following the editorial guidelines on approximately six occasions.\nA third party who is a prominent voice on social media published internal correspondence (a “welcome email” exchange including various employees within IITV and undersigned by the claimant as the “creative director”) which showed the claimant’s involvement with the defendant. A leak was internally investigated but the investigation was inconclusive. The claimant alleged that this constituted a data breach as he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that IITV could and should have prevented the leak. He relied on Article 5(1)(f) of the GDPR to support his argument that “his contact details and the content of the welcome note constituted personal data and IITV did not take appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect it against unauthorised leaks.”\nThe High Court was referred to Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc for guidelines on the application of ‘ensures, appropriate security... using appropriate technical or organisational measures’ to test a leak. However, it found that “[t]he mere fact of disclosure or loss of information is not sufficient for there to be a breach. An organisation is not vicariously liable for deliberate leakage. So it is a question of ‘appropriate’ risk management in all the circumstances of the case.”"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202315744","text":"On 10 May 2019, the data subject consented to the processing of his personal data for the use of captured image in activities and interviews to be published in Gabinete de Neurociencias S.L.'s (the controller) social networks and websites to disseminate the sporting activities.\nOn 7 February 2023, the data subject exercised his right of objection and withdrew his consent for the use of his personal images, claiming that on 30 March 2023, his images still appeared in the claimed company social media.\nThe controller argued that they attempted to address the request appropriately and that technical and communication issues with Meta (the company behind the social networks used) prevented the timely deletion of the image. Despite their efforts, including multiple attempts to contact and requests for assistance from META, the corporate account in question could not be recovered or modified in time.\nThe Spanish DPA (AEPD) dismissed the complaint because the data controller did respond to the data subject’s request, complying with the applicable deadlines stipulated by GDPR. It found that the completeness of the request depends on META’s return.\nThe data subject filed an appeal. The data controller reiterated their documented attempts and efforts to delete the images and communicate with Meta, arguing that despite their efforts they faced issues in fully complying with the erasure request due to Meta's nonresponsiveness."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9751137","text":"A data subject issued a complaint with the Italian DPA (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali – Garante) against his previous employer Costampress S.p.A. (a manufacturer of aluminium components). The data subject alleged that once his employment relationship had been terminated, the company had failed to delete the company email assigned to him, and that he had not been granted access to the company laptop computer and the personal data contained in it.\nThe company responded to these allegations, stating that after the data subject’s dismissal, he had unilaterally proceeded to delete all the communications in his company email account. The company also explained that in order to protect its legitimate interest, it set up an automatic response system that would notify users of the deactivation of the complainant's mailbox, with an alternative email address to send messages relating to the activities carried out by the complainant within the company. According to the employer, this lasted for a month and a half, and then the email account itself was completely deactivated.\nFurthermore, the company stated that once the relationship was terminated, the data subject’s company laptop was given to an expert IT consultant to carry out an inspection. This was based on a legitimate suspicion that the hard disk might contain elements that could be used to refute the authenticity of documents which were subject to a separate legal dispute between the claimant and the company in the a Specialised Business Section Court in Venice.\nAdditionally, during the preliminary phase of the proceedings, the Garante expressed concerns related to this data processing carried out on the data subject’s hard disk, due to an absence of specific company regulations regarding the handling of IT systems used by employees. The company addressed these concerns, noting that among the tasks entrusted to the complainant, one was precisely the drafting of these regulations, which were never fully completed during his tenure."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00483/2020","text":"Asesoria Alpi Clua S.L., an audit company, mistakenly sent via email the personal data of one of their clients to a different client, the claimant, when this client asked for documentation concerning their own data.\n\nDispute\nDid Asesoria Alpi Clua infringe the principle of confidentiality established by Article 5(1)(f) GDPR?\nWas there a personal data breach?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00057/2020","text":"The decision is the consequence of a sanction procedure started by the AEPD against the defendant due to a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen stating that the defendant is the owner of three (3) websites that load a big number of cookies without offering the corresponding basic layer information to the user.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant answered to the AEPD investigation requests stating that: (i) at the date of the complaint (October 31st, 2019) it was performing a data protection adaption to the GDPR, and it had limited resources to do such; (ii) due to the controversial CJEU judgement C-673/17 dated October 1st, 2019, the defendant decided not to install a basic layer regarding cookies until the publication of any guides or recommendations by the AEPD; (iii) the majority of cookies loaded at the three websites were necessary cookies that did not process a large volume of data (never special data), and the defendant had not capitalized such data nor developed aggressive commercial campaigns (as the majority of its customers are companies) with them. In its written answer, the defendant also specified that, due to the complaint, it had installed the basic information layer and it has updated the second information layer, following, in both cases, the recommendations at the guide by the AEPD on the usage of cookies dated November 8th, 2019. The AEPD checked the three websites afterwards and it understood that they do not comply yet with the legislation, so it started the corresponding sanction procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_AP (The Netherlands) - 10.12.2020 (Booking.com)","text":"On 7 February 2019 Booking.com (Booking) submitted a data breach notification to the AP. An unknown person(s) gained access to the reservation system of Booking by pretending to be a Booking employee. About 40 accommodations in the United Arab Emirates Personal were affected. Personal data of guests from different EU and non-EU countries were exposed. Booking stated in the notification that they became aware of the breach on 10 January 2019, which triggered an AP investigation under Article 33(1) GDPR (obligation to notify the supervisory authority about a breach within 72 hours).\nBooking maintains the reservation platform where the so called “Trip Providers” can offer accommodation, flights, car rentals and day trips to the users of Booking. These users have to give the contact-, reservation and payment data in order to complete the reservation. That information is then shared with the Trip Providers via Extranet, an online administration dashboard for reservations. Access to Extranet is secured: representatives of Trip Providers have to fill in a username, password and a “2FA pin code”.\nThis breach was a result of what is called by AP a social engineering attack: an unknown person contacted a Trip Provider by the phone and obtained a username, password and the “2FA pin code” necessary to access Extranet by pretending to be a Booking employee. Personal data of about 4109 guest got compromised, including first and last names, addresses, phone numbers, check-in and check-out dates, total price, price per night, reservation numbers, communication between hotels and guests, 283 credit card details with CVCs of about 97 of them.\nTimeline on the breach.\n19 December 2018 – social engineering phone call, start of the incident\n9 January 2019 – 1st email to Booking from accommodation 1. A guest of that hotel had been approached by email sent from a Hotmail account by a “reservation employee”. The “employee” had asked for he guest’s birth date, which was necessary to complete the payment. The night rate was mentioned in the email, a PDF with the reservation details was attached to the email.\n13 January 2019 – 2nd notification from the same accommodation: another guest got a phone call from “Booking”, asking for the credit card information and other personal data.\n20 January 2019 – 3rd notification from accommodation 1, reporting another phone call to a guest, the caller had asked for the credit card details.\n20 January 2019 – accommodation 2 reports multiple notifications from guests. All guests mention the attempts to get their credit card details, using hotel’s name, arrival/departure dates and other information.\n31 January 2019 – Booking’s Security team gets involved.\n4 February 2019 – Preliminary report of the security team, confirming the breach. Privacy teams gets involved, affected individuals get informed of the incident.\n6 February 2019 – Privacy team qualifies the incident as a personal data breach that needs to be reported to the AP. 7 February 2019 – Breach is reported to the AP.\n28 February 2019 – Final report of the Security team.\n\nDispute\nMain disagreement between the AP and Booking was about exactly when Booking became aware of this breach, but other points were also outlined in the AP’s report.\n\nNotification within 72 hours of “becoming aware”\nBooking’s position is that it can take months to finish an incident investigation, so notifications within 3 days are not always possible. Furthermore, A29WP’s data breach guidelines say, according to Booking, that it can take time for controllers to investigate and properly report all connected incidents. So Booking is of the opinion that it reported the breach within 72 hours from becoming aware of it on 4 February 2019. AP did not share this logic. It pointed out that companies can report breaches in stages where all information is not available at the moment of the notification. Moreover, according to the AP, Booking became aware of the breach on 13 January 2019:\na) The email of 9 January should have given Booking a first serious suspicion that something was not right;\nb) That first incident should have been brought to the attention of Booking’s Security team right away;\nc) The email of 13th of January was the second signal. Accommodation stressed that that incident was similar to the previous one and that there must have been a breach at Booking. On 13 January 2019 Booking had reasonable certainty that a security incident affecting personal data had occurred. In addition, the AP pointed out that Booking’s own “Data Incident Response Policy” was clear: all suspected incidents needed to be reported to the Security team immediately. Which did not happen here until 31 January.\n\nController\nAccording to Booking, it is a controller of personal data in Booking platform, but Trip Providers have their own purposes for processing data in Extranet. AP concluded that Booking was the responsible controller in this case, considering that:\n1) Booking’s Privacy statement outlines the data categories and purposes of processing.\n2) Booking is responsible for the security measures on Extranet.\n3) Booking submitted the data breach notification to AP.\n\nRisks\nBooking noted that it had taken measures to minimize the risks for the affected individuals. For example: in general, only contact information was affected with no email or reservation information being leaked; emails in Extranet were hashed and could not be extracted from the system; credit card data was stored according to the PCI DSS requirements; clients were informed about social engineering and other forms of possible fraud; immediate communication to the affected individuals; Booking also offered them a compensation of financial damage. AP is of the opinion that there is a risk to rights and freedoms of individuals when their personal data is seen by unauthorized individuals. In the present case the risks of financial loss and identity fraud have materialized. Financial damage compensation does not remove the risks themselves but only helps to minimize their consequences.\nTrip Provider did not properly report the breach to Booking\nBooking argued that the Trip Providers are obliged to report all security incidents via the so called “Partner portal” to the Security team directly, which was not the case here. AP rejected this argument: obligations under GDPR stand separated from private agreements between companies.\n\nEmployee policy breach\nBooking argued the fact that an employee had breached an internal protocol by not reporting the suspected incident to the Security team, should not be held against Booking. Booking referred AP to a decision by a Hungarian DPA, according to Booking, supported this conclusion. AP disagreed: the case in question could not be applied to the current situation. In addition, AP’s reading of the conclusion of that decision differs from that of Booking."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO - Enforcement Notice against Experian","text":"The ICO autonomously started an investigation into the three major Credit Reference Agencies ('CRAs') in 2018 under the Data Protection Act 1998. The investigation was paused and then resumed after the new GDPR entered into force in order to ensure the violations were addressed under the modern data protection regime, rather than a historical legal position, given the importance and relevance of such processing activities.\nThe processing in question is on a very large scale (roughly 50 million people resident in the UK, with more than 500 attributes for each person).\nExperian acquired this information from a variety of sources and it also include credit reference data, which could lead to unexpected and 'invisible' processing activities. Experian uses them to propose a variety of marketing-led products (eg. Mosaic and Channelview), which are sold to third parties to enable them more targeted and effective direct marketing to data subjects.\nHaving found several violations of the new Regulation, the Commissioner issued a Preliminary Enforcement notice on 17 April 2019 to Experian. Afterwards, Experian collaborated with the Authority and provided further details and documents in order to make the improvements requested. On 20 April 2020, a revised Enforcement Notice was proposed.\n\nDispute\nThe ICO had to determine whether all the information requested by art. 13 and 14 of the GDPR are clearly communicated to the data subjects involved in the processing activity carried out by Experian.\nThen, the Authority needs to establish if the lawful grounds used by Experian and its suppliers are correct and understood by the data subjects involved."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-002","text":"Société Particulier à Particulier - Editions Neressis (\"controller\") provides individuals with a set of publications and services allowing them to conclude real estate transactions without intermediaries. The CNIL conducted an online investigation of their website, www.pap.fr, to verify the methods of informing people about their rights as data subjects, and whether the procedure for creating a user account was sufficiently secure and confidential.\nThe on-site investigation focused on the verification of the retention periods applied to user account data, the legality of data processor agreements in place and the technical and organizational measures to ensure the security of the data collected through the website.\nDuring its investigations, the CNIL found that the controller defined a systematic retention period of ten years from the acceptance of an order on the website. The CNIL also discovered that the controller did not include the right to lodge a complaint with the DPA, the legal basis for each processing as well as the recipients and categories of recipients in their privacy policy.\nThe CNIL initiated a sanctioning procedure against the controller on 6 February 2023."}
{"_id":"facts_DSB (Austria) - 2021-0.568.642","text":"The subject matter of the complaint is whether the respondent violated the first and second complainants' right to confidentiality (under §1(1) DSG) by obtaining their \"most personal\" data - which the Austrian DPA understood to mean their address data, specifically title, name, date of birth and address - from the customer and prospect file systems of other address and direct marketing companies.[1]\nThe respondent argued that it had the commercial authority of an address publishing and direct marketing company, and therefore lawfully processed the complainant's personal data. They supported this claim by handing over declarations of the data providers to the Austrian DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9870832","text":"The Italian DPA after receiving complaint from Inder Kahlon on 24th February 2023 (Numero protocollo: 0033835) opened an investigation concerning ChatGPT, an AI service offered by the American company OpenAI. The investigation focused on three main areas.\nFirst, the controller did not provide the data subjects whose personal data had been collected through the Internet with appropriate information about the processing.\nSecond, the DPA found that ChatGPT final outcome – its “answers” – despite based also on personal data and thus often containing personal data, did not always represent reality in an accurate way.\nFinally, the investigation showed that OpenAI did not adopt any measure to check that users were above the minimum age requirement of 13 years."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00476/2021","text":"A data subject filed a claim with the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against Baser Comercializadora de Referencia, S.A. (an electrical supply company) claiming that a third party had made changes to his electricity contract without his authorisation.\nAs evidence, the data subject offered an audio recording of a call made to the company, in which a woman states that she is the data subject’s sister. The woman also states that she is living in her brother’s house, and complains that she has been suffering power outages lately. The woman is informed that the electrical power output has been reduced online on the company’s website, from 1.8KW to 1.4KW. The woman proceeded to request that the company change the power supply back to 1.8KW.\nAccording to their internal protocol, the company asked the woman to provide certain information related to the contract (name, surname, ID number, telephone number, and address) as security questions in order to change the electrical current supply back to 1.8KW.\nIn its defense, the company claimed that by answering these questions, the woman successfully overcame the security protocol, and was therefore considered by the company as effectively authorised to change the contract on the data subject's behalf."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202315637","text":"In March 2023, LaLiga (data controller) issued a regulation to football clubs in Spain requiring the implementation of changes to how clubs allowed access to their stadiums. For ordinary ticket holders, patrons could either present their physical ticket and be given entry, or, provide an electronic ticket and use a fingerprint scanner. For access to the “animation stands”, reserved for the biggest fans of the home team, patrons had to subject to biometric identification through either fingerprinting or facial recognition, and provide consent to this processing at the point of entry, or be denied entry. The controller also offered to the clubs a system of access for implementing and complying with the updated access guidance.\nOn 4th November 2022, a fan filed a complaint against the controller with the AEPD."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 24.04.2023","text":"The controller, Tensa Art Design SA, was an optician and merchant for glasses, sunglasses as well as contact lenses. As part of its business the controller was sending commercial messages.\nA data subject, objected to receiving the commercial messages as foreseen by Article 21 GDPR, by unsubscribing from the newsletter service. Yet, the controller continued to send commercial communications to the data subject's phone number via SMS in a frequent manner. Consequently, the data subject filed a complaint with the Romanian DPA, prompting the DPA to investigate the matter."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202205208","text":"XFERA MÓVILES, S.A. (also known as Yoigo, the controller) is a telecommunications company. On 15 April 2022, a data subject presented a complaint to the DPA. The data subject received several advertising calls related to the controller’s services despite being included in an Advertising Exclusion List (the Robinson List[1]). During its investigation, the DPA found no contractual relationship between the controller and the owners of the telephone lines from which the calls were made.\nThe DPA dismissed the case on 22 July 2022 on the basis that it had not found a violation of data protection laws. The data subject filed an internal appeal in August 2022. The DPA carried out an investigation and began a sanctioning procedure for an alleged violation of the principle of data accuracy (Article 5(1)(d) GDPR) in April 2024.\nThe DPA requested information from the controller on the holders of the phone lines that had called the data subject. After further investigation, the DPA found that the data provided by the controller was not accurate, as the ID documents did not match with information from the Tax Authority (and one of the IDs was proven to be false).\nThe controller argued that the calls came from prepaid accounts, and therefore it did not have the responsibility to identify them. According to the controller, it only had the obligation to retain data in accordance with obligations under national data retention laws. The controller also argued that the DPA had no competence, as the case related to national data retention laws[2] and not the GDPR. Finally, the controller argued that the DPA’s sanctioning procedure based on data inaccuracy was not related to the complaint regarding unwanted advertising calls."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W292 2248672-1","text":"The data subject wanted to enter into an energy supply contract with an energy supplier in 2020, but received a letter back on 1 October 2020 from the energy supplier that this was not possible due to an insufficient credit rating. This credit check was done by a credit reference agency (the controller).\nOn 7 October 2020, the data subject submitted an access request under Article 15 GDPR to the controller.\nOn 8 October 2020, the controller provided the data subject with the personal data it had of the data subject, including their name and address. It also stated that the energy supplier had made a credit inquiry to the controller about the data subject on 1 October 2020.\nOn 7 January 2021, the data subject requested the controller to properly comply with its obligation to provide access.\nOn 13 January 2021, the controller replied that there was no right to access under Article 15(1)(h) GDPR with regard to the calculation of credit scores and the parameters and methods that were used to calculate a risk value as those were seen as business secrets of the controller.\nOn 17 March 2021, the data subject lodged a complaint against the controller at the Austrian DPA (“Datenschutzbehörde -DSB“).\nThe controller argued in the proceeding that there was no automated decision-making within the meaning of Article 22 GDPR and that there was therefore no right of access under Article 15 GDPR. It furthermore argued that it calculated the credit score on the basis of the parameters “qualified payment defaults (debt collection entries, insolvency, etc.) age, and place of residence”. Regarding the data subject, the controller sent a “medium” credit score to the energy supplier. No negative payment history data was available in the controller’s system to determine the creditworthiness score of the data subject. The controller stated it collected data from publicly available sources, data from address publishers and information on payment experience provided by corporate customers and debt collection partners.\nThe DPA upheld the complaint and found that the controller violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 13(2)(f) GDPR, Article 14(2)(g) GDPR. Article 15(1)(h) GDPR and Article 22 GDPR. The DPA further ordered the controller to comply with the access request of the data subject within eight weeks.\nThe controller appealed the DPA’s decision at the Federal Administrative Court (“Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG“)."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 17/01281","text":"The Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) had issued a reprimand to a local missionary organization for what the DPA said was unlawful use of private camera surveillance footage (i.e. lacking legal grounds for processing under Article (6)(1)(f)). The Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board (Personvernrådet) overturned this decision, as they concluded that the missionary organization had indeed legal grounds as per Article (6)(1)(f) to process the personal data in question.\nThe case revolved around neighbours A and B, who had a conflict. B had installed camera surveillance on her property and some footage revealed A's seemingly harassing behaviour towards B. B shared this footage with C, a deputy member of the board of a local missionary organization, where A was a board member. C further involved D, the chairman of the organization. Based on the footage they'd viewed, C and D questioned if A was suited to be a member of the board. They presented the footage to A and her husband (whom A had requested to be there), and following some discussions, A withdrew from the board. A then submitted a complaint to the DPA, for what she felt was unjust and unlawful processing of her personal data in the surveillance footage.\nThe question here was consequently: did the missionary organization have legal grounds to process the footage, based on Article (6)(1)(f)?\nThe DPA held that they didn't, after their review of the three necessary elements of legitimate interest: 1) First, the DPA concluded the missionary organization had a legitimate interest to process the personal data. 2) Second, the DPA held, however, that the processing was *not* necessary to achieve this interest, and therefore, 3) the balancing test should go in favor of the data subject (in this case \"A\"). Thus, the DPA concluded that the conditions for relying on Article (6)(1)(f) was not fulfilled.\nOn the contrary, the Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board considered that the second condition of legitimate interest was indeed fulfilled, as it was deemed necessary to view the footage. In addition, they considered that there were little harm to A, as the footage was only viewed by C, D, A herself and her husband (on her request).\n\nDispute\nWas the DPA's conclusion to reprimand the missionary organization for lack of legal grounds, correct?"}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - LTH Holdings Limited","text":"LTH Holdings Limited is a telephone marketing company which sells a variety of products under various trading names.\nBetween May 2019 and May 2020 the ICO received a number of complaints from individuals about marketing calls from 'Serenity Funeral Plans,' (a trading name of LTH) which noted the rising cost of funeral plans. On 12 May 2020, the ICO sent an initial investigation letter to LTH setting out concerns and asking a number of questions regarding LTH's campaigns, with the complaints received to date attached.\nLTHs response, as well as its further responses throughout the investigation, provided details of campaigns it had carried out, the source of data for those campaigns, the Calling Line Identifiers (CLIs) used for its calls, the scripts used by it as its various trading identities during the calls, and the connected call figures.\nIt transpired that the data that LTH used for its campaigns was provided by third-party data providers that compile data via multiple sources, i.e. online and paper catalogues, as well as 'internal sales/ internal data'. These third party data providers allegedly only provide data from sources whereby individuals have 'opted in' to be called. The ICO collected information on the 'opt in' mechanisms operated by each of the relevant third party data providers (which were unnamed)."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01813","text":"A Norwegian hospital notified the DPA of three personal data breaches lasting between two and nine years.\nThe breaches found their origin in deficient internal systems upgrades, poorly managed access controls, routines not being followed, and lack of data deletion. The concerned personal data included names, social security numbers, health metrics data, sensitive health data (including information on substance abuse, or health data relating to children), and passwords stored in clear text in an unprotected server.\nThese breaches were discovered during an audit by the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General. A significant number of patients were affected (e.g. about 21,000 records containing sensitive health data in one breach alone). However, the hospital did not have a comprehensive log, making it impossible to fully determine the extent of each breach."}
{"_id":"facts_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2019-4062","text":"Klarna Bank AB is a company which provides both credit and non-credit payment solutions to approximately 90 million consumers and more than 200,000 merchants in 17 countries through a variety of financial services, such as direct payment, various forms of \"try first and pay later\" services and payment through installments, as well as account information services. In order to provide these services, Klarna needs to process large amounts of personal data. The Swedish DPA (IMY) initially examined Klarna's privacy policy, and noted that there was a lack of clarity regarding many aspects, and therefore decided to launch an ex officio investigation to determine Klarna's compliance with the provisions on clear information and communication to data subjects. During the investigation, Klarna continuously changed the information provided on how the company handled personal data. IMY's decision concerns the information as it stood from 17 March to 26 June 2020."}
{"_id":"facts_IP (Slovenia) - 0611-10/2021/11","text":"During the inspection procedure, the IP established that the controller was carrying out video surveillance at a bar. An outdoor camera recorded the entrance and the outdoor terrace. The first indoor camera captured the server rooms and the bar counter and the right side of the building. The second indoor camera captured the server rooms and the left side of the facility."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9677521","text":"The dentist, Dr. Marini, required that patients fill out a medical history questionnaire before receiving dental services at his office. The questionnaire asked about previous, existing or suspected infectious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, hepatitis, HIV). The complainant, a prospective patient, indicated that he was positive for an HIV infection. The dentist subsequently refused to give him dental treatment, claiming that the complainant’s HIV infection would prevent him from “averting a possible contagion of staff and other patients.”\nItalian national law (Law of June 5 1990, n. 135) holds that specific precautions to prevent contagion should be taken for each individual patient, such that patients with HIV infections can access dental services. Meanwhile, Article 5 GDPR provides that personal data must be processed in a lawful and transparent manner, relevant and limited to what is necessary with respect to the purposes for which they are processed (the principles of \"lawfulness, fairness, transparency\" and “data minimization”). In combination, this means that patient history on infectious diseases can only be used to provide a better plan of medical treatment."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 170/2022","text":"The controller was a press organisation/public service broadcaster. The data subject filed a complaint with the Belgian DPA on 18 June 2018 because the controller’s live service for web streaming was only accessible on Belgian territory, and only for data subjects who would provide their personal data (such as email address, Facebook - or Google accounts). The data subject also complained that it was not possible to connect to the live service if he disabled cookies and trackers of third-party companies on the controller’s website.\nThe investigation service of the DPA (the investigation service) started an investigation into the controller. In its report, the investigation service reported the following findings:\nFinding 1: The investigation service determined that the processing of registration data was based on legitimate interest, while the processing of data related to personalisation (profiling) was based on legitimate interest and/or consent. However, the investigation service considered that because the controller was likely an ‘autonomous public undertaking’ (Article 5 LTD (Data protection act)), legitimate interest could not be used as a legal basis. According to the investigation service, legitimate interest of the controller could not be used for processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks (Article 6(1) GDPR). Moreover, legitimate interest as a legal basis requires a balancing of the interests involved and the controller did not prove that such a balancing exercise was conducted. Finally, the DPA held that the controller could not switch from consent to legitimate interest as a legal basis for the processing of data for personalisation purposes.\nFinding 2, 3 and 4: Regarding the processing for advertising profiling and the possibility of objecting, the controller's management contract allowed the controller to use 'content recommendation algorithms. However, the definition of ‘content recommendation algorithms' did not include advertising, according to the investigation service. Because of this lacking definition, the investigation service questioned compliance with Article 5(1)(b) GDPR). Additionally, the provisions of Articles 12(2), 21 and 25 GDPR did not appear to be satisfied because the data subject could not refuse advertising profiling at the time of registration. The controller also did not appear to allow easy opposition to this profiling after registration. Finally, the controller was supposed to update the purposes on the registration form to add the purpose of advertising profiling. However, the controller did not modify the registration form as of 9 January 2020, which resulted in a breach of Articles 12(1), 13 and 14 GDPR).\nFinding 5 and 6: The investigation service also held that there was a difference between the mechanism of connection to the live service and registration to the platform of the controller using social networks (Facebook and Google). This difference lacked clarity and explanation, which was incompatible with Articles 12(1), 13 and 14 GDPR, according to the investigation service. Moreover, the mechanism used (under the guise of logging in using a Facebook account) was in fact the creation of a user account at the controller, using the data subject’s Facebook data. The data subject was not informed about the workings of this mechanism, which breached articles 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b) and 5(1)(c) GDPR as well as Articles 12(1), 13 and 14 GDPR.\nHowever, in decision 168/2022, the Belgian DPA had agreed to a settlement with the same controller, regarding the use of cookies on it’s website, pursuant of Article 100(1)(4) WOG (Law establishing the DPA). This settlement extended to potential infringements of the law of 13 June 2005 (WEC – Wet Elektronische Communicatie) as well as potential infringements of the GDPR with regards to cookies, in the period from 25 May 2018 to 11 November 2020."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2018-7320-0166","text":"Citizen submitted a request for erasure of his personal data to the jewellery company Pandora SA according to Article 17 GDPR. The company asked him to submit his passport or driving license before considering examining his request.\n\nDispute\nOn which condition can the controller ask for an ID proof in order to respond to a deletion request?"}
{"_id":"facts_IP - 07121-1/2020/1677","text":"The DPA had previously issued a press release that touched upon the topic of introducing systems for measuring the temperature of workers or visitors. In the press release, the DPA concluded that companies and institutions are generally not entitled to measure the temperatures of employees or visitors and thus process their health personal data. This type of health data, the DPA held, belongs to Article 9 of the GDPR and cannot be processed without specific authorization.\nThe DPA then went on to also discuss the viability of using video cameras to record the working hours of employees.\n\nDispute\nWhat temperature-check measures companies could introduce on a wide-scale basis. Whether video cameras can be used to record the working hours of employees."}
{"_id":"facts_EWCA - Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing LLP","text":"This case concerns a data subject access request (SAR) under the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998. The data subjects were beneficiaries under a trust. The data controller was a firm of solicitors, holding trust money as trustees. Following the appointment of further trustees and transfer of trust money into a new trust for other discretionary beneficiaries, the data subjects challenged the validity of these appointments and served the data controller with a SAR under section 7(2) DPA 1998.\nThe data controller refused to make the disclosure, stating that the personal data was covered by Legal Professional Privilege (LPP), and therefore exempted from disclosure under Schedule 7 para. 10 DPA 1998. Furthermore, the data controller asserted that the supply of information required a disproportionate effort. The data subjects contended that many categories of personal data held by the data controller were not privileged and that, if any, the only privilege on which the data controller could rely was litigation privilege. The data subjects applied to the court for a declaration under section 7(9) DPA 1998 that the data controller had not complied with the request and to oblige the data controller to comply with the SAR. At trial, the court agreed with the data controller and refused to make such an order.\nThe appellate court had to determine:\n 1. whether, taking a narrow view, the LLP exception is limited to documents subject only to legal professional privilege under English law;\n 2. whether, if the narrow view is correct, any further search would involve \"disproportionate effort\" for the purposes of section 8(2) DPA 1998 so that the data controller is excused from doing so;\n 3. whether the exercise of the court’s discretion under section 7(9) DPA 1998 can be refused because the data subject's real motive was to use the information in legal proceedings against the data controller."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Materiale Constructii Online SRL","text":"A data subject filed a complained with the Romain DPA, because Materiale Constructii Online SRL (the controller) did not comply with his request to delete his account from the website www.depozit-online.ro."}
{"_id":"facts_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-05-2023","text":"In December 2022, Croatian DPA received an anonymous complaint in which it was stated that a debt collection agency processed a large number of personal data of natural persons (debtors) without authorization. They also received a USB stick containing a database with personal data of debtors - first and last name, date of birth and personal identification number for a total of 77,317 natural persons who had outstanding debts to credit institutions, and which were purchased by the debt collection agency.\nFollowing this complaint, the DPA launched an investigation and supervisory procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Gyldendal A/S","text":"During an inspection visit to Gyldendal A/S (controller), the Danish DPA found that information about approximately 685,000 unsubscribed members of Gyldendal's book clubs was kept for longer than needed. The controller stored data in a so-called \"passive database\" and had no procedures or guidelines for deleting it. Some of this information was kept for longer than ten years."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 201905709/1/A3","text":"In a domestic violence and child abuse case, the Minister for Legal Protection granted the father’s request to obtain a copy of the correspondence between the mother and the Council for the Protection of Childhood. Since there were several data subjects, the Minister asked the mother, in accordance with Article 4 GDPR, whether she objected to the inspection and surrender of the data and weighed up the interests involved. The mother objected, but the Minister for Legal Protection decided however that the father had the right to inspect or obtain a copy of the files, as the information contained in the files were already largely known to the father.\nThe District Court of The Hague dismissed the mother’s appeal against that decision, considering that the father, having authority over the children, was entitled under Article 15(1) GDPR to inspect the files. In the opinion of the Court, it did not appear that the provision of the documents to the father would adversely affect the rights and freedoms of the mother.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2022-2351/2372/2373/2374/2375","text":"The Swedish DPA assessed five complaints from data subjects who had requested removal of search results in accordance with Article 17(1) and 21 GDPR. All five requests had been denied on the ground that the contents of the web pages in question were inaccessible to Google due to paywalls, and that Google was therefore unable to assess whether the contents were no longer relevant or inaccurate.\nAfter the complaints were filed, Google acted on the requests. Nevertheless, the Swedish DPA assessed Google's explanation for refusing the requests in the first place."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202414144","text":"The controller is the website owner of EDICIONES CATÓLICOS Y VIDA PÚBLICA, S.L.U.\nOn 3 September, 2024, a data subject filed a complaint against the controller. According to the complaint, the controller used non-technical[1] and unnecessary cookies without the user's prior consent.\nThe controller argued that the website's cookie policy was in accordance with the current regulations. Furthermore, the controller claimed that consent could be managed and revoked through their website; for the technical cookies no consent was required.\nThe DPA started an investigation on 8 January 2025 and found that cookies were installed regardless of whether the user interacted with the website. Furthermore, cookies remained installed after users revoked or rejected all prior consent."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 19.04.2023","text":"The Romanian Ombudsman forwarded to the Romanian DPA, several notifications. These notifications were mentioning that Salvati Romania Union Party (in Romanian: Partidul Salvati Romania - USR), the controller, published on its website personal data belonging to several data subjects. These data included the data subjects' degrees of disability.\nFollowing such, the Romanian DPA started an investigation. It revealed that the data controller operator collected the personal data i.e. name, surname, personal numerical code (a unique 13 digits number assigned to Romanians and Romanian residents), address, identity card number, medical certificate number, degree of disability, from official documents of authorities and public institutions and later published them on the party's website, as part of a project."}
{"_id":"facts_AP (The Netherlands) - Clearview","text":"The controller, Clearview Inc., provides facial recognition services. Among others, it offers a service called “Clearview for law-enforcement and public defenders”. This service allows governments and investigative authorities to search “by image” in a database of over 30 billion pictures. In this way, the user of the service can upload a picture of a data subject and find out which other photos of the database show the same data subject.\nThe controller had created the database by scraping images uploaded on the Internet, including the ones on social media platform. The controller did not set any limitations in terms of geographical location or nationality, so also personal data concerning EU/EEA data subjects (including Dutch ones).\nSome data subjects noted that their picture was present in this database and, therefore, filed a complaint with the DPA. In addition, the DPA decided to open an ex officio investigation on this matter."}
{"_id":"facts_BVwG - W176 2245370-1","text":"The controller operates a doctor search and evaluation platform. The data subject is a doctor for skin and venous diseases.\nIn December 2019, the data subject used the reporting function of the platform to request the deletion of a user's review pursuant to Article 17(1) GDPR. The controller did not remove the disputed review from the platform, but instead published the controller's request for deletion on the platform, arguing that there is a legitimate interest for the publication of this information under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The data subject objected to the publication and lodged a complaint with the Austrian Data Protection Authority (DSB).\nThe Austrian Data Protection Authority (DSB) disagreed with the controller's view. It stated that, generally, such evaluation platforms and the associated processing of personal data are covered by the right to freedom of expression in accordance with Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 CFR. It further reasoned that, usually, the added social value created by the evaluation platform or the interests of the broader public outweigh the interests of the data subject, so that the publication of comments by users of this platform can in principle be based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The DSB, however, concluded that, since the data subject used the report function and not the comment function of the page, the use of the data was intended exclusively for the purpose of reporting and, therefore, the data subject did not reasonably have to expect the publication of the data. Consequently, the DSB found that the legitimate interests of the controller or the platform users (i.e. the patients) did not outweigh the legitimate interests of the controller and, therefore, the controller violated the data subject's right to deletion.\nThe controller appealed this decision."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/530061 / KG ZA 21-617","text":"The controller is Ziggo bv. The data subjects are customers of Ziggo.\nZiggo is the largest internet service provider in the Netherlands. Stichting BREIN is dedicated to claims against copyright infringements on behalf of its members. BREIN states that more than 200 e-books are made available to the public through an 'open directory' with an IP-address made available by Ziggo. BREIN demands Ziggo to send a warning to the user to which the IP-address belongs for said copyright infringement. Ziggo refuses to send such a message. Alternatively, BREIN wants Ziggo to provide NAW-data (name, address and residence) of the user of the IP-address. This will enable BREIN to send the letter independently. BREIN also demands all of the above for every customer of Ziggo that infringes on the copyright of its members through an open directory in the future.\nBREIN states that the copyright infringement in question is established. In addition, BREIN states that Ziggo does not need a permit from the Dutch DPA nor a DPIA for these actions. Ziggo disputes these notions."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9815931","text":"The Royal Palace Hotel is owned by Luxury Flats s.r.l. (the controller). An employee (the data subject) from the Royal Palace Hotel in Rome filed a complaint against the controller for the use of a biometric device aimed at recording the employees’ attendance at work. This tool had the ability to register the start and end of the employees’ workday by scanning their fingerprints.\nFollowing the complaint, the DPA opened an investigation into the case. On 10 August 2020, the DPA gave the controller the opportunity to provide feedback, followed by two other inquiries on 5 January 2020 and 29 April 2021. The controller did not respond to any of them. Therefore, the DPA delegated the case to the Special Unit for the Protection of Privacy and Technological Fraud of the Italian finance police to acquire the requested information and to notify the controller of the initiation of sanctioning proceedings pursuant to Article 166(5) of the Personal Data Protection Code (Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali).\nDuring the visit from the Special Unit, the controller declared that it \"did not understand the meaning of the DPA's emails regarding the investigation\" and \"was not aware that it had to respond to these inquiries.\" The controller stated that the device had not been used since January or February 2020 since it did not work properly. It could not recall where the device was, nor could it provide documentation on the model of the device."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00003/2021","text":"The controller is Michael Page International, a company based in the United Kingdom, and the parent company of the PageGroup business group. It is an employment agency and operates under various brands, including “Michael Page”. It has subsidiaries in many European countries, with the Dutch subsidiary being the Michael Page entity International - Nederland B.V. The data subject, who is a Dutch citizen that had created an account and had uploaded her CV on the web portal of the controller, submitted an access request on 28 September 2018. The controller, however, requested the data subject's ID to verify the identity of the data subject. Since the data subject found this request to be excessive, she lodged a complaint with the Dutch DPA (AP).\nAfter the AP contacted the Dutch subsidiary, the subsidiary explained that, although the corporate group's headquarters are located in the United Kingdom, the legal department (compliance team, responsible for managing access requests exercised by data subjects) is located in Barcelona, Spain. Hence, according to the Spanish DPA (AEPD), this establishment is the main establishment by the definition of Article 4(16) GDPR, and therefore declared its competency to act as the lead supervisory authority under Article 56(1) GDPR.\nThe AEPD then investigated the controller's procedure of dealing with access requests and concluded that these procedures complied with the GDPR. Hence, the DPA considered that there were no indications of infringement and that no further action was necessary. After sharing this draft decision with the other interested DPA's (see more info in comment), the Portuguese DPA (CNPD) and The Berlin DPA (BInBDI) opposed this conclusion after reviewing the contents of the Draft Resolution as interested authorities. They considered that there were multiple violations (Articles 12, 5(1)(c), 25, and 32 GDPR) because, in order to make access to data subjects' personal data feasible, additional information should only be requested in case of doubts about the identity of the interested party.\nThe AEPD then reconsidered their initial decision."}
{"_id":"facts_Commissioner (Cyprus) - 17.05.23","text":"In September and October 2018, four articles were published in the print edition of the newspaper \"24h\", owned by Breikot Management Ltd., (the controller). In these articles, the names and photographs of five persons, and a reference to the conviction of one of them were published. A complaint was made to the DPA by the persons concerned on 17 October 2018.\nFollowing the complaint, the DPA issued an initial decision, in which it found violations of Articles 5(1)(c) and 6 GDPR and Article 29(1) of Law 125(I)/2018.\nConcerning the violation of Article 29(1) of Law 125(I)/2018, the DPA took into account the public interest and the principle of data minimisation, and found that for the purposes of public interest the mentioning of the names of the complainants and the conviction of one of them outweighed the interests, fundamental rights and freedoms of the complainants. The publication was excessive in relation to the purpose pursued, in violation of Article 29(1) of Law 125(I)/2018. Article 85 GDPR mandates member states to legislate for the reconciliation of data protection and journalistic freedom. Law 125(I)/2018 does this through Article 29(1), which provides that:\n\"29(1) The processing of personal data or special categories of personal data or personal data relating to criminal convictions and offenses, which is carried out for journalistic or academic purposes or for purposes of artistic or literary expression, is permitted, provided that those purposes are proportionate to the aim pursued and respect the essence of the rights as set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which was ratified by the ratifying law on the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and in Part II of the Constitution.\"\nMoreover, the Cypriot DPA found that the publication of the photographs of three (3) of the five (5) complainants in three (3) of the four (4) publications exceeded the principle of data minimisation in violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, and the controller had no legal basis for the processing as required by Article 6 GDPR.\nAs a result of the violations, The DPA imposed a fine of €3,000 on the controller. This decision was appealed by the controller before the Administrative Court on 24 January 2019. The Administrative Court upheld the DPA's Decision in regard to the infringements found, but annulled the administrative fine imposed. The Administrative Court requested that the DPA review the amount of the fine."}
{"_id":"facts_Cass.Civ. - 24797/2024","text":"The case is part of a broader dispute between a company and some of its employees. During a meeting between the managers of the company and the employees, one of the employees (the controller) recorded the ongoing conversation, without the managers being aware of this.\nSome years later, another employee used this recording during a labour trial as evidence.\nTherefore, the managers (the data subjects in this case) filed a complaint with the Italian DPA (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali).\nThe DPA rejected this complaint, arguing that the processing at hand had the only purpose of proving the employee's statements during the trial.\nThe data subjects appealed the DPA's decision before the Court of Venice (Tribunale di Venezia). Contrary to the DPA, the court upheld the data subjects' claims, ruling that the processing was unlawful and fining the controller €5,000. The court gave the following reasons:\n 1. when the recording was made, there was no defence needs but only some \"organisational problems\" in the company;\n 2. the trial in which the recording was used took place years later;\n 3. the household exemption provided for by Article 2(2)(c) GDPR does not apply.\nThe controller appealed this decision before the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di cassazione)."}
{"_id":"facts_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-07-2022","text":"The tenants (the controller) of a residential building in Zagreb installed surveillance cameras that captured the co-owned space as well as the public surface. A data subject complained about this fact to the Croatian DPA which in turn started an investigation and asked the controller for submissions. The controller argued that the CCTV system had been bought online, installed and maintained by the controller. The owner also added that only two persons had access to the cameras and no video recording or storage had ever taken place. During the investigation, the DPA determined that the cameras indeed partially monitored the public space of the city of Zagreb."}
{"_id":"facts_AKI (Estonia) - 2.1.-3/19/3971","text":"The bank – the controller- notified its client that his account had been closed. The bank did not provide any reasons for the termination of the contract. The client –the data subject- asked for clarification and submitted a subject access request to the controller. The controller provided only for a “limited extract of personal data in English”. The representative of the data subject considered that the controller failed to comply with its obligations under GDPR and submitted a complaint before the DPA. The data subject’s representative claimed that the controller did not provide for an exhaustive copy of their personal data. The controller claimed that it should not be subject to the obligations set out in Articles 15 and 17 to 21 GDPR due to domestic legal obligations. Indeed, it claimed it would be contrary to the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financial Prevention Act to disclose complaint’s personal data to their representative.\n\nDispute\nIs the access right exercised before credit institutions limited by the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financial Prevention Act?"}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 12.01.2023","text":"On an unspecified date, a logistics firm (controller) notified the Romanian DPA of two data breaches in line with Article 33 GDPR. Following the notifications, the DPA launched an investigation which concluded that the security breaches were caused by the theft of a bookshelf containing the files of 12 employees. The theft allowed unauthorised third parties access the personal data contained therein. The breach occurred on 3 June 2021 and included data concerning contact information, academic and professional training, employment details, information on tax deductions and dependents, and employees' health status. The DPA concluded the investigation in December 2022."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd (Island) - Case no. 2021101963","text":"The data subject is an individual whose personal data was shared through a news article. As the news article was findable by a search query through Google's search engine, Google LLC being the controller, the data subject requested the controller to remove the search result from its database pursuant the data subject's right to be forgotten (Article 17 GDPR). Google denied the request, justifying it by the fact that the news article concerns the data subject's employment in a public setting, which is relevant for the public interest.\nFollowing Google's response, the data subject submitted a complaint to the Icelandic DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202414976","text":"On the 11th of October 2024, an individual found a box in a bin outside of the playing field of Club Rapido de Bouzas (the controller) on a public road. The box contained hundreds of documents detailing the ID numbers, names and surnames, addresses and photographs of their players (who were minors). In total, 1,444 cards identifying data subjects by name and photograph were found in the box.\nThe club had a “cleaning day” and claimed that this box was disposed of in the field in error.\nThe individual (a father of one of the players) reported the matter to the police, and subsequently filed a complaint with the AEPD (Spanish DPA).\nOn December 19th 2024, the DPA initiated their investigation."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9524194","text":"A 10 year old person taking part in the “blackout challenge” died.\nThe “blackout challenge” is an internet phenomenon in which participants film themselves in an autoerotic asphyxiation. This practice is one of the most dangerous and extreme practices of BDSM. Becuase of the carotid sinus reflex, cardiac arrest can occur in certain cases.\n\nDispute\nAre the age verification measures used by TikTok sufficient?"}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10095836","text":"The data subject, a patient, filed a complaint against her plastic surgeon, the controller. The controller published, without authorisation, photographs depicting her during an aesthetic surgery on Instagram. The images showed her recognizable face before (wearing a surgical cap) and after the procedure, with controller's logo displayed on his personal page.\nThe data subject stated that she had not given any consent for the sharing of the photographs, which had been taken for internal use only. Informed by a friend about the publication, she took legal action to request the removal of the images and compensation for damages.\nIn the context of this separate civil procedure, the controller explained that he requested the removal of all patient images from his social media profiles years earlier. He further clarified that the issue arose because the patient had signed consent forms with another colleague at the clinic, without specific authorization for the publication of the images.\nAlthough he did not admit any wrongdoing, the doctor resolved the separate legal through a settlement agreement, providing financial compensation."}
{"_id":"facts_RKHKm - 4-23-742","text":"On 13 February 2023, the DPA imposed a fine of € 200,000 EUR to Ida Tallina Central Hospital (‘controller’) for the unlawful disclosure of health data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR. A member of the management board threw them into an open bin outside of the hospital and open to public access. With this conduct, the controller violated the requirements of Article 32(1)(b) GDPR to ensure the confidentiality of the services processing personal data. Pursuant to Article 62 PDPA, the controller committed a misdemeanour. The decision of the DPA was appealed by the controller.\nOn 31 August 2023, the Harju County Court (‘first instance court’) annulled the decision of the DPA and ruled that the controller could not be punished for committing a misdemeanour because of the principle of derivative liability applied. According to this principle:\n1) a legal person, such as a hospital, can only be liable for an offence if the conduct of its body, member, manager, or competent representative met all the elements of a tort or delict, and\n2) if the act was committed in the interests of the legal person.\nIn this case, the violation was attributed to a member of the management board, but the misconduct did not meet all the legal elements of the offense to be done in the interest of the hospital. Since this was not the case, the hospital could not be held liable for the alleged infringement.\nOn 21 December 2023, an appeal against the decision of the first instance court was filed by an out of court proceeding by the data subject which sought the annulment of the above decision.\nThe controller argued in the appeal proceeding that the misdemeanour proceedings should be terminated as the offence is time-barred according to 29(1)(5) Code of Misdemeanour Procedure (‘VTMS’)."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202405048","text":"PLATAFORMA CABANILLAS SA (a logistics company, the controller) requested documentation from a data subject before a job interview in July 2023. This included the data subject’s criminal record, civil status and number of children. The data subject presented a complaint to the DPA the same month.\nThe controller argued that requesting these documents at that stage of the selection process was carried out in the interest of the data subject. The goal was to verify if the candidate met the legal requirements of the job position, and avoid situations in which a candidate progressed to a later stage to find out that they did not meet the necessary legal requirements. Furthermore, requiring this information was not discriminatory, as the controller is under legal obligation to verify the possible criminal records a person may have for a minimum of five years.\nIn June 2024, the controller changed its candidate selection process, requesting the documentation on criminal records and civil status once the contract was signed. In the case of having a criminal record, the controller implemented a separate process of verifying if the candidate was suitable for specific security related job positions."}
{"_id":"facts_OGH - 6Ob127/20z","text":"The controller (defendant) is the biggest logistics and postal service provider in Austria. Its main business activities include the transport of letters, advertising mail, print media, and parcels. Furthermore, the defendant also conducts business as an address publisher under § 151 Austrian Trade Regulation Act (Gewerbeordnung 1994 - GewO) and sells personal data for third-party marketing purposes.\nOn 14.01.2019 the data subject (claimant) sent an access request under Article 15 GDPR to the controller on which the controller replied to on 14.02.2019. Besides data such as name and phone number the controller stated to process certain \"marketing classifications\" under § 151(6) GewO. These \"marketing classifications\" are calculated based on a a variety of socio-demographic circumstances (e.g. age, place of residence, level of education) and express a statistic probability of the data subject belonging to a certain demographic group (e.g. \"do-it-yourselfer\", \"night owl\", \"person with affinity for investments\").\nThe data subject was not content with the controller's reply and filed a lawsuit for the provision of access under Article 15 and erasure under Article 17 GDPR in connection with Article 21 GDPR. Furthermore, the data subject requested a declaratory judgment that the controller is under the legal obligation to provide access to the data subject regarding certain \"marketing classifications\" under Article 15 GDPR in the case of further access requests by the data subject.\nThe first instance court (Regional Court Wels - LG Wels) rejected the lawsuit, holding that the controller had already fulfilled the data subject's requests. Following an appeal by the data subject, the second instance court (Higher Regional Court Linz - OLG Linz) partially overturned this decision and held that the data subject had indeed a legal interest in the claimed declaratory judgment. Consequently, it held that the controller is under the legal obligation to provide access to the data subject regarding certain \"marketing classifications\" under Article 15 GDPR in the case of further access requests by the data subject\n\nDispute\nIn the course of the procedures before the LG Wels, the OLG Linz and the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof - OGH), several legal questions arose:\n  * Can a data subject file a lawsuit under Article 79 GDPR in cases of an alleged violation of Article 15 GDPR or can such violation only be subject to a complaint before a DPA under Article 77 GDPR?\n  * Do \"marketing classifications\" under § 151(6) GewO qualify as personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR although they only express a statistic probability?\n  * Does the data subject have a legal interest - as required under § 228 Austrian Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozessordnung - ZPO) - in a declaratory judgment that the controller is under the legal obligation to provide access under Article 15 GDPR in the case of further access requests by the data subject?"}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9780409","text":"Several data subjects randomly searched for their names on the Google Search engine and found out their contact details and names on the website www.inelenco.com. They never knew about the existence of their data on the website and never gave any consent for their publication.\nThus, the Italian DPA received many requests, reports and complaints relating to the unauthorized publication of personal data on this website. Moreover, the data subjects tried several times and for several months to request the erasure of their data without any success. Additionally, it contained incorrect data relating to one of the data subjects concerned. Finally, there was no information on the website that enabled the identification of the controller or its owner.\nFirstly, the DPA conducted a preliminary investigation through the hosting provider – to find out who the controller and owner were – which reported that the service was in use by Mr. Fabio Giovanni Petta who was the sole proprietor and data controller of the website. Secondly, on 14 May 2020, the DPA asked the controller to provide clarifications to which the controller replied with a laconic answer, on 26 May 2020, by merely stating that there was a “delete data” link on each page from which one could access a form to be used to enter the number to be deleted, obtaining automatic removal within 72 hours. The controller requested to receive copies of the applications received to verify the date and IP address of the (alleged) registrations.\nOn 1 September 2020, the DPA forwarded by email, copies of six instances requesting appropriate feedback within 20 days of receipt to the controller. The controller did not respond. On 2 April 2021, the DPA initiated the proceedings for the adoption of corrective measures and sanctions due to the presence of various profiles of unlawfulness found in the processing. The controller did not respond either. Therefore, the DPA had to request the Special Privacy Unit of the Italian Finance Police to provide for the notification of the outstanding acts which was served on 20 December 2021.\nOn 12 January 2022, the controller gave some information about the functioning of his website. Moreover, he stated that all data was automatically deleted from the system after the data subjects had requested it, but the controller did not provide any documents proving this statement.\nAfter the objection and even after the company's defensive observations, complaints continued to reach the DPA complaining about the presence of personal data on the www.inelenco.com website without the knowledge of the persons concerned. Moreover, despite repeated requests for deletion made through the link on the website, the data continued to be published. Finally, on 4 May 2022, the website still did not contain any information about the data controller and how to exercise rights."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00670/2022","text":"SEUR was charged with picking up an Amazon return package from the data subject on 29 August 2022. The data subject requested pickup at its address, but Amazon erroneously indicated an incorrect address. On the same day, the data subject requested that Amazon modify the address. However, on 6 September 2022, the data subject learned that an mailperson from SEUR had left a note on a mailbox at a different address than the one requested, within view of any neighbor or visitor, stating their personal data including their name, address and phone number.\nOn 12 September 2022, the data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD). It filed a complaint against SEUR, but by then, SEUR had been absorbed by GEOPOST ESPAÑA, S.L. (the controller) in a merger; thus, the AEPD considered GEOPOST the controller and applied the proceedings to it. The controller stated that the incident had occurred as a result of human error: a mailperson had gone to what they believed to be the data subject's home to pick up the package, but that the data subject was not there, so the mailperson left a note taped to their mailbox. The controller stated that it has data protection materials for its employees and noted that the controller's delivery manual instructs that deliveries and pickups be made to the consignee and, in the even of their absence, a notice of absence should be left under the door, in the door wedge or in the mailbox. It also stated that it makes over 50 million deliveries a year, and that human error is not habitual but is inevitably impossible to completely avoid."}
{"_id":"facts_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-85-3/2022","text":"In September 2021, the Hungarian DPA initiated an ex officio investigation against Budapest Bank Zrt. (hereinafter the Bank) related to the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) software applied to the audio recordings of customer service telephone conversations between May 2018 and the start of the investigation.\nAccording to the Bank, the software used speech signal processing based on AI to identify periods of silence, different voices talking at the same time, key words, and emotional elements (such as voice speed, volume and pitch) within the recorded sound files in order to identify customer dissatisfaction. Once the software had made an automated decision to identify calls according to these criteria, a Bank employee then listened to the recordings, and made call-backs to customers in order to handle and attempt to resolve any customer dissatisfaction issues.\nThe Bank stated that its legal basis for this processing was based on legitimate interest, and its purpose was to conduct call quality control, to prevent complaints and customer churn, as well as to increase efficiency.\nThe Bank stated that customers were informed at the beginning of the calls that they were being recorded, but admitted that they did not inform them that the AI software would be used to analyse the calls, since detailed information in this regard would make the introduction to the calls too long, outlasting many of the simple queries made by customers when calling the Bank. The Bank also claimed that the system did not store any identifiable personal data, or perform automated decision-making in order to create personal profiles.\nAdditionally, in a Data Protection Impact Assessment carried out by the Bank, the Data Protection Officer stated that: “The purpose of the processing is lawful on the basis of the rights of the data subjects and the business interests of the Bank, there is no direct or indirect legal prohibition. The processing is high-risk for several reasons, in particular the novelty of the technology used, as the audio recordings are analysed and findings are made automatically by artificial intelligence. The aggregate data is suitable for profiling or scoring for both sets of data subjects [customers and employees], and although no automated decision making is involved, the data processing may have legal effects on the data subjects. The high risk is mitigated by the controller through measures identified in the impact assessment, such as human decision-making at the end of automated processing. The exercise of data subjects' rights is ensured in accordance with standard practice.”"}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9556625","text":"Following some reports, the Italian DPA ascertained that the MISE uploaded on its website a list of more than 5,000 managers containing their personal data, including name, tax code, e-mail address, CV, mobile phone and, in some cases, ID and health card. All this data was freely visible and downloadable. The MISE published that list to help SMEs in booking advice from experienced business professionals on the technological and digital processes to manage vouchers provided in compliance with the 2019 Budget Law.\nThe DPA has also found that the MISE did not appoint a DPO by May 25, 2018, as required for all public bodies according to art. 37 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00143/2020","text":"The claimant's personal data was written on a notification document posted on a public notice board. The notification document was posted by the defendant (the neighbourhood community) as a call for the claimant to attend a General Assembly meeting. The notification document included the claimant's name and an outstanding debt of €286,81 in his name.\nThe defendant claimed that notifying via the public notice board was standard practice since 2014 as well as notifying through a more direct means of communication (such as ordinary mail or 'burofax'). The defendant claimed that it had not notified the defendant via a more direct means of communication as this notification would not have arrived on time.\n\nDispute\nIs posting a data subject's name and outstanding debt on a public notice board in breach of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_CNPD (Luxembourg) - Délibération n° 3018","text":"Rocketreach sells access to personal data on EU data subjects, allegedly without any legal basis.\n\nDispute\n1. Deleting the data subject's information when all he solely asked for was access.\n2. Did not answer requests to enquire about the Legal basis of processing.\n3. Has not selected an EU Representative\n4. Mass Processing of European Data Subjects"}
{"_id":"facts_IDPC (Malta) - CDP/DBN/31/2020","text":"On 1 April 2020, the media reported an alleged personal data breach suffered by C-PLANET, wherein a database containing the personal data of Maltese voters had been exposed.\nThe media reported that the political opinions of 335,000 voters has been exposed.\nThe Maltese DPA (IDPC) opened an ex officio investigation, and noyb filed a complaint on behalf of several Maltese citizens on 12 November 2020."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00183/2021","text":"A data subject filed an access request with a transport company regarding the results of a selection process for a job. The data subject did not agree with the outcome of the process and wanted to access the videos of one of the driving tests.\nSince the controller did not answer, the data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD). Towards the DPA, the controller claimed that they would not give away videos since the cameras were set to only recorded the outside of the vehicles, thereby recording third persons such as passengers.\nThe data subject compared the case to the access to written answers of an exam already decided by previous judgements. Therefore an access to the driving test videos may have the same result, especially since it would be possible to blur or pixel images of third parties concerned."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2022-018","text":"GIE INFOGREFFE (controller) has a website which allows consultation of legal information on companies. This website also provides the possibility to order certain documents. In its \"Confidentiality Charter\" on its website, the controller made a distinction between two kinds of users: \"members\" and \"subscribers\". \"Members\" were users who could order a selected paid service on the website, for which they needed an account. \"Subscribers\" were users who had subscribed to an annual subscription of the website.\nA data subject filed a complaint at the DPA stating that he was able to get a password on the phone only by telling his name. The data subject also complained that the website stored user passwords in plain text. The DPA started an investigation into the website of the controller.\nOn its website, the controller had stated in the \"Confidentiality Charter\" that the personal data of members and subscribers were kept for 36 months after the last order from a customer requesting service or documents. The DPA found in its investigation that no procedure for the automatic deletion of personal data was used by the controller and that personal data was kept for excessive periods of time in relation to the respective purpose and the own policy set by the controller. The controller admitted that personal data had been kept for longer than 36 months but stated that for purposes such as 'collection operations', it would be justified for certain data to be stored for a longer period of time.\nWith regard to the manual anonymization of personal data upon requests of users, the controller admitted that 25% of accounts were kept for more than 36 months after the last order, formality or invoice, without being anonymized. The was also no automatic anonymization procedure implemented by the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9761383","text":"A data subject filed a complaint with the Italian DPA (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali - Garante) against the Regional Agency for the Protection of the Environment of Abruzzo (hereinafter “the Agency”). The data subject stated that he had previously been an employee at the Agency, and that a resolution by its Director which contained his personal data had been published on its website. The resolution was related to the approval of a trade union conciliation report, and it contained references to events connected with a criminal proceeding involving the data subject, for which he had been eventually acquitted. The data subject claimed that the document had been made public without any anonymisation and with indexing on search engines.\nIn its defense, the Agency claimed that the resolution should be considered as part of a contractual obligation between the Agency and the data subject, and that therefore, the processing was carried out on the basis of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, as well as to fulfill a legal obligation pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) GDPR related to public entities’ transparency requirements. Moreover, the Agency claimed the data subject himself had already made information related to the criminal proceedings public himself, and that this information had been disclosed by the press and still traceable on the internet. Additionally, the Agency argued that since no reference was made within the resolution to the specific crimes which the data subject had been charged with, nor was any conviction mentioned therein because the data subject had been acquitted, the Agency was not subject to a challenge under Article 10 GDPR since no personal data related to criminal offenses or convictions had been disclosed. Lastly, the Agency also stated that, at the data subject’s request, it had taken the resolution off its website for external access, and had taken all precautions to make sure it was no longer indexed on search engines."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00408/2019","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by a Spanish citizen, according to which the AEPD required the defendant to provide certain information.\n\nDispute\nThe defendant did not answer to any AEPD investigation requests nor provided the required information, so the AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02319","text":"A data subject received direct marketing in e-mail from the controller Komplett Bank ASA despite of having previously objected to such processing pursuant to Article 21(3) GDPR.\nThe controller's privacy statement and on-line customer portal suggested the lawful basis used for the direct marketing was «Consent» pursuant to Article 6(1)(a) GDPR. The data subject had at no point given consent for processing of his personal information for direct marketing purposes.\nCommunication between the data subject and the controller's data privacy officer eventually revealed that the controller was using another lawful basis for this processing, specifically «Necessary for the performance of a contract» pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) GDPR.\nThe contract in question regarded a credit card service bundled with a non-optional customer benefit / loyalty program. While the customer benefit program part of the contract did contain a clause stating the controller would send direct marketing to its customers, the data subject considered that such marketing activity could not be considered objectively necessary for the performance of the contract.\nThe responses from the controller's data privacy officer to the data subject's requests for information did on multiple occasions exceed the maximum time limit of 30 days pursuant to Article 12(3) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2019-001","text":"The NGO noyb filed a complaint with the CNIL related to the following practice: Google is conditioning the use of a phone running Android to the acceptance of Google’s terms and conditions and privacy policy, making the device unusable otherwise.\nThe NGO la Quadrature du Net (LQDN) filed a complaint with the CNIL about Google's lack of lawful basis to process personal data for targeted advertising purposes.\nThe CNIL decided to gather the two complaints and decide on them in a single decision, following an extensive investigation.\nGoogle's main arguments were that the complaints are inadmissible and there was a violation of the company's right to a fair trial (art. 6 ECHR), in particular because of the language used (French) and the imparted time to respond.\n\nDispute\nDoes the Google's acceptance system for terms and conditions and privacy policy are in line with the transparency and information obligations?\nIs there a legal basis for the processing?\nIs the case admissible? Is the company's right to a fair trial violated?"}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10095791","text":"The Region of Molise (the controller) used an information system to handle electronic health records and make them available to citizens. The controller relied on a number of processors and sub-processors, including IT services company Engineering Ingegneria Informatica S.p.a., the developer of the system (the sub-processor).\nData processing agreements were in place between controllers, processors, and sub-processors. These agreements included provisions on security measures for processing personal data. In particular, the agreement between the controller and Società Molise Dati S.p.a. (the processor) provided for the limitation of account privileges on a need-to-know basis.\nA user logged into the records system with his patient-level account. He was then able to access files of other patients by changing the url address of the page. He accessed personal data such as personal details and addresses as well as medical records and other sensitive, health-related data.\nThe user informed the controller of the vulnerability. The vulnerability was immediately addressed by limiting access privileges for patient-level accounts. At the request of the controller, the processor assessed the software for similar vulnerabilities.\nThe controller notified the Italian authority of the data breach. Based on system logs, the controller found that only seven files were accessed without authorization.\nThe controller held that the breach did not result in a high risk for the data subjects and decided not to inform them of the breach. In this regard, the controller considered that the user who breached the data, reported the vulnerability himself and intended no harm to the data subjects. The authority did not challenge this view."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Civilstyrelsen indstilles til bøde","text":"The Civil Affairs Agency (controller) is a part of the Danish Ministry of Justice. Its mission is to guarantee the basic principles of the rule of law by, for instance, offering compensation to victims of criminal offenses and supporting access to justice. The nature of its work involves processing large volumes of sensitive and confidential information regarding the parties in the proceedings.\nThe Agency returned a USB flash drive with more than 800 pages of personal information to a representative of a data subject. However, the flash drive was later lost under undisclosed circumstances. Notably, the USB flash drive was not encrypted, and the Agency did not have any guidelines for its caseworkers regarding the handling of removable storage devices and portable media.\nFurthermore, the Agency learned about the data breach on 26 August 2020 but did not report it to the supervisory authority as required under Article 33(1) GDPR. Eventually, the data subject's representative complained to the Danish DPA about the controller's way of handling personal data."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 35/2024","text":"The data subject was a former employee of the controller and worked with them until 2021. In August 2023 the data subject noticed that the controller published her photo in a recruitment campaign on the controller's website and social media. The data subject had never consented to this and was working with one of the controller's competitors at that time.\nOn 31 August 2023, the data subject requested the controller to erase all her images on the website and social media and not use them again in the future. The controller responded that arrangements were being taken regarding the use of people's photos after their departure from the company. Therefore, the controller refused to delete the images, but informed the data subject that new photographs would be made to prevent situations like this.\nOn 6 November 2023 the data subject filed a complaint with the Belgian DPA (\"APD\")."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 137/2022","text":"The data subject exercised its right to be forgotten on 19 June 2022, but the controller didn’t provide an answer. On 8 August 2022, the data subject filed a complaint at the Belgium DPA for the lack of an answer to the request."}
{"_id":"facts_DPC (Ireland) - Meta Ireland","text":"This decision is the final result of an inquiry launched in April 2019 after Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (MPIL) notified the DPC of the personal data breach. MPIL notified the DPC that it had inadvertently stored passwords of social media users in plaintext on its internal systems without cryptographic protection or encryption.\nThe DPC press release shows that passwords were not made available to external parties.\nThe DPC had submitted a draft decision under Article 60 GDPR to the other Concerned Supervisory Authorities across the EU/EEA in June 2024 and no objections were raised by the other authorities."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 8979/162/21","text":"The Finnish DPA was notified that the social and health authority of the city of Oulu (the controller) had required persons applying to become foster parents to request access to their personal data processed by the police and to provide this information to the controller.\nThe DPA had asked the controller to explain for what purpose it processed the personal data and why it required the data subjects to provide this information.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that the information received from the police was required in the process of approving applicants as foster parents. The controller had to ensure that the conditions at the foster home were safe and stable and that the children placed in foster care received better care than at home. The controller claimed that the information about, among other things, domestic violence and disruptive behaviour was necessary because it hindered working as a foster parent.\nThe controller stated that the police did not disclose the information based solely on the consent of the data subject. For this reason, it had become a practice to request the information directly from persons applying to become foster parents."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10077129","text":"GEDI Gruppo Editoriale S.p.A., the parent company of the editorial group GEDI, the controller, concluded a contract with OpenAI, with the objective of “bringing Italian-language content from GEDI's portfolio of high-quality news agencies to OpenAI users\", who \"will have access to attributed quotes, contents and links to GEDI publications, including La Repubblica and La Stampa\". This contract will last for three years and entails a remuneration that GEDI will receive upon sharing editorial content with OpenAI.\nOpenAI in turn commits to use such content to allow users to do real-time research, and to have available a summary right away, comprising a hyperlink to such news.\nA DPIA was conducted and transmitted to the Italian DPA stating that the data processing will happen on the basis of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, namely the legitimate interest to exercise the profession of journalist in innovatively."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 14/2014","text":"The data subject, citizen from a third country filed a complaint to the Hellenic DPA requesting his deletion from the List of Inadmissible Third Country Nationals. The data subject was sentenced to a prison sentence, a fine of ten thousand euros and the lifelong expulsion from the country for the acts of importation, transportation and possession of narcotic substances into Greek territory. Another Court decision accepted objections of the data subject regarding his judicial deportation and annulled this part of decision."}
{"_id":"facts_OLG Graz - 2 R 192/24h","text":"The data controller is an online casino-game provider. The data subject set up an account, deposited money and lost it on the website.\nOn 23rd May 2024, the data subject submitted (through his representative) an access request with the controller requesting access to their personal data, and specifically, all deposits and withdrawals and the stakes, wins and losses made on his account. The access request was made through the data subject’s representative, and included an electronically signed power of attorney and a copy of the data subject’s ID.\nOn 26th May 2024, the controller refused the applicant’s request, asking for a handwritten power of attorney signed by the plaintiff in ink.\nThe data subject did not respond to the controller’s response and filed the present action on 5th July 2024 with the Regional Court of Klagenfurt. The data subject sought that the controller be compelled to provide a digital copy of the data requested.\nOn August 1st 2024, the controller sent further communication to the data subject’s representative and, in light of having received notice of the claim filed, deemed there to be a legally valid power of attorney within the meaning of Section 8 RAO and provided the information requested by the data subject on 23rd May.\nOn 9th October, the data subject, having received the requested information, limited the scope of their filing to request only reimbursement of the costs incurred in the court proceeding. The trial court ruled that the controller could not rely on § 45 ZPO, an Austrian Civil Procedure provision which requires plaintiffs in a proceeding to bear the costs of such proceeding where the cause of action is not attributable to the action of the defendant and the defendant immediately acknowledges the claim in action. The controller had argued that this provision should apply as the power of attorney received in May 2024 was invalid.\nThe trial judge ordered the controller to reimburse the data subject for their legal costs, to the tune of €1559.60. The judge also held that the requesting of a power of attorney in ink by the controller violated their obligation under Article 12(2) GDPR to facilitate the data subject in making an access request. The court noted that no reasonable doubt as to the identity of the data subject could have been held by the controller as the data subject’s signatures on both their ID and the power of attorney were identical.\nThe controller appealed this decision to the Higher Regional Court, alleging incorrect legal assessment by the trial court, and requesting the controller be required to reimburse their legal costs of €1,170.35."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202001629/2/A3","text":"On 12 November 2018 Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (Dutch DPA) rejected the applicant’s request for enforcement. On 12 June 2019 the DPA declared applicant’s objection invalid. On 4 February 2020 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. Applicant is now appealing this Court decision before the preliminary relief judge of the Council of State.\n\nDispute\nApplicant is asking the preliminary relief judge to urgently order DPA to: a) Notify relevant transportation companies in the European Union that they can start an investigation into the decommissioning of the ATB system and request these companies to continue supporting the system; b) Investigate the historical and current facts behind the decommissioning; c) Prevent further decommissioning if the investigation shows that the ATB system is being dismantled; d) Report the outcome of the investigation for the Court to use in the main proceedings.\nDutch DPA is of the opinion that NS (Dutch public transportation company the applicant complained about) did not violate GDPR, so the enforcement is rejected. Moreover, according to the DPA, the applicant’s enforcement request only concerns cases where NS acts as a controller, which means it only applies to situations where NS sells its own tickets and not international tickets of other companies."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00362/2020","text":"The complainant informed the AEPD on 2 July 2020 that he had been receiving e-mails from the website creation company \"beiNNova\" without him having any relationship with that company.\nThe complainant sent emails to unsubscribe to the newsletter and to stop the sending of unwanted mail but he did not receive a reply from the company and the sending of emails continued.\nThe AEPD initiated a sanctioning proceeding against \"bieNNova\" on 4 December 2020. Subsequently, the AEPD tried to contact the company and did not obtain any response or allegations.\n\nDispute\nIs sending advertising emails without the consent of the recipient an infringement of Article 21 of the Spanish Information Society Services Act (LSSI) implementing the e-Privacy Directive?"}
{"_id":"facts_RvS (Netherlands) - 202004638/1/A3","text":"The appellant is the owner of an arable farm ('the partnership'). The defendant is the Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality.\nThe Minister informed the partnership that its name, address details and so-called Chamber of Commerce number will be passed on to the Sector Organisation for Arable Farming and that the partnership can object to this on the basis of the GDPR. The Minister wished to provide this information from the partnership to the Sector Organisation for Arable Farming so that it could implement a 'Joint Research and Innovation Programme', as part of which agricultural companies are required to register and make financial contributions.\nThe partnership requested that its data not be passed on. They believed that the transfer of her data was contrary to the GDPR, because she did not consent to it. The information had originally been collected as part of an annual report about agricultural and technical data that is mandatory for the appellant's company. As part of that report, it explicitly denied permission to transfer data to \"trade associations\".\nThe court in this appeal had to determine whether the Minister may pass on this information about the partnership to the Sector Organisation for Arable Farming."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-31-5743","text":"Elgiganten A/S, a consumer electronics retailer (the controller), took back the data subject's used TV. Returned TVs that had not been reset yet were usually placed inside the store in an area that only employees had access to. However, in this case, an employee of the controller placed the data subject's TV in the controller's warehouse due to lack of space and hectic situation in the store. The warehouse was subsequently bulglarised and the TV was stolen. As the TV had not been reset yet, the burglar(s) gained access to the data subject's personal data from the various streaming services to which the data subject was logged in, as well as the data subject's browsing history.\nBefore the burglary, the controller had carried out a risk assessment for theft of its products and concluded that the risk was high. Therefore, the warehouse was secured by a lock, a high wall, surveillance cameras and motion censors. However, the burglar gained access to the area by punching a hole in the high wall."}
{"_id":"facts_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-373-31/2023","text":"Following several compaints, the DPA launched an \"ex officio\" investigation. The controller (Client 1, Pitagorasz Oktatási Stúdió Kft) organises preparation courses for entry exams to secondary schools. It sent letters to students of different age (who are probably interested in applying for an entry exam), addressed to the students but mentioning that they are destined (also) to their caretakers. The addresses were received from the official government register, quoting as purpose market research. There is a law enabling this, but since 2019, this is not possible for direct marketing in respect of private individuals. The letters were sent after the registration to the courses was closed. Parents were informed about the source of the data at the bottom of the letters, and that the use of the data was terminated when the letter was forwarded. The information on the letter and in the legal basis could give the impression that this was an official communication and based on a legal obligation. The letter itself did not contain a market research questionnaire and could not be returned by mail. It hinted to an on line questionnaire which could be filled in. The privacy statement was not provided, it was only mentioned that it is available on the homepage of the controller (not a specific link to the statement itself). The information on the privacy statement mixed the processing of addresses used for sending the letters, the processing of registrations and of responses to the on line questionnaire. Different pieces of information (registration form, privacy statement etc.) contained differing information as to the legal basis of processing. The information given for consent was incomplete. The DPA acquired information from the provider of a mailing software and database used. It was established that this provider did not have access to the personal data, was neither controller, nor processor. The DPA investigated the database and found data of different groups of data subjects in it, including those who filled in the on line questionnaire, registrants and even lecturers. Not all data were collected on line, some were entered into the database manually. The fact of consent was not indicated at all data subjects whose data were processed based on consent. An assessment of interest was not conducted for the processing based on legitimate interest. Data of data subjects who meanwhile withdrew consent (were inactive) were not removed in time and were found in the database. Controller also enabled registrations to a newsletter and to send information about course organisation but did not separate the consent to these two different purposes."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - AWB - 20 3811","text":"The Sociale Verzekerinsbank (Social Security bank, hereafter SVB) sends personal data of all newly born children in the Netherlands to the 'toeslagen' (welfare benefits) department of the tax office in a 'start-message'. The start-messages are shared on the basis of an agreement between the SVB and the tax office. Data includes the BSN-number (a state-issued identity number), date of birth and country of residence of the child. The SVB has this data as it is responsible for paying out the general child allowance, to which all parents/caretakers are entitled. The tax office is responsible for paying out the 'kindgebonden budget' (child-related budget), an extra allowance for relatively low-income families. The data in the start-messages is used to quickly decide on applications for the child-related budget.\nThe claimant has a daughter born in 2016, whose personal data was shared by the SVB with the tax office in a start-message. The claimant's daughter does not qualify for the child-related budget."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 64/2022","text":"On the one hand, the DPA has an obligation to openly and publicly available the decisions it adopts contributing to the transparency and facilitating their further use for the benefit of the public public interest and, on the other hand, the DPA's obligation to protect the personal data of natural persons who decisions, in accordance with the provisions of the GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Realmedia Network SA","text":"Following informations received from the Internet, the Romanian DPA launched an ex officio investigation into Realmedia Network SA (the controller) for a possible data breach. The controller operates a real estate platform called imobiliare.ro, where agencies and individuals can advertise their properties.\nThe DPA's investigation revealed the unauthorized disclosure and access to the following personal data that was not supposed to be accessible: name, surname, telephone number, email address, postal address, personal numerical code, signature, copies of identity cards, including identification codes, function/quality, bank data, information included in land deed extracts/cadastral drafts, property titles and user profile image. 194,309 data subjects were impacted."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Midden-Nederland - UTR 21/2729","text":"The data subject used to be an employee at the municipality (controller) until 8 July 2008. On 6 May 2021, the data subject requested rectification of all changes made until this date in their files."}
{"_id":"facts_Cass.Civ. - 1/26778/2019","text":"Deutsche Bank S.p.A. asked a customer to provide his sensitive data in order to sign a contract for a bank account. The customer initially accepted the clause included in the contract, but then he withdrew his consent. As a result, the bank interrupted the service.\n\nDispute\nThe Court had to assess whether this sensitive data was necessary for the Bank in order to conclude a contract for a bank account."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00425/2019","text":"The decision is the consequence of a complaint submitted by a Civil Guard local office (the claimant) stating that the data controller had sent a Whatsapp message to a third party including personal data (name, surname, ID number) of three people (a mother and her children, probably underage) without their knowledge nor their consent. The complaint includes a copy of such message and a certification by the Civil Guard (although the mobile number of the sender is not identified).\nThe data controller did not answer to any AEPD investigation requests, so the AEPD started the corresponding sanction procedure.\n\nDispute\n..."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10068155","text":"The data subject is an employee of the Municipality of Verona (the controller). Via email, the data subject requested the controller to provide him with a new FFP2 mask and mentioned his health conditions in this message.\nWhen a municipal officer replied to the email, they cc'd the email account of the controller's warehouse. This email address was shared among 6 other employees. In this response, the officer mentioned the fact that the data subject suffered from certain illnesses and referenced to the Italian law regulating disability benefits (Law 104/1992 - Legge 104/1992), implying that the data subject was entitled to them.\nBelieving that sharing this data with other employees of the controller was unlawful, the data subject filed a complaint with the DPA.\nThe controller argued that it had referenced to the Law 104 only in a generic way, not specifically stating that it applied to the data subject. Moreover, it pointed out that after realizing the mistake, its officer sent subsequent communications only to the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-41-0149","text":"JP/Politikens Hus A/S (controller) is an operator of the news website, www.eb.dk. In 2021, the Danish DPA conducted an inspection into how the controller processed personal data of visitors on its website. During the check, the website had a cookie consent solution allowing the visitors to click on three different boxes: \"Only necessary\" (in a red box), \"Customise settings\" (in a grey box) and \"Accept all\" (in a green box).\nFrom the \"first layer\" of the consent solution, it appeared that the controller processed personal data for statistical and marketing purposes. In the \"second layer\", which the visitor could access by clicking on \"Customise settings\", the visitor could select the processing for preferences, statistics and marketing."}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Solarwave Limited EN","text":"The UK DPA, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), examined the monthly reports received from the Telephone Preference Service Ltd (TPS), which described complaints about Solarwave Limited’s unsolicited marketing calls. Between 2 January 2020 and 2 October 2020, Solarwave Limited made 73,217 unsolicited direct marketing calls, and 30 complaints were submitted in relation to those calls. The calls were made to subscribers who had registered with the TPS and who had not given their prior consent to receive calls.\n\nDispute\nICO examined whether Solarwave Limited contravened regulation 21 of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003 (PECR), according to which a company can make direct marketing calls to individuals who are registered with the TPS (for not less than 28 days) only if those individuals consented to receiving such calls. Further, ICO examined whether the conditions under section 55A Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) for the imposition of a monetary penalty are met."}
{"_id":"facts_LG Köln - 28 O 221/21","text":"The controller is the biggest German credit rating agency “SCHUFA Holding AG”. The data subject is a consumer with a low credit score. In October 2020, an insolvency court discharged the data subject of a residual debt he had with a third party for the amount €45,000. The controller added the information about the discharge to its database. The entry contained the information that a discharge of residual debt had been granted, the date of the decision and its case number.\nIn February 2021, the data subject objected to the processing and requested the controller to erase the entry altogether. The controller rejected the request by referring to the \"Rules of conduct for the review and deletion periods of personal data by the German credit agencies\" (\"Verhaltensregeln für die Prüf- und Löschfristen von personenbezogenen Daten durch die deutschen Wirtschaftsauskunfteien\") (\"Rules of Conduct\"), under which the information will be deleted only after three years have passed. The Rules of Conduct are a code of conduct within the meaning of Article 40(5) GDPR which was approved by the Hesse DPA (Hessischer Beauftragter für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit).\nConsequently, the data subject filed a lawsuit against the controller before the Regional Court Cologne (Landgericht Köln - LG Köln) requesting that the court orders the controller to delete the entry. He argued that the entry makes it impossible for him to find a new and bigger apartment to start a family with his partner, to obtain a property loan for a new apartment, to open up a new bank account, to conclude a new mobile phone or power supply contract or to get a new job as a salesman.\nFrom the time the controller included the information in its database until the end of the court proceedings, no customer of the controller requested information about the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_Commissioner (Cyprus) - 11.17.001.010.064","text":"The Cyprus electricity authority (controller) intended to place a power line on the data subject's land. The controller sent the data subject a consent form for the placement of this power line. However, an employee of the controller delivered the consent form, which contained personal data, to the neighbour of data subject. The data subject filed a complaint at the Cyprus DPA (DPA) on 11 April 2022.\nThe controller also submitted a notice of the violation of this incident to the DPA. The controller stated that the employee had realised his mistake and had apologised. The controller acknowledged the violation, apologised for it and stated that this violation was committed out of negligence and human error, and not out of malice. The controller had previously organised periodic briefings and GDPR related training sessions for its staff (not attended by the employee in question). However, the controller also acknowledged the need for further training for its staff and had already planned further training sessions. The controller also confirmed that it had not set out specific procedures and measures which described how its staff would conduct service and also admitted that the deliverance of the consent form to the neighbour was contrary to Article 31 of the Electricity Law (KEF.170), which stated that the consent form can only delivered to the owner of the land, in this case the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00028/2021","text":"The Spanish DPA (AEPD) received a complaint from a data subject living close to a building owned by the Spanish Ministry of Defence. Such building had cameras recording its outside perimeter, that included private parking spots from homes more than five meters apart.\nThe data subject alleged that, as they owned one of those homes, they were recorded by the cameras every time they moved around their home, so any security workers of the building could know what time they left and entered the house, recording their vehicle, including its licence plate, and themselves while doing it.\nThe Ministry of Defence acknowledged that, even if there were informing banners about the cameras, some made reference to the former data protection act, and that the angles of some cameras should be adjusted. Those cameras showed part of an avenue, including private homes, and part of the facade of some buildings, showing the inside of the homes through them. They also alleged that the images could only be watched in certain cases authorized by law. Also, that the legal basis for the recording was Article 6(1)(e), given the fact that the surroundings of the building were classified as military-home-zone, and they had authorization to proceed in such a way."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202303130","text":"The data subject had health problems arising from conflicts in the workplace in the City Council of Zaragoza (the controller). The Prevention and Occupational Safety Service of the City Council of Zaragoza, issued a medical report recommending that she contact the Health Monitoring Unit to assess an adaptation or change of job. The Health Surveillance Unit issued a decision to adapt the tasks of her post along with an attached document containing the data subject's medical report. This e-mail was sent without a seal or indication marking the information as confidential. This was different to standard procedure for confidential e-mails at the City Council of Zaragoza, who usually use nominal corporate e-mail accounts and an Internal Communications Service (SIC).\nWhen the AEPD began its sanctioning procedures, the controller sent a letter to the DPA admitting a personal data breach. However, they made the point that it was an isolated event. Additionally, they claimed adequate security measures had been taken because only \"authorised personell\" are permitted to open emails. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the email access was limited as anyone within the City Council could have opened it."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 02/2023","text":"On 1 December 2022, the data subject requested the controller to erase his personal data under Article 17(1) GDPR. In order to do so, he followed the instructions provided in the controller's privacy policy. However, the controller did not acknowledge receipt, not even after the data subject sent a reminder on 19 December 2022. On the 28 December 2022, almost a month after the data subject had submitted his erasure request, the controller sent him a promotional e-mail. The data subject filed a complaint at the Belgian DPA on 3 January 2023 for the lack of a response by the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_RvS - 202206218/1/A3","text":"The data subject submitted a request to the Minister for Legal Protection (now: the State Secretary for Justice and Security) to erase the files of her two sons held by the controller, the Child Protection Council (RvdK), pursuant to Article 17 GDPR. The files contained documents regarding the termination of her parental rights to both her children.\nOn 15 September 2021, the Minister rejected the erasure request, arguing that the records should be retained under the Dutch Archives Act, and on 14 February 2022, he rejected the objection lodged against it.\nThe data subject filed an appeal before the court of first instance against the decision of the Minister.\nBy judgment dated 22 December 2022, the court dismissed it as unfounded. It held that the processing of the data subject’s children’s personal data was necessary for the fulfillment of a statutory processing obligation pursuant to Article 17(3)(b) GDPR.\nThe data subject filed an appeal before the highest administrative court (Council of State-Raad van State). She argued that since the custody termination order for her youngest son had been lifted the files must be deleted because their content was incorrect and therefore unlawful. She further argued that the measure of custody termination for the eldest son should also be lifted because it was based on the unlawful RvdK files."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Overijssel - AK 20 2097","text":"In June 2019, the defendant, the Dutch Tax Office ('Gemeenschappelijke belastingkantoor Lococensus-Tricijn', 'GBLT'), addressed a letter to the claimant. However, the destination of the letter was the claimant's old residential address. The claimant sent an email to the defendant, drawing attention to this error and emphasising that, as a result, his personal data had reached a third party. In its response, the defendant apologised, and proposed that the appropriate action would be to ask the third party to delete the relevant data and confirm this. The claimant indicated they were unable to respond to this proposal until certain ambiguities were resolved regarding the content of the leaked data.\nIn August 2019, the claimant sent another email to the defendant, in which he asked a number of questions regarding the provision of his email address by the defendant to a company called 'KCM Survey BV', as well as other third parties for customer research purposes. Among other things, the complainant stated that he had not given his consent for this transfer, and asked what the legal basis was for sharing his data with third parties, and which third parties his data was shared with.\nThe defendant responded stating that it considered processing for customer research purposes to be part of its statutory duties - more specifically, evaluating and ensuring the quality of the implementation of the Tax Act ('belastingwet') - and that therefore it does not consider it necessary to rely on the consent of data subjects. It did add, however, that it considered the claimant's communication as an objection to the processing of his email address for customer research purposes, and that it would no longer process the email for this purpose.\nSeveral months later, on 16 February 2020, the claimant asked for more information about the initial data breach involving the letter, as it was still not clear to him which documents were leaked.\nOn 28 February 2020, by primary decision, the defendant provided the claimant with information regarding the personal data that had been transferred by the defendant to third parties, including both KCM Survey BV, and the initial third party that received the letter. In the decision, defendant once again confirmed that the claimant's email address had been processed by third parties for customer research, and indicated that the email address had been deleted on 23 August 2019, and was also no longer being processed by KCM survey BV.\nThe claimant objected to this decision on 2 April 2020. The defendant acknowledged receipt of the objection, and 18 August 2020, a hearing took place, at which the defendant confirmed the contested decision.\nThe claimant then appealed the primary decision in the present case before the District Court of Overijssel. Among other things, he: reiterated his objection to the processing of his email address with third parties for research purposes; argued that, in the primary decision, the defendant did not provide him with full access to the personal data concerning him that were provided to third parties; and sought compensation for the unlawful disclosure of personal data to third parties."}
{"_id":"facts_IP - N/A","text":"In the Republic of Slovenia, in addition to applying for vaccination with a personal physician, a comprehensive data collection on vaccination interest is conducted in parallel via the eGovernment portal, which is not an application for vaccination. Individuals receive completely vague and meager information when applying for the vaccination expression of interest via the eGovernment portal, and additional ambiguity is introduced by various diametrically opposed interpretations of individual speakers at press conferences of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia regarding the significance of this role.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - E/09208/2018","text":"A data subject lodged a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against Niantic, a software developer, regarding their interactive game \"Pokemon Go\".\nPokemon GO is a game in which users interact with the real world, so they share their location in order to walk the map. This include sharing their user data with others when they go to specific locations called \"gyms\", in which they play together with others. For that, a user needs to be at least at 500m from the site. Therefore, their real location is also known.\nHowever, some users fake their real location, so they can access the gyms from further away. Therefore, the location of other users may be also shared not only with regular players but with players that are faking their location.\nFrom this data, that can easily indicate where a person lives or works, malicious users could access this information and also infer the real identity of these subjects, what may lead to harassment or stalking. It is important to note that a big number of players of the game are minors, what increases the risk.\nThe complainant had asked Niantic to avoid sharing location data with users that were known to be faking their location.\nNiantic stated that they have a security policy in place that tries to tackle that problem. Players who are detected to use these methods are warned with a three-strikes mechanism. They have other additional measures, such as information about the data that is shared, a recommendation not to provide your real name, the lack of a chat where users can directly interact, prohibitions on harassing and misuse, limited sharing of data, and different privacy options and information."}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9771142","text":"The Italian DPA launched an investigation into Uber B.V., with registered office in Amsterdam, and Uber Technologies Inc., with registered office in San Francisco, after the US parent company made public a data breach in 2017. The DPA found that the Dutch company Uber BV and the US company Uber Technologies were joint controllers, each responsible for violating the Italian Privacy Code (the Italian implementation of EU Directive 95/46/EC) against data subjects in Italy.\nDuring their inspections carried out at Uber Italy srl, the DPA found several violations, including inadequate privacy notice, personal data processed without consent and failure to notify the DPA about the data breach.\nThe security incident, which occurred before the GDPR came into effect, involved the data of around 57 million data subjects worldwide, and had been sanctioned by the Dutch and British DPA on the basis of their respective national regulations. The personal data processed by Uber concerned personal and contact data (name, surname, telephone number, and e-mail), access credentials to the app, location data (those that appeared at the time of registration), and relations with other data subjects (sharing trips, introducing friends, profiling information).\nThe controllers had also, without having obtained valid consent, processed the data of approximately 1,379,000 data subjects by profiling them on the basis of the so-called 'fraud risk', assigning them a qualitative rating (e.g., 'low') and a numerical parameter (from 1 to 100). Finally, the controllers had not complied with the obligation to notify the DPA of the processing of personal data for geolocation purposes, as required by the legislation in force before the GDPR came into effect."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 7684/171/22","text":"The Finnish Meteorological Institute (the controller) used Google Analytics and reCAPTCHA services including cookies on its website. Because Google is a US-based service provider, personal data of the controller’s website visitors, such as IP address and other information that could be used to identify a data subject, were transmitted to the United States through the use of the Google services in question.\nFollowing a website user first contacting the controller on the issue, the controller filed a data breach notification with the Finnish DPA in September 2022. According to the controller, the data breach started on 1 January 2010, and the number of data subjects affected was estimated to be 330 000. As a result, the controller disabled the Google services in question from it’s website in September 2022.\nPursuant to Article 44 GDPR, transfers of personal data to a third country can only take place if the controller and processor comply with the conditions set out in Chapter V GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Natural Person","text":"The Romanian DPA started an investigation after receiving a complaint against a natural person (the controller), who operated the website https://centralpoint.ro/afisare-bd-general/.\nDuring its investigation, the DPA found that the controller had published the personal data of 383 data subject's on the website. This included their CNP (personal identification number), phone number, ID series and number, e-mail address, bank details (real estate purchases) and marital status."}
{"_id":"facts_DSB (Austria) - 2022-0.930.971","text":"The controller, a research institute active in the field of automated drive, applied for a data processing authorisation with the Austrian DPA. The controller wanted to test automated vehicles on public highways and needed to process a large amount of personal data – in particular, videos from both outside and inside the vehicles – to train their algorithm. The controller claimed that the identity of data subjects whose images were captured by the cameras was of no importance for the processing. However, the recording was essential to ensure that automated vehicles were safe for road users. The controller performed a DPIA according to Article 35 GDPR and held that risks could be sufficiently mitigated."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 12/2025","text":"The data subject's father advanced a complaint before the DPA, even if the data subject was not underage. The complaint was against a municipality, the controller and related to the request of the controller to collect a total of eight fingerprints of the data subject when issuing a new ID card, even if Article 6(2) of Belgian Law of 19 July 1991, only requires one fingerprint.\nThe data subject alleges that, when inquiring about the amount of fingerprints taken, the controller did not disclose the legal basis for the mandatory processing of personal data of the data subject. At the moment of collection of the ID card, eight fingerprints were again scanned.\nThe controller puts forward that their legal basis is, as per Article 6(1)(c) GDPR, a legal obligation stemming from the Royal decree of 25 March 2003 on identity cards, which itself builds on the Article 6(2) of Belgian Law of 19 July 1991."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd - 2020010738","text":"The Icelandic credit report agency \"Lánstraust\" is the data controller. The complainant had debts in the past which he paid. Therefore, he argues that the data controller is not authorized to use his payment history information when making a credit rating.\n\nDispute\nWhether the data controller was lawfully processing payment history data of the complainant."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 36/2021","text":"This decision is a reconsideration of decision APD/GBA - 31/2020 of the Dispute Resolution Chamber dated June 16, 2020, and implements the judgment of the Markets Court dated November 18, 2020, number 2020/AR/990.\nThe Markets Court approved appeal of Article 5(1)(a), Article 12(1), Article 13(1) and Article 13(2). The appeal for Article 5(1)(c), Article 6(1) and Article 8 GDPR was not approved. This partial annulment means the DPA must reassess and motivate its original fine of €2,000.\n\nDispute\nCan a not for profit private educational institution be seen as a public body in Article 83(7) and article 221(2) of the Belgian Data Protection Law and thus be exempt from receiving an administrative fine?"}
{"_id":"facts_ICO (UK) - Advanced Computer Software Group Limited","text":"Advanced Computer Software Group Ltd. (data processor) is a software company providing IT and software services to organisations including the NHS in England.\nIn August 2022, the processor suffered a cyber-attack whereby the threat actor obtained access to their internal systems. This was achieved through the provision of a correct username and password through a customer account, allowing the actor to disable the antivirus measures and obtain domain administrator privileges. The threat actor was able to gain access to 19GB of data. This caused widespread disruption to NHS services.\nThe processor had to take multiple systems offline in order to re-build them. In May 2023, the final data controller was reconnected.\nThe personal data of a total of 82,946 individuals was compromised, with some of the data relating to deceased individuals, leaving a total of 79,404 individual’s personal data having been exfiltrated. This number includes the special category data of 41,196 data subjects. The personal data was comprised of demographic and contact information, employment related information, medical and health related information, and other special category information including racial or ethnic origin and religious or philosophical beliefs.\nFollowing report of the disruption to NHS services, the ICO (United Kingdom DPA) contacted the processor and launched their investigation."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03530","text":"Following noyb’s complaints, the Irish supervisory authority (DPC) issued decisions (IN-18-5-5 and IN-18-5-7) where it was found that Meta Platforms Ireland (Meta) could not rely on Article 6(1)(b) GDPR (contract) for its processing of personal data for behavioural advertising. In those decisions Meta was ordered to bring its processing operations in compliance with the GDPR, in accordance with the conclusion reached by the binding decisions 3/2022 and 4/2022 of the EDPB.\nAfter the DPC decisions, Meta shifted its legal basis from Article 6(1)(b) GDPR (contract) to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest) for most of its processing of personal data for behavioural advertising.\nHowever, in a recent judgment C-252/21 Facebook Inc. and Others v Bundeskartellamt by the Court of Justice (hereinafter “Bundeskartellamt Judgment”), the Court of Justice essentially held that Meta could not rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR for personalised advertising.\nMutual assistance (Article 61 GDPR)\nFollowing the DPC's decisions against Meta as well as the Bundeskartellamt Judgment, the Norwegian supervisory authority – in its role as a concerned supervisory authority (Article 4(22) GDPR) – raised its concerns and requested mutual assistance under Article 61(1) GDPR from the DPC as lead supervisory authority. The Norwegian supervisory authority requested the DPC the following:\n  * Firstly, to issue a temporary ban on Meta regarding certain processing operations until Meta has provided adequate and sufficient commitments to ensure compliance with Articles 6(1) and, potentially, with the right to object under Article 21 GDPR. However, the DPC informed that it could not comply with that request.\n  * Secondly, to share information on how would the DPC ensure that Meta complies with Article 6(1) GDPR. The DPC replied to the request, but the Norwegian authority viewed, essentially, that the DPC did not reply to the request adequately, and that the DPC did not provide any explanation on the reasons why is the DPC unable to provide the requested information.\nUrgency procedure (Article 66 GDPR)\nFollowing the aforementioned lack of assistance by the DPC, the Norwegian DPA initiated an urgency procedure according to Article 66 GDPR. The authority viewed that Meta’s shift towards legitimate interests was unlawful, and that essentially Meta shifted from one unlawful legal basis (contract) to another (legitimate interests). Thus, the authority argued that Meta had not brought its processing operations into compliance with Article 6(1) GDPR as the DPC's decisions had foreseen.\nIn this context, under Article 66(1) GDPR, a concerned supervisory authority – such as the Norwegian DPA – may, in exceptional circumstances (urgent need to act), immediately adopt provisional measures towards a controller on its own territory with a specified period of validity in accordance with Article 55(1) GDPR.\nIn the present case, the Norwegian supervisory authority considered that these conditions are met. The Norwegian authority viewed that Meta’s persistent state of non-compliance demanded immediate action to protect the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Additionally, the authority held that, since the DPC did not cooperate adequately (see two points above) - as it should have under Article 60 GDPR - Article 61(8) GDPR applied, which meant that the urgent need to act under Article 66(1) GDPR was presumed to be met and required an urgent binding decision by the EDPB pursuant to Article 66(2) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4300/182/2019","text":"A data subject requested a copy of a criminal case from the Finnish Supreme Court under The Public Access to Information Act. According to the Act, a person requesting the information does not have to indicate their identity, so the archives would not keep information about the case's recipient. However, the court asked the data subject for a personal identity number and home address for a billing purpose. It explained that it does not keep a separate register of persons who requested documents. Still, the information is required for the billing system maintained by the State Financial and Human Resources Service Center (Palkeet).\nConcerned that the defendant in the criminal case could later learn about persons receiving case materials and retaliate against them, the data subject asked the Finnish DPA to investigate it.\nThe DPA assessed first whether it is competent to supervise the processing when courts disclose personal data contained in criminal records. Secondly, it examined the legality of collecting and processing personal identity numbers for billing purposes. Thirdly, it evaluated the Supreme Court's approach to providing information on those who requested and received a copy of a document."}
{"_id":"facts_IP - 07120-1/2021/168","text":"The DPA was asked by a hospital if it can provide an employee with data on which of its other employees are processing health data, as well as when and how they are processing such data."}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd - 2020082249","text":"As the Icelandic DPA receives complaints on media coverage of individuals on a regular basis, it has decided to issue an opinion on the relationship between freedom of expression of the media and the privacy of individuals. This new opinion comes as an update of previous opinions regarding privacy and the media issued in the context of older laws."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Vodafone România S.A. 3","text":"The ANSPDCP conducted an investigation into Vodafone România S.A. and found that the controller could not demonstrate compliance and prove that it had fulfilled access and deletion requests.\n\nDispute\nDid the controller facilitate and fulfill the rights of data subjects enshrined in Articles 12, 15, and 17 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_Personvernnemnda - PVN-2024-01","text":"The controller, an employer, suspected that an employee had committed embezzlement and carried out an inspection of the employee’s mailbox. After discovering e-mail exchanges between the employee and another employee (the data subject), the controller also suspected that the data subject contributed to a possible embezzlement and accessed their mailbox as well.\nAccess to the data subject’s mailbox was carried out by the controller with the assistance of a third party and a data processor.\nThe inspection of the e-mails showed the data subject had breached their duty of loyalty in their employment by sharing insider information and other confidential information. The data subject was then dismissed.\nOn 12 July 2020, the data subject lodged a complaint at the Norwegian DPA (“Datatilsynet”). The data subject argued that the controller had no legal basis for conducting an inspection and disclosing their personal data.\nThe DPA found that the controller failed to comply with the accountability principle under Article 5(2) GDPR as the controller did not submit documentation of the legal basis for conducting the inspection of the data subject’s mailbox. The DPA held that the controller had a legitimate interest to inspect the data subject’s mailbox under Article 6(1) GDPR and Section 2 of the Norwegian E-mail Regulations (“e-postforskriften”). Under the E-mail Regulations, an employer has the right to access an employee’s mailbox in the event of \"reasonable suspicion that the employee's use of a mailbox or other electronic equipment results in a serious breach of the obligations arising from the employment relationship or may provide grounds for termination or dismissal\". However, the DPA found that the controller did not process the data subject’s personal data with sufficient transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR and Article 14 GDPR, as the data subject was not informed about the processing. The DPA stated that the controller could have made a copy of the emails in advance before the inspection to safeguard their interests, so that the data subject could be notified of the inspection in advance. The DPA also found that the controller did not conduct the inspection in accordance with the data minimisation principle under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. The search terms used were likely to generate more personal data than was necessary for the purpose of clarifying any unfair conduct. The DPA thus issued a reprimand against the controller under Article 58(2)(b) GDPR as the infringements affected a limited number of people and the violations of the accountability and transparency principle only affected the data subject and they were notified of the inspection shortly after it was carried out.\nThe data subject also filed a lawsuit with a district court, claiming that the termination was invalid and demanded compensation and redress. Both the district court and later the court of appeal concluded that the dismissal was valid and there were no grounds for compensation. However, they both held that the rules for access to employees' mailbox had been violated, so that there were grounds for compensation for damages under the Norwegian Personal Data Act. The controller was ordered to pay €1.741,50 (NOK 20,000) as compensation for damages.\nThe data subject appealed the DPA’s decision to the Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board (“Personvernnemnda”), stating that the DPA failed to impose a fine against the controller. Moreover, the data subject argued that the third party was a processor and therefore the DPA's assessment that a data processing agreement was not necessary was incorrect. The data subject also argued that the DPA did not take into account the controller’s breach of Article 30 GDPR when issuing a reprimand against the controller. The data subject argued that the records of processing activities was not handed over by the controller to the DPA until more than a year after access to the data subject’s email box had ended, violating Article 30 GDPR. The data subject also argued that the DPA’s handling of the case was biased and subjective and therefore failed to uphold its obligation to investigate and deal with all cases in full independence, regardless of a legally enforceable judgement related to the termination case against the controller."}
{"_id":"facts_Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Finland) - 3620/2023","text":"The controller (Lääkäriklinikka Estetic Oy, a medical clinic) had asked the Administrative Court of Helsinki (the Court) to overturn the €5,000 administrative fine imposed by the Finnish DPA and the DPA's decision, according to which the controller had not implemented the data subject's access request.\nThe controller filed the appeal claiming that it had already fulfilled the data subject's access request as far as it concerned the personal data it processed. The controller emphasised that it did not have access to the patient records of another company whose surgeon had treated the data subject at the controller's premises.\nThe controller argued that the DPA should have requested an explanation from the other company as well, because the data subject was not a patient of the controller, but a patient of the other company. The controller also stated that the DPA's actions had not been based on a sufficient and appropriate investigation.\nThe DPA emphasised that the data subject had received treatment from the controller at the controller's premises and that the controller had not informed the data subject that their patient records are in the possession of another company. The DPA also stated that the controller had not instructed the data subject to request their personal data from another company or otherwise informed the data subject about the matters related to the controllership of their personal data."}
{"_id":"facts_LG Köln - 28 O 328/21","text":"The controller is Scalable Capital, an online stockbroker. The data subject is a customer of the controller. The controller informed the data subject about a data breach which had occurred on 19 October 2020. A third party had accessed parts of the data subject's personal information, potentially including personal, tax and contact data and their IBAN.\nThe breach was conducted by using the credentials of CodeShip Inc., a \"Software as a Service\" company which the controller had contracted in the past. The contract was terminated in 2015. After the termination, the controller did not delete or change the credentials of CodeShip Inc. The third party obtained the credentials by means of a cyber attack against CodeShip Inc. The third party used CodeShip’s – still valid – credentials three times between April and October 2020 to gain access to the controller's database. Some of the data obtained was supposedly used for identity theft or for other fraudulent behaviour.\nAfter the breach, the controller paid the data subject a one-year subscription to the identity protection service “meine SCHUFA Plus”."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 38/2020","text":"Individual submitted a complaint on unsolicited political communications (email) he received by politician. The politician collected the complainant's contact details through his professional occupation for different purposes.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_Persónuvernd - 2020010613","text":"On April 9 2019, the Icelandic DPA received a complaint from a Complainant regarding the processing of their personal information in connection with credit rating by Creditinfo Lánstrausti hf. (hereinafter, 'Creditinfo'). The registration of a complainant's defaults affects their credit rating for up to four years from registration.\n\nDispute\nThe Icelandic DPA had to decide whether Creditinfo could use information about the complainant's defaults within the four-year period."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202317282","text":"On 20 October 2023, a data subject filed a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD) against Banco Cetelem, S.A. (the controller). It claimed that the controller, which offered lending services, made numerous unsolicited charges on his bank account between July and September 2022.\nThe data subject filed numerous complaints against the controller as well as a police report concerning the charges. On 8 August 2022, the data subject requested the deletion of his account data from the controller’s systems, as well as the reimbursement of the amount expended due to the unduly charged bills. The data subject also reproached the controller for attributing his bank account to a third party without previously requesting the relevant certificate of bank ownership from the third party.\nOne year later, in September 2023, the controller again charged the data subject with a new bill from the controller. The data subject complained to the controller about the charge, but the controller once again made another charge in October 2023.\nThe controller claimed that the charges occurred as a result of human error during the initial transcription of the bank account. It informed the AEPD that the data subject’s bank account number had been erroneously attributed to a debtor’s contract and was subsequently stored this way in the controller’s database. It stated that it deleted the data subject’s account information from its database after the first claim the data subject filed, but that it then sold the debt to a third party company in June 2023 and that the contract still contained the incorrect account number."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet - Datatilsynet - Arp-Hansen Hotel Group A/S indstilles til bøde","text":"During an audit visit to Arp-Hansen Hotel Group A / S (hereinafter Arp-Hansen), the Danish DPA became aware of a number of systems contained a lot of personal data that should have been deleted in accordance with Arp-Hansen's own set deletion deadlines. The DPA also found customer profiles which should have been deleted several years earlier. In summation, about 500,000 profiles were found that should have been deleted.\n\nDispute\nWhether Arp-Hansen was in violation of the storage limitation principle under GDPR Article 5(1)(e)?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00093/2019","text":"A third-party received several documents related to a contract with Vodaphone, containing the complainant's personal data. Thus, the complainant filed a complaint with the AEPD. Vodaphone claimed that a mistake has been made by on of its employee in good faith.\n\nDispute\nCan a mistake made in good faith justify the sharing of personal data to a third-party?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00315/2020","text":"The company EHR, dedicated to tourism and hotelier services, hired another company, Signallia, dedicated to software and computing services, to manage their data and servers. The data processing agreement between them stated that Signallia had to give back EHR all data and copies obtained or processed for them, as their relationship ends.\nAccordingly, when EHR decided to move their servers to an internal place they instructed Signallia to return to them all their data. However, the processor did not follow the request and instead asked the controller to pay the debts they had with them. The controller argued that the processor had debt with them as well and that they had lodged a legal claim before the courts. The legal claim was targeted at getting back data, including those of the clients of their hotels.\nEven though the processor communicated to the controller that they would handle over the data, a month after such communication no data was received. Therefore, the controller lodged a complaint with the Spanish DPA (AEPD). Again, the processor offered the controller to handle the data over in a 5TB hard disk, which they did not do, alleging organizational problems.\nThis behaviour caused huge losses to the controller, who could not access their servers and data during a long time."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00085/2020","text":"The complainant asked a company to exercise his/her right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed and to access these data in accordance with Article 15 GDPR.\nThe request did not receive the legally required response.\nThe claimant provided various documents relating to the complaint submitted to the Spanish DPA, which requested the company in question to inform the Agency of the actions taken to deal with the complaint submitted. There was also no response to this request.\n\nDispute\nCan companies be sanctioned for not attending to a customer's claim to exercise his or her right of access to data?"}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against S.C. Delivery Solutions S.A. (Sameday)","text":"S.C. Delivery Solutions S.A. (processor), commonly known as \"Sameday\", is a courier company. Sameday is authorized by two companies (controllers) for the processing of personal data.\nThe DPA received complaints about the processor's database, as it was found for sale on a website (RaidForums). Following the complaint, the DPA started an investigation.\nThe database contained the personal data of 26,566 customers (name of the recipient, contact details, address of the recipient, parcel details, delivery status etc.). The website was later seized by FBI, Europol and other European national police agencies."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Asociația de Proprietari Aviației Park","text":"The controller is a building owners association which mandated a security company to ensure security and protection of their buildings (processor). The data subjects were couriers accessing the building complex of the controller. The investigation of the ANSPDCP (Romania), which was initiated upon a complaint, revealed that the processor was collecting a big amount of personal data of the couriers on behalf of the controller. The processor was instructed by the controller to keep an access register of couriers entering the residential complex and note the following information there: name, surname, number of the ID card, destination, time of arrival, time of departure, observations. The DPA further found in its investigation that a video surveillance system was installed at the entrance of the building complex to monitor who is entering the complex and that the video footage captured by this surveillance system was stored longer than necessary."}
{"_id":"facts_LG Lübeck - 15 O 262/23","text":"The data subject took a case against a telecommunications provider, here the controller, for unlawfully disclosing their data. The controller transmitted the following data to a credit rating agency, namely SCHUFA Holding AG: name, address, date of birth, start and end date of the contract, contract number and a SCHUFA ID.\nUpon the data subject’s request, SCHUFA informed him that information on the contract conclusion had been supplied to SCHUFA and that this information will be stored until the end of the contract. The data subject called on the controller to cease the data transfer and to pay damages, which the controller rejected.\nThe data subject stated that he didn’t know that the controller would share this information and that this transfer brought upon him feelings of loss of control and worry. The data subject claimed for a minimum of €5,000 in damages and a declaration on claims regarding damages for future loss.\nThe controller brought forward that with the formation of the contract, the data subject was supplied with an informational which included a notice on the transfer of data to SCHUFA. It therefore concluded that the data subject was informed about the transfer, which nevertheless was necessary for fraud prevention"}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - TSV/35/2022","text":"The Finnish DPA was notified that a municipality-run educational institution (the controller) processed the personal data of its students for the marketing of courses offered by a third party without the consent of its students. The DPA asked the controller to explain the purpose of the personal data processing.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that a teacher had sent the students an email in which the teacher advertised their own course in another organisation. The controller emphasised that sending the email in question was not related to the activities of the controller.\nThe controller claimed that the email in question had been sent against the controller's instructions. According to the controller's privacy notice, personal data was not disclosed to third parties for direct marketing."}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 6097/161/21","text":"Otavamedia Oy (controller) is a publishing company whose online services reach approximately 2 million Finns monthly. Between 2018 and 2021, eleven data subjects complained about the controller to the Finnish Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (DPA). Five complaints concerned the controller's requirement for data subjects to send a filled and signed paper form if they wished to exercise their right for erasure under Article 17 GDPR. The rest reported that the controller did not respond to their subject access requests under Article 15 GDPR that were sent via an online form. With regard to the erasure requests, the controller justified the demand for a person's signature by the need to prevent identity fraud. For the other cases, the controller explained that the requests in question did not reach its customer service staff due to a technical error in its emailing system that lasted for seven months."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - PPC Energie Muntenia S.A.","text":"A data subject advanced a complaint before the DPA against the controller, an energy supply company. The complaint concerned marketing calls by an operator of the controller. The data subject asked the operator how he got their contact and advanced an access request as per Article 15 GDPR, to which no answer was given. The data subject reiterated their request, the controller replied but the data subject was not satisfied by the reply."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202311911","text":"DIGI SPAIN TELECOM, S.L. (the controller) is a telecommunications company. On 6 April 2021, a third person requested to duplicate the data subject’s SIM card at a store that sold the controller's products. The data subject lost phone service. Two hours later, the data subject obtained a new SIM card duplicate at a different store, which gave them access to the service again. According to the data subject, the controller did not take any measures to verify the identity of the person requesting the SIM card duplicate. Furthermore, the third person committed identity theft, because the data subject noticed an unauthorised bank transfer from their account (this was not addressed in the case).\nThe data subject presented a complaint to the DPA on 12 July 2023. The DPA imposed a €200,000 fine on the controller for duplicating SIM cards for unauthorised third parties on 8 November 2024. The controller then filed an internal appeal to the DPA on 11 December 2024.\nThe controller argued that its procedure for situations such as these that was carefully followed, and allowed it to process data lawfully in accordance to its obligations. The controller also contested the unauthorised bank transfer as a result of the SIM duplicate. In addition, it argued that it could not be held completely responsible for identifying and mitigating fraud. The controller requested a lower fine based on mitigating circumstances, stating that the DPA had set a disproportionately high fine. Among others, it argued that it had effectively solved the situation and that it did not process special categories of personal data."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00051/2020","text":"The complainant, a former affiliate to the political party, had fully unsubscribed from the political party and requested the erasure of all her personal data (even receiving a confirmation to that respect by the DPO of the controller). Notwithstanding that, she later received an email asking her about the possibility of acting as a party's representative in the Spanish general elections of November 2019. The complainant, therefore, assumes that her personal data had not been duly deleted. The controller answered to the first AEPD investigation stating that, as soon as the data subject sent the deletion request, her personal data were totally erased.\n\nDispute\nThe Authority has to assess the lawfulness of the processing following the withdrawal of consent under Article 7(3) GDPR. The Authority also considers the existence of a deletion request under Article 17 GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 160/2022","text":"The data subject received different calls by the controller, which used different phone numbers. These were national, foreign and anonymous numbers. The nature of the controller and the nature of these calls were not specified in the decision. The data subject asked the controller for a copy of his data (Article 15 GDPR) and asked the controller multiple times to remove his data (Article 17 GDPR). The data subject submitted the erasure requests by e-mail and using the controller’s website. However, the controller never replied."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Telekom Romania Communications SA 3","text":"When terminating the contract with Telekom, a previous customer withdrew their consent for data processing. After this, they were contacted again by Telekom for marketing purposes and the complainant exercised their rights to opposition and erasure. Despite this, complainant was further contacted by the controller for marketing purposes.\n\nDispute\nThe controller processed personal data even after the data subject withdrew his/her consent, objected to the processing and made an erasure request."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Den Haag - AWB - 22 5012","text":"On 17 May 2020, the data subject exercised their right of access (Article 15 GDPR) at the Dutch Tax Authority, de belastingdienst (controller). The controller refused to provide access to the relevant files, which lead the data subject to file a complaint with the Dutch DPA on 17 June 2020.\nOn 25 March 2021, the DPA rejected the complaint of the data subject. The reason for the rejection was not specified in this decision.\nOn 2 November 2021, the data subject appealed the decision. According to Dutch administrative law, the DPA itself had to assess this appeal (in Dutch: bezwaar). On 3 May 2022, the DPA requested the controller to provide information regarding the data subject to assess this appeal. The controller replied on the same day and provided details about ongoing financial procedures between the controller and the data subject.\nOn 2 June 2022, the controller made a decision regarding the data subject's access request. It is not clear from this ruling if the controller provided access and if so, in what from.\nOn 11 July 2022, the DPA agreed with the appeal of the data subject and warned the controller for not answering the access request within the time limit, in violation of Article 12(3) GDPR. The data subject, who was apparently not satisfied, appealed this decision to the District court of Den Haag (in Dutch: Beroep).\nOn 18 October 2022, the data subject filed another complaint with the DPA against the controller because it provided information to the DPA on 3 May 2022.\nIn his appeal, the data subject filed claims against both the DPA and the tax authority.\nRegarding his claim against the controller, the data subject stated that the controller never informed him about its decision of 2 June 2022 regarding the access request. The data subject claimed a compensation of €25,000.\nRegarding his claim against the DPA, he stated that the DPA did not properly execute its tasks under the GDPR. For this, the data subject requested €25,000 for immaterial damages. The data subject also stated that the DPA violated Article 6 ECHR for the lack of a hearing within a reasonable time.\nThe data subject received some financial compensation, established in Dutch law, because the DPA did not respond in time to their request."}
{"_id":"facts_BfDI (Germany) - 11.02.2021","text":"The company mivolta GmbH used partners to call hundreds of consumers to make telephone advertising for supply agreements (electricity and gas) of his own product. Thereby the telephoners also acted without and against the consumers wishes. Partially the telephoners used a hidden telephone number. In some cases the telephoners told the consumers that they are from the consumers electricity provider to get necessary data to be able to initiate a change of the provider. So the consumers had to make revocations of contracts they never concluded.\n\nDispute"}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2024-442-4149","text":"On 17 June 2021, the City of Copenhagen (“the controller”) reported a personal data breach to the Danish DPA (“Datatilsnynet”).\nDuring a routine scan on 15 June 2021 of the controller’s open file drive, the controller found that there was access to a normally closed drive that contained personal data. The data included name and address information, but the files also contained information about well-being, language assessment and information about children's dental and health care. Normally, only four data warehouse developers have access to this data, but now approximately 37,500 employees in the municipality gained unauthorised access to information about up to 3.7 million people. This was due to human error as an employee with administrator access mistakenly gave too wide access to the drive during a disk swap.\nThe unauthorised access existed for almost two months until the controller discovered the error. The access was then closed and reported to the DPA. The controller stated there was a very low probability of an ordinary employee encountering the drive, as it required special prerequisites to find it. Network registration was turned off on the individual PCs, which meant that employees could not find the drive through ordinary searches on the PC. It also meant that the URL had to be known or the drive had to be actively scanned for. Moreover, the controller, after investigation, found that no scanning tool had been used to look for open drives during the period of the breach.\nFurthermore, examination of the administrative log showed access only for people with a work-related need. However, the controller's logs of all administrative IT users' potential access to the drive only went back in time 35 days and therefore the controller could not definitively conclude that no employees other than those with a work-related need had accessed the data during the period.\nThe controller also stated that the majority of the files were not immediately readable for those who gained unauthorised access as this required a specific program to process the data. The controller argued that the data was thus not readable for a random administrative employee.\nThe controller stated that they would implement stronger safeguards to ensure that appropriate security measures are implemented to reduce the risk of future breaches and to ensure that potential breaches are detected quickly."}
{"_id":"facts_DSB (Austria) - DPA 2021-0.415.529","text":"The data subject was registered as a jobseeker with the Austrian Public Employment Service. The data subject received unsolicited job offers from a company (“the controller”) by text message, whereby the company had informed the data subject by telephone that it had received the data subject’s contact details from the Austrian Public Employment Service (“AMS’).\nThe data subject emailed the controller with a request for erasure, but received no response from the controller. The data subject continued to receive further text messages with job offers from the controller.\nThe data subject then lodged a complaint with the Austrian DPA (“Datenschutzbehörde”).\nThe controller argued that since the data subject had had been registered as a jobseeker with the AMS at the time of the first contact, it was not considered unlawful to send a job offer to the data subject. It therefore had a right to process the data subject’s data for the purposes of its business and thus had legitimate interests under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The controller did not address the issue of the data subject's right to erasure in its statement.\nThe data subject stated that they did not question the legality of the collection of their data as they were aware that the controller collected personal data such as their telephone number from the AMS. The data subject only wanted to enforce their right to erasure. The data subject explained that they had suspended all of their job advertisements via the AMS’s online portal, because they no longer needed support from the AMS. However, the data subject still received text messages from the controller with job offers despite several requests for erasure."}
{"_id":"facts_Rb. Den Haag - C/09/662309 / HA RK 24-104","text":"The data subject has multiple bank accounts with the controller, a bank.\nOn 13 November 2023, the controller asked the data subject to provide documents concerning their source of income. Since the data subject did not reply to this request, the controller closed their bank account.\nOn 29 November 2023, the data subject filed an access request to the controller according to Article 15 GDPR.\nOn 2 January 2024, the controller replied to the data subject, sending several data processed by it.\nHowever, the data subject considered it implausible that the controller does not process any data about the blocking of the account and that the logic behind the decision-making cannot be explained. Therefore, the data subject informed the controller about this and requested the latter not to delete their data pursuant to Article 18(1) GDPR since they intended to file a lawsuit.\nOn 5 February 2024, the data subject initiated legal proceeding against the controller before the District Court of The Hague (Rechtbank Den Haag – Rb. Den Haag). More specifically, the data subject aimed at acquiring more information about the decision-making process about the blocking of their bank account and if this decision had been taken through automated means.\nThe controller argued that it had already sufficiently acted on the access request and pointed out that there was no automated decision-making (ADM). Indeed, the controller explained that, even though an alert about a suspicious transaction is triggered automatically, then human intervention is required to decide whether to take further action.\nFurthermore, it noted that in the case at hand Article 41(1)(d) of the Dutch GDPR Implementation Act (Uitvoeringswet Algemene verordening gegevensbescherming – UAVG) applies, since the purpose of this processing is preventing criminal offences pursuant to the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act (Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme – Wwft)."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02376","text":"A bank launched a new online portal for a selection of customers (about 500) where they would be able to see their loans. However, as a result of \"frequent navigation\" and, consequently, a problem with verifying sessions per user, some customers were able to see other customers' data, including contact information, while others only saw incorrect loan details. After a customer notified the bank that her loan details were incorrect, the bank immediately shut the portal down. By then, 91 customers had logged on and had potentially viewed incorrect data/ data of other data subjects. When asked about the exact reason why the discrepancy occurred, the bank was not able to recreate the error.\nThe bank claimed they tested the portal between May and August 2019. After this incident, they conducted thorough testing and added an extra verification measure in the system, before they testing once again and did another launch for a selection of customer. After 14 days without errors, they launched the portal to all customers and after six months operations, no new errors have been discovered.\nWhen asked by the DPA, the bank said that they had assessed the risks for the rights and freedoms of the customers as \"low\" because they could not change the information themselves and the personal data presented were not of a sensitive nature. However, they were not able to document that they had made this assessment.\n\nDispute\nDid the bank comply with the requirements of Articles 24 and 32 GDPR when introducing the new online customer portal?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00357/2020","text":"A public body for the defense of consumers' rights filed a complaint with the AEPD against the defendant for failing to comply with Article 13 GDPR on its website.\nIn its investigation, the AEPD found that the defendant's website had a data collection form, but users did not have all the necessary information on the processing of their data according to Article 13 GDPR.\nSubsequently, the AEPD verified that the defendant had updated the information on its website.\n\nDispute\nThe decision does not establish precisely why the information provided was not in accordance with the GDPR. However, on the basis of the available information it seems that the information appeared under the title \"legal notice\" instead of \"privacy policy\". In addition, the text referred to the old Spanish law instead of the current one."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00368/2021","text":"Representatives of the Spanish Football Federation (RFEF), the Association of Spanish Footballers (AFE), and the Professional Football League (LNFP) held a meeting via Zoom on April 2020 to follow-up on the COVID-19 pandemic situation, and its impact on the national football landscape. According to the AFE and the LNFP, the RFEF shared the recording of this meeting with two radio broadcasters (Cadena Ser, COPE) without the participant's knowledge or consent, who eventually found out when the recordings were broadcasted a few days later. As a result, both the AFE and the LNFP filed several complaints against the RFEF with the Spanish DPA (AEPD). According to the claimants, the participants were not informed about the fact that the meeting was being recorded, and they did not receive the required information under Article 13 GDPR.\nThe RFEF alleged that during a prior in-person meeting, all the participants had agreed to record that meeting. The RFEF claimed that in the subsequent second meeting held on Zoom, all the participants were informed that the meeting was being recorded because there was an indicative red circle sign next to the word \"recording\" on the screen. Additionally, the RFEF stated that the meeting was recorded in order to obtain a literal transcript (the minutes), and to publish a press release according to its transparency requirements. The RFEF also alleged that it had only shared the recording to refute a false statement made by the AFE related to that meeting.\nLastly, the RFEF provided a document (drafted after the second meeting) that was shared with participants for setting up future meetings, which contained a data protection clause stating that participants consented to the recording of the meeting, and that this recording was carried out by the RFEF for public interest purposes."}
{"_id":"facts_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Compania Națională Poșta Română SA","text":"The investigation was started by ANSPDCP as a result of the notification of the controller for a data security violation by Compania Națională Poșta Română SA, as a processor.\nAs part of the investigation, it turned out that the Compania Națională Poșta Română SA lost certain postal items that contained decisions establishing pension rights, work cards and death certificates, affecting 35 natural persons .\nIt was also found that the processor did not implement adequate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of confidentiality and security of the personal data of the data subjects, which led to the loss, unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized access to certain personal data ."}
{"_id":"facts_EDPB - Binding Decision 2/2022 - 'Instagram'","text":"The DPC had conducted an investigation into Meta, specifically into Instagram. The DPC focused its investigation on two aspects. First: displayed information on business accounts of child users and second: default settings of newly created Instagram accounts. Based on this investigation, the DPC formulated a draft decision under Article 60(3) GDPR.\nProcessing of contact information on child user’s business accounts\nThe DPC held that Instagram permitted child users to switch from personal accounts to business accounts. During this switch from personal to business account, the child user was presented with an option screen (titled “Review Your Contact Info”). This screen was automatically filled with the user’s information, which was collected at the time of registration. The child user had the opportunity to modify this information. However, in order to complete switching process from personal- to business account, the child user also had to provide an email address or a phone number (contact information). Before September 2019, the phone number and e-mail were published on the respective user page in the form of a contact button. These contact details were not encrypted and visible in plain text.\nSince 4 September 2019, an updated version of this option screen was presented, with possibilities to modify contact details. Also, the user could choose not to provide any contact details at all.\nBefore march 2019, the contact details of child users were also visible as plain text in the HTML source code of the web-version of Instagram.\nAlso, for a time between August 2020 and November 2020, e-mail addresses of Instagram business accounts were visible in the HTML source code of the Instagram website as plain text, including to persons not registered as Instagram users.\nAccording to the DPC, by registering for a personal Instagram account, a data subject had to agree to the Instagram Terms of Use. The DPC held that Meta used two legal grounds in these terms of service for processing the personal data of Instagram child users: for the performance of a contract (Article 6(1)(b) GDPR) and for legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR).\nArticle 6(1)(b) GDPR\nIn its original draft decision, the DPC held that Meta could use Article 6(1)(b) GDPR GDPR as a legal ground for processing. The data subject would have to accept the terms of service. It also stated that Article 6(1)(b) GDPR does not require the inclusion of explicit contractual provisions. It would be sufficient if processing was necessary in the respective case. The DPC held that in this case, the contact information processing could be necessary for the performance of Meta’s Terms of Service with its users.\nArticle 6(1)(f) GDPR\nThe DPC also held that Meta could use Article 6(1)(f) GDPR as a legal ground for processing. This legal ground has three cumulative elements which need to be fulfilled by the controller in order to use this legal ground:\n1) the pursuit of a legitimate interest by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed; In its draft decision, The DPC held that the interests of Meta for processing the contact information were legitimate for Meta as well as for the Instagram users, because publication of contact details may be a reasonable and lawful mode to promote a business or other undertaking. The DPC did not specify if this concerned all Instagram users or a specific type of user. (The EDPB assumed all Instagram users based on submissions of Meta and the interpretation of these by the DPC).\n2) the need to process personal data for the purposes of the specific legitimate interests; The DPC held that the processing of contact information could be considered necessary for business account users who wished to provide contact information outside of Instagram. The DPC held in its original draft that the principle of data minimization (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR) had been violated by Meta, which is a relevant factor to decide if processing is necessary. The DPC determined this violation because child users of Instagram business accounts had to publish their information publically on business accounts in the HTML-code of the Instagram Website, prior to 7 March 7 2019.\n3) That the fundamental rights and freedoms do not take precedence. (Balancing exercise) The DPC held that Meta’s own analysis, regarding of the adequacy of the information provided to child users, was inadequate. The DPC also held that there was a lack of transparency because child users were not properly informed that the publication of their contact information might result in a high risk situation. Also, parts of the provided information were technical and hypothetical. The DPC came to the same conclusion for the security and safety measures implemented by Meta. The DPC held that these measures did not mitigate all relevant risks for child users. These inadequate measures would result in a risk of possible communication between child users and dangerous individuals, both on the Instagram platform itself as well as outside of the platform.\nIn the end, the DPC held that Meta could also use Article 6(1)(f) GDPR as a legal ground for processing. the DPC held that in cases where processing occurred in the context of the ‘well-considered professional activities’, it could happen that the legitimate interests at issue would not be overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the child user.\nPublic-by-default Instagram accounts\nBesides the remarks regarding the legal grounds for processing contact information of child users (business accounts), the DPC also determined violations regarding public by default processing of personal Instagram account regarding child users.\nThe DPC had stated that Instagram accounts were public by default, including accounts belonging to child users. This meant that a new account would automatically be public without changing the settings. This meant that every user in the app or website, registered Instagram user or not, could see the contents of the account. If this had been the private setting, the user would have to approve who could look at their account. Meta informed its child users of the public-by-default account settings in its 2018 and 2020 Data Policies.\nThe DPC held that Meta had violated Article 12(1) GDPR because it did not inform child users of the purposes of the public-by-default processing in a clear and transparent way.\nThe DPC also held that Meta had violated Article 5(1)(c) GDPR and Article 25(2) GDPR, because the public-by-default processing was not necessary nor proportionate. The DPC also mentioned that that child users may have a reduced ability to change privacy settings. The DPC held that Meta had failed to implement technical and organizational measures to ensure that only personal data that was necessary for the relevant purpose of processing was collected.\nThe DPC also held that Meta violated Article 25(1) GDPR by not implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures.\nThe DPC also held that Meta had violated Article 24(1) GDPR because the DPC found that the safeguards and measures implemented by Meta IE did not assess the specific risks to the rights and freedoms of child users properly.\nThe Norwegian DPA objected this assessment regarding the 'public by default' accounts, because it wanted the DPC to conclude that the public-by-default processing was not necessary or proportionate on several grounds. It also wanted the DPC to conclude that Article 6(1)(b) GDPR and Article 6(1)(f) GDPR were not applicable legal bases for the public-by-default processing.\nDraft decision sent to the EDPB\nThe DPC had published this draft decision and invited other DPA’s to react. Other DPA’s objected to this draft for various reasons, amongst other things that the conditions for Article 6(1)(b) GDPR and Article 6(1)(f) GDPR were not met. After this, the DPC submitted its draft decision to the consistency mechanism for dispute resolution by the EDPB (Article 65(1)(a) GDPR)."}
{"_id":"facts_LfDI (Bremen) - 03/2022","text":"The controller is BREBAU GmbH. Its business consists mainly of building and managing residential apartments. During its investigation the DPA of Bremen found that BREBAU was processing information of over 9,500 prospective tenants about their the skin colour, ethnicity, religion, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, health status and even the hairstyle, body odour and personal appearance."}
{"_id":"facts_Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2021-13 (20/01874)","text":"In May 2018, an employee at a restaurant lodged a complaint against camera surveillance at the work place. One year later, the Norwegian DPA (Datatilsynet) requested additional information from the company running that restaurant (the Company). Even though the Company replied within a few weeks, the DPA did not follow up again until March 2020.\nAfter receiving more information from the Company, it took another five months before the DPA managed to issue a preliminary decision, which included an injunction to end the camera surveillance due to the lack of a valid legal basis as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and a fine of €30,382 (NOK 300,000) for breaching Article 6(1)(f), 13 and 24.\nAfter the Company shared its comments and objections to the preliminary decision, the DPA issued a final decision where the fine was reduced to €20,255 (NOK 200,000) due to the company's financial situation under the COVID-19 pandemic.\nThe Company argued that the administrative fine was too high and therefore appealed the decision before the Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board. After reviewing the case, the DPA decided to uphold its decision, and the case was submitted to the Privacy Appeals Board (Personvernnemnda, PVN) for consideration."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202206302","text":"On 20 April 2022 a mother made a complaint to Instagram and the Spanish Civil Guard because a photo of her 13 year old son was used as the profile picture of a false Instagram account. The account included a video of man masturbating, face hidden. The DPA requested from Meta Platforms Ireland, as the data controller of the Instagram portal, the date, time and IP address from which the profile was created, and the identification and contact information of the profile's creator. As of July 14 2022, the profile had been deleted and the profile was at least available until 22 April 2022.\nOn August 8 2022, the controller responded that there was an error in the profile name. On August 29, the DPA made the same request as above with the corrected profile name. A response from the controller was received on September 23, and on September 26 the DPA determined that the IP address came from Digi Spain Telecom SL. Digi Spain then provided the details of the profile creator, AAA. The DPA proceeded to initiate a sanctioning procedure, under Article 83(5)(a) of the GDPR, against AAA on 21 December 2022, due to a infringement of Article 6. AAA was the father of the minor who created the profile. He gave a written statement in response to the allegations, generally stating that the infraction was committed by a knowing minor who had no intention or knowledge of causing harm, that no damage was caused, that the violation had no social repercussions and that it only lasted a few hours.\nThe DPA decided to fine AAA €10,000 on February 27 2023, although AAA reiterated his previous statements on March 23 in response to the decision."}
{"_id":"facts_First-tier Tribunal - Vestani v Information Commissioner","text":"On 2 November 2020, Capital Letters (London) Limited informed its employee, Jashu Vestani, that he was the victim of a data breach affecting the company. Mr. Vestani later experienced cyber attacks and other fraudulent activities which he concluded had resulted from Capital Letters' data breach.\nOn 4 January 2023, Vestani submitted a complaint about the data breach to UK DPA - the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). On March 14, 2023, the ICO decided not to investigate the complaint further, due to lack of evidence directly linking the attacks to the breach.\nOn 23 June 2023, Vestani appealed the ICO's decision to the First-Tier Tribunal.\nThe ICO argued that under Section 166 of the Data Protection Act, the Tribunal cannot examine the underlying merits of the original complaint, only whether the ICO took appropriate action. As the expert regulator, the ICO has wide discretion in handling complaints that the Tribunal cannot override without evidence of mishandling.\nThe core legal dispute centred on the scope of the Tribunal's authority to review the ICO's processing of data breach complaints and whether it can evaluate the regulator's decision itself or merely the appropriateness of internal procedures followed."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-019","text":"The CNIL received a complaint from several unions in May 2020 regarding the collection and storage of data on the number of days that RATP's agents had been on strike days. These data were kept in files normally used for careers advancement procedures. The RATP recognized that four bus transport units were concerned by this practice. The investigation conducted by the CNIL confirmed that this practice had been commonplace in at least three bus transport units of the RATP. During the investigation, the CNIL also found other breaches regarding storage limitation and data security."}
{"_id":"facts_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 21-07-2022 (car dealership)","text":"The Croatian DPA carried out an investigation over the processing of personal data by a car dealership in Zagreb (the controller). The controller used a video surveillance system on its premises."}
{"_id":"facts_CNIL (France) - SAN-2019-010","text":"The CNIL received a complaint on the ground that he was very regularly cold called by a company whose activity consists of direct marketing solicitations via phone (the controller). Although the complainant had previously informed the controller they did not want to be called and had already exercised their right to object via e-mail, the controller continously sent them marketing emails. Thus, a complaint was lodged with the CNIL.\n\nDispute\nIn addition to the violation of the right to object, could unsolicited direct marketing phone calls lead to additional GDPR infringments?"}
{"_id":"facts_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9435753","text":"The Italian DPA (Garante) received complaints from Wind Tre and non-Wind Tre users about unsolicited marketing communications made without their consent via texting, emails, faxes, and automated phone calls. In several complaints, the complainants noted that they were unable to withdraw their consent or object to the processing of their data for marketing purposes, in part due to inaccurate contact information in Wind Tre's privacy policies. Other complainants' personal data had been included in public phone directories despite objections being made by those complainants.\nThe investigation by the Garante also found that the MyWind and My3 apps had been \"configured in such a way as to require the user to consent, on each access, to processing for various purposes including marketing, profiling, communication of data to third parties, data enrichment and geolocation; withdrawal of such consent was allowed after 24 hours.\" The investigation also uncovered a number of infringements affecting Wind Tre's business partners, including a fine of eur 200,000 against a business partner who had subcontracted without a legal instrument whole sets of processing activities to call centres, who collected data on behalf of the business partner.\nAn interesting finding of the DPA’s investigation concerned practices for the identification of data subjects. In many cases, the company stated that it did not act on data subjects’ requests to withdraw consent if these did not come with a copy of an ID. The Garante clarified that while indeed Article 12(6) GDPR allows controllers to request further information, this is possible “only if they have reasonable doubts about the identity of the person making the request”. Moreover, Recital 64 GDPR require the measures adopted to identify data subjects to be “reasonable”. This aims, according to the Garante, at discouraging “excessive requests aimed at discouraging the exercise of rights, but also to avoid the collection and retention of unnecessary data.” Utmost importance must here be given to the principles of proportionality, necessity and adequacy. In the specific context of data processing for commercial purposes, the illegitimate exercise of the right to withdraw consent from a third party poses, according to the Garante, an almost insignificant risk to the legal sphere of the data subject, so that the collection and processing of ID copies cannot be considered reasonable. Even more so, in cases where the person trying to withdraw her consent is not a customer of Wind Tre. In such cases, the request “appears even more disproportionate and may involve the acquisition of personal data that are not already available to the owner and are therefore not necessary.”\n\nDispute\nWas the collection of the personal data by Wind Tre a breach of Articles 5, 6 and 24 GDPR?\nWas the processing by Wind Tre in violation of Articles 5 and 6 GDPR?\nWas the information provided by Wind Tre to the users in breach of Articles 12 and 13 GDPR?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00332/2020","text":"In 2016, the complainant contacted BORJAMOTOR, S.A. and objected to the processing of his personal data for direct marketing via e-mail. However, the complainant continued to receive e-mails with offers, although less frequently.\nThe complainant contacted the company on two further occasions to stop receiving emails: in November 2018 and in September 2019. During the latest unsubscribe request, the complainant used the contact form on the company's website to insist that he did not want to receive any more advertisements and to inform the company that he was going to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. The company responded to the data subject by showing its apologies. The AEPD decided to dismiss the case under the wrong impression that the situation had been rectified. However, in June 2020, the complainant received an SMS from the defendant with advertising content, so the data subject filed a new complaint with the AEPD.\nAfter a request for information, the company said that the complainant had received the SMS because months before he had used the contact form on the BORJAMOTOR, S.A. website to inform them about his complaint. In order to send the complainant's message correctly, it was necessary to accept the privacy policy and, therefore, the sending of electronic commercial communications.\n\nDispute\nDid the obtained a valid consent from the data subject to send him commercial communications? Is it correct to send commercial communications to a person just because they used a contact form?"}
{"_id":"facts_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 8493/161/21","text":"The Finnish DPA was notified that the controller (Lääkäriklinikka Estetic Oy, a medical clinic) had refused to provide patient records to the data subject despite an access request pursuant to Article 15 GDPR. The DPA had asked the controller to explain why it had refused to fulfil the data subject's request.\nIn response to the request, the controller clarified that the data subject had been treated at the controller's premises by a surgeon from another company, which is an independent controller of its patient records. The controller did not have access to that company's patient records.\nThe controller stated that its patients could access their personal data by visiting the controller's premises and that the personal data was not sent by email. The controller also claimed that it had already provided the requested personal data to the data subject."}
{"_id":"facts_ArbG Köln - 18 Ca 6830/21","text":"The controller is a company providing workplace health promotion services by consulting other companies on this topic and developing tailored measures for them. Its main customer base are care facilities.\nThe controller informed its employees that due to an amendment of the German Infection Protection Act, access to care facilities was only permitted to persons that are either vaccinated, recovered or tested negative against Covid-19. The controller asked their employees to prove their vaccination status by either handing over a screenshot of the digital vaccination certificate or by presenting the vaccination card. It also informed them that a copy will be made for documentation purposes.\nOn 03 December 2021, the data subject, who was employed as a counselor, presented her vaccination card to the controller. When asked by the HR officer whether she also has a QR vaccination code, she explained that she only has a digital vaccination certificate stored on her private mobile phone, which she did not have with her at the moment. As it was not possible for the controller to check the validity of the vaccination certificate without the QR code, the controller carried out a batch query, which means that it compared the provided vaccination data with publicly available information on the availability of vaccination batches in order to determine irregularities. It found that the vaccination data provided by the data subject was inconclusive as the first vaccination allegedly took place at a time when only elderly people were vaccinated. During a conversation with the data subject, the suspicion of forgery could not be dispelled, as she then asserted to never have stored the QR code on her phone because of data protection reasons and that she did not know whether she still had the QR code in paper form. As the data subject was unable to provide proof that the vaccination had actually been carried out, the controller terminated the employment relationship.\nThe data subject took legal action against the termination. During the court proceedings the data subject did not contest that it was not vaccinated but argued that the request to present the vaccination card as well as the subsequent processing of personal data had been unlawful and, therefore, the court was prohibited from considering the the fact that she was not vaccinated."}
{"_id":"facts_OLG Köln - 15 U 249/24","text":"A credit information agency (the controller) stored data regarding three undisputed and settled claims against an individual (the data subject) for a total of about €750. The last of these claims dated to February 2022 and was paid in December of the same year.\nIn November the data subject reached out to the controller and requested the erasure of the claims. The controller only erased the oldest claim and refused to delete the other two, claiming that the retention was justified under the legal basis of its legitimate interest.\nThe two remaining claims were updated with a settlement note. Additionally, creditworthiness scores were calculated based on the claims and were disclosed to a number of third parties: several banks, an energy supply company, and a telecommunications company.\nThe data subject requested the Regional Court of Cologne to order the erasure of the two remaining claims. The data subject also required compensation for immaterial damages. The Regional Court dismissed both request and held that the legitimate interest of the controller justified the retention of the data for three years.\nThe data subject challenged the ruling and claimed that the legitimate interest of the controller did not justify the storage of settled claims for longer than six months. In this regard, the data subject referenced the case law of the EU’s Court of Justice.\nThe controller requested the Court to dismiss the appeal. It argued again that it had a legitimate interest in storing the data, based on empirical analyses showing a correlation between an individual’s paid debts and their risk for insolvency. The controller also argued that the retention complied with a relevant code of conduct drafted by the Association of credit information agencies and approved by the Hessian DPA."}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00464/2020","text":"The Police Force of Navarra (Spain) reported to the AEPD the fact that they had found documentation held by controller next to a garbage container in a building. The documents included personal data of clients and suppliers. The police officers tried to locate the controller, but the business activity had ceased the activity at their premises. However, the person responsible for the company responded to a communication from the police informing that they had ceased their activity and that they had disposed of the \"files that they could\".\n\nDispute\nDid the controller appropriately process the personal data under its responsibility by adopting the necessary technical and organizational measures?"}
{"_id":"facts_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00377/2021","text":"The data subject, an employee of the Municipality, filed a complaint with the AEPD because of a video surveillance system that recorded employees and citizens actions within the Municipality's premises, even though no proper authorisation was requested and granted. Moreover, since the cameras could also record audio, personal conversations of employees and visitors could be recorded. Lastly, although there was a sign that informed visitors and employees of the presence video surveillance cameras, it was unclear for which purpose these cameras were installed. The AEPD informed the Municipality (hereafter: respondent) regarding the complaint but never got a reply. Hence, it agreed to process the complaint."}
{"_id":"facts_HDPA (Greece) - 2/2024","text":"On 03.05.2023 the HDPA sent a single questionnaire to be completed on the designation and position of the Data Protection Officer (DPO) to selected public bodies, such as the Ministry of Rural Development and Food. The deadline for submission of the questionnaire was set for 19 May 2023. The Ministry of Rural Development and Food did not submit the questionnaire on time and a new closing date of 31.05.2023 was set. Despite being urged by the authority, the questionnaire was not submitted. The authority was informed that during the concerned period, the Ministry of Rural Development and Food was in the process of designating a DPO.\nOn 28.11.2023, the authority sent a summons to the Ministry of Rural Development and Food to be heard on 19.12.2023. The Ministry of Rural Development and Food in a memorandum clarified that the contract of the DPO of the Ministry had expired on 04. 08.2022, while a new DPO was appointed on 20.06.2023; in the interim period, during which there was no designated DPO, it was stated that a personal data protection and security plan was in place and that the data subjects did not suffer any harm. Further, they claimed that an employee of the Directorate of Administrative Organization and Supervision of Legal Entities of the Ministry after receiving the second letter on 26.05.2023 immediately proceeded to complete and submit the questionnaire, which could not be done due to a technical error."}
{"_id":"facts_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2022-432-0099","text":"A Danish citizen lodged a complaint with the Danish DPA regarding the Danish Agency for Digital Government's (the controller) processing of his personal data in their Driving Licence app, which he had not registered for or used.\nThe app is a digital alternative to the physical driving licence and contains information about the licence holder's name, birth data, place of birth, nationality, licence number, passport number, passport photo, social security number, health, and data relating to criminal convictions and offences.\nFollowing the complaint, on 7 September 2022, the DPA started an own-volition investigation of the matter. They found that the controller was processing the personal data of approximately 3.96 million Danish citizens with a driving licence, yet only 1.7 million had registered for the app, while the remaining group had not joined the app.\nThe controller attributed the excessive processing to technical constraints of the driving licence database, built on an outdated mainframe system, which gave it access to all valid Danish driving licenses. They explained to have initially considered three possible solutions for the app but deemed only the one adopted realistically viable. The one adopted complied with certain operational and performance requirements while allowing for the digital driving licence, updated with the latest information, to be made accessible to citizens. Consequently, they claimed that the processing was in line with Article 5(1)(c) GDPR."}
{"_id":"facts_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-2501-10/2022","text":"The controller is a limited liability company in Hungary and also part of the Samlerhuset Group, an international group of companies based in Amsterdam. It sold different versions of commemorative and historical coins, with a specific focus on Hungarian history. The controller acquired the data of its customers as follows: they can place an order by filling in a form, received as part of advertising materials via postal mail. This data includes name, address, phone number, e-mail address.\nSince July 2020, the DPA received several complaints from data subjects concerning the processing of their data by the controller and objecting to its data processing practices. In most cases, the controller created a user account (profile) with the personal data provided during the purchase or ordering process. However, it only informed the data subjects afterwards about the processing. The DPA therefore carried out a test registration on the controller's website and analysed the privacy notices on the website and from the postal mail. Based on its findings, the DPA suspected an infringement of GDPR and launched an investigation.\nDuring the DPA’s investigation, the controller provided the following information on its data processing: potential new customers received a promotional mailing by post. In the controller's view, this did not constitute direct marketing under the Hungarian Act CXIX of 1995 on the processing of name and address data for research and direct marketing. The controller argued that the promotional material was sent to the data subjects together with a newspaper, to which they were subscribed pursuant to a contract with another separate company. Thus, the controller did not contact data subjects directly by itself. The data subjects could then contact the controller online, by phone or by post, in case they would like to order coins.\nIn the online shopping process, the information on data processing is linked at the end of the order. The controller emphasized that the online registration did not involve the processing of any more personal data than a purchase without registration. It was also possible to order products by phone or by post, without registering an online account. The data subjects gave their consent by signing the order form in writing for postal orders, verbally for phone orders and by ticking a specific checkbox for online orders.\nThe controller also informed the DPA that for the purpose of targeted advertising on Facebook and Google social media platforms, the controller manually selected – without automated decision-making – a group of its customers with an e-mail address for whom the given advertisement may be relevant. This list of addresses was hashed and uploaded to the Facebook and Google advertising systems for the display of the advertisement to data subjects whose email address hash matched an element of the uploaded hash list.\nThe controller further stressed that it found data protection highly important, and it employed a dedicated data protection officer (DPO) as well."}