text:
After respondent was indicted for armed robbery of a bank, and while he was in jail pending trial, Government agents contacted an informant who was then an inmate confined in the same cellblock as respondent. An agent instructed the informant to be alert to any statements made by federal prisoners but not to initiate conversations with or question respondent regarding the charges against him. After the informant had been released from jail, he reported to the agent that he and respondent had engaged in conversation and that respondent made incriminating statements about the robbery. The informant was paid for furnishing the information. At respondent's trial, which resulted in a conviction, the informant testified about the incriminating statements that respondent had made to him. Respondent moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that the introduction of the informant's testimony interfered with and violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Government's actions impaired respondent's Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201.
Held: Respondent's statements to the informant should not have been admitted at trial. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce respondent to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Under the facts -- particularly the facts that the informant was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government while ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate, and that respondent was in custody and under indictment at the time -- incriminating statements were "deliberately elicited" from respondent within the meaning of Massiah. Since respondent was unaware that the informant was acting for the Government, he cannot be held to have waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Pp. 447 U. S. 269-275.
opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 447 U. S. 277. REHNQUIST, J., filed dissenting opinion, post, p. 447 U. S. 289.
We granted certiorari to consider whether respondent's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by respondent to his cellmate, an undisclosed Government informant, after indictment and while in custody. 444 U.S. 824 (1979).
The Janaf Branch of the United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National in Norfolk, Va., was robbed in August, 1972. Witnesses saw two men wearing masks and carrying guns enter the bank while a third man waited in the car. No witnesses were able to identify respondent Henry as one of the participants. About an hour after the robbery, the getaway car was discovered. Inside was found a rent receipt signed by one "Allen R. Norris" and a lease, also signed by Norris, for a house in Norfolk. Two men, who were subsequently convicted of participating in the robbery, were arrested at the rented house. Discovered with them were the proceeds of the robbery and the guns and masks used by the gunmen.
armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). He was held pending trial in the Norfolk city jail. Counsel was appointed on November 27.
Nichols informed the agent that he was housed in the same cellblock with several federal prisoners awaiting trial, including Henry. The agent told him to be alert to any statements made by the federal prisoners, but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. In early December, after Nichols had been released from jail, the agent again contacted Nichols, who reported that he and Henry had engaged in conversation, and that Henry had told him about the robbery of the Janaf bank. [Footnote 2] Nichols was paid for furnishing the information.
Federal Bureau of Investigation testified concerning the events surrounding the discovery of the rental slip and the evidence uncovered at the rented house. Other witnesses also connected Henry to the rented house, including the rental agent, who positively identified Henry as the "Allen R. Norris" who had rented the house and had taken the rental receipt described earlier. A neighbor testified that, prior to the robbery, she saw Henry at the rented house with John Luck, one of the two men who had by the time of Henry's trial been convicted for the robbery. In addition, palm prints found on the lease agreement matched those of Henry.
Nichols testified at trial that he had "an opportunity to have some conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail," and that Henry told him that, on several occasions, he had gone to the Janaf Branch to see which employees opened the vault. Nichols also testified that Henry described to him the details of the robbery and stated that the only evidence connecting him to the robbery was the rental receipt. The jury was not informed that Nichols was a paid Government informant.
On the basis of this testimony, [Footnote 3] Henry was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 25 years. On appeal, he raised no Sixth Amendment claims. His conviction was affirmed, judgt. order reported at 483 F.2d 1401 (CA4 1973), and his petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari was denied. 421 U.S. 915 (1975).
he had just learned that Nichols was a paid Government informant and alleged that he had been intentionally placed in the same cell with Nichols so that Nichols could secure information about the robbery. Thus, Henry contended that the introduction of Nichols' testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded for an evidentiary inquiry into "whether the witness [Nichols] was acting as a government agent during his interviews with Henry."
"I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any statements made by these individuals [the federal prisoners] regarding the charges against them. I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals about the charges against them, however, if they engaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he was requested to pay attention to their statements. I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges against Henry, but that, if Henry initiated the conversations with Nichols, I requested Nichols to pay attention to the information furnished by Henry."
The agent's affidavit also stated that he never requested anyone affiliated with the Norfolk city jail to place Nichols in the same cell with Henry.
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the actions of the Government impaired the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant under Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964). The court noted that Nichols had engaged in conversation with Henry and concluded that, if by association, by general conversation, or both, Nichols had developed a relationship of trust and confidence with Henry such that Henry revealed incriminating information, this constituted interference with the right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. [Footnote 5] 590 F.2d 544 (1978).
"the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him."
Id. at 377 U. S. 206. The Massiah holding rests squarely on interference with his right to counsel.
The question here is whether, under the facts of this case, a Government agent "deliberately elicited" incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah. Three factors are important. First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols.
This combination of circumstances is sufficient to support the Court of Appeals' determination. Even if the agent's statement that he did not intend that Nichols would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating information is accepted, he must have known that such propinquity likely would lead to that result.
It is quite a different matter when the Government uses undercover agents to obtain incriminating statements from persons not in custody but suspected of criminal activity prior to the time charges are filed. In Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 385 U. S. 302 (1966), for example, this Court held that "no interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved" because "the Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." See also United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971). Similarly, the Fifth Amendment has been held not to be implicated by the use of undercover Government agents before charges are filed, because of the absence of the potential for compulsion. See Hoffa v. United States, supra at 385 U. S. 303-304. But the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims made in those cases are not relevant to the inquiry under the Sixth Amendment here -- whether the Government has interfered with the right to counsel of the accused by "deliberately eliciting" incriminating statements. Our holding today does not modify White or Hoffa.
Sixth Amendment where the accused is prompted by an undisclosed undercover informant than where the accused is speaking in the hearing of persons he knows to be Government officers. That line of argument, however, seeks to infuse Fifth Amendment concerns against compelled self-incrimination into the Sixth Amendment protection of the right to the assistance of counsel. An accused speaking to a known Government agent is typically aware that his statements may be used against him. The adversary positions at that stage are well established; the parties are then "arm's length" adversaries.
When the accused is in the company of a fellow inmate who is acting by prearrangement as a Government agent, the same cannot be said. Conversation stimulated in such circumstances may elicit information that an accused would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be Government agents. Indeed, the Massiah Court noted that, if the Sixth Amendment "is to have any efficacy, it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations, as well as those conducted in the jailhouse." The Court pointedly observed that Massiah was more seriously imposed upon because he did not know that his codefendant was a Government agent. 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 206.
Moreover, the concept of a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply in the context of communications with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the Government. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). In that setting, Henry, being unaware that Nichols was a Government agent expressly commissioned to secure evidence, cannot be held to have waived his right to the assistance of counsel.
The record does disclose that, on November 21, 1972, the same day the agent contacted Nichols, the agent's supervisor interrogated Henry at the jail. After denying participation in the robbery, Henry exercised his right to terminate the interview.
Henry also asked Nichols if he would help him once Nichols was released. Henry requested Nichols to go to Virginia Beach and contact a woman there. He prepared instructions on how to find the woman and wanted Nichols to tell her to visit Henry in the Norfolk jail. He explained that he wanted to ask the woman to carry a message to his partner, who was incarcerated in the Portsmouth city jail. Henry also gave Nichols a telephone number and asked him to contact an individual named "Junior" or "Nail." In addition, Henry asked Nichols to provide him with a floor plan of the United States Marshals' office and a handcuff key because Henry intended to attempt an escape.
Joseph Sadler, another of Henry's cellmates, also testified at trial. He stated that Henry had told him that Henry had robbed a bank with a man named "Lucky" or "Luck." Sadler testified that, on advice of counsel, he informed Government agents of the conversation with Henry. Sadler was not a paid informant, and had no arrangement to monitor or report on conversations with Henry.
In his § 2255 petition, Henry also alleged that Sadler's testimony was perjurious; that the Government failed to disclose Brady material, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); that the United States Attorney's argument to the jury was impermissibly prejudicial; and that his trial counsel was incompetent. The District Court rejected each of these grounds, and none of these issues is before this Court.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the testimony of Sadler, another cellmate of Henry, supported the conviction, but was not willing to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Nichols' testimony did not influence the jury. Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 386 U. S. 24 (1967).
Although both the Government, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST in dissent, question the continuing vitality of the Massiah branch of the Sixth Amendment, we reject their invitation to reconsider it.
The affidavit of the agent discloses that "Nichols had been paid by the FBI for expenses and services in connection with information he had provided" as an informant for at least a year. The only reasonable inference from this statement is that Nichols was paid when he produced information, not that Nichols was continuously on the payroll of the FBI. Here, the service requested of Nichols was that he obtain incriminating information from Henry; there is no indication that Nichols would have been paid if he had not performed the requested service.
Two aspects of the agent's affidavit are particularly significant. First, it is clear that the agent, in his discussions with Nichols, singled out Henry as the inmate in whom the agent had a special interest. Thus, the affidavit relates that "I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals," and "I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges," but to "pay attention to the information furnished by Henry." (Emphasis added.) Second, the agent only instructed Nichols not to question Henry or to initiate conversations regarding the bank robbery charges. Under these instructions, Nichols remained free to discharge his task of eliciting the statements in myriad less direct ways.
The situation where the "listening post" is an inanimate electronic device differs; such a device has no capability of leading the conversation into any particular subject or prompting any particular replies. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978). However, that situation is not presented in this case, and there is no occasion to treat it; nor are we called upon to pass on the situation where an informant is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged.
No doubt the role of the agent at the time of the conversations between Massiah and his codefendant was more active than that of the federal agents here. Yet the additional fact in Massiah that the agent was monitoring the conversations is hardly determinative. In both Massiah and this case, the informant was charged with the task of obtaining information from an accused. Whether Massiah's codefendant questioned Massiah about the crime or merely engaged in general conversation about it was a matter of no concern to the Massiah Court. Moreover, we deem it irrelevant that, in Massiah, the agent had to arrange the meeting between Massiah and his codefendant, while here the agents were fortunate enough to have an undercover informant already in close proximity to the accused.
This is not to read a "custody" requirement, which is a prerequisite to the attachment of Miranda rights, into this branch of the Sixth Amendment. Massiah was in no sense in custody at the time of his conversation with his codefendant. Rather, we believe the fact of custody bears on whether the Government "deliberately elicited" the incriminating statements from Henry.
This is admittedly not a case, such as Massiah, where the informant and the accused had a prior longstanding relationship. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence in the record which discloses that Nichols had managed to become more than a casual jailhouse acquaintance. That Henry could be induced to discuss his past crime is hardly surprising in view of the fact that Nichols had so ingratiated himself that Henry actively solicited his aid in executing his next crime -- his planned attempt to escape from the jail.
The holding of the Court of Appeals that this was not harmless error is on less firm grounds in view of the strong evidence against Henry, including the testimony of a neutral fellow inmate, Henry's rental of the hideaway house, and his presence there with the other participants in the robbery before the crime. The Government, however, has not argued that the error was harmless, and, on balance, we are not inclined to disturb the determination of the Court of Appeals.
"(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:"
"(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so."
See also Ethical Consideration 7-18.
The question in this case is whether the Government deliberately elicited information from respondent in violation of the rule of Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977). I join the opinion of the Court, but write separately to state my understanding of the Court's holding.
377 U. S. 206. Government agents outfitted an informant's automobile with radio transmitting equipment and instructed the informant to engage the defendant in conversation relating to the crimes. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72 (CA2 1962) (Hays, J., dissenting). In suppressing statements overheard during the resulting conversation, the Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment must "apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. . . .'" 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 206, quoting 307 F.2d at 72 (Hays, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Brewer v. Williams, supra, we applied Massiah to a situation in which a police detective purposefully isolated a suspect from his lawyers and, during a long ride in a police car, elicited incriminating remarks from the defendant through skillful interrogation. We suppressed the statement because the government "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit" information from a suspect. 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 399; see id. at 430 U. S. 407 (MARSHALL, J., concurring); id. at 430 U. S. 412 (POWELL, J., concurring).
The rule of Massiah serves the salutary purpose of preventing police interference with the relationship between a suspect and his counsel once formal proceedings have been initiated. But Massiah does not prohibit the introduction of spontaneous statements that are not elicited by governmental action. Thus, the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a passive listening device collects, but does not induce, incriminating comments. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978). Similarly, the mere presence of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed to overhear conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conversations would not necessarily be unconstitutional. In such a case, the question would be whether the informant's actions constituted deliberate and "surreptitious interrogatio[n]" of the defendant. If they did not, then there would be no interference with the relationship between client and counsel.
I view this as a close and difficult case on its facts because no evidentiary hearing has been held on theMassiah claim. Normally, such a hearing is helpful to a reviewing court and should be conducted. On balance, however, I accept the view of the Court of Appeals and of the Court that the record adequately demonstrates the existence of a Massiah violation. I could not join the Court's opinion if it held that the mere presence or incidental conversation of an informant in a jail cell would violate Massiah. * To demonstrate an infringement of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show that the government engaged in conduct that, considering all of the circumstances, is the functional equivalent of interrogation. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 399; id. at 430 U. S. 411, 430 U. S. 412 (POWELL, J., concurring). See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980).
Because I understand that the decision today rests on a conclusion that this informant deliberately elicited incriminating information by such conduct, I join the opinion of the Court.
* By reserving the question whether the mere presence of an informant in a jail cell violates Massiah, the Court demonstrates that its holding is not premised upon such a theory. Ante at 447 U. S. 269, n. 6.
MR JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting.
In this case, the Court, I fear, cuts loose from the moorings of Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), [Footnote 2/1] and overlooks or misapplies significant facts to reach a result that is not required by the Sixth Amendment, by established precedent, or by sound policy.
judges then on that court dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. And MR. JUSTICE POWELL, in his separate concurring opinion, obviously is less than comfortable, finds the case "close and difficult," ante at 447 U. S. 277, and writes to assure that his concurring vote preserves his contrary posture when the Court will be confronted with only "the mere presence or incidental conversation of an informant in a jail cell." Ibid. This division of opinion about this case attests to the importance of correct factual analysis here.
Because I view the principles of Massiah and the facts of this case differently than the Court does, I dissent.
Massiah mandates exclusion only if a federal agent "deliberately elicited" statements from the accused in the absence of counsel. 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 206. The word "deliberately" denotes intent. Massiah ties this intent to the act of elicitation, that is, to conduct that draws forth a response. Thus Massiah, by its own terms, covers only action undertaken with the specific intent to evoke an inculpatory disclosure.
case of "intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements." Ante at 447 U. S. 274. (Emphasis added.) This determination, coupled with the statement that Nichols "prompted" respondent Henry's remarks, ante at 447 U. S. 273, and see ante at 447 U. S. 271 n. 9, leads the Court to find a Massiah violation.
Thus, while claiming to retain the "deliberately elicited" test, the Court really forges a new test that saps the word "deliberately" of all significance. The Court's extension of Massiah would cover even a "negligent" triggering of events resulting in reception of disclosures. This approach, in my view, is unsupported and unwise.
A. Authority. The Court's precedents appear to me to be contrary to this new objective approach. Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959), whose concurring opinions presaged Massiah, see 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 204, concerned an "all-night inquisition" during which the defendant "repeatedly asked to be allowed to send for his lawyer." 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 327 (concurring opinion). Obviously, that case involved deliberate efforts to extract information in the absence of counsel. In Massiah itself, the agent engineered a pretrial meeting between the accused and a turncoat codefendant. The agent instructed the latter to talk to the defendant about the crime, see United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (CA2 1962); id. at 72 (dissenting opinion), and he bugged the meeting place so he could listen in. [Footnote 2/2] United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300 (1973), by emphasizing that Massiah involved a "ruse" and that Massiah's purpose was to neutralize "the overreaching of the prosecution," id. at 413 U. S. 312, reinforced the view that deliberate elicitation entails purposeful police action.
"[t]here can be no serious doubt . . . that Detective Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams,' and because, in giving his 'Christian burial speech,' Leaming 'purposely sought . . . to obtain as much incriminating information as possible."
The unifying theme of Massiah cases, then, is the presence of deliberate, designed, and purposeful tactics, that is, the agent's use of an investigatory tool with the specific intent of extracting information in the absence of counsel. Thus, the Court's "likely to induce" test fundamentally restructures Massiah. Even if the agent engages in no "overreaching," and believes his actions to be wholly innocent and passive, evidence he comes by must be excluded if a court, with the convenient benefit of 20/20 hindsight, finds it likely that the agent's actions would induce the statements.
a situation "likely to induce" the production of incriminatory remarks, and that the informant in fact "prompted" the defendant. Even accepting the most capacious reading of both this language and the facts, I believe that neither prong of the Court's test is satisfied.
if he breached his promise; yet the Court asks us to infer that Coughlin's conversation with Nichols "likely would lead" Nichols to engage in the very conduct which Coughlin told him to avoid. Ante at 447 U. S. 271.
The Court also emphasizes that Henry was "unaware that Nichols was a Government agent." Ante at 447 U. S. 273. One might properly assign this factor some importance, were it not for Brewer v. Williams. In that case, the Court explicitly held that the fact "[t]hat the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant." 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 400. (Emphasis added.) The Court's teeter-tottering with this factor in Massiah analysis can only induce confusion.
It merits emphasis that the Court's resurrection of the unawareness factor is indispensable to its holding. For, in Brewer, substantial contact and conversation with a confined defendant preceded delivery of the "Christian burial speech." Yet the Court clearly deemed the speech critical in finding a Massiah violation; it thus made clear that mere "association" and "general conversation" did not suffice to bring Massiah into play. Since nothing more transpired here, principled application of Brewer mandates reversal of the judgment in this case.
Finally, the Court notes that Henry was incarcerated when he made his statements to Nichols. The Court's emphasis of the "subtle influences" exerted by custody, however, is itself too subtle for me. This is not a case of a custodial encounter with police, in which the Government's display of power might overcome the free will of the accused. The relationship here was "social" and relaxed. Henry did not suspect that Nichols was connected with the FBI. Moreover, even assuming that "subtle influences" might encourage a detainee to talk about his crime, there are certainly counterbalances of at least equal weight. Since, in jail, "official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day,"
Lanza v. New York, 370 U. S. 139, 370 U. S. 143 (1962), and a jailmate has obvious incentives to assist authorities, one may expect a detainee to act with corresponding circumspection. Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 300, n. 4 ("Custody in . . . a [Massiah] case is not controlling; indeed, the petitioner in Massiah was not in custody").
which officers singled out a specific target. On these facts, I cannot agree that Coughlin "must have known that [it was] likely" that Nichols would seek to elicit information from Henry.
"[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that . . . the [defendant] was peculiarly susceptible to approaches by cellmates or that [he] . . . was unusually disoriented or upset."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 302-303. On these facts, it seems to me extremely unlikely that Coughlin's actions would lead to Henry's statements.
Even though the test forged by the Court has no precedent, we are not without some assistance in judging its application. Just a few weeks ago, in Rhode Island v. Innis, the Court held that Miranda was implicated only by "words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."
446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 302 (emphasis deleted and added). Here, the Court asks whether agents "creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements." Ante at 447 U. S. 274. Although the Court in Innis emphasized that the Massiah and Miranda rules are distinct, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 300, n. 4, I have some difficulty in identifying a material difference between these formulations. Since the Court found its test not satisfied in Innis, it should follow that Henry's statements may be excluded only if there was greater reason in this case than in Innis to expect incriminatory disclosures. The case for finding that disclosures were "likely," however, was clearly stronger in Innis. There, the defendant had just been arrested at 4:30 a.m.; he was handcuffed and confined in a "caged wagon"; and the three police officers accompanying him triggered his confession by conversing about the danger that a "little girl" attending a nearby school for the handicapped would "maybe kill herself" upon finding a gun he supposedly had hidden. Id. at 446 U. S. 293-295. Against the backdrop of Innis, I cannot fathom how the Court can conclude that Coughlin's actions rendered Henry's disclosures "likely."
conversations with Mr. Henry while he was in the jail.'" Ante at 447 U. S. 267. "Henry had engaged [Nichols] in conversation," "had requested Nichols' assistance," and "had talked to Nichols about the bank robbery charges against him." App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. Thus, we know only that Nichols and Henry had conversations, hardly a startling development, given their location in the same cellblock in a city jail. We know nothing about the nature of these conversations, particularly whether Nichols subtly or otherwise focused attention on the bank robberies. Indeed, to the extent the record says anything at all, it supports the inference that it was Henry, not Nichols, who "engaged" the other "in some conversations," and who was the moving force behind any mention of the crime. I cannot believe that Massiah requires exclusion when a cellmate previously unknown to the defendant and asked only to keep his ears open says: "It's a nice day," and the defendant responds: "It would be nicer if I hadn't robbed that bank." The Court of Appeals, however, found it necessary to swallow that bitter pill in order to decide this case the way it did, and this Court does not show that anything more transpired.
to be released was a logical choice to serve as a go-between. The Court, however, seems unconcerned that some of Henry's statements were "spontaneously given." 590 F.2d 544 549 (CA4 1978) (dissenting opinion). It emphasizes that "[i]n Massiah, no inquiry was made as to whether Massiah or his codefendant first raised the subject of the crime under investigation." Ante at 447 U. S. 271-272. This observation trivializes the central facts of Massiah, in which an agent arranged a bugged meeting between codefendants who shared a natural interest in their pending prosecution, and in which the informant was instructed to, and did, converse about the pair's misdeeds.
In sum, I think this is an unfortunate decision, which disregards precedent and stretches to the breaking point a virtually silent record. Whatever the bounds of Massiah, that case does not justify exclusion of the proof challenged here.
For purposes of this case, I see no need to abandon Massiah v. United States, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST does.
The planted bug, of course, not only underscored the agent's deliberate design to obtain incriminating information. By permitting the agent to monitor whether the codefendant informant abided by his agreement, it all but ensured that affirmative elicitation in fact would occur.
It is noteworthy that the phrase "deliberately elicited" appears at least three times in the Massiah opinion. See 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 204, 377 U. S. 206.
"Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated; even a psychiatrist asked to express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in custody would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to make the judgment now charged to police officers."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 446 U. S. 304 (1980) (opinion concurring in judgment).
"Massiah serves the salutary purpose of preventing police interference with the relationship between a suspect and his counsel once formal proceedings have been initiated."
I fail to see any greater "interference" on the facts of this case than in a case where an inmate is permitted to have a conversation with a trusted visitor, but with an electronic listening device in place, a practice MR. .JUSTICE POWELL finds unobjectionable. Ibid. Indeed, bugging might be said to present an even stronger case for finding "deliberate elicitation." There is, after all, a likelihood that the inmate will place added confidence in a relative or longtime friend who visits him. Nichols, in contrast, had not known Henry previously. Moreover, with bugging, a defendant cannot know what he is dealing with. He lacks the ability intelligently to gauge the probability that his confidences will be "reported" back to government agents. See Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1191 (CA2 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945 (1979).
Rejection of an objective test in this context is not inconsistent with Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, since "the policies underlying the two constitutional protections [Fifth and Sixth Amendments] are quite distinct." 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 300, n. 4. Miranda's "prophylactic rule," see Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 412 U. S. 53 (1973), seeks to protect a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination from "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" when "interrogation" occurs. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 384 U. S. 458 (1966). Thus, in Miranda cases, the degree of compulsion is critical. Beyond an objectively defined "pressure point," statements will be deemed presumedly compelled, and therefore properly excluded, absent the countercoercive effect of Miranda warnings. See id. at 384 U. S. 467. Massiah, in contrast to Miranda, is not rooted in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Rather, it is expressly designed to counter "deliberat[e]" interference with an indicted suspect's right to counsel. By focusing on deliberateness, Massiah imposes the exclusionary sanction on that conduct that is most culpable, most likely to frustrate the purpose of having counsel, and most susceptible to being checked by a deterrent. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 422 U. S. 604 (1975).
The Court also notes that Henry, being located in the same cellblock as Nichols, was accessible to the informant. It nonetheless totally ignores the fact that the investigating agent had nothing to do with placing Henry and Nichols in the same cellblock. Indeed, the record shows that Coughlin did not confer with Nichols initially with the purpose of obtaining evidence about Henry; rather, the agent's affidavit indicates t.hat he was unaware that Nichols and Henry were in the same cellblock until Nichols informed him. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a-58a.
The record shows that Nichols "had been paid by the FBI for expenses and services in connection with information he had provided on . . . previous occasions," id. at 57a, and that "Nichols was paid by the FBI for expenses and services in connection with the [investigation] of Henry." Id. at 59a. These facts establish, at most, an amorphous course of dealing, emanating from an unspecified number of previous investigations. They do not show that Nichols previously was paid only when he produced information. There can be no assurance that Nichols would not have been paid had he failed to come up with evidence implicating Henry or other federal defendants. Nor is there anything to indicate that Nichols acted on this assumption.
"Nichols advised that he was in the same cellblock, as Billy Gale Henry as well as with other prisoners who had Federal charges against them. I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any statements made by these individuals regarding the charges against them. I specifically recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals about the charges against them, however, if they engaged him in conversation or talked in front of him, he was requested to pay attention to their statements. I recall telling Nichols not to initiate any conversations with Henry regarding the bank robbery charges against Henry, but that, if Henry initiated the conversations with Nichols, I requested Nichols to pay attention to the information furnished by Henry."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a (emphases added). Since the affidavit containing this statement was submitted in Henry's case, it is neither surprising nor significant that it occasionally refers to Henry by name, while not referring specifically to remarks Coughlin might have made about other detainees. The Court's reading of this passage as establishing that "the agent . . . singled out Henry as the inmate in whom the agent had a special interest" seems to me extraordinary.
Indeed, here, unlike the scenario sketched by MR. JUSTICE POWELL, there was no instruction "to engage . . . in some conversations." It would seem that, a fortiori, Henry's statements should not be excluded.
has been a Massiah violation, ante at 447 U. S. 270, I think that Massiah constitutes such a substantial departure from the traditional concerns that underlie the Sixth Amendment guarantee that its language, if not its actual holding, should be reexamined.
"It is only a sterile syllogism -- an unsound one, besides -- to say that, because [the accused] had a right to counsel's aid before and during the trial, his out-of-court conversations and admissions must be excluded if obtained without counsel's consent or presence. The right to counsel has never meant as much before, Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504; Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and its extension in this case requires some further explanation, so far unarticulated by the Court."
"is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case,"
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."
information voluntarily obtained from an accused despite the fact that his counsel may not be present. In such circumstances, the accused, at the least, has been informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and often will have received advice from his counsel not to disclose any information relating to his case, see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977).
Once the accused has been made aware of his rights, it is his responsibility to decide whether or not to exercise them. If he voluntarily relinquishes his rights by talking to authorities, or if he decides to disclose incriminating information to someone whom he mistakenly believes will not report it to the authorities, cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966), he is normally accountable for his actions and must bear any adverse consequences that result. Such information has not in any sense been obtained because the accused's will has been overborne, nor does it result from any "unfair advantage" that the State has over the accused: the accused is free to keep quiet and to consult with his attorney if he so chooses. In this sense, the decision today and the result in Massiah are fundamentally inconsistent with traditional notions of the role of the attorney that underlie the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
on the basis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment long before the Court selected the Sixth Amendment as one that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" and made applicable against the States as well as the United States. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).
Ordinary citizens are expected to report any criminal activity they might observe, and they are often required, under pain of compulsory process, to reveal information that may incriminate others, even their friends and relatives. It generally does not matter that the information was obtained as a result of trust or confidence that develops from friendship or family ties. The incriminating information may still be obtained through use of the subpoena power, and in many instances, of course, it will be voluntarily revealed by the citizen interested in the enforcement of the laws.
"First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols."
Ante at 447 U. S. 270. I disagree with the Court's evaluation of these factors, and would conclude that no deliberate elicitation has taken place.
The Court acknowledges that the use of undercover police work is an important and constitutionally permissible method of law enforcement. Ante at 447 U. S. 272. As the Court observes, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 302, for example, recognizes that the Constitution affords no protection to "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it," even if that person is an undisclosed informer. And in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 429 U. S. 557 (1977), we acknowledged the "necessity of undercover work" and "the value it often is to effective law enforcement." See also e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U. S. 423, 411 U. S. 432 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 401 U. S. 752 (1971).
The Court nonetheless holds that, once formal criminal proceedings have commenced, such undercover activity in some circumstances may not be constitutionally permissible even though it leads to incriminating statements by an accused that are entirely voluntary and inherently reliable. The reason for this conclusion is not readily apparent from the Court's opinion.
The fact that police carry on undercover activities should not automatically be transmuted because formal criminal proceedings have begun. It is true that, once such proceedings have commenced, there is an "adversary" relationship between the government and the accused. But an adversary relationship may very well exist prior to the commencement of formal proceedings. And, as this Court has previously recognized, many events, while perhaps "adversarial," are not of such a nature that an attorney can provide any special knowledge or assistance to the accused as a result of his legal expertise. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300 (1973) (no right to an attorney at pretrial photographic identifications at which the accused is not present); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 267 (no right to an attorney at taking of handwriting exemplars). When an attorney has no such special knowledge or skill, the Sixth Amendment does not give the accused a right to have an attorney present.
"We do not question that, in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted."
type of encounter is one that is properly viewed as a critical stage at which counsel is necessary to provide guidance or protection to the accused to enable him to cope with unfamiliar legal proceedings, or to counterbalance the expertise of a professional prosecutor. Rather, as previously discussed, when the accused voluntarily reveals incriminating information to a third party in this context, I do not think there is any justification for excluding his admissions from trial, whether or not the third party was acting at the behest of the prosecution.
Finally, the Court considers relevant the fact that, because the accused is confined and in custody, "subtle influences" are present "that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover agents." Ante at 447 U. S. 274. An appeal to an accused's conscience or willingness to talk, however, does not, in my view, have a sufficiently overbearing impact on the accused's will to warrant special constitutional protection.
designed to extract incriminating statements from the accused. The same would be true if the accused made a statement that a prison guard happened to overhear. See, e.g., United States v Barfield, 461 F.2d 661 (CA5 1972). I think there likewise is no Sixth Amendment violation when the accused's cellmate initiates conversation with him, and the accused makes incriminatory admissions. The fact that the cellmate is an informant has no impact on the accused, because the informant appears to him to be an ordinary cellmate. Whether the accused makes any statements is therefore dependent on his own disposition to do so, despite the fact that he is confined in a cell.
Finally, I disagree with the Court's reading of the facts, though that reading obviously narrows the scope of its holding. Here the District Court found that the Government did not employ Nichols to question respondent or to seek information from him, but merely to report what he heard. The Government had no part in having Nichols placed in the jail cell with respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. And the record, in my view, fails to support the conclusion that Nichols engaged in any affirmative conduct to elicit information from respondent. The Court of Appeals did not either explicitly or implicitly find to the contrary. Thus, this Court's factual conclusions are not supported by the findings of the District Court. I consequently would conclude, as did the District Court, that here respondent has not been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
"It is not enough to assume that counsel . . . precipitated into the case [on the morning of the trial] thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given. Defendants were immediately hurried to trial. Chief Justice Anderson, after disclaiming any intention to criticize harshly counsel who attempted to represent defendants at the trials, said: '. . . The record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active. . . .' Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense. To decide otherwise would simply be to ignore actualities."
287 U.S. at 287 U. S. 58.
This rationale has also been applied to the arraignment, .where "[a]vailable defenses may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes," Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 368 U. S. 54 (1961), and to a preliminary hearing, where such defenses may similarly be lost when the accused enters his plea. White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (lineup); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967) (combination probation-revocation and sentencing hearing); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (preliminary examination); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977) (one-person showup at a hearing, which combined the functions of a preliminary arraignment and preliminary examination, that was adversary in nature and at which the accused was entitled to move for suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges).
"historical background suggests that the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance' at trial, when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor."
413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 309. The English common law rule, which severely limited the right of a person accused of a felony to consult with counsel, was apparently rejected by the Framers as inherently irrational. Id. at 413 U. S. 306-307.
"call[s] for examination of the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary."
Id. at 413 U. S. 313.
Whatever may be the appropriate role of counsel in protecting the accused's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, see, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 442 U. S. 719 (1979), when, as in this case, the accused merely engages in conversation with someone whom he does not know to be a governmental agent, the hazards of coercion and governmental overreaching are entirely absent.
"[U]nlawfully obtained evidence is not automatically excluded from the factfinding process in all circumstances. In a variety of contexts, we inquire whether application of the rule will promote its objectives sufficiently to justify the enormous cost it imposes on society."
"As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."
"United States v. Calandra, [414 U.S. 338, 414 U. S. 348 (1974)]; Accord, Stone v. Powell, supra at 428 U. S. 486-491; United States v. Janis, [428 U.S. 433 (1976)]; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 422 U. S. 606, 422 U. S. 608, 422 U. S. 609 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, [422 U.S. 531, 422 U. S. 538-539 (1975)]."
"Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end, or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his."
I also disagree with the Court that the fact that Nichols was a paid informant and on a contingency fee is relevant in making this determination. See ante at 447 U. S. 270.
"Massiah does not prohibit the introduction of spontaneous statements that are not elicited by governmental action. Thus, the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a passive listening device collects, but does not induce, incriminating comments. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978). Similarly, the mere presence of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed to overhear conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conversations would not necessarily be unconstitutional. In such a case, the question would be whether the informant's actions constituted deliberate and 'surreptitious interrogatio[n]' of the defendant. If they did not, there would be no interference with the relationship between client and counsel."
Ante at 447 U. S. 276. Deliberate elicitation does not and cannot depend on the subjective intention of the government or its informant to obtain incriminatory evidence from the accused within the limits of the law. Such an intention of course is the essence of conscientious police work.


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We supply and install a range of impact absorbing surfaces in North Yorkshire YO23 2 for children's play areas, parks and public pathways. These are available in a choice of specifications with the most popular being wetpour and rubber mulch. Our surfaces all meet up with the National Building Specification, so you can be sure you are getting quality services. To learn more about NBS, please visit this page https://www.impact-absorbing-surfaces.co.uk/nbs/north-yorkshire/ We are able to discuss the different options available with you to help you decide which would be the best for your facility. If you're looking for a more natural area, we would recommend having rubber mulch or grass matting installed; these are great for woodlands areas and parks. As leading marketers in the surfacing industry, we are able to carry out high quality installations using premium products to ensure you get the best finish. Our surface installations are guaranteed to last a long time with the correct maintenance and we carry out repairs and servicing if necessary.
Our impact absorbent surfaces can be installed under playground equipment as they meet BS EN 1777 standards, passing safety requirements for young children. We are professional safety surface installers and will only make use of premium material so you can be sure the installation is carried out to a top quality standard. Our safety surfaces are also SuDS compliant; this means that they are permeable floors which allow water to drain through easily. The advantage of porous flooring is that children can play on the playground all year round since it will not get muddy or waterlogged. To learn more about playground flooring please click here https://www.impact-absorbing-surfaces.co.uk/facilities/playground/north-yorkshire/ Alternatively you could get more info on the impact absorbing surfaces we install and details on costs by filling in our contact box. Once you have completed the form one of our experts will get respond quickly with a response answering any questions or queries you may have.
Our local professional installers closest to you may carry out the construction of children's safety surfacing in North Yorkshire YO23 2 to create a fun and safe area for children to play in. If you've got high playground equipment installed in your playground or surrounding areas, it is important to have flooring which is impact absorbent installed. The surface needs to be installed for safety no matter what the use. NEAP areas will need safety surfacing since the kids will need to be safe. For more information on NEAP surfacing please click here https://www.impact-absorbing-surfaces.co.uk/facilities/neap/north-yorkshire/ Our experts can install wetpour and rubber mulch in different depths to meet the Critical Fall Height necessary to keep the children safe in the event that they fall off the playground equipment. The CFH is calculated by looking at the sub base which the children's safety surfacing will be laid over and the height of the play equipment. If the apparatus is very high, you will need to have a thicker surface installed to make sure the children won't get injured if they fall. All of our safety surfaces meet up with British Standards for safety, as this is essential when construction a children's play area.
We offer you even more details on the impact absorbing surfaces in North Yorkshire YO23 2 that can be installed along with details on costs and prices. If there are any questions which you would like us to answer, please fill out the contact form available. Our expert team members will get back to you as soon as possible with more information on safety flooring available and the installation process. We have made our enquiry process easy to follow so that you can receive your information quickly.

industry_corpus2: Real Estate & Construction


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Adding videos to business websites is one of the most effective e-commerce marketing strategies today. These help e-businesses in attaining the professional presence they want to achieve in the online environment. Such can easily attract end-users and can create a dynamic and interactive internet platform for potential customers.
Nonetheless, efficiently incorporating video sources to websites is not that easy. There are a lot of complicated technicalities involved and if businesses are not adept with the use of technology, they can end up spending extensively for web pages and video materials that are not as competitive as they could have been. Thankfully, there are professional web hosting providers like Oculu that offer cloud based video delivery systems that can resolve all problems of video uploads and can defy the limits of web developing.
Cloud hosting delivery was created to maximize the space that the Internet can provide. Its development has spared many businesses from buying numerous servers for their database and website support systems. Instead, they can simply use the Internet to access sources, software, and other information stored in multiple servers whenever and wherever they may need such materials. Hence, even video uploads will no longer be a problem. Content from different sources can be squeezed into a single playlist and inclusion of audio clips can be done effortlessly. Above all, video format issues and challenging software use can also be resolved.
For businesses that plan on energizing and optimizing their web pages, the services of cloud video hosting sites are the answer. With such delivery systems, e-commerce entities can attain cost efficiency as well. Their expenditures on multiple servers and professional IT services can be minimized. In addition, access fees to available online hosting platforms are quite affordable.
Of course, this step is also important for companies to obtain their desired scalability. The platforms will allow them to take full control of their websites and video materials through user-friendly video dashboard software and applications. More importantly, these video hosting sites also enable their clients to see full and comprehensive viewing reports or statistics made by end-users in time frames specified.
Such deals are already irresistible for businesses that have long aimed to efficiently boost their presence in the online market. However, there are reliable platforms that offer favorable deals beyond that. There are some video hosting sites that can provide a free video spokesperson who can relay important messages to viewers in behalf of the company. Trading firms simply need to come up with script drafts that can be edited and executed by the host sites’ in-house team of professional copywriters. With these cloud based technology, the sky is truly the limit for excellent web development and video integration.

industry_corpus2: Computing & Telecommunications


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A user-friendly vibratory sifter incorporating the patented TLI (twist, lock and inflate) airlock clamping system designed to provide effortless operation while maximizing screening performance. The Russell Compact Airlock Sieve™ is one of Russell Finex’s finest vibratory sifters accurately removing oversize contamination, ideal for check screening your incoming ingredients on the primary side right through to finished powders on the secondary side of your production facilities. The cGMP design of the screener is based on clean lines, making sanitation easier and enhancing performance.
Contact us to learn how the Russell Compact Airlock Sieve can help improve your product quality or find out more about our wide range of sieving machines.
These vibratory sifters are able to provide substantial improvements in product containment with its patented TLI (Twist, Lock and Inflate) pneumatic clamping system. Simply place the component parts into the base and locate them by twisting and locking the lid. An inflatable seal then locks the components in place. This reduces the dust and improves your operators’ health and safety, providing validatable OEL 5 containment (less than 1µg/m3).
View our complete range of Russell Compact Sieves® and other check screening sieving machines.

industry_corpus2: Manufacturing


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We value all of our guest’s feedback highly. Please take some time to read through our guestbook and see first-hand, comments we have had. If you have recently stayed with us, feel free to leave your own thoughts and share your experience.
Beautiful little place. Stayed with my family in one of the cottages beautiful cottage. Very spacious. Beautiful view from the windows. Amazing breakfast. Great service we will be returning.
A huge thank you to all. We recently stayed in Pen-y-Fan cottage with 6 of our friends to celebrate my husband's 60th birthday. The cottage & hospitality of all staff was superb. Breakfast was gorgeous.
The views from the cottage were fantastic, this really is a wonderful place to stay. Definitely the place to go to relax in peace and quiet.
We booked this place as I love the area. The Pen Y Fan lodge was lovely and very spacious. Well looked after and a absolute pleasure to stay in. We don't normally bother writing reviews but felt our experience was deserving... The team, Michael and his fantastic wife made us feel very welcome. I'd definitely have no problem recommending this place and will return soon with more of the gang. The food was good, realisticly priced, good value overall and more importantly the service impeccable. Thank you guys!
Can`t fault accommodation,food or location.
Absolutely Amazing.The best customer service I`ve seen in a long,long time.We made the Beacons highest peak but would not have made it but for the ride up to the top reservoir.

industry_corpus2: Hospitality & Catering


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Olivia Munn isn’t letting Brett Ratner’s unkind words deter her from the company of men. The actress dined with New York Ranger Brad Richards at Spasso in the West Village on Thursday and then went to the game at MSG on Friday. It isn’t clear if Munn and Richards are dating, but he would likely make a more chivalrous boyfriend.
Ratner had claimed,“I banged her a few times, but I forgot her.” He later apologized and admitted to lying about sleeping with Munn.

industry_corpus2: Film & Entertainment


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In this past week’s episode, we talked a bit about a few different manifestations of death. The delineations between them can be a little blurry sometimes, so here is a breakdown of some of DC’s death gods ranked from most to least powerful.
A member of the Endless, Death came into existence shortly after the first beings came to life. She is the personification of death itself and ushers souls from life into the next stage of their existence – either to a particular afterlife or toward reincarnation. She is literally death given form, but will leave the job of reaping to other, lesser death gods if such beings have a claim to a soul; for example, if someone worships a different deity of death, Death of the Endless will leave that soul to that deity. But ultimately, the responsibility for all souls falls to Death.
A different manifestation of death, Nekron is the gatekeeper to the afterlife. Trapped within the Land of the Unliving, Nekron rules over the buffer spiritual realm where all souls await judgment. Sentient but soulless himself, Nekron desires the death and destruction of all life. He is able to resurrect the dead and, via the Black Lantern rings, he can reanimate and control the corpses of the deceased.
The Black Racer is the death god of the New Gods of New Genesis and Apokolips. Just a spirit of death, the Black Racer always requires a physical host, the two most famous of which are Willie Walker (a Vietnam veteran selected by the Source to become the Racer) and the Flash, who was bonded with the Black Racer during the Darkseid War. As the personification of death for the multiversal New Gods, the Black Racer is more powerful than other, lesser death gods from within the Orrery of Worlds.
The Black Flash is the speedster manifestation of death, fast enough to run down speedsters and return them to the Speed Force, which serves as the afterlife for all who channel its power. Though the Black Flash is tasked with managing the deaths of speedsters, it is also capable of killing those not connected to the Speed Force. Briefly, Barry Allen was transformed into the Black Flash.
Unlike the Green or the Red, which are the collective consciousnesses of plant and animal life, respectively, the Black represents the collective consciousness of rot and decay, forces extremely closely associated with death. And just as Swamp Thing and Animal Man are avatars of the Green and the Red, the Black also selects an avatar to further the cause of rot and death, draining the life force from any living being. The most memorable and dangerous of these avatars was Anton Arcane, a necromancer and long-time foe of Swamp Thing. His niece, Abigail Arcane has also been the avatar.
Originally created by Veronica Cale and the Science Squad, Azraeuz was one of the Four Horsemen of Apokolips and an avatar of death. He is demonic by nature, and is able to draw strength and energy from any and all death in his vicinity, can reanimate the dead, and is able on occasion to take physical form through the possession of someone else’s body.
There are, of course, many others who wield or commune with the force of death, and many others who embody or personify it as death gods, but hopefully this gives a bit of context as to the fractured nature of death’s personification in DC.
I was thinking of you as I added Arcane into this list!


text: These resources are specifically designed to help you in your developmental studies of the Word of God. God's Word is a stabilizing force of comfort in your life. Purpose to read and study God's Word each day.

industry_corpus2: Subject Education


text: From simple branded cardboard shipper displays to elaborate hutches, Nassau Candy can help you market your goods. We stock handsome point of sale counter displays and combination racks designed to hold multiple types of goods. Neat and orderly presentations are easy with the correct racks and displays.


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Fans of Japanese consumer electronics and gritty Northern Hemisphere rugby union rejoice! Toshiba has confirmed it is packing in to the scrum, joining the maul from the side and taking the 3 as a sponsor of the 2015 Rugby World Cup.
This is the third edition of Rugby-Mania that Toshiba has supported and it comes on the back of a very successful stint as a partner of the 2015 Asian Cup, won gloriously by the Socceroos.
The 2015 Rugby World Cup is being held in England (and Wales, though not in an co-hosting capacity) from 18 September through 31 October 2015, with 20 nations playing 48 matches in 13 stadia, including famous locales like Twickenham, Elland Road, St James’ Park, Wembley and Old Trafford. Toshiba joins other official partners including Emirates, Heineken, Land Rover, DHL, MasterCard, Societe Generale.
While the Wallabies are sponsored by rival brand Samsung, the Rugby World Cup has onerous rules preventing participating nations from spruiking their own sponsors, meaning Toshiba should have clear air to promote its wares.
Locally, Toshiba Australia is proud!
Toshiba’s sponsorship covers all areas of its business — that is, it’s not restricted to being simply, say, the TV sponsor — and elements will include social infrastructure, air conditioning, multi-functional printers, digital products and medical imaging devices. Toshiba will also be supplying products to World Rugby (nee IRB) to assist in the staging of the tournament.
“Toshiba is a world leader and innovator in pioneering high technology and with the expanded reach of Rugby World Cup; we are working together to reach people wherever and whenever they are watching, talking about or playing rugby,” said Murray Barnett, head of commercial, broadcast and marketing for the 2015 Rugby World Cup organising committee.
Australia’s Pool A opponents for the 2015 World Cup are England, Wales, Fiji and Uruguay.
Interestingly, the 2019 Rugby World Cup is scheduled to be held in Toshiba’s homeland, Japan, meaning a fourth quadrennium of sponsorship is highly likely.


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21 New Street near Bishopsgate is a 7 storey former wool warehouse. MAX was approached to review options for the property and the site.
They included refurbishment of the offices, conversion to a hotel, serviced apartments or residential accommodation, or substantial demolition and new-build. MAX proposed a development that responds to the need for short and mid-term accommodation in this location while providing a mix of private and public amenity that encourage footfall to this interesting corner of the city.
Modelling and analysing the site in its context, we were able to designate spaces suitable for longer term accommodation or short-term stays and identify those more suited to ancillary or supporting uses. The model supported an argument for establishing both serviced apartments and boutique hotel accommodation operated centrally around shared communal facilities with either open or membership access by the general public. Designed to an exceptional standard, the development would be aimed at the top end of the itinerant working and visiting City population.


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The TRACKER® Pro Team? 195 TXW is the biggest, most powerful all-welded Mod V boat we've ever built. And it's packed with features to make it our most tournament-ready Mod V, too. From the huge 39-square-foot bow casting deck to the box beam, all-aluminum transom, it's built for serious fishing.
At 18' 7" long and a generous 8' 2" beam, it's as smooth and stable as an aluminum bass boat can be. It's also loaded with storage compartments for all your tournament gear, including a center rod locker for 12 rods up to 8'. It comes standard with a 150HP Mercury® outboard and features our Revolution? Mod V hull with Smooth Ride Guarantee?. And it?s backed by the TRACKER Promise?the best factory warranty in aluminum boats.
TRACKER-exclusive all-welded Revolution? hull w/Smooth Ride Guarantee?
Fuel capacity - 30 gal.
Max. person weight - 685 lbs.
Max. person, motor & gear weight - 1350 lbs.
Average weight - 1215 lbs.
Average package weight - 2541 lbs.
Towing length - 24' 9"
Storage length (w/outboard trimmed down) - 20' 7"

industry_corpus2: Agriculture & Fisheries


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Big League Cards has not reviewed all of the sites linked to its Internet web site and is not responsible for the contents of any such linked site. The inclusion of any link does not imply endorsement by Big League Cards of the site. Use of any such linked web site is at the user's own risk.
Any claim relating to Big League Cards' web site shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida without regard to its conflict of law provisions.

industry_corpus2: Others


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Yesterday was the traditional day in the blogosphere for posting canine images, but it is also the traditional day in Milwaukee for going out to eat fried fish and the traditional day in my household for doing grocery shopping. I managed, by ignoring much barking, to get Hunter to stick around long enough to get a few pictures last night, but it wasn't until this morning that I had time to edit (using Paint Shop Pro 4.0 and not Photoshop) out my thumb and some background noise. So anyway, better views of our canine than previously posted. By the way, she told my wee wifey, in a dream, that Hunter was her name, and has been far more responsive to it than she had been to Polarity.
Anyone curious about Hunter's ancestry, or concerned about Breed Specific Legislation, will find this of interest.


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After breaking box office records on its opening weekend last month, Marvel Studios' "Captain Marvel" had shattered another cinematic milestone and surpassed $1 billion at the global box office, earning $358 million domestically and $645 million internationally through April 2, 2019.
Directed by Anna Boden and Ryan Fleck, "Captain Marvel" opened worldwide on March 8th, 2019 starring Brie Larson, Samuel L. Jackson, Clark Gregg, Jude Law, Lashana Lynch, Ben Mendelsohn, Djimon Hounsou, Gemma Chan, Rune Temte, Algenis Perez Soto, Mckenna Grace, Lee Pace and Annette Bening.
Reaching $1 billion at the box office is a landmark that only 37 other movies in history have reached; "Captain Marvel" is now the 38th. It's also the first female-led Super Hero movie to reach $1 billion in global sales as well as the first movie release of 2019 to hit $1 billion.
"Captain Marvel" is the seventh Marvel Studios movie to reach this massive number, following in the footsteps of "Avengers: Infinity War" ($2.048 billion), "Avengers" ($1.519 billion), "Avengers: Age of Ultron" ($1.405 billion), "Black Panther" ($1.347 billion), "Iron Man 3" ($1.215 billion), and "Captain America: Civil War" ($1.153 billion).
Marvel Studios' "Captain Marvel" is in theaters now! Captain Marvel will appear next in Marvel Studios' "Avengers: Endgame", opening April 26.
Christopher Townsend walks Earth's Mightiest Show through how visual effects brought 'Captain Marvel' to life!


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LA-20 PROJECT | Barriere Construction Co.
The LA-20 Project was a 2.676-mile roadway widening endeavor in the City of Thibodaux that, within the context of future plans, efficiently alleviated congestion and enhanced access to local businesses in this rapidly developing area. The Project required a large volume of work, coordinating changes in traffic patterns, and an emphasis on building and maintaining a strong partnership with the City of Thibodaux as well as local residents and businesses along the route within a short 244-day timeframe. Barriere worked closely with LADOTD, locally-based Duplantis Design Group, and the City to implement the Project plans from January to October in 2016.
The combination of Thibodaux locals opting to commute to jobs in New Orleans due to an economic decline and New Orleanians opting for more affordable housing 46 miles outside the bigger city has led to a boom in residential and commercial development in the City of Thibodaux. There has been a corresponding increase in traffic volume on rural roadways severely under equipped to handle this shift that has had an eye-opening effect on developers making plans to capitalize on this dynamic not only now, but in the years to come.
The original roadway was a two-lane highway with poorly-timed, outdated traffic signals that caused traffic flow inefficiencies and a “suicide lane” down the middle that posed head-on and merging hazards. Project plans called for four-lanes as well as the introduction of controlled-access crossing points and modernization of traffic signals. The LADOTD prioritized maintaining two-way traffic and access to the local businesses in the Project area throughout the course of construction.To successfully complete the project, Barriere loaded up the job with readily-available resources, such as 45,000 tons of asphalt from its own plant, quality equipment, experienced workers, a strong services and supplier network, and expertise in teaming up high-production transportation construction, project management and asphalt operations.
Barriere completed the Project on-time, on-budget, and without a lost-time or recordable incident. Miscellaneous drainage and concrete work was added at the conclusion of the Project, resulting in a final contract value of $10,001,725. LADOTD noted the lack of complaints about a potentially disruptive project and gave Barriere a bonus based on its delivery of a smooth final asphalt surface with no grinds – a testament to Barriere’s Effective communication, innovative resolutions, and quality construction solutions allowed Barriere to complete the project on-time, on-budget, and without a lost-time or recordable incident.


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if you decided that you want to install Dlink DI-1750 Router device for your network then you can read this complete article. In this blog, we will explain the steps for installing a new Dlink DI-1750 Router device for your home network. After the installations are done, you can access http:// dlinkap.local web address and change other settings when required.
How to Setup Dlink DI-1750 Router Device?
Place your dlink wifi router device to a table where you can get power supply for your device easily.
After that provide power supply to Dlink DI-1750 Router device. you will find the power connecting port at the back side of your device.
When you provide supply to your device, you can check the front power LED for your device and this LED will be solid green in color.
Using RJ45 connector you can connect your dlink wifi router login device and computer together. The RJ 45 connector you are using will have different wires for different functions.
Open web browser and access http:// dlinkap.local web address. When you access this web address, you will automatically get status page for your dlink device. from this status page, you can easily get the configurations for your devices.
Once the configurations are done, you can change the location for your device. There are some common troubleshooting that you can use for your device any time you get wifi related issues. From other articles of this website, you will get details for resolving the wifi issues for Dlink DI-1750 Router devices.
Having a wireless card becomes the necessity of everyone’s for enjoying the internet. So, in this blog you will get the complete details regarding the device D-Link DWP -157 21 wireless data card.
If you are a traveller or you are a homeowner if you want to have the smooth internet connection, then having this wireless card is the cheap and the best option for you.
This device is made with the USB port, which make this device an ease to connect with the computer or a laptop.
This device is having drivers pre-installed in them so, that there will not be any need to install the software like dlinkap local wizard.
If you are downloading something using this wireless data card, the internet speed that you will experience is of around 21.6 Mbps.
If you are uploading something using this wireless data card, the internet speed that you will experience is of around 5.76 Mbps.
This device is equipped with the in-built functionality of sending as well as receiving e-mails. While operating this device, you do not need to have the batteries.
If you are going to buy this device from the internet, then you will get the warranty of 3 years.
The expandable memory of this device is around 32 GB which is enough for everyone.
You can also avail the feature of voice call, through this D-Link DWP-157 21 wireless data card.
The most important thing to know about this device is that this can easily work with both 2G as well as 3G type of networks.
If you are going to buy this device from any online store, then the price at which you will get this device is of around rs1500 and the price vary from website to website.


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Get on with this Powerful Beet Root!
If it’s good enough for Elite athletes — don’t you deserve it too?
I treat myself to beet juice + other vegetables at least three times per week. It keeps me healthy, energized, and really makes a difference in my workouts. My endurance is noticeably improved and I’ve hit most of my personal records after downing a big cup of carrot/beet/ginger juice.
Let the information spread my friends!!!

industry_corpus2: Sports


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An exhibition of two halves; Best Art Vinyl Barnsley takes an in-depth look at 12 of its own vinyl record covers.
An exhibition of two halves; Best Art Vinyl Barnsley takes an in-depth look at 12 of its own vinyl record covers, including contributions from Saxon, Dave Burland, Rolo Tomassi and The Black Lamps, all displayed alongside the original artwork.
The other half of the exhibition will consist of a wall of records curated by the community, including personal favourites, alongside personal anecdotes and memories.


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ESC8000 G4 features a powerful GPU architecture that supports up to eight high-performance NVIDIA® Quadro® or Tesla® GPU cards in a 4U chassis. With so much graphics power, ESC8000 G4 lets you accomplish demanding computing tasks more quickly and with greater efficiency. An optimized internal layout enables ESC8000 G4 to fit a wide variety of graphics cards - including dual-slot GPUs - with active or passive thermal modules.
ESC8000 G4 provides flexible system topology configuration options, including the ability to choose a single or dual root complex, making it ideal for deep learning requirements. The patented Adaptive Topology design enables users to switch the system topology easily via the intuitive web-based GUI of the ASUS ASMB9-iKVM server management solution, without changing any hardware configurations or cable routing.
ESC8000 G4 is designed for easy scalability to fit growing businesses and workloads. With eight PCIe Gen3 x16 slots that fit full-height, full-length GPU cards, two PCIe Gen3 x16 slots for high-speed networking cards, and one internal PCIe Gen3 x8 slot for an HBA/RAID card, ESC8000 G4 is ready to deliver high-density, parallel computing power.
It also features multiple interface types for flexible storage configurations, including dual PCIe or SATA M.2, and port-to-port dual OCuLink with Intel VROC technology for two hot-swappable 2.5" NVMe SSDs. ESC8000 G4 also fits up to eight 2.5" SATA 6Gbp/s HDDs or eight 2.5" SAS 12Gbp/s HDDs with an optional HBA card.
ESC8000 G4 features an embedded ASMB9-iKVM module and is bundled with ASUS Control Center software to provide comprehensive in-band and out-of-band management. For more information, see the ASUS Control Center microsite.
Cooling an accelerator server handling extreme workloads at up to 3200 Watts of power consumption is a demanding task, so ESC8000 G4 is equipped with hot-swappable, redundant fans and dedicated air tunnels for the CPU, GPUs and DIMMs. Ten fans for the GPUs - five primary and five back-up fans - plus two coolers for the CPU ensure nonstop cooling performance for nonstop server operation.
ESC8000 G4 features ASUS-exclusive thermal radar technology with ambient sensors placed on the CPUs, GPUs and DIMMs. This design provides internal and external temperature monitoring and enables dynamic fan curve adjustment, lowering fan power consumption up to 20% and reducing TCO which is ideal for extreme workload data center.
With the ingenious placement design, IT staff can swap key components with ease.
ESC8000 G4 has three easy-access covers that can be opened without tools, enabling IT staff to perform maintenance on specific components without removing the server fully from the rack.
ESC8000 G4 has a visible Q-Code/port 80 LED display LED for simple monitoring of the entire boot process, from power on through loading of the operating system.
ESC8000 G4 provides instant system information during initialization as well as any unusual diagnostic results for more efficient IT operation and easy troubleshooting.


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I'm gonna describe here the root cause of JBVFS-38.
1) Open an existing zip file using JDK's ZipFile object, iterate over entries but don't close the ZipFile.
2) Then, overwrite this zip file with new content using _any_ method (i.e. JarOutputStream, or copy over an existing archive ...) , and properly close it.
3) Now, open a new ZipFile around this file and iterate over entries.
The key to the problem is step 2) - overwriting the _still open_ ZipFile with new content.
or going so far as to use Runtime.exec("sh -c 'cp file1 file2'") ... no matter what I do, it doesn't help.
If ZipFile is closed first, then overwritten, everything is fine.
If it's deleted and then recreated, everything is fine as well.
I added delete() method to VirtualFile. It delegates the delete all the way to ZipEntryHandler layer - which takes care of releasing locks if necessary - so we can now reliably delete a file, and then reconstruct it, in order to avoid writing over an open file.


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Rising power prices, the need to build more electricity generation and serious concerns for the environment are creating huge investment opportunities in the clean-energy market, according to a report from Sprott Securities Inc.
The situation has become so pressing that politicians in Canada and the U.S. are embracing the environment as a top campaign issue as both countries nudge closer to elections.
"I don't think we've ever seen these (market) drivers converge as we're seeing now," said MacMurray Whale, alternative energy analyst at Sprott and author of the report, Power, Politics and Technology.
"Energy security, high energy prices and issues of the environment – they're all being dealt with at the same time. Politicians are looking around and looking at the potential of technology. They're saying, `How can we fix this? I need a tool to fix this.' At the same time, you have the cost of these technologies coming down."
Whale said the problems aren't new, and neither are the technologies. What has changed is that the public – and investors – are becoming more aware of them in a way that is beginning to alter the psychology of the market.
This has also led to a significant shifting of the political climate. Whale's report points out that leading candidates for the 2008 U.S. election are expected to make the environment a key issue. In Canada, the Stephen Harper government is rebranding itself as an environmental custodian that embraces sustainable development.
For example, Environment Minister John Baird and Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn are expected to announce today new funding for clean-energy technologies. Other similarly themed announcements are expected over the next couple of weeks, sources say.
"We believe these themes will not just increase the deployment of wind turbines, run-of-river hydro, solar panels and biomass plants, but that investor interest will also increase," Whale wrote. "This should drive valuations higher, reflecting the growth prospects for both facility developers and technology suppliers."
Sprott highlights several companies that show the most promise, including power electronics maker Xantrex Technology Inc., solar LED innovator Carmanah Technologies Inc. and flow battery pioneer VRB Power Systems Inc. All are British Columbia-based companies.
On the power developer side, Boralex Inc. was singled out for its "very strong position" as Quebec proceeds with plans to develop 2,000 megawatts of wind power in the province.

industry_corpus2: Power & Energy


text: Sorry Casey...Jeremy's always on you tube and now we all know you are good! And we want to hear more. We love you and support you because no joke, you are very talented.


text: CloudMatrimony.com is the best matrimonial service portal for Tirupathur Matrimonial. We offer a one stop platform for online matchmaking that allows prospective Tirupathur brides and Tirupathur grooms to meet and communicate regarding matrimony. Our purpose is to provide a better Matrimonial service to Tirupathur Singles through our website. It was founded with a simple objective to help people find their life partner. Registration is free for our matrimonial service. Our easy to use interface and features allow good partner search. All profile mannually validated to ensure they meet the norms of our site. Create your profile & start searching for prospective Tirupathur brides and Tirupathur grooms today.


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Refugee Road is the first book in the Freedom Fighters series, set in an alternate history of a war torn United States. Lizzie lost everything in the war – her mother, sister and her best friend. Now she is a refugee, fighting along side a small band of freedom fighters, led by a man named Darren who is not only the leader, but a vengeful, dangerous man. Along the way, you meet Mal who is like a big brother to Lizzie and Alec, a man she met once before the war and who becomes Lizzie’s whole world. Alec is a member of the militia, the sworn enemy of the refugees.
What I love most about this book is how rich the characters are. Landis has created characters so believable that you cannot help but care about them, even her villains, Darren and Donnovan (who is only a villain for a short while). As much as you want to cheer for Lizzie, Alec and Mal, you also want to see them defeat Darren and Donnovan.
Landis has also done an excellent job with settings. Her descriptions put you right there in each scene, in the cold and dark, shivering in the mud, or warm and safe in a temporary shelter. There is one terrifying scene that she does exceptionally well – when Lizzie is beaten.
I will confess, I do not generally read romances. What set this one apart is the alternate history and dystopia nature of the story. The romantic scenes in the story are sweet in nature. A bit overly mushy, but told in a gentle manner. If you enjoy sweet romances, you will definitely enjoy this one.
My only criticism for this story is that while it began with a lot of action and suspense, it did slack off in the middle. This is probably just my own reaction since I do not read a lot of romances because all the romance happened in the middle. By then end of the book, the action did pick up again.
The last scene in the book is definitely a lead-in to the next book in the series titled Midnight Surrender, which I will now have to read to see how Lizzie gets out of that situation.
I am not going to rate this story negatively just because of the slow, romantic part in the middle. As I said, I don’t normally read romances, so for me, it was slow. For others though, it might actually be the best part of the story.
For all of you Romantics out there….
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Cold days seem to bring people closer.
I whispered your sweet name.
My sweet dreams bring your beautiful face to my memory.
I dreamed of our blissful nights.
Leading us to the paradise of the innocence.
Opening a passion that grows with each tender touch.
You came to me on a cold December day.
You brought me into a raging torrent my siren.
We tried to burn away the passion.
Desperate to satisfy the desire of the flesh.
My desire increased with each dance.
In the fire of emotion and sexual battle.
I hear a soft knock at my door.
My blue eye Angel with six wine coolers.
Wrapped her arms around me.

industry_corpus2: Literature & Emotions


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You know you are being sued when you receive two documents: a “Summons” and a “Complaint.” The summons informs you that you are being sued and lets you know how to respond, while the complaint provides the basis for which the plaintiff is suing.
The biggest mistake one can make after being served with papers is to ignore them, set them aside for later and fail to act quickly. At this point, the lawsuit is in your hands and your fate rests in the decisions that you make. How you choose to respond will lay the groundwork. We here at i-lawsuit have created a cohesive step-by-step manual that explains the proper steps that you should take after being served papers.
Most lawsuits require a response within 20 to 30 days, depending on the case and the jurisdiction. If you set your papers aside and fail to act within the deadline, the plaintiff may apply to the court for a default judgment. This means that if you do not respond within the required time frame, the plaintiff may be awarded everything they requested.
Compile a collection of any papers, correspondence, bills, photographs, receipts and contracts that may be relevant to your case. If you are unsure what is significant, your attorney can help you sort through the mess.
Hire an attorney straight away. One of the biggest mistakes that a person in this situation can make is to assume they do not need to hire a lawyer. While an experienced attorney may be expensive, that money spent will be pocket change in comparison to potential money lost in a judgment against you.
Consider a settlement and/or mediation: Through a formal mediation or an informal personal conversation, extending an olive branch may keep you out of court and allow you to settle your dispute on your own. Before doing so, speak with your attorney who may be able to advice you on a negotiation strategy.
File an answer: Filing an answer simply allows you the opportunity to respond to the claims listed in the complaint, and to compose affirmative defenses against those claims. This is the most common response because it offers a defendant the chance to buy time while preventing a default judgment.
File a motion to dismiss: You may file a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff has no legal right to bring about a lawsuit against you. Common reasons to file a motion to dismiss are that there is a lack of jurisdiction, insufficient service of process and failure to state a claim.
Sue the plaintiff: In certain circumstances you may have the opportunity to pursue a counterclaim against the plaintiff.
This is the part of the process where each party has gained information about each other’s case. Discovery is gained through interrogatories, document production or depositions. During this period either party may request any number of motions. When a motion is requested the court intervenes, therefore the more motions that come about, the more drawn out and entangled the process will become.
The great majority of lawsuits are settled before trial, so chances are you will never have to step foot in a courtroom. However, it can’t hurt to be prepared. Have your attorney walk you through the experience of a trial, and train you on appropriate attire and responses to questions you may be asked.
Depending on how adept your attorney is, how much documentation you have been able to provide and the components of your particular case, you may win or you may lose. Be prepared for either scenario.

industry_corpus2: Law & Justice